The Yemeni Dilemma

The rapidly collapsing state of Yemen is on the verge of becoming a serious rival to Pakistan's FATA as a secure base for groups advocating and practicing violent political Islam.  Foreign fighters displaced from Afghanistan and elsewhere by successful security operations are coming to Yemen as a sort of evil twin to the Haj.  Along with genuine foreigners are sizable numbers of denizens of the Arabian Peninsula returning to familiar deserts and barren mountains from their travel-broadens-the-mind sojourns in combat zones ranging from Iraq to Afghanistan and other, even more exotic, climes.

These early birds of passage will be followed by others as the operations in Afghanistan and from the sky over the FATA become ever more lethal and thus discouraging to the Mighty Warriors Of The One True Faith.  Yemen seems destined to become even more of a center of violent political Islam as more and more muscle is added by the returnees.

There is no doubt but Yemen and its Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) are the most attractive venue for those folk dedicated to the tenets of violent political Islam.  Yemen is an ungoverned and perhaps ungovernable place with a physical and human terrain seemingly ideal for the propagation and growth of AQAP.  The attractiveness of Yemen is in no way lessened by the talents of Anwar al-Awlaki as is hinted at by the flow of wannabe martyrdom seekers from Western Europe, the UK, and the US.  Thanks to the Internet, Yemen is only a click or two away from anywhere on Earth.

The Yemen dilemma is both real and pressing for American decision makers.  Individuals based in its so far very hospitable environment constitute a genuine threat to CONUS as events of the past year have brought home with appropriate drama.  At the same time the government of Yemen has demonstrated a pervasive lack of political will and competence in confronting the AQAP such as to make the government of Pakistan appear to be a frothing-to-fight bunch in comparison.

Yemen's internal problems ranging from exceptional poverty to the ongoing nature of two insurgencies to the ever increasing shortage of water to an unsupportable population growth assure the government lacks the resources and legitimacy necessary to take on AQAP even if it wanted to.  Further exacerbating the weakness, not to say impotence, of the government is the intensely tribal nature of Yemeni society and culture.  Of course, the government in no way helps its cause by exhibiting a level of corruption and nepotism which would make the old Dick Daley machine in Chicago drool with envy.

Since the Yemeni population is characterized by a degree of prickly nationalism which surpasses even that of the Mexicans, the capacity or the desirability of the US to enter the conflict directly is nil at best.  Realistically, any direct, evident American presence in Yemen would be counterproductive.  It is not, as Secretary of Defense Gates noted that the US does not "need" another war but rather that any attempt to wage war in Yemen would be to assure failure.

Even the relatively low footprint usage of Predators and other UAVs is not really safe.  Yemeni tribesmen are aware of the Predators overhead and resent their drone overhead even when no Hellfire missiles are forthcoming.  Perhaps the initial reaction to the arrival of the Predators would not have been so negative had the US not used Tomahawk cruise missiles in an ill-advised and failed attack to take out a high value personality about a year ago.  The attack may not have killed its intended victim but did manage to terminate with the utmost of prejudice a number of civilians including women and children and a well respected high ranking member of the local government.

About the only military activity the US can undertake without unacceptable risks of an unintended, counterproductive outcome is training selected Yemeni personnel and providing logistical, intelligence, and procurement support.  This level of assistance would be "safe" and might have some benefits for the local central government but will not defeat AQAP.  It will not abate nor measurably lessen the threat to the US resident in Yemen.

Even the capture or killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, desirable and emotionally satisfying as such might be, would not alter the state of play in Yemen in favor of the US.  Nor would a more robust Saudi presence in Yemen, even if the House of Sand could be persuaded that such might be in its interests.

The task of making the human terrain of Yemen unsuitable for the continued growth of violent political Islam is one of establishing effective governance in the place for the first time in modern history.  This in turn means assisting the government of Yemen in winning the crucial bones of perceived legitimacy.  Due to the tribal nature of Yemeni society and culture, the legitimacy must be functional as it can never be inherently existential, not until the primary loyalty of the individual Yemeni focuses on the state rather than the tribe.

The "soft" power instruments of the US are both available and appropriate for the task of enhancing the perceived functional legitimacy of the central government.  In considering this the Geek is reminded of the time in the early Seventies when he encountered Mideastern students, including those from Yemen (among whom was the father of Anwar al-Awlaki) who were attending New Mexico State University (NMSU.)  The majority of these men (and they were, unsurprisingly, all male) were taking courses in dry land agriculture, hydrology, and similar real world, severely practical matters.  All intended to go back home and apply the newly acquired knowledge and skills to the very real and pressing problems there.  Mr Awlaki senior was in no way different from the majority.

Forty years ago NMSU and other state schools had rather large programs supported by the State Department and USAID to find, recruit, and educate a new generation of technically competent leaders in most of the states of the Mideast and North Africa.  Schools such as NMSU had much experience in dealing with the sort of problems confronting countries with limited rainfall, extensive dry lands, periodic flooding, and the other disasters which limit agricultural development in places such as Yemen.

For various reasons including a desire by students to do work in areas ranging from political science to urban planning, the basic efforts pioneered with success in the Sixties and early Seventies fell increasingly by the wayside.  The situation in Yemen demands that the State Department, USAID, and relevant universities reinvigorate the old approach with haste.

Agricultural shortfalls coupled with water scarcity, population growth, and the economic displacement of current farmers represent a critical area in Yemen's present capacity for survival as well as its longer term prospects.  A crash program focusing on these considerations with an emphasis on eduction of locals would rebound to the credit of the US and the government of Yemen alike.  Insofar as the current deficiencies are addressed and future talent developed, the perceived functional legitimacy of the Yemeni government will be enhanced.  At the same time the demonization of the US would be lessened--perhaps even ended.

Beyond legitimacy enhancement and life improvement efforts, the US can assist the local government in properly exploiting the inherent provincialism and tribal loyalties of the several tribes against AQAP.  As the number of foreigners entering the tribal homelands increases, there will be more and more frictions with the locals.  Every time and ever place where foreign fighters have embedded themselves with local coreligionists, the consequent frictions have outweighed the ties of Islam.  To a Yemeni even a Saudi is an outsider, a person who may be entitled to hospitality and protection but also a person who can overstay his welcome or abrade the customs of hospitality by his arrogance or indifference.

An awareness of and exploitation of tribal sentiments, norms, and values can serve the coinciding interests of the US and the Yemeni central government.  The US has already shown its awareness of the intense xenophobia which characterizes many of the Yemeni tribals.  All that is needed now is an informed program conducted with and through the San'a regime to exploit these norms and values to the disadvantage of AQAP and even "homeboys" such as Anwar al-Awlaki.  (The least-worst solution to the problem of Anwar is for him to die at the hands of an insulted local tribesman.)

The really nifty thing about Yemen is that it provides an excellent venue to explore not only smaller footprint means of waging military counterinsurgency but ways of engaging soft power tools to promote the perceived legitimacy of the threatened host government.  To do this successfully all hands in Washington and San'a must understand that stability and peace alike rest on the twin pillars of properly employed coercion including lethal force and enhanced popular perceptions of governmental legitimacy.  The fact that Yemen is almost as bad off in the governance area as Somalia not only makes the challenge greater--it will make the success all the more compelling when (and if) it happens.