Belaboring The Obvious Or Passing The Buck?

Adm Micheal Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has delivered in an appropriately stentorian tone his appreciation of the self-evident: China has a, even the, main role to play in convincing the North Korean regime to refrain from lobbing artillery shells on Southern territory, troops, and civilians.  Admiral Mullen is stating a position which is not only appealing but represents the consensus of the Obama administration.

The presumed ability of China to influence the actions of the rulers of the Hermit Kingdom of the North seems so obvious that it might appear foolish not to pass the baton on North Korean affairs to the Trolls of Beijing.  Of course, the contention that China should do the heavy lifting depends upon affirmative answers to a few key questions.

Do the Trolls really have as much juice as so often affirmed?  Do they have the influence equivalent to the dependence upon China normally attributed to North Korea?

Even more important: Does Beijing have any real interest in modifying Pyongyang's behavior in the way desired by the US, South Korea, and Japan?  What, if any, interests held by the Trolls to be important would be facilitated or advanced by becoming the carrier of American water in the Korean Peninsula?  What costs would the Trolls impose on the US for agreeing to be the point man on American policy?

Given the North Korean defining philosophy of juche, meaning national self-reliance and an absolute avoidance of even the slightest appearance of foreign "domination" even by a close "friend" and ally such as China, what grounds exist to believe that Pyongyang would capitulate in any manner to Chinese pressure or blandishments?  Can the centrality of a unique definition of nationalism and national strength trump even the capacity of China for influence?

None of these questions are without answer, but, for most of them the answer would be unpleasant to the eyes and ears of President Obama and most of his foreign policy "team."  Even more disturbing, at least for those Americans who are not part of the presidential inner circle, would be the answer to another, more basic question.

This foundation question?  By seeking to put China in the driver's seat is the administration acknowledging that  the US no longer has the ability or will to take the lead in advancing and protecting the interests not only of itself but of close and strategically critical allies such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the other, smaller states of the Pacific littoral who increasingly have been looking to us as the barrier against China's more expansionist and aggressive policies?

The North Korean regime took advantage of the visit by a highly qualified American nuclear expert, Siegfried Hecker, to demonstrate just how effective their application of juche has been in the area of nuclear materials production. While the exhibit of their new centrifuge cascade as well as the construction of a new and much larger light water reactor near the site of the decommissioned one at Yongbyon can be interpreted as showing how important China has been in Pyongyang's evasion of the sanctions, it can also be seen as a tribute to juche.

The Hermit Kingdom of the North has been and remains willing to provide only one half the required daily calorie requirement to its citizens, telling them to scrounge for the rest.  In essence and in the internal messages given its population every day, the sacrifice is necessary in the name of juche, the need to maintain sufficient military strength to deter the main enemies and assure national independence.  The result is simple: Nobody is happy, but most all are willing to (literally) tighten their belts if doing such keeps the country sovereign.

To put it in a slightly different way, the linkage of sacrifice with the needs of juche and the constant threats presented by South Korea, the US, Japan, and others of the "imperialist camp," provides North Korea with a degree of monolithic political will virtually beyond the capacity of a Westerner to comprehend or even imagine.  Within the context of a multi-generational cult of personality which has engraved itself on the hearts and minds of nearly every North Korean, the sacrifice-equals-independence driven political will provides the Hermits Of Pyongyang with an instrument of remarkable durability.

The impending succession of Kim Jong-un has put stresses on the leadership mechanism as well as the ties that bind leadership to population.  Unlike the long preparatory period preceding the ascension of Kim Jong-il, the current transfer of both power and legitimacy to the number three son has been taking place at warp speed.  It has been and will continue to be critical for the smooth passing of the mantel of heaven from father to son for the son to win his bones with the very hardline bunch behind the throne.

This has meant that Kim Jong-un be perceived as a tough and shrewed man, a man capable of performing actions which would crush a lesser personality.  The sinking of the CheoAn as well as the artillery stonk on Yeonpyeong island are calculated provocations intended to demonstrate the new kid's capacity and willingness to take risks successfully.

Of course the risks were far more apparent than real.  Neither Pyongyang nor Seoul want to restart the Korean War.  Neither does China.  Nor the US.  All  hands agree that war is not a winner.

The Hermits of Pyongyang must have known quite well before the sinking of the CheoAn that there would be no real repercussions.  As had been demonstrated previously by the tepid responses to the nuclear weapons test and the partially successful test firing of a prototype ICBM, the talk might be tough and the UN sanctions apparently so as well, but where the rubber hits the road the consequences would be nonexistent.  The Hermits knew they could depend upon the Trolls to play the stall game effectively and, if necessary, either veto sanctions or conspire in their avoidance.

The Trolls and the Hermits alike had appreciated the American president as having a diplomatic backbone equivalent to that of President McKinley.  They also agreed in their view that the South Korean government and people were so enamored of peace and prosperity to respond with little beyond a few unpleasant words to the sinking of a warship and the killing of a few dozen sailors.

The artillery fire mission the other day was a small escalation of the CheoAn affair.  The difference resides in the presence of civilian bodies (two) among the dead.  That difference is not sufficient to ignite a war, and all concerned knew this before the first shot was fired.

Right now the primary interest of North Korea other than assuring the succession goes smoothly is the extortion of more food aid from the world generally and the West more particularly.  As an attention getting device the shelling has worked--quite well.  The probability the food will flow in greater quantity has been enhanced particularly as the need for food--even on the terms dictated by Pyongyang which contravene normal policy--has been embraced by one time South Korean foreign minister and now UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

Longer term the Hermits of Pyongyang want much more than food aid.  This is why the Hermits insist to every  (in Lenin's famed formulation) "useful fool" who happens by that everything is on the table including the nuclear program provided North Korea is treated with "respect."  What the Hermits leave out of the discussion is that the only goal worth sacrificing the nuclear and other weapons related programs is the reunification of the two Koreas under Northern domination.  The Hermits have been convinced for some years now that the best way to achieve that goal is by slowly and surely reducing the political will of South Korea and its primary supporters.  Combining provocations with stalls is a good tactic in achieving that goal.

China has no problem with the goal of the Hermits.  If anything a reunification on the terms and conditions dictated by Pyongyang would mesh with Chinese regional interests.

Reunification is a long way off at best.  Thus China has short term goals with respect to North Korea.  Most of all the Trolls want transition to go down slick and sure.  No bumps, no surprises, one Kim out and another, younger one in without missing a beat.

Beijing understands the need for Number Three Son to have the correct credentials in the estimate of the assorted powers behind the throne.  Thus they have no difficulties with provocations, even an escalating series of such.  The Trolls have full confidence in President Obama to do nothing beyond words, symbols such as joint naval exercises, and showing continued faith in the UN.  They are also sure the South Korean government is in no hurry to see Seoul as an "ocean of flame."

A companion goal for the Trolls is a burnishing of the perceptions of their power in the region.  By being seen as the key player in the Korean affair it is probable that they will be seen more generally as being what they wish to become--regional hegemon.

By passing the buck to Beijing the Obama administration has given assistance to the Trolls in their goal of enhanced diplomatic and political influence and status in the region.  And, given the contagion of perceptions common in the world, greater influence and status throughout the globe.

To answer the question which is the title of this post: The Obama administration has both underscored the apparent but not necessarily real influence of China on North Korea and passed the buck to Beijing.  By doing so the administration has simultaneously boosted the Trolls in their quest for more influence and surrendered another portion of American diplomatic strength.

Wow!  What a great way to pursue the national and strategic interests of the United States.