President Obama--or, to err on the side of accuracy--Secretary of Defense Robert Gates deserve a strong thumbs-up for two specific decisions on personnel. One is the move of Leon Panetta from CIA to SecDef. The other is tabbing Marine LtGen John Allen to take over the supreme command in Afghanistan.
Panetta, like Gates, has a long and distinguished record in Washington. More to the point, Panetta has spent the last two years immersed in the realities of the threats confronting the US now or in the near to mid-term. It is this latter consideration which makes Panetta the only real contender to follow Gates to the Pentagon. With his knowledge of the dark sides of the world, Panetta is best equipped to argue budget cuts which will leave the US in the best possible position to honor commitments and defend its national and strategic interests. Panetta is prepared in all essential respects to hold an open debate on American priorities and absolute requirements as the budgetary considerations demand a shrinkage of the Pentagon's budget by at least four hundred billion dollars over the next decade.
The great fear of Gates and all other reasonably knowledgeable observers has been an across the board cut which would result in all defense capacities being hollowed out equally. This would leave the US without sufficient capabilities in any area either to honor obligations to treaty partners or to deter and defeat threats to national interests. It would leave the US without the muscle necessary to support diplomacy in all its myriad forms.
Gates has been in favor of an open debate, a far reaching one by necessity over the stance of American military forces. Such a debate will be messy, unpleasant, ideological in all too many ways, and, unless undertaken with a leadership both well informed and willing to lead, inconclusive. Panetta should be able to perform the function of debate facilitator quite well. Given that he can combine the expertise of having run a large, complex, and sensitive agency with knowledge of the world and previous experience with both the Office of Management and Budget and the Appropriations Committee, it is hard to see any other person so well equipped to handle the delicate and highly important matter of guiding the Pentagon budget to a soft landing.
While unknown outside the Marine Corps and the small number of mavens of small wars, LtGen Allen is an excellent choice to run operations in Afghanistan during what will prove to be the make or break end stage of the war. When the Geek encountered Allen in the context of an advanced service school many years before the man got his first star let alone his third, the Geek was quite impressed by the officer's quick and probing mind. That the mind was far more than merely quick or probing was demonstrated by Allen's success in recruiting critical tribal leaders so as to shift Sunni tribes from leaning to the insurgents in Iraq to siding with the US. This act was central to the development of the Awakening Councils and the Sons of Iraq, both of which proved to be very important components of the victory over the various insurgent combines.
While the tribal politics of Afghanistan are not so regimented or predictable as was the case in Iraq, there is very good reason to believe that LtGen Allen's skills in this area will serve the cause of defeating the insurgents with high efficiency. It is also probable that General Allen will be able to establish a relationship with Hamid Karzai which more closely resembles that which existed between Stanley McChrystal than the current troubled one with David Petraeus.
It rather appears that LtGen Allen combines much of the warfighting nature of McChrystal with many of the political skills possessed by General Petraeus. This will do much to assure the US and its allies including Afghanistan are more rather than less likely to come out on top in the war. Potentiating this is the fact that the war in Afghanistan is now an all Marine operation at the highest levels with a Marine as CENTCOMCINC and another running the shop in Afghanistan. This will do much to smooth any of the frictions which normally exist between major commands and theater commands.
Robert Gates has performed many outstanding services to We the People over his long career. However, few equal let alone surpass this last day effort--choosing two perfect candidates for two very tough jobs. The outgoing Secretary of Defense deserves more than the usual gratitude for the care with which he has prepared for his leaving office with wars in progress and a budget which must be cut without damage to the core interests of the US.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Happy Talk--But, There Is Bad News Coming
The Pentagon spin machine has released its latest Congressionally required semi-annual appraisal of the state of play in Afghanistan. By and large it is 108 pages of happy talk, soothing mood music, a sort of happy-days-will-be-coming-soon-(maybe.) The same tone, very upbeat, but with a slight note of caution obtains in the news release issued as a cover letter on the report.
The report spends fifty-three pages in consideration of the security situation in-country. Much of the good news is contained in this section. It is clear that operations over the past several months have shifted the initiative to the the ISAF/US/ANF coalition. The insurgents despite their capacity to undertake high visibility attacks, plant IEDs, and generally give the appearance of still being in the fight have lost the initiative and seem to have lost some of their will to combat.
The Local Security Program which dates back to General McChrystal and is the descendant of the Vietnam War Combined Action Platoon Program as well as the much deprecated Regional Forces-Popular Forces ("Ruff-Puffs") has been developing with a fair degree of success even given the opposition of the Karzai government and the inherent corruption and inefficiency of the Afghan Interior Ministry. Should this trend continue over the next six months, it bodes well for long term stability as only a credible locally based force with primary loyalty to the area it is protecting can assure Taliban and the other insurgent groups cannot and will not return after the foreigners leave. It is clear that more external support for the development of the local forces is required. It is equally evident that more pressure must be placed on Kabul to allow the local forces to develop and deploy.
The same applies to the Afghan Local Police. This organization (to use the term generically and loosely only) is not only a necessary complement to the Local Security Program's Village Stability Operations, it provides the only governmental presence which is directly observable by and accountable to the local folks. Thus it is a critical instrument of government which, if operating correctly, will go toward countering the impression of the Afghan National Police and Army as corrupt, distant, and non-responsive. Again, Kabul has dragged its feet in allowing and encouraging the development of the Afghan Local Police due to its customary fear of losing control of the population--as if it actually ever had any such control.
The report way understates both the importance of these locally oriented efforts and the resistance to them which is presented by the central government. This is unfortunate and raises doubts about the future ability of the Pentagon (and considering the impending change of management) the Agency to evaluate progress or lack thereof in Afghanistan. The low balling of the local initiatives also erodes the ability of Congress to assure American dollars and manpower is put to the best possible use.
The thirty-five pages covering the development and deployment of the Afghan National Army and Police is optimistic but not overly so. The report does note the severe problem presented by the very, very low level of basic literacy among the recruits. It pays some attention to the chronic willingness of ANF&P personnel to desert, change sides, or "go rogue." Overall, the attrition affecting the ANF&P represents a major challenge in meeting the ambitious goals for force size. It may be necessary for Kabul to institute a draft of some sort which would open a very large can of very vicious political and tribal worms.
The subtext of the pages considering the procurement process for the ANF&P hints at but, unfortunately, does not state the difficulties presented by pervasive corruption. The problem is that the corrupt actions are not simply those of locals but involve representatives of foreign firms offering both equipment and materiel. It is easy to see the political/diplomatic considerations which demanded a heavy foot on the soft pedal. Even if justifiable, this absence of accuracy misleads the reader, congressional, media, or private citizen.
Because of the mis-definition of the mission in Afghanistan as one of "nation-building" rather than one of punishment and deterrence, the report wanders at some length into the areas of governance and "reconstruction and development" as well as counternarcotics. All of these areas may be of very real relevance to the Afghan population, but they are tangential at best to the US and its foreign allies. The goal of assuring that Afghanistan does not and will never again provide a safe haven to groups practicing violent political Islam does not require the construction of a faux Western nation-state from the tribal warp and woof of the local population.
Unfortunately, the military does not question the importance of these civilian goals any more in this report than it has in previous efforts or in the decision making process regarding the nature and character of the military efforts in-country. The underlying assumption that nation-building is central to effective counterinsurgency rides along in splendor, unquestioned, undoubted in this report. A close reading of the sections regarding nation-building shows a surplus of fine sounding mood music, lofty words, and even loftier ambitions coupled with barely whispered lyrics concerning the sorry record of nearly unmitigated failure in all areas.
One lack is noteworthy due to its sheer obviousness. There is not a word about religion or the role of religion in facilitating instability within the country. Nor is there any consideration of the centrality of tribal affiliation and loyalties to the challenges of facilitating the construction of a unitary national identity and state in Afghanistan. The leaving aside of the two most important features of individual and group self-identification so as to not consider their impact on the goals of nation-building is an inexcusable flaw in the report as it was in predecessors. The complete absence of such key features skews the ability of any reader to accurately appreciate what can and cannot be done in-country along with what has and has not been accomplished.
A total of three, that's right, three pages was spent considering Afghanistan in its regional engagement context. Considering that the Taliban and Haqqani network as well as the survivors of al-Qaeda would have been sent to Paradise years ago had Pakistan not been such a close and inviting ally, the failure to accurately and comprehensively consider the regional engagement aspect of the conflict is a fine example of moral and intellectual bankruptcy.
All and all this semi-annual exercise in shading reality resembles the everything-is-perfect-and-getting-better approach of the Pentagon during the Vietnam War. One can only wonder if the denizens both in the Five Sided Wigwam and Afghanistan are deluding themselves or simply hoping to delude the rest of us--particularly the money givers on the Hill.
As if to prove the cautionary notes of impending problems and setbacks contained in the report are not only accurate but in their accuracy buttress the marginal credibility of the entire exercise, there are now two shop mutterings of Taliban major attacks coming in the next few days. No details of course, just the vague words about casualties and ultimate Taliban failure. It is a fine example of salvation through good timing or, to use the invisible motto over the entrance at Langley, "Thank God for coincidence."
The report spends fifty-three pages in consideration of the security situation in-country. Much of the good news is contained in this section. It is clear that operations over the past several months have shifted the initiative to the the ISAF/US/ANF coalition. The insurgents despite their capacity to undertake high visibility attacks, plant IEDs, and generally give the appearance of still being in the fight have lost the initiative and seem to have lost some of their will to combat.
The Local Security Program which dates back to General McChrystal and is the descendant of the Vietnam War Combined Action Platoon Program as well as the much deprecated Regional Forces-Popular Forces ("Ruff-Puffs") has been developing with a fair degree of success even given the opposition of the Karzai government and the inherent corruption and inefficiency of the Afghan Interior Ministry. Should this trend continue over the next six months, it bodes well for long term stability as only a credible locally based force with primary loyalty to the area it is protecting can assure Taliban and the other insurgent groups cannot and will not return after the foreigners leave. It is clear that more external support for the development of the local forces is required. It is equally evident that more pressure must be placed on Kabul to allow the local forces to develop and deploy.
The same applies to the Afghan Local Police. This organization (to use the term generically and loosely only) is not only a necessary complement to the Local Security Program's Village Stability Operations, it provides the only governmental presence which is directly observable by and accountable to the local folks. Thus it is a critical instrument of government which, if operating correctly, will go toward countering the impression of the Afghan National Police and Army as corrupt, distant, and non-responsive. Again, Kabul has dragged its feet in allowing and encouraging the development of the Afghan Local Police due to its customary fear of losing control of the population--as if it actually ever had any such control.
The report way understates both the importance of these locally oriented efforts and the resistance to them which is presented by the central government. This is unfortunate and raises doubts about the future ability of the Pentagon (and considering the impending change of management) the Agency to evaluate progress or lack thereof in Afghanistan. The low balling of the local initiatives also erodes the ability of Congress to assure American dollars and manpower is put to the best possible use.
The thirty-five pages covering the development and deployment of the Afghan National Army and Police is optimistic but not overly so. The report does note the severe problem presented by the very, very low level of basic literacy among the recruits. It pays some attention to the chronic willingness of ANF&P personnel to desert, change sides, or "go rogue." Overall, the attrition affecting the ANF&P represents a major challenge in meeting the ambitious goals for force size. It may be necessary for Kabul to institute a draft of some sort which would open a very large can of very vicious political and tribal worms.
The subtext of the pages considering the procurement process for the ANF&P hints at but, unfortunately, does not state the difficulties presented by pervasive corruption. The problem is that the corrupt actions are not simply those of locals but involve representatives of foreign firms offering both equipment and materiel. It is easy to see the political/diplomatic considerations which demanded a heavy foot on the soft pedal. Even if justifiable, this absence of accuracy misleads the reader, congressional, media, or private citizen.
Because of the mis-definition of the mission in Afghanistan as one of "nation-building" rather than one of punishment and deterrence, the report wanders at some length into the areas of governance and "reconstruction and development" as well as counternarcotics. All of these areas may be of very real relevance to the Afghan population, but they are tangential at best to the US and its foreign allies. The goal of assuring that Afghanistan does not and will never again provide a safe haven to groups practicing violent political Islam does not require the construction of a faux Western nation-state from the tribal warp and woof of the local population.
Unfortunately, the military does not question the importance of these civilian goals any more in this report than it has in previous efforts or in the decision making process regarding the nature and character of the military efforts in-country. The underlying assumption that nation-building is central to effective counterinsurgency rides along in splendor, unquestioned, undoubted in this report. A close reading of the sections regarding nation-building shows a surplus of fine sounding mood music, lofty words, and even loftier ambitions coupled with barely whispered lyrics concerning the sorry record of nearly unmitigated failure in all areas.
One lack is noteworthy due to its sheer obviousness. There is not a word about religion or the role of religion in facilitating instability within the country. Nor is there any consideration of the centrality of tribal affiliation and loyalties to the challenges of facilitating the construction of a unitary national identity and state in Afghanistan. The leaving aside of the two most important features of individual and group self-identification so as to not consider their impact on the goals of nation-building is an inexcusable flaw in the report as it was in predecessors. The complete absence of such key features skews the ability of any reader to accurately appreciate what can and cannot be done in-country along with what has and has not been accomplished.
A total of three, that's right, three pages was spent considering Afghanistan in its regional engagement context. Considering that the Taliban and Haqqani network as well as the survivors of al-Qaeda would have been sent to Paradise years ago had Pakistan not been such a close and inviting ally, the failure to accurately and comprehensively consider the regional engagement aspect of the conflict is a fine example of moral and intellectual bankruptcy.
All and all this semi-annual exercise in shading reality resembles the everything-is-perfect-and-getting-better approach of the Pentagon during the Vietnam War. One can only wonder if the denizens both in the Five Sided Wigwam and Afghanistan are deluding themselves or simply hoping to delude the rest of us--particularly the money givers on the Hill.
As if to prove the cautionary notes of impending problems and setbacks contained in the report are not only accurate but in their accuracy buttress the marginal credibility of the entire exercise, there are now two shop mutterings of Taliban major attacks coming in the next few days. No details of course, just the vague words about casualties and ultimate Taliban failure. It is a fine example of salvation through good timing or, to use the invisible motto over the entrance at Langley, "Thank God for coincidence."
Wednesday, April 27, 2011
The Consequences Of "Leading From Behind."
Michael Oren is a historian whose works by and large have met with the Geek's unqualified approbation. He is also the current Israeli ambassador in Washington. Presumably he is good at this job. One strong indication of his quality of work as well as the sorry state of present day relations between the government of Israel and the Obama administration is an excellent article in Foreign Policy.
The article is a very fine short compass rendition of the American relation with Israel as well as the firm foundations for that relation. It is nothing less than tragic that the ambassador believed himself compelled to have to write it. Before the Obama administration there would have been no call for so doing.
The unfortunate reality is that the emerging Obama quasi-doctrine for foreign policy--at least as such obtains in the Mideast, a doctrine labeled "leading from behind" has brought about the necessity of Ambassador Oren's argument. The same Obama doctrine has resulted in the totality of the mess which constitutes current US policy for the region. More than that, it has alienated other key allies such as France and the UK as well as perhaps obliging one or both of these countries to deploy ground forces in Libya.
As has been noted many times in this blog, Mr Obama is apparently determined to test whether or not a Great Power can voluntarily resign its status. Doing so is without historical precedent. Throughout the sweep of human events, many Great Powers have lost their status through the efforts of other emerging powers or have been dethroned as a consequence of internal collapse, but none have ever simply walked away from it as a voluntary choice.
The approach to the politics of the globe favored by the Nice Young Man From Chicago is one which combines "humility" with a predilection for hectoring of a sermonizing sort. The "humility" expresses itself in the placing of responsibility for decision making upon international organizations both regional and global. It is as if the US constantly said to the world, "Well, if you all really, really want us to do something, well, then, we guess, we can go along with it--as long as we are not alone in the job."
What an image! The US as the most humble and obedient servant of the political will of others, of others in regional or global congress assembled. Not for us will be the reactionary notion of defining and achieving our national and strategic interests. No sir, we will meekly seek to submit to the stated will expressed by the consensus or votes of transnational assemblies--that is provided the will is predicated upon ideals we find laudable.
The insect in the Jello of the Obama approach is found in ideals. The US has ideals, the Obama administration has insisted repeatedly. To pursue these the US will stand in the background, suitably humble, pressing meekly for decisions on the part of regional and global organs which express our ideals with good effect. The real key to the notion of "leading from behind" is found in this dynamic--appearing to bow to international will while setting the climate of ideals to which we will bow.
While seeking the shadows in order to be the "hindmost" in international decision making, the administration generally and the president in particular prefers the spotlight. Standing under the klieg lights, Mr Obama is right at home with his unique brand of hectoring sermon--demands that this leader or that depart the scene without delay, declaring that this or that government's actions are "unacceptable," the general announcement of broad goals with Olympian force. All of these have been notable during the long days of tumult in the Mideast.
The combination--or more properly, the tension--of ideals based international decision making and absolutist rhetoric have brought about the current strategic and operational dilemma in Libya. The same duo have resulted in the disconnects between US actions in Libya, and those not taken in Yemen, Syria, or Bahrain which have resulted in accusations of American hypocrisy.
The fecklessness of NATO in Libya has degraded the credibility of that organization. At the same time it has added force to the repeated denunciations of the US and NATO being peddled by Vladimir Putin. It is scarcely necessary to point out that both would have been obviated by the US having acted like the Great Power, taking one or the other of the two top options: stay out or go all the way in.
Had the US done the second--gone all the way in with both air and ground forces in a short duration mission of regime removal only--it could be argued that Syria would have been far more circumspect in its dealing with demonstrators and far more open to the bribe and reform concept favored by the Saudis. Had the US taken the first of the two options--the stay out option using as its reason the absence of any compelling national or strategic interest, the revolt would have been crushed long ago, probably at a lower overall body count than will prove to be the case when the current fracas is completed.
Either option would have been suitable for the US as a Great Power. Even the use of a Security Council resolution is completely in keeping with past American Great Power behavior. However, the present bastard child of "leading from behind" is not befitting of a Great Power. It is in keeping with the Obama record of refusing to take a public lead, which is consistent over time. It is keeping with the variable stances taken by Mr Obama in Egypt and Tunisia. It is in keeping with his long standing practice of trivializing allies while ineffectually genuflecting to assorted adversaries, particularly those of a Muslim majority nature.
Of all the people on the planet least likely to be impressed by a posture of humility and mildness none excel Muslims, particularly Arab Muslims. Strength acts like strength. The strong decide--and act on the decision rapidly and without either second thoughts or regrets. Only weakness is humble. Only weakness is indecisive. Only weakness talks tough but fails to lead from the front.
The one time anti-Vietnam War protester and now Secretary of State may sincerely believe that the US should be a less-than-great power. In this she may be joined by the president who, after all, was nurtured by a mother who was an early member of the blame-America-First school of thought and educated in academic environments almost totally populated by members of the same school. Both Mr Obama and Ms Clinton may really, really believe that the day of the nation-state is over and the globalist world is upon us. Both may rue any American exceptionalism or any American will and ability to act decisively. But, their view is not one shared by the majority of people--or governments--in the world today.
It is this disconnect between members of the American elite such as Mr Obama and Ms Clinton on the one hand and the majority of folk on the other which make it impossible for the US to resign its Great Power status. To put it bluntly, governments and people alike expect the US to lead--from the front--to lead as a Great Power. We and our government are expected to take a clear stand and stick to it. Then there is a fixed point in favor or opposition of which other states can react.
While the US cannot do everything--even though quite a few people around the world think that we can--it is imperative for the stability and well being of the world that we do some things, things which are in our clear and demonstrable national interest. We are expected to make decisions and abide by them for more than a single news cycle. We are expected to be and act like a Great Power and not even the most well meaning of the Lofty Thinking people behind "lead from behind" can change that.
The article is a very fine short compass rendition of the American relation with Israel as well as the firm foundations for that relation. It is nothing less than tragic that the ambassador believed himself compelled to have to write it. Before the Obama administration there would have been no call for so doing.
The unfortunate reality is that the emerging Obama quasi-doctrine for foreign policy--at least as such obtains in the Mideast, a doctrine labeled "leading from behind" has brought about the necessity of Ambassador Oren's argument. The same Obama doctrine has resulted in the totality of the mess which constitutes current US policy for the region. More than that, it has alienated other key allies such as France and the UK as well as perhaps obliging one or both of these countries to deploy ground forces in Libya.
As has been noted many times in this blog, Mr Obama is apparently determined to test whether or not a Great Power can voluntarily resign its status. Doing so is without historical precedent. Throughout the sweep of human events, many Great Powers have lost their status through the efforts of other emerging powers or have been dethroned as a consequence of internal collapse, but none have ever simply walked away from it as a voluntary choice.
The approach to the politics of the globe favored by the Nice Young Man From Chicago is one which combines "humility" with a predilection for hectoring of a sermonizing sort. The "humility" expresses itself in the placing of responsibility for decision making upon international organizations both regional and global. It is as if the US constantly said to the world, "Well, if you all really, really want us to do something, well, then, we guess, we can go along with it--as long as we are not alone in the job."
What an image! The US as the most humble and obedient servant of the political will of others, of others in regional or global congress assembled. Not for us will be the reactionary notion of defining and achieving our national and strategic interests. No sir, we will meekly seek to submit to the stated will expressed by the consensus or votes of transnational assemblies--that is provided the will is predicated upon ideals we find laudable.
The insect in the Jello of the Obama approach is found in ideals. The US has ideals, the Obama administration has insisted repeatedly. To pursue these the US will stand in the background, suitably humble, pressing meekly for decisions on the part of regional and global organs which express our ideals with good effect. The real key to the notion of "leading from behind" is found in this dynamic--appearing to bow to international will while setting the climate of ideals to which we will bow.
While seeking the shadows in order to be the "hindmost" in international decision making, the administration generally and the president in particular prefers the spotlight. Standing under the klieg lights, Mr Obama is right at home with his unique brand of hectoring sermon--demands that this leader or that depart the scene without delay, declaring that this or that government's actions are "unacceptable," the general announcement of broad goals with Olympian force. All of these have been notable during the long days of tumult in the Mideast.
The combination--or more properly, the tension--of ideals based international decision making and absolutist rhetoric have brought about the current strategic and operational dilemma in Libya. The same duo have resulted in the disconnects between US actions in Libya, and those not taken in Yemen, Syria, or Bahrain which have resulted in accusations of American hypocrisy.
The fecklessness of NATO in Libya has degraded the credibility of that organization. At the same time it has added force to the repeated denunciations of the US and NATO being peddled by Vladimir Putin. It is scarcely necessary to point out that both would have been obviated by the US having acted like the Great Power, taking one or the other of the two top options: stay out or go all the way in.
Had the US done the second--gone all the way in with both air and ground forces in a short duration mission of regime removal only--it could be argued that Syria would have been far more circumspect in its dealing with demonstrators and far more open to the bribe and reform concept favored by the Saudis. Had the US taken the first of the two options--the stay out option using as its reason the absence of any compelling national or strategic interest, the revolt would have been crushed long ago, probably at a lower overall body count than will prove to be the case when the current fracas is completed.
Either option would have been suitable for the US as a Great Power. Even the use of a Security Council resolution is completely in keeping with past American Great Power behavior. However, the present bastard child of "leading from behind" is not befitting of a Great Power. It is in keeping with the Obama record of refusing to take a public lead, which is consistent over time. It is keeping with the variable stances taken by Mr Obama in Egypt and Tunisia. It is in keeping with his long standing practice of trivializing allies while ineffectually genuflecting to assorted adversaries, particularly those of a Muslim majority nature.
Of all the people on the planet least likely to be impressed by a posture of humility and mildness none excel Muslims, particularly Arab Muslims. Strength acts like strength. The strong decide--and act on the decision rapidly and without either second thoughts or regrets. Only weakness is humble. Only weakness is indecisive. Only weakness talks tough but fails to lead from the front.
The one time anti-Vietnam War protester and now Secretary of State may sincerely believe that the US should be a less-than-great power. In this she may be joined by the president who, after all, was nurtured by a mother who was an early member of the blame-America-First school of thought and educated in academic environments almost totally populated by members of the same school. Both Mr Obama and Ms Clinton may really, really believe that the day of the nation-state is over and the globalist world is upon us. Both may rue any American exceptionalism or any American will and ability to act decisively. But, their view is not one shared by the majority of people--or governments--in the world today.
It is this disconnect between members of the American elite such as Mr Obama and Ms Clinton on the one hand and the majority of folk on the other which make it impossible for the US to resign its Great Power status. To put it bluntly, governments and people alike expect the US to lead--from the front--to lead as a Great Power. We and our government are expected to take a clear stand and stick to it. Then there is a fixed point in favor or opposition of which other states can react.
While the US cannot do everything--even though quite a few people around the world think that we can--it is imperative for the stability and well being of the world that we do some things, things which are in our clear and demonstrable national interest. We are expected to make decisions and abide by them for more than a single news cycle. We are expected to be and act like a Great Power and not even the most well meaning of the Lofty Thinking people behind "lead from behind" can change that.
Monday, April 25, 2011
It Looks As If Assad Has Made A Decision
The Baathist regime has sent the tanks to Daraa, the place where it all started. It would appear that Assad and company have decided to end the protests where they began a few short and bloody weeks ago. A cell phone image of the hulking mass of a top of the line Soviet era MBT lurking in a city street gives a particular air of menace--a air which is undoubtedly true.
One is tempted to compare the Syrian government's response to the anti-regime movement with that of the Trolls of Beijing regarding the pro-democracy demonstrators twenty two years ago. Assad's regime, like the Masters of the Forbidden City, gave warnings, blunt and unmistakable warnings, offered (carefully limited) reforms, and, finally, cracked down with sledgehammer violence. The protesters have been given ample time--and inducements--to back down. If nothing else, they had the memory of what Assad the Father did to the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Homa thirty years ago.
Arguably, the single greatest mistake made by Assad the Son was not stomping the initial demonstrators in Daraa harder and faster than was the case. The first response was just brutal enough to outrage, but not brutal enough to intimidate. The same can be said of the later responses to demonstrations. The less than truly scarifying moves by the security forces coupled with the offers of reform sent mixed messages to the large body of inchoate anti-regime opinion festering throughout the Syrian population.
It is easy to see how the anti-government figures--particularly the large, influential expat community who possessed the bravery of being out of range--interpreted the mixed messages to mean the regime lacked the political will to suppress the forces of change. While easy to understand the process of misinterpretation, it must be pointed out that those who did the misinterpretation were overlooking the most important part of the regime's motivations--physical survival. The vast majority of the power elite from Assad down to the mid and lower ranks of the military officer corps, the civil service, and, most importantly, the security forces is comprised of religious minorities. Alawites, Christians, Druze, and others of minority persuasions would be at a very real risk of being killed should religiously enthusiastic Sunni take over.
This is not to say there is any real danger of the Muslim Brotherhood or akin groups rising to the top in Syria even if the protesters are successful in ousting the Baathists. The decades of very effective repression directed against the Brotherhood ever since the abortive uprising assure the organization is weak, divided, few in members, and lacking broad support. However, religious enthusiasm is percolating through the anti-regime ranks with sufficient vigor to make credible the fears resident throughout the elite regarding what would happen to them should the status quo end.
With motivation of such a fundamental nature in play, it is not shocking that the regime has struck back. And, struck back with a ferocity which is not likely to lessen in future days and weeks. If anything, threats such as that levied over the weekend of prosecution by the International Criminal Court will amp up the brutality and lethality of the repression. The necessary inference to be drawn from the ICC gambit is simply that the Assad family and the Baathist regime generally will have no place to run, nowhere to hide if and when the mobs break down the palace gates.
Quite literally the Baathists are fighting for their lives. More even than Gaddafi, Bashir al-Assad, his fellows, and underlings have nothing to lose by fighting as fiercely as they can regardless of casualties to civilians, heedless of international condemnation, indifferent to expressions of disapprobation such as sanctions, travel bans, or UN resolutions. And, they have nothing to gain by giving in to the demands of the anti-regime movement and its foreign supporters.
Indeed, the more foreign governments offer indirect support to the anti-regime movement, the more the body count will grow. The chimera of foreign support has the effect of enhancing the political will of the anti-regime forces. The size, sophistication, and orientation of the Syrian expat communities in Western Europe and the US will magnify both the reality and the appearance of Western sympathy to and support of the Oust Bashir movement. This will lengthen the fighting. Lengthening means more killing. More killing means the political will of both sides is strengthened as increasingly the dead dictate policy.
Another factor that needs consideration is the relation between a more robust response by the regime and Iranian government policy. Tehran will be pleased to see the Syrians finally following the Iranian model of regime maintenance by harsh repression. This course of action has undoubtedly been the major message from the mullahs to the Baathists. By letting the tanks roll in Deraa and authorizing more snipers to pull more triggers, Assad has tied his regime closer to Tehran which means Tehran will invest more in enhancing the security of Assad's government.
The losers in the new escalation of violence are Saudi Arabia and Israel. The House of Saud certainly has been in a clandestine conflict for influence in Damascus with the mullahs.
Regardless of King Abdullah's intense distaste for Assad and his view that the ophthalmologist turned dictator is a viper in the Arab tent, the goal of prying Syria loose from Iran is high on the Kingdom's to-do list. However, not even the redoubtable Prince Bandar has been able to do the job. If that had been the case, it is far more likely that Assad would have restrained the snipers and left the tanks in the garage, preferring instead to use bribery and more promises of more reforms to undercut the appeal of the anti-regime agenda.
Israel loses as well. The spreading unrest in Syria may result in undesired spill overs including a ratcheting up of the Hezbollah threat. Certainly, there is no reason to believe that any successor regime to that of the Baathists will be any more kindly disposed to the Jewish state and many reasons to conclude the hypothetical successor will not be able to assure the peace is kept regardless of such events as the 2006 Lebanon war. If a successor comes to power over the corpses of Assad and company with the assistance of Iran (not an impossibility should the mullahs conclude Assad is losing anyway), the successor will be far less amenable to any sort of comprehensive peace settlement.
Henry Kissinger once famously quipped that the Arabs can't make war without Egypt--and can't make peace without Syria. He was right. Thirty and more years later his observation is still bang on. Syria--not Egypt, not the Palestinians, not the Saudis, not the Iranians--is the major player in bringing about a genuine and comprehensive Mideast peace. The anti-regime movement and, even more, the regime's increasingly blunt and bloody response puts severe constraints on both the will and ability of Syria to play its linchpin roll in securing a lasting regional peace.
The endless intransigence of the Israeli government on the Golan Heights Question boggles the mind of an objective observer. Even more logic defying is the American position in the matter. One American administration after another has kept a myopic focus on the Palestinian Question and the Two State Solution to that question as if this was the only or best way to achieve a comprehensive peace. The reality--a reality so simple that even a Deep Thinker inside the Beltway should be able to get a grip on it--is simple. No matter what the Palestinians do, no matter if there is a Two State or a Three State Solution, unless Syria signs off on the deal, there is no comprehensive regional peace.
If and when Syria signs a deal, there will be a genuine comprehensive peace in the region. For Syria to do this, there is but one requirement. Syria gets the Golan Heights back. That's it, folks, Golan or no peace.
This ground truth argues powerfully for one approach to Syria. It is a time sensitive matter. If the US, if the EU, if the UN actually care about the body count in Syria, there must be a tough single minded effort to convince Israel that the time is now for returning the Golan Heights to Syria.
Word of the return of the "lost provinces" (to use a phrase redolent of meaning for the French) would have immediate and very positive effects on the current situation in Syria. Assured of the speedy return of the Golan Heights, Assad would order the tanks back to the garage, the snipers to stand down. The anti-regime protests would fade away faster than a rain shower in the desert. Assad would be the hero of the Syrian people. Additionally, Damascus would dump its "eternal" and "strategic" alliance with Iran with a haste worthy of the phrase, "a New York second."
And, to the benefit of all--Israel, the new regime in Egypt, the embattled Saudis, everyone except Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and a few other malcontents--peace would be a reality in the region. With Syria on board, it would be possible to bring the Palestinian Authority to the table with a realistic attitude regarding the "settlements," Jerusalem, and the Jordan Valley security belt. The Palestinians would not be in a position to resist the pressures and inducements which could and would be brought by a united Arab front now including Syria as well as Saudi Arabia.
There is the near-term alternative to what otherwise must be a welter of blood as the Baathists wage an existential battle against the anti-regime movement. Sanctions will not deter Assad. Not even if the EU joins with the US in a campaign of economic punishment will the pain outweigh the perils of losing in an existential contest. The way to peace in Syria is identical with the way to peace in the Mideast: Give the Golan Heights back to its rightful sovereign.
It must be so simple as to fly below the elevated thoughts of the Deep Thinkers of the administration. But, at least they can go home at night without dodging snipers' bullets or fearing the tanks' treads.
One is tempted to compare the Syrian government's response to the anti-regime movement with that of the Trolls of Beijing regarding the pro-democracy demonstrators twenty two years ago. Assad's regime, like the Masters of the Forbidden City, gave warnings, blunt and unmistakable warnings, offered (carefully limited) reforms, and, finally, cracked down with sledgehammer violence. The protesters have been given ample time--and inducements--to back down. If nothing else, they had the memory of what Assad the Father did to the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Homa thirty years ago.
Arguably, the single greatest mistake made by Assad the Son was not stomping the initial demonstrators in Daraa harder and faster than was the case. The first response was just brutal enough to outrage, but not brutal enough to intimidate. The same can be said of the later responses to demonstrations. The less than truly scarifying moves by the security forces coupled with the offers of reform sent mixed messages to the large body of inchoate anti-regime opinion festering throughout the Syrian population.
It is easy to see how the anti-government figures--particularly the large, influential expat community who possessed the bravery of being out of range--interpreted the mixed messages to mean the regime lacked the political will to suppress the forces of change. While easy to understand the process of misinterpretation, it must be pointed out that those who did the misinterpretation were overlooking the most important part of the regime's motivations--physical survival. The vast majority of the power elite from Assad down to the mid and lower ranks of the military officer corps, the civil service, and, most importantly, the security forces is comprised of religious minorities. Alawites, Christians, Druze, and others of minority persuasions would be at a very real risk of being killed should religiously enthusiastic Sunni take over.
This is not to say there is any real danger of the Muslim Brotherhood or akin groups rising to the top in Syria even if the protesters are successful in ousting the Baathists. The decades of very effective repression directed against the Brotherhood ever since the abortive uprising assure the organization is weak, divided, few in members, and lacking broad support. However, religious enthusiasm is percolating through the anti-regime ranks with sufficient vigor to make credible the fears resident throughout the elite regarding what would happen to them should the status quo end.
With motivation of such a fundamental nature in play, it is not shocking that the regime has struck back. And, struck back with a ferocity which is not likely to lessen in future days and weeks. If anything, threats such as that levied over the weekend of prosecution by the International Criminal Court will amp up the brutality and lethality of the repression. The necessary inference to be drawn from the ICC gambit is simply that the Assad family and the Baathist regime generally will have no place to run, nowhere to hide if and when the mobs break down the palace gates.
Quite literally the Baathists are fighting for their lives. More even than Gaddafi, Bashir al-Assad, his fellows, and underlings have nothing to lose by fighting as fiercely as they can regardless of casualties to civilians, heedless of international condemnation, indifferent to expressions of disapprobation such as sanctions, travel bans, or UN resolutions. And, they have nothing to gain by giving in to the demands of the anti-regime movement and its foreign supporters.
Indeed, the more foreign governments offer indirect support to the anti-regime movement, the more the body count will grow. The chimera of foreign support has the effect of enhancing the political will of the anti-regime forces. The size, sophistication, and orientation of the Syrian expat communities in Western Europe and the US will magnify both the reality and the appearance of Western sympathy to and support of the Oust Bashir movement. This will lengthen the fighting. Lengthening means more killing. More killing means the political will of both sides is strengthened as increasingly the dead dictate policy.
Another factor that needs consideration is the relation between a more robust response by the regime and Iranian government policy. Tehran will be pleased to see the Syrians finally following the Iranian model of regime maintenance by harsh repression. This course of action has undoubtedly been the major message from the mullahs to the Baathists. By letting the tanks roll in Deraa and authorizing more snipers to pull more triggers, Assad has tied his regime closer to Tehran which means Tehran will invest more in enhancing the security of Assad's government.
The losers in the new escalation of violence are Saudi Arabia and Israel. The House of Saud certainly has been in a clandestine conflict for influence in Damascus with the mullahs.
Regardless of King Abdullah's intense distaste for Assad and his view that the ophthalmologist turned dictator is a viper in the Arab tent, the goal of prying Syria loose from Iran is high on the Kingdom's to-do list. However, not even the redoubtable Prince Bandar has been able to do the job. If that had been the case, it is far more likely that Assad would have restrained the snipers and left the tanks in the garage, preferring instead to use bribery and more promises of more reforms to undercut the appeal of the anti-regime agenda.
Israel loses as well. The spreading unrest in Syria may result in undesired spill overs including a ratcheting up of the Hezbollah threat. Certainly, there is no reason to believe that any successor regime to that of the Baathists will be any more kindly disposed to the Jewish state and many reasons to conclude the hypothetical successor will not be able to assure the peace is kept regardless of such events as the 2006 Lebanon war. If a successor comes to power over the corpses of Assad and company with the assistance of Iran (not an impossibility should the mullahs conclude Assad is losing anyway), the successor will be far less amenable to any sort of comprehensive peace settlement.
Henry Kissinger once famously quipped that the Arabs can't make war without Egypt--and can't make peace without Syria. He was right. Thirty and more years later his observation is still bang on. Syria--not Egypt, not the Palestinians, not the Saudis, not the Iranians--is the major player in bringing about a genuine and comprehensive Mideast peace. The anti-regime movement and, even more, the regime's increasingly blunt and bloody response puts severe constraints on both the will and ability of Syria to play its linchpin roll in securing a lasting regional peace.
The endless intransigence of the Israeli government on the Golan Heights Question boggles the mind of an objective observer. Even more logic defying is the American position in the matter. One American administration after another has kept a myopic focus on the Palestinian Question and the Two State Solution to that question as if this was the only or best way to achieve a comprehensive peace. The reality--a reality so simple that even a Deep Thinker inside the Beltway should be able to get a grip on it--is simple. No matter what the Palestinians do, no matter if there is a Two State or a Three State Solution, unless Syria signs off on the deal, there is no comprehensive regional peace.
If and when Syria signs a deal, there will be a genuine comprehensive peace in the region. For Syria to do this, there is but one requirement. Syria gets the Golan Heights back. That's it, folks, Golan or no peace.
This ground truth argues powerfully for one approach to Syria. It is a time sensitive matter. If the US, if the EU, if the UN actually care about the body count in Syria, there must be a tough single minded effort to convince Israel that the time is now for returning the Golan Heights to Syria.
Word of the return of the "lost provinces" (to use a phrase redolent of meaning for the French) would have immediate and very positive effects on the current situation in Syria. Assured of the speedy return of the Golan Heights, Assad would order the tanks back to the garage, the snipers to stand down. The anti-regime protests would fade away faster than a rain shower in the desert. Assad would be the hero of the Syrian people. Additionally, Damascus would dump its "eternal" and "strategic" alliance with Iran with a haste worthy of the phrase, "a New York second."
And, to the benefit of all--Israel, the new regime in Egypt, the embattled Saudis, everyone except Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and a few other malcontents--peace would be a reality in the region. With Syria on board, it would be possible to bring the Palestinian Authority to the table with a realistic attitude regarding the "settlements," Jerusalem, and the Jordan Valley security belt. The Palestinians would not be in a position to resist the pressures and inducements which could and would be brought by a united Arab front now including Syria as well as Saudi Arabia.
There is the near-term alternative to what otherwise must be a welter of blood as the Baathists wage an existential battle against the anti-regime movement. Sanctions will not deter Assad. Not even if the EU joins with the US in a campaign of economic punishment will the pain outweigh the perils of losing in an existential contest. The way to peace in Syria is identical with the way to peace in the Mideast: Give the Golan Heights back to its rightful sovereign.
It must be so simple as to fly below the elevated thoughts of the Deep Thinkers of the administration. But, at least they can go home at night without dodging snipers' bullets or fearing the tanks' treads.
Sunday, April 24, 2011
The Egyptian Foreign Policy "Reset" Button
One upon a time Egypt was a power to be reckoned with, even to be feared. No, kiddies, not in the time of Ramses or one of the other big time pharaohs but fifty years ago when Gamal Abdel Nasser was running the show.
Nasser built much of his personal power on projecting Egypt very large on the international scene. The fertile mind and great energy of the one time colonel turned dictator was responsible for the phenomenon of pan-Arabism. In addition, he was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement. Nasser rapidly became the bete noir of John Foster Dulles to say nothing of so alienating both the British and French governments that these two allies linked up with Israel in a conspiracy to commit aggressive war against Nasser's Egypt.
Throughout it all, through all the defeats in war, the ups and downs of regional and global diplomacy, all the twists and turns of playing the Cold War game, the Egyptian public felt very, very good about themselves, their country, and their leader. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, also played the foreign policy game well. And, better yet for the Egyptians, he played the Great Game of War far better than had Nasser with the result that the Egyptian army and people reclaimed their long lost testicles in 1973 with the Yom Kippur War. Sadat followed that with the best diplomatic volte face in years when he switched sides from the Soviets to the Americans.
Egyptians walked tall and talked loud, punching well above their weight in the global arena. They continued to do so right on to and past the signing of the Camp David Accords. But, not long after Mubarak replaced the assassinated Sadat, the Egyptian diplomatic power house faded to black.
True, Egypt helped this process when signing the Camp David Accords resulted in Cairo being shunned by the other "frontline" states of the Arab League. However, far more important than this brief episode was the decision made incrementally by Hosni Mubarak to link Egypt's domestic political tranquility and economic well being to the US policy interest of maintaining Mideast peace. Egypt withdrew from the diplomatic arena in all save a few, carefully selected, peace enhancing ways.
As long as Mubarak followed this approach of quiescence, the US overlooked the lack of democracy and the abundance of repression in Egypt. Additionally, the US provided huge amounts of money desperately needed by Egypt to keep consumer prices on basic commodities low. It was a decent bargain for both sides.
The bargain gave rise to a persistent belief among Egyptians that Mubarak was nothing more than an American lapdog. This belief was and is emblematic of a proud people's reaction to their country and government having gone from the top ranks of diplomatic players to the silent majority of states that don't matter.
While subsidiary in importance to purely domestic issues, the shrinking of Egypt's global status was not absent in the overthrow of Mubarak. The chant, "Stand tall, you are Egyptian!" speaks to that issue bluntly and clearly.
The tossing over of Mubarak assured that Egypt would shortly embark upon a new course of diplomacy. It was a given that this new course would be one which kept the US at least at an arm's length. It was a given that Egypt would edge closer to Iran. It was a given that Egypt would be far more solicitous of the Palestinian cause.
Implied in these givens was the high probability that Egypt's new course would be one which did not meet with the approbation of the Saudis. A further implication running in tandem with the first is that insofar as Egypt moved closer to Iran, the more it would find itself caught in the crossfire of the Saudi-Iranian cold war.
While there are some experts on the Mideast who think that the triangular dynamic of thirty years ago--Egypt, Iran and Turkey--exists unchanged today the reality is different, far different. Even thirty years ago, the triangle was morphing into a quadrilateral with Iraq. Today it is again a four cornered array with Saudi Arabia as the fourth. The degree to which Iran influences Turkish policy is debatable, but there is sufficient community of interest between Ankara and Tehran to wonder if any meaningful daylight exists between the two.
From the vantage point of Riyadh, the prospect of Egypt, reinvigorated with the new politics of a post-Mubarak epoch, linking at all with Iran would be both threatening and totally unacceptable. This raises the stakes for the US.
Were it not for the upticking Saudi-Iranian cold war, the US could view any changes in Egypt's diplomatic posture with a high degree of equanimity. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is not in danger. Not even a government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood would rip up that particular piece of paper. To do so would be quite unacceptable to both the US and the European Union, the two money bags upon which Egypt's basic fiscal health and thus political stability depends.
The prospect of an Egypt given to greater denunciation of the US and Israel is not amusing but neither is it a challenge to the good order of the region. Even a greater degree of support for Hamas on the part of Cairo is not a game changer--except for the possibility for levering Hamas away from sole dependence upon Iran by way of Syria. The US, Europe, and Israel could all deal with this level of change on the part of Egypt.
It is the Saudi-Iranian cold war which alters the dynamic in a fundamental way. Right now the Saudis are counting the house, seeing who is potentially with them--and against them. Affairs are looking a bit bleak from the Saudi point of view. Syria is still in Tehran's hip pocket. Iraq is run by the Shiites--and the last of the US forces is scheduled to be out in mere months. And, Egypt is moving slowly but surely into the gravitational field of Iran. Jordan is an embattled semi-nonentity. Yemen is close to collapse--or, in a best case, suitable as a hollow state under direct Saudi control.
To the Saudis nothing is secure beyond their fellow feudal rulers of Sunni belief in the Gulf states. For this reason if no other the Kingdom will be looking to the Obama administration to put some muscle on the Egyptians not to wander too far off the old reservation. This will bring Washington into direct confrontation with the needs of the transitional government as well as whatever and whoever succeeds it to establish its bona fides as an independent actor with potency on the global and regional stages.
The resulting balancing act will be both difficult and demanding for the current administration. It has shown itself remarkably tone deaf to the nuances of regional politics as well as the internal affairs of the several key countries. It has also compiled a record of being indecisive and slow to act. When the preoccupations of an active campaign for reelection and the domestic politics of divided government facing monumental difficulties are factored in, the probability of the administration or the president acting in a timely and effective fashion is low to say the least.
When the full weight of what is in process hits home it is likely that both Mr Obama and Ms Clinton will wish they were safely back in the senate voting "present" on pieces of controversial legislation.
Nasser built much of his personal power on projecting Egypt very large on the international scene. The fertile mind and great energy of the one time colonel turned dictator was responsible for the phenomenon of pan-Arabism. In addition, he was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement. Nasser rapidly became the bete noir of John Foster Dulles to say nothing of so alienating both the British and French governments that these two allies linked up with Israel in a conspiracy to commit aggressive war against Nasser's Egypt.
Throughout it all, through all the defeats in war, the ups and downs of regional and global diplomacy, all the twists and turns of playing the Cold War game, the Egyptian public felt very, very good about themselves, their country, and their leader. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, also played the foreign policy game well. And, better yet for the Egyptians, he played the Great Game of War far better than had Nasser with the result that the Egyptian army and people reclaimed their long lost testicles in 1973 with the Yom Kippur War. Sadat followed that with the best diplomatic volte face in years when he switched sides from the Soviets to the Americans.
Egyptians walked tall and talked loud, punching well above their weight in the global arena. They continued to do so right on to and past the signing of the Camp David Accords. But, not long after Mubarak replaced the assassinated Sadat, the Egyptian diplomatic power house faded to black.
True, Egypt helped this process when signing the Camp David Accords resulted in Cairo being shunned by the other "frontline" states of the Arab League. However, far more important than this brief episode was the decision made incrementally by Hosni Mubarak to link Egypt's domestic political tranquility and economic well being to the US policy interest of maintaining Mideast peace. Egypt withdrew from the diplomatic arena in all save a few, carefully selected, peace enhancing ways.
As long as Mubarak followed this approach of quiescence, the US overlooked the lack of democracy and the abundance of repression in Egypt. Additionally, the US provided huge amounts of money desperately needed by Egypt to keep consumer prices on basic commodities low. It was a decent bargain for both sides.
The bargain gave rise to a persistent belief among Egyptians that Mubarak was nothing more than an American lapdog. This belief was and is emblematic of a proud people's reaction to their country and government having gone from the top ranks of diplomatic players to the silent majority of states that don't matter.
While subsidiary in importance to purely domestic issues, the shrinking of Egypt's global status was not absent in the overthrow of Mubarak. The chant, "Stand tall, you are Egyptian!" speaks to that issue bluntly and clearly.
The tossing over of Mubarak assured that Egypt would shortly embark upon a new course of diplomacy. It was a given that this new course would be one which kept the US at least at an arm's length. It was a given that Egypt would edge closer to Iran. It was a given that Egypt would be far more solicitous of the Palestinian cause.
Implied in these givens was the high probability that Egypt's new course would be one which did not meet with the approbation of the Saudis. A further implication running in tandem with the first is that insofar as Egypt moved closer to Iran, the more it would find itself caught in the crossfire of the Saudi-Iranian cold war.
While there are some experts on the Mideast who think that the triangular dynamic of thirty years ago--Egypt, Iran and Turkey--exists unchanged today the reality is different, far different. Even thirty years ago, the triangle was morphing into a quadrilateral with Iraq. Today it is again a four cornered array with Saudi Arabia as the fourth. The degree to which Iran influences Turkish policy is debatable, but there is sufficient community of interest between Ankara and Tehran to wonder if any meaningful daylight exists between the two.
From the vantage point of Riyadh, the prospect of Egypt, reinvigorated with the new politics of a post-Mubarak epoch, linking at all with Iran would be both threatening and totally unacceptable. This raises the stakes for the US.
Were it not for the upticking Saudi-Iranian cold war, the US could view any changes in Egypt's diplomatic posture with a high degree of equanimity. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is not in danger. Not even a government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood would rip up that particular piece of paper. To do so would be quite unacceptable to both the US and the European Union, the two money bags upon which Egypt's basic fiscal health and thus political stability depends.
The prospect of an Egypt given to greater denunciation of the US and Israel is not amusing but neither is it a challenge to the good order of the region. Even a greater degree of support for Hamas on the part of Cairo is not a game changer--except for the possibility for levering Hamas away from sole dependence upon Iran by way of Syria. The US, Europe, and Israel could all deal with this level of change on the part of Egypt.
It is the Saudi-Iranian cold war which alters the dynamic in a fundamental way. Right now the Saudis are counting the house, seeing who is potentially with them--and against them. Affairs are looking a bit bleak from the Saudi point of view. Syria is still in Tehran's hip pocket. Iraq is run by the Shiites--and the last of the US forces is scheduled to be out in mere months. And, Egypt is moving slowly but surely into the gravitational field of Iran. Jordan is an embattled semi-nonentity. Yemen is close to collapse--or, in a best case, suitable as a hollow state under direct Saudi control.
To the Saudis nothing is secure beyond their fellow feudal rulers of Sunni belief in the Gulf states. For this reason if no other the Kingdom will be looking to the Obama administration to put some muscle on the Egyptians not to wander too far off the old reservation. This will bring Washington into direct confrontation with the needs of the transitional government as well as whatever and whoever succeeds it to establish its bona fides as an independent actor with potency on the global and regional stages.
The resulting balancing act will be both difficult and demanding for the current administration. It has shown itself remarkably tone deaf to the nuances of regional politics as well as the internal affairs of the several key countries. It has also compiled a record of being indecisive and slow to act. When the preoccupations of an active campaign for reelection and the domestic politics of divided government facing monumental difficulties are factored in, the probability of the administration or the president acting in a timely and effective fashion is low to say the least.
When the full weight of what is in process hits home it is likely that both Mr Obama and Ms Clinton will wish they were safely back in the senate voting "present" on pieces of controversial legislation.
Saturday, April 23, 2011
And Still The Blood Flows---
Yesterday the Syrian security forces killed more than one hundred anti-government protesters. Today it was more of the same as snipers in civilian clothes were reported to be engaging funeral processions in suburbs of Damascus. It is looking more and more like Bashir al-Assad is losing control of the situation as the old truism of the dead dictating policy is once again operative among the long repressed and fearful folks of Syria.
While still too early to start an inquest on the Fall of the Baathists, it does seem that Bashir miscalculated in his mix of pseudo-reforms and blunt repression. His father, Hafez, skipped the reform gambit, relying on repression pure and simple. It is self-evident that Bashir is not a chip off the old block, but is actually inclined to being a reformer as he has so often proclaimed.
As Bashir's allies and mentors in Tehran could (and undoubtedly have) advised, forget about gestures of reform when faced by mobs in the streets, just go ahead and kill them. The mixed messages from the top of the tree in Damascus which started in the immediate wake of the very first protests have given the impression of a weak will being in charge. Having wrong footed it from the get-go, the Syrian regime must now play catch up in the break-their-will-by-killing-enough-of-them game. As events in Yemen have made crystalline, this is not the way to go. Unless you are willing to toss in the towel and get the next stage out of Dodge (hopefully with immunity from prosecution.)
It may still be possible for the Baathists to kill their way to remaining in office, but it will take a very great deal of killing for that to happen. This opens the question of how much killing will other states accept. How many bodies must be piled up in how short a time to force some sort of international collective action perhaps even of the Libyan sort?
In a way the Syrian government is quite fortunate that the Libyan adventure in humanitarian protection is underway. The difficulties which have been encountered in what too many civilian leaders in the West incorrectly assumed would be a quick, cheap, and easy operation against the opinion of military commanders, particularly those of the US, have put a deep chill on any notion of imposing a peaceful regime change on Bashir et al.
No one well oriented in time and place would consider Syria to be the easy nut to crack that Libya appeared to be. The Syrian defense capacities are orders of magnitude greater than those possessed by Libya, and the army, although conscript in nature, has not yet turned on the regime. An attack by outsiders would be certain to keep the armed forces loyal to the government. It would even turn back some civilians from the path of opposition to that of support. To belabor the obvious, the military option is a non-starter--even if the Security Council could be cozened into one more R2P predicated resolution.
Nor is Syria all that easy to isolate either diplomatically or economically. Unless and until Iran concludes that Bashir cannot survive, Syria will have its support and assistance. Given the success shown by Iran in avoiding and evading sanctions, this support is not trivial. Iran is not likely to give up on Syria quickly or easily considering the importance of Syria to Iranian diplomatic and paramilitary ambitions in the region. However, if the mullahs see the end is near--or even merely probable--it can be expected they will open contact with the opposition so as to protect their investment in Syria and ongoing access to the proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.
The clandestine war between Iran and Saudi Arabia has a new front in Syria along with the older one in Iraq. The majority of the Syrian population is Sunni which gives Saudi Arabia a form of home court advantage which it lacks in Iraq. That plus the money the House of Saud can pass around gives the Kingdom quite a leg up over the mullahs. So, it is probable that Iran will stick with Bashir until the bitter end with the Saudis doing all they can to encourage the anti-government forces.
This implies more pressure will be put on the US to at least go full throated in its rhetoric of condemnation. The Saudis would expect the US to go beyond words into the realm of sanctions. This is possible but meaningless in effect. As events have shown elsewhere and repeatedly, sanctions of all sorts are very weak weapons whose effects, if any, are long in coming. Still, the US will have to go through the motions not only to placate the Saudis but also to sooth the bruised sensitivities of various components of the Obama base.
In the past the Baathists have shown a willingness to kill on levels undreamed of by Gaddafi and company. The imperatives to do the same now exist. The government, the higher ranks of the military, the security services, the elites aligned with these are all comprised of minorities including the Alawites and Christians who would be at great risk should Muslims given to violent political Islam gain the ascendancy. Considering that the long outlawed Muslim Brotherhood still exists with the organizational competence necessary to gain political dominance, the fear of losing one's life felt by many in the regime's higher and mid-ranks is realistic.
Not even the Israelis are sure that removing Bashir and the Baathists would be a good idea. The current regime may be highly anti-Israeli and almost as stridently anti-American, but the Syrian government is predictable, does keep the peace, can keep out of Hezbollah initiated wars, and does restrain more than a few terrorist groups. As the Geek has argued in previous posts, it is still possible to wean the Syrians away from the Iranian orbit and even onto the first faint path of true reform--but it takes Israel recognizing the reality that it can't keep the Golan Heights any longer.
As coercion is not a viable option in Syria, perhaps the time has come for the administration to focus on inducements. The only inducement which matters so much to Bashir and the Baathists that they would be willing to drop the Iranian connection and consider real reforms is the return of the Golan. The problem is simply that time is the most important commodity right now and this means the administration and Israel must do something both are loath to do--work fast for a dramatic solution to a real and bloody problem.
While still too early to start an inquest on the Fall of the Baathists, it does seem that Bashir miscalculated in his mix of pseudo-reforms and blunt repression. His father, Hafez, skipped the reform gambit, relying on repression pure and simple. It is self-evident that Bashir is not a chip off the old block, but is actually inclined to being a reformer as he has so often proclaimed.
As Bashir's allies and mentors in Tehran could (and undoubtedly have) advised, forget about gestures of reform when faced by mobs in the streets, just go ahead and kill them. The mixed messages from the top of the tree in Damascus which started in the immediate wake of the very first protests have given the impression of a weak will being in charge. Having wrong footed it from the get-go, the Syrian regime must now play catch up in the break-their-will-by-killing-enough-of-them game. As events in Yemen have made crystalline, this is not the way to go. Unless you are willing to toss in the towel and get the next stage out of Dodge (hopefully with immunity from prosecution.)
It may still be possible for the Baathists to kill their way to remaining in office, but it will take a very great deal of killing for that to happen. This opens the question of how much killing will other states accept. How many bodies must be piled up in how short a time to force some sort of international collective action perhaps even of the Libyan sort?
In a way the Syrian government is quite fortunate that the Libyan adventure in humanitarian protection is underway. The difficulties which have been encountered in what too many civilian leaders in the West incorrectly assumed would be a quick, cheap, and easy operation against the opinion of military commanders, particularly those of the US, have put a deep chill on any notion of imposing a peaceful regime change on Bashir et al.
No one well oriented in time and place would consider Syria to be the easy nut to crack that Libya appeared to be. The Syrian defense capacities are orders of magnitude greater than those possessed by Libya, and the army, although conscript in nature, has not yet turned on the regime. An attack by outsiders would be certain to keep the armed forces loyal to the government. It would even turn back some civilians from the path of opposition to that of support. To belabor the obvious, the military option is a non-starter--even if the Security Council could be cozened into one more R2P predicated resolution.
Nor is Syria all that easy to isolate either diplomatically or economically. Unless and until Iran concludes that Bashir cannot survive, Syria will have its support and assistance. Given the success shown by Iran in avoiding and evading sanctions, this support is not trivial. Iran is not likely to give up on Syria quickly or easily considering the importance of Syria to Iranian diplomatic and paramilitary ambitions in the region. However, if the mullahs see the end is near--or even merely probable--it can be expected they will open contact with the opposition so as to protect their investment in Syria and ongoing access to the proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.
The clandestine war between Iran and Saudi Arabia has a new front in Syria along with the older one in Iraq. The majority of the Syrian population is Sunni which gives Saudi Arabia a form of home court advantage which it lacks in Iraq. That plus the money the House of Saud can pass around gives the Kingdom quite a leg up over the mullahs. So, it is probable that Iran will stick with Bashir until the bitter end with the Saudis doing all they can to encourage the anti-government forces.
This implies more pressure will be put on the US to at least go full throated in its rhetoric of condemnation. The Saudis would expect the US to go beyond words into the realm of sanctions. This is possible but meaningless in effect. As events have shown elsewhere and repeatedly, sanctions of all sorts are very weak weapons whose effects, if any, are long in coming. Still, the US will have to go through the motions not only to placate the Saudis but also to sooth the bruised sensitivities of various components of the Obama base.
In the past the Baathists have shown a willingness to kill on levels undreamed of by Gaddafi and company. The imperatives to do the same now exist. The government, the higher ranks of the military, the security services, the elites aligned with these are all comprised of minorities including the Alawites and Christians who would be at great risk should Muslims given to violent political Islam gain the ascendancy. Considering that the long outlawed Muslim Brotherhood still exists with the organizational competence necessary to gain political dominance, the fear of losing one's life felt by many in the regime's higher and mid-ranks is realistic.
Not even the Israelis are sure that removing Bashir and the Baathists would be a good idea. The current regime may be highly anti-Israeli and almost as stridently anti-American, but the Syrian government is predictable, does keep the peace, can keep out of Hezbollah initiated wars, and does restrain more than a few terrorist groups. As the Geek has argued in previous posts, it is still possible to wean the Syrians away from the Iranian orbit and even onto the first faint path of true reform--but it takes Israel recognizing the reality that it can't keep the Golan Heights any longer.
As coercion is not a viable option in Syria, perhaps the time has come for the administration to focus on inducements. The only inducement which matters so much to Bashir and the Baathists that they would be willing to drop the Iranian connection and consider real reforms is the return of the Golan. The problem is simply that time is the most important commodity right now and this means the administration and Israel must do something both are loath to do--work fast for a dramatic solution to a real and bloody problem.
The House Of Saud Is Getting Very, Very Worried
Perhaps the best sign of growing Saudi anxiety over the near future is the recall of the legendary Prince Bandar from the diplomatic/political purgatory he has inhabited for the past several years. Bandar's record in the many jobs he has held including a lengthy and very productive stint as the Kingdom's ambassador to the US shows him to be a man of unusual boldness, resourcefulness, and determination. Given the way in which regional affairs have been going rapidly and steadily south from the perspective of Riyadh, it was a certainty that Bandar would be brought back, the Kingdom's diplomatic cavalry in action.
The single greatest reason for the return of Bandar and the incipient panic in the House of Saud reflected in his recall is the firm belief that the US is currently run by a crew of notably inept, incompetent, unrealistic, naive folks who have no clue regarding the merciless nature of the environment of the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The Saudi elite have reached the conclusion that more than ever they are on their own, that the US has abandoned its relationship with the Kingdom. Even if that is not completely true, the behavior of the Obama administration and the president personally have demonstrated that there is no accurate understanding of the existential contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Rightly or wrongly (and the former is far more likely than the latter), the Saudi government is convinced that Iran is playing for keeps, that the mullahs have the near- to mid-term goal of becoming the regional hegemon and the long-term ambition of seeing Shia replace Sunni as the dominant form of Islam. This would include the Shiites (takfir, the lot of them) taking control of the Land of the Two Mosques. In the estimate of the Saudis this would mean not only the end of the Kingdom, but the end of Wahhibism, indeed the end of Islam as the world currently knows it.
That, bucko, adds up to existential with a capital "E."
In the eyes of the House of Saud, the Obama administration has been tried in the balance and found wanting during the episodes constituting the "Arab Spring." Not even personal massaging (and messaging) by Secretary Gates or the National Security Advisor can change the reality that the US eased the exit of Hosni Mubarak, that the US has been far less than resolute in seeking the removal of Saudi bete noir Gaddafi, that the US has been confining its disapproval of Syria (seen by the Saudis as an Iranian viper in the Arab house) to boilerplate platitudes, or that the US has been irresolute to say the least in its support of Saudi client Bahrain.
According to the Saudi scorecard, the US is 0 for 4--0 for 5 if Yemen is included.
Enter Prince Bandar. The first mission the prince undertook was a series of quick trips to Pakistan, China, and Russia. Ostensibly these were for the purpose of shoring up diplomatic support for the Kingdom, and, indeed, that was no doubt part of the Bandar brief. But it was not the only part.
Years ago Prince Bandar covertly arranged the sale by China of medium range missiles without the knowledge let alone the consent of the US. The resulting storm with Israel was settled by the US, and the Saudis won a significant increase in both their arsenal and diplomatic clout. Considering the Saudis have been buying weapons by the freighter load from countries as diverse as the US and Spain, there is no reason to believe the prince was not exploring what hardware the Chinese might have to offer.
The same is true with respect to Russia. The Russian arms industry is no slouch in the quality department--at least in some areas of production. And, they deliver a lot more potential bang for the buck--without any nasty diplomatic or political diversions as is so often the case with the US. Nor would Russian weapons and munitions be confined necessarily to what might be delicately termed "conventional."
Now for Pakistan. It is very well known that Saudi Arabia funded the extensive Wahhibist "outreach" program at the behest of Zia. Not as well known but equally critical to the state of play today is that Saudi petrodollars underwrote much of the cost of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Now a "quid" of that magnitude does not come without a suitable "pro quo."
While the prince might have been jawing with the lads in Islamabad only to assure diplomatic understanding or to arrange the importation of good Sunni security personnel to crack Shiite heads in Bahrain or the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, it is doubtful that anyone would be surprised if there was some talk about when and under what conditions a portion of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal would be "forward deployed" in the Kingdom as a counter to Iranian ambitions.
An understanding of this sort would confer benefits on both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Both are concerned about an emergent, nuclear armed Iran. The posting of some nuclear weapons on Saudi soil would complicate the task of forcible nuclear disarmament of Pakistan. And, Pakistan would gain diplomatic leverage by being seen as co-guarantor with the Saudis of the continued Sunni possession of the Two Mosques. Mutual needs and mutual ambitions could be met with one grand bargain.
As a further benefit, the mere threat of a Saudi "forward basing" of Pakistani nukes would send a very firm and unmistakable warning message to the US. The message boils down to: There are very grave dangers in a world where the US sits passive on the sidelines.
Peace, love, flower power, and the UN are all nice, warm, fuzzy notions. They make a person feel good just considering them. But, they are darn poor predicates for foreign and national security policy. The Obama love affair with a "humble" US and an assertive UN may sit well with touchy-feely segments of the American and Western European elites, but they are totally irrelevant in the very tough neighborhood inhabited by Saudi Arabia.
Prince Bandar is the right man to take bold, even over-the-edge actions calculated to shock the US into a more realistic course of action in the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The most likely actions for Bandar to pursue are those which are "fail-safe" from the Saudi vantage point. An understanding on nuclear weapons--or even the grey market procurement of such--represents a proper "fail-safe" approach. Either the US wakes up and smells the coffee or, at the worst, Riyadh has the mechanisms necessary to counter the potential Iranian nuclear capacity--and the diplomatic implications of this.
Bandar's arrival back in the center of Saudi decision making assures there will be additional pressures brought to bear on the Obama "team" to get off the dime in both Libya and Syria. The will and ability of the US to do something about these two Saudi adversaries speaks volumes concerning the American capacity and willingness to do something about Iran when such proves absolutely necessary. There will also be additional pressure on the Nice Young Man From Chicago to come down on the right side in Bahrain.
The outlines of a deal are hinted here. Obama moves hard against both Gaddafi and Assad so he has the political freedom to overlook the repression in Bahrain. From the perspective of a man with the balls and brains of Bandar this is a perfect deal.
Of course it will look quite different from the point of view held by the Guy in the Oval who is notably deficient in the very areas where Prince Bandar is arguably overendowed.
The single greatest reason for the return of Bandar and the incipient panic in the House of Saud reflected in his recall is the firm belief that the US is currently run by a crew of notably inept, incompetent, unrealistic, naive folks who have no clue regarding the merciless nature of the environment of the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The Saudi elite have reached the conclusion that more than ever they are on their own, that the US has abandoned its relationship with the Kingdom. Even if that is not completely true, the behavior of the Obama administration and the president personally have demonstrated that there is no accurate understanding of the existential contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Rightly or wrongly (and the former is far more likely than the latter), the Saudi government is convinced that Iran is playing for keeps, that the mullahs have the near- to mid-term goal of becoming the regional hegemon and the long-term ambition of seeing Shia replace Sunni as the dominant form of Islam. This would include the Shiites (takfir, the lot of them) taking control of the Land of the Two Mosques. In the estimate of the Saudis this would mean not only the end of the Kingdom, but the end of Wahhibism, indeed the end of Islam as the world currently knows it.
That, bucko, adds up to existential with a capital "E."
In the eyes of the House of Saud, the Obama administration has been tried in the balance and found wanting during the episodes constituting the "Arab Spring." Not even personal massaging (and messaging) by Secretary Gates or the National Security Advisor can change the reality that the US eased the exit of Hosni Mubarak, that the US has been far less than resolute in seeking the removal of Saudi bete noir Gaddafi, that the US has been confining its disapproval of Syria (seen by the Saudis as an Iranian viper in the Arab house) to boilerplate platitudes, or that the US has been irresolute to say the least in its support of Saudi client Bahrain.
According to the Saudi scorecard, the US is 0 for 4--0 for 5 if Yemen is included.
Enter Prince Bandar. The first mission the prince undertook was a series of quick trips to Pakistan, China, and Russia. Ostensibly these were for the purpose of shoring up diplomatic support for the Kingdom, and, indeed, that was no doubt part of the Bandar brief. But it was not the only part.
Years ago Prince Bandar covertly arranged the sale by China of medium range missiles without the knowledge let alone the consent of the US. The resulting storm with Israel was settled by the US, and the Saudis won a significant increase in both their arsenal and diplomatic clout. Considering the Saudis have been buying weapons by the freighter load from countries as diverse as the US and Spain, there is no reason to believe the prince was not exploring what hardware the Chinese might have to offer.
The same is true with respect to Russia. The Russian arms industry is no slouch in the quality department--at least in some areas of production. And, they deliver a lot more potential bang for the buck--without any nasty diplomatic or political diversions as is so often the case with the US. Nor would Russian weapons and munitions be confined necessarily to what might be delicately termed "conventional."
Now for Pakistan. It is very well known that Saudi Arabia funded the extensive Wahhibist "outreach" program at the behest of Zia. Not as well known but equally critical to the state of play today is that Saudi petrodollars underwrote much of the cost of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Now a "quid" of that magnitude does not come without a suitable "pro quo."
While the prince might have been jawing with the lads in Islamabad only to assure diplomatic understanding or to arrange the importation of good Sunni security personnel to crack Shiite heads in Bahrain or the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, it is doubtful that anyone would be surprised if there was some talk about when and under what conditions a portion of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal would be "forward deployed" in the Kingdom as a counter to Iranian ambitions.
An understanding of this sort would confer benefits on both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Both are concerned about an emergent, nuclear armed Iran. The posting of some nuclear weapons on Saudi soil would complicate the task of forcible nuclear disarmament of Pakistan. And, Pakistan would gain diplomatic leverage by being seen as co-guarantor with the Saudis of the continued Sunni possession of the Two Mosques. Mutual needs and mutual ambitions could be met with one grand bargain.
As a further benefit, the mere threat of a Saudi "forward basing" of Pakistani nukes would send a very firm and unmistakable warning message to the US. The message boils down to: There are very grave dangers in a world where the US sits passive on the sidelines.
Peace, love, flower power, and the UN are all nice, warm, fuzzy notions. They make a person feel good just considering them. But, they are darn poor predicates for foreign and national security policy. The Obama love affair with a "humble" US and an assertive UN may sit well with touchy-feely segments of the American and Western European elites, but they are totally irrelevant in the very tough neighborhood inhabited by Saudi Arabia.
Prince Bandar is the right man to take bold, even over-the-edge actions calculated to shock the US into a more realistic course of action in the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The most likely actions for Bandar to pursue are those which are "fail-safe" from the Saudi vantage point. An understanding on nuclear weapons--or even the grey market procurement of such--represents a proper "fail-safe" approach. Either the US wakes up and smells the coffee or, at the worst, Riyadh has the mechanisms necessary to counter the potential Iranian nuclear capacity--and the diplomatic implications of this.
Bandar's arrival back in the center of Saudi decision making assures there will be additional pressures brought to bear on the Obama "team" to get off the dime in both Libya and Syria. The will and ability of the US to do something about these two Saudi adversaries speaks volumes concerning the American capacity and willingness to do something about Iran when such proves absolutely necessary. There will also be additional pressure on the Nice Young Man From Chicago to come down on the right side in Bahrain.
The outlines of a deal are hinted here. Obama moves hard against both Gaddafi and Assad so he has the political freedom to overlook the repression in Bahrain. From the perspective of a man with the balls and brains of Bandar this is a perfect deal.
Of course it will look quite different from the point of view held by the Guy in the Oval who is notably deficient in the very areas where Prince Bandar is arguably overendowed.
Friday, April 22, 2011
A Fiftieth Anniversary--And An Object Lesson For Today
Cuba went all giddy a couple of days ago. The reason was the Fiftieth Anniversary of the failed Bay of Pigs "invasion" of Cuba by an American trained and equipped motley brigade of refugees. The initial plan for the operation came during the closing days of the Eisenhower administration. The plan was predicated upon highly overly optimistic projections of weakness on the part of the Castro regime plucked from the imaginations of recently arriving political refugees.
The Eisenhower administration passed the plan along to the incoming Kennedy people. The bunch surrounding JFK was comprised of steely-eyed cold war liberals eager to show how the job of containing and rolling back communism should and could be done. Propelled by faith in their ideology, the New Frontiersmen backed the evermore ambitious plans of CIA for their proxy army. A glittering assemblage of unjustified assumptions and fond hopes was assembled. By the time it was necessary to make a final go/no-go decision, all hands with the exception of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had convinced themselves that the operation would succeed. Even the handful of doubters took comfort in the belief that should the operation stumble, the US military would come to the rescue.
When push did come to shove as it must, the belief that the cavalry would back the play of the invaders was proven false. For reasons good or bad President Kennedy refused to allow the US Navy, which was offshore with aircraft fueled and bombed up, to take part in the rapidly failing effort. Our aircraft were limited to making demonstration passes safely offshore, and the Marines most assuredly did not land.
Within two days it was all over. The invaders were all dead or captured. Castro was more firmly in control than ever. The US was humiliated. And, a valuable lesson should have been learned--there is no such thing as a plausibly deniable military operation after the administration of the United States had declared that a given foreign leader was unacceptable to it.
Before embarking on his strangely bifurcate effort in Libya, President Obama would have been very well advised to revisit the misadventure in Cuba. After all Mr Obama had made it clear that the policy goal of the US was the removal of Brother Leader Gaddafi (or choose the alternative spelling you prefer.) Once these words had passed the president's lips, the whole world knew just what the US, the purported front porch dog of the Free World, wanted in Libya. The real deal of the attendant UN Security Council resolution, for all its diplomatic pap (inserted so that neither Russia nor China would exercise the veto) about protecting civilians, was that the US in conjunction with at least two other Great Powers, France and the UK, sought the removal of Gaddifi. The Colonel would go, peacefully if possible, violently if that was the only option.
Every halfway thoughtful observer knows perfectly well that the removal of an obnoxious regime is not difficult. The US did the job in a matter of days in Afghanistan and mere weeks in Iraq. The removal part of regime change is easy to accomplish. The problems in both Afghanistan and Iraq came later--in the bootless attempt to create a modern Western style nation-state in Afghanistan and the very difficult task of seeing Iraq create of itself a reasonable simulacrum of a functioning nation-state with some aspects of democracy and rule of law.
In Libya the same paradigm would have applied if the Obama administration had not opted to retreat behind the screen of proxies, in this case NATO. When this choice was made, the path to a replay of the Bay of Pigs was charted.
Showing an abysmal ignorance of history--even very recent history, Mr Obama confused the removal part of regime change with the what-next? effort of seeing a new government created by a society unused to the freedom of creating its own polity. He also failed to understand that there is no way the US can hide the bright light of its policy under the bushel of a proxy.
Had the US gone full bore into Libya, including the use of ground forces for combat against Gaddafi's loyalist units, Brother Leader would be gone already. It is important to note that by removing the obnoxious leader the US would not have accrued an automatic responsibility for maintaining the good order within Libya. Nor would it have taken the burden of turning Libya into a modern, pluralistic Western style democratic nation-state. Both of these are misapprehensions.
The sole responsibility of the US would have been the execution of its declaratory policy--removing Gaddafi and by so doing protect civilians against the harm created by his loyalist forces. The follow-on of creating a national polity from the tribal matrix of Libya would have been up to the Libyans with whatever assistance from other states or international organizations they might request. The doctrine of R2P does not impose an unending task upon whatever state or states removes the threat to the civilians in need of protection.
Obama like Kennedy wanted to eat his cake while retaining it intact. Both presidents wanted to abate a nuisance to American policy interests but had no desire to carry the long term freight of reconstituting the polity. To this end both sought to use proxies. In part Obama has seen the rebels in Libya as the equivalent of the exile Cuban "freedom fighters" with NATO playing the role which should have been undertaken by the US at the Bay of Pigs.
The Libyan insurgents are an even weaker reed than were the exiles at the Bay of Pigs. This implies strongly that the Libyans would need even greater amounts of outside aid than did the Cubans of a half century ago. An acceptance of this ground truth places an even greater onus on the US to use effective military force against Gaddafi and his loyalists. Passing the buck to a divided and force impaired NATO set the stage for a stalemate in Libya and a loss of credibility for NATO.
Fifty years ago JFK made the worst decision possible. If Castro was as American declaratory policy had maintained completely unacceptable to us, a threat to the peace and stability of the Western Hemisphere and a potential threat to CONUS, the right decision was to send in our forces in sufficient numbers to abate the nuisance quickly and decisively. If, on the other hand, Castro was in fact a mere annoyance, a diplomatic conundrum, an embarrassment, the proper choice was to do nothing. The worst option by far was the unsupportable attempt at covert invasion by proxy forces.
So it is in Libya. If Gaddafi really is a challenge to national or strategic interests as Mr Obama's rhetoric holds, then the proper option is to go in fast and hard so as to remove the man and his forces. If, to the contrary, Gaddafi is a threat only to his own people, then the US should have stayed out. Or, if R2P is now to be a cornerstone of US policy, the correct choice is once again to move in openly, fast, and hard and then, after the removal of Gaddafi, back out and turn affairs over to the Libyans and whatever leaders they find in their midst giving only such aid as may be requested and justified.
From that list Mr Obama had a two in three chance of getting it right. He didn't. He chose the only bad option in the lot--the proxy effort to achieve American declaratory policy. He sought to justify his blunder by what must either be spectacular ignorance of recent history or flat out tergiversation. His use of Iraq, his "we have been down that road before" remark is a complete misrepresentation of what happened in Iraq. The regime was changed in mere weeks and the consequent internal war was in large measure the foreseeable and preventable consequence of an ill-founded effort at nation-building which could have been avoided by the simple expedient of leaving the matter up to the Iraqis and providing only such aid as they requested specifically.
The same could have been accomplished in Libya. All that was necessary was the assurance that the political goal was carefully and narrowly defined and that military force was crafted to achieve that goal. Bereft of any implied responsibility for giving the Libyans a turn-key modern Western style state (which they don't want in any event) the task of directly turning declaratory policy into actual events would have been easy.
JFK is one of Obama's heroes. It is too bad that the Nice Young Man From Chicago could not learn one simple lesson from Kennedy's second biggest blunder.
The Eisenhower administration passed the plan along to the incoming Kennedy people. The bunch surrounding JFK was comprised of steely-eyed cold war liberals eager to show how the job of containing and rolling back communism should and could be done. Propelled by faith in their ideology, the New Frontiersmen backed the evermore ambitious plans of CIA for their proxy army. A glittering assemblage of unjustified assumptions and fond hopes was assembled. By the time it was necessary to make a final go/no-go decision, all hands with the exception of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had convinced themselves that the operation would succeed. Even the handful of doubters took comfort in the belief that should the operation stumble, the US military would come to the rescue.
When push did come to shove as it must, the belief that the cavalry would back the play of the invaders was proven false. For reasons good or bad President Kennedy refused to allow the US Navy, which was offshore with aircraft fueled and bombed up, to take part in the rapidly failing effort. Our aircraft were limited to making demonstration passes safely offshore, and the Marines most assuredly did not land.
Within two days it was all over. The invaders were all dead or captured. Castro was more firmly in control than ever. The US was humiliated. And, a valuable lesson should have been learned--there is no such thing as a plausibly deniable military operation after the administration of the United States had declared that a given foreign leader was unacceptable to it.
Before embarking on his strangely bifurcate effort in Libya, President Obama would have been very well advised to revisit the misadventure in Cuba. After all Mr Obama had made it clear that the policy goal of the US was the removal of Brother Leader Gaddafi (or choose the alternative spelling you prefer.) Once these words had passed the president's lips, the whole world knew just what the US, the purported front porch dog of the Free World, wanted in Libya. The real deal of the attendant UN Security Council resolution, for all its diplomatic pap (inserted so that neither Russia nor China would exercise the veto) about protecting civilians, was that the US in conjunction with at least two other Great Powers, France and the UK, sought the removal of Gaddifi. The Colonel would go, peacefully if possible, violently if that was the only option.
Every halfway thoughtful observer knows perfectly well that the removal of an obnoxious regime is not difficult. The US did the job in a matter of days in Afghanistan and mere weeks in Iraq. The removal part of regime change is easy to accomplish. The problems in both Afghanistan and Iraq came later--in the bootless attempt to create a modern Western style nation-state in Afghanistan and the very difficult task of seeing Iraq create of itself a reasonable simulacrum of a functioning nation-state with some aspects of democracy and rule of law.
In Libya the same paradigm would have applied if the Obama administration had not opted to retreat behind the screen of proxies, in this case NATO. When this choice was made, the path to a replay of the Bay of Pigs was charted.
Showing an abysmal ignorance of history--even very recent history, Mr Obama confused the removal part of regime change with the what-next? effort of seeing a new government created by a society unused to the freedom of creating its own polity. He also failed to understand that there is no way the US can hide the bright light of its policy under the bushel of a proxy.
Had the US gone full bore into Libya, including the use of ground forces for combat against Gaddafi's loyalist units, Brother Leader would be gone already. It is important to note that by removing the obnoxious leader the US would not have accrued an automatic responsibility for maintaining the good order within Libya. Nor would it have taken the burden of turning Libya into a modern, pluralistic Western style democratic nation-state. Both of these are misapprehensions.
The sole responsibility of the US would have been the execution of its declaratory policy--removing Gaddafi and by so doing protect civilians against the harm created by his loyalist forces. The follow-on of creating a national polity from the tribal matrix of Libya would have been up to the Libyans with whatever assistance from other states or international organizations they might request. The doctrine of R2P does not impose an unending task upon whatever state or states removes the threat to the civilians in need of protection.
Obama like Kennedy wanted to eat his cake while retaining it intact. Both presidents wanted to abate a nuisance to American policy interests but had no desire to carry the long term freight of reconstituting the polity. To this end both sought to use proxies. In part Obama has seen the rebels in Libya as the equivalent of the exile Cuban "freedom fighters" with NATO playing the role which should have been undertaken by the US at the Bay of Pigs.
The Libyan insurgents are an even weaker reed than were the exiles at the Bay of Pigs. This implies strongly that the Libyans would need even greater amounts of outside aid than did the Cubans of a half century ago. An acceptance of this ground truth places an even greater onus on the US to use effective military force against Gaddafi and his loyalists. Passing the buck to a divided and force impaired NATO set the stage for a stalemate in Libya and a loss of credibility for NATO.
Fifty years ago JFK made the worst decision possible. If Castro was as American declaratory policy had maintained completely unacceptable to us, a threat to the peace and stability of the Western Hemisphere and a potential threat to CONUS, the right decision was to send in our forces in sufficient numbers to abate the nuisance quickly and decisively. If, on the other hand, Castro was in fact a mere annoyance, a diplomatic conundrum, an embarrassment, the proper choice was to do nothing. The worst option by far was the unsupportable attempt at covert invasion by proxy forces.
So it is in Libya. If Gaddafi really is a challenge to national or strategic interests as Mr Obama's rhetoric holds, then the proper option is to go in fast and hard so as to remove the man and his forces. If, to the contrary, Gaddafi is a threat only to his own people, then the US should have stayed out. Or, if R2P is now to be a cornerstone of US policy, the correct choice is once again to move in openly, fast, and hard and then, after the removal of Gaddafi, back out and turn affairs over to the Libyans and whatever leaders they find in their midst giving only such aid as may be requested and justified.
From that list Mr Obama had a two in three chance of getting it right. He didn't. He chose the only bad option in the lot--the proxy effort to achieve American declaratory policy. He sought to justify his blunder by what must either be spectacular ignorance of recent history or flat out tergiversation. His use of Iraq, his "we have been down that road before" remark is a complete misrepresentation of what happened in Iraq. The regime was changed in mere weeks and the consequent internal war was in large measure the foreseeable and preventable consequence of an ill-founded effort at nation-building which could have been avoided by the simple expedient of leaving the matter up to the Iraqis and providing only such aid as they requested specifically.
The same could have been accomplished in Libya. All that was necessary was the assurance that the political goal was carefully and narrowly defined and that military force was crafted to achieve that goal. Bereft of any implied responsibility for giving the Libyans a turn-key modern Western style state (which they don't want in any event) the task of directly turning declaratory policy into actual events would have been easy.
JFK is one of Obama's heroes. It is too bad that the Nice Young Man From Chicago could not learn one simple lesson from Kennedy's second biggest blunder.
Thursday, April 21, 2011
Pakistan Is Not Worth The Trouble Or Money It Is Costing Us
The government and military of Pakistan is continuing its campaigns of lies and extortion. That is as self-evident as the size of the US budget deficit. It is also self-evident that Pakistan will keep on with its dual track approach of prevarication and extortion because it has no alternative.
The Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Mike Mullen, grabbed the stinging nettle the other day when he stated categorically in the Pakistani English language newspaper Dawn as well as the TV service Geo that we knew perfectly well that the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) maintained its ongoing relationship with the Haqqani network, the most deadly American adversary in Afghanistan. The long-standing and very strong connection between ISI and the Haqqani crew has been the worst kept secret in Washington for years now. Mullen, bringing it into the open on an official level only hours before meeting mano a mano with his Pakistani counterpart, did the cause of honesty between alleged allies a great and long overdue service.
The response from the government and military of Pakistan was not one of either embarrassed silence or humiliating acknowledgement of the truth of the allegation. Of course not. The Army Chief of Staff, Ashfaq Kayani, was quoted as denouncing the Mullen statement as "negative propaganda." The brazen effrontery of the general would be breath taking had it come from anyone other than a senior Pakistani official.
However, bald face lying is a tried and true approach practiced by Pakistani officials in and out of uniform. The finance minister, straight face firmly in place, averred that it was "largely a myth" that Pakistan had received billions of US dollars in aid from the Great Cash Cow pastured in Washington, DC. In the real world, the US has provided twenty or so billion bucks in the years since 9/11. Of this mountain of money, roughly half has come under the auspices of the program entitled "Coalition Support Funds." Much of the money shifted to Islamabad under this program has been not been properly documented or accounted for.
Other funds have flowed under other programs such as the civilian development oriented Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill. Still more money has been expended under assorted military assistance programs including those which have provided Pakistan with big ticket items such as F-16s with little utility in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism efforts. In short, the money has been authorized, appropriated, and in major part expended all to the benefit of Pakistan. Still, the finance minister felt obliged to carry on with a lie so humongous as to make Dr Goebbels blush.
On the extortion side of the twin prong offensive, the Pakistanis have reiterated their demands for more intelligence sharing on the part of the US--allegedly so the Paks can get on with the job of acting upon it--and transferring our UAV technology to Pakistan--supposedly so that they and not us can use Predators and Reapers to take out Haqqani network and Taliban figures in the FATA. Actually these demands are not simply extortionate, they are part of the keep-on-lying tactic.
The Pakistanis want access to our most sensitive intelligence sources, methods, and practices so that Islamabad will know all that we know about the connections between Pakistan and the assorted groups under the protection of ISI. After all, the highest goal of any intelligence service is finding out in detail what the enemy's spooks know and don't know about your operations. As KGB bent every effort to penetrate MI6, MI5, OSS, and CIA, so now does Pakistan's ISI want to penetrate our intelligence operations. There is no desire to act upon American intelligence with any goal in mind other than better protecting and facilitating the operations of the Haqqani network and other like minded groups. (Sure, the Paks would use our information to neutralize individuals or sub-groups that have wandered too far off the reservation, but that is scarcely a benefit from our point of view.)
The Pakistani military has long drooled after our UAVs. The generals and the spooks have had a perpetual case of the woodies ever since the first Predator launched its first Hellfire. From their perspective, the UAVs represent a fine way of countering the Indian doctrine of "Cold Start," even better by being lower signature than their new short range battlefield missiles. One must never forget that India and only India is the "main enemy" in the estimate of the Pakistani military.
The US has offered to provide Pakistan with eighty-five Ravens. These small, short range, and non-lethal UAVs are "drones" and thus meet the demand for access. It is doubtful that the Pakistanis will be satisfied with this sop. Eighty-five Ravens do not change the calculus of forces as between India and the Muslim Republic.
After his carefully titrated dose of honesty, Admiral Mullen went back onto the standard message. Our relationship with Pakistan is strong. They are our close and important allies in the war on terror. Pakistan's cooperation is critical for success in Afghanistan. Stopping terror in the FATA is the key to universal and permanent peace. Yadda-yadda, dabba-dabba-do and harrumph!
Let's get down, dirty, and honest here. The US could get out of Afghanistan right now without any real decrement in its security. It could leave that sorry piece of real estate without any meaningful increase in the risk of terror acts directed at the American homeland. True, it would be better if we were to engage in one hellacious crescendo of lethal violence directed at each and every important al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Haqqani network figure we could pinpoint. It would be preferable if, so to speak, we leave doing what we should have done when we first went in--launch a destructively punitive blow at the bad guys of violent political Islam.
This means admitting reality. Afghanistan will become what it both wants to be and will be forced by the Pakistanis to be--an Islamic nation living in a hollow state. The FATA will remain what Islamabad wants it to be--the safe haven of violent political Islam. Both are acceptable outcomes provided the government and military of Pakistan understand that should any jihadist with any connection to either the FATA or Pakistan dominated Afghanistan harm a hair on Uncle Sam's head, we will be back. Back not as an occupation force or a nation-building crew but as a destructive force of such a punishing nature as to make the floods and cyclones of the past appear to be gentle love pats from a benign mother nature.
It would not harm our interests either short- or long-term interests if the lying extortionists of Islamabad were made to understand and appreciate that our interests and those of India were far more closely coincident than were ours and those of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In truth we have been cozying up too close for too long with the loser on the sub-continent. India and the US have far more shared norms and values, far more coinciding interests. Tilting ever more in the direction of India is in our interests--and against those of Pakistan.
Consider that last sentence for a moment. It suggests a viable alternative should the Obama administration demonstrate its ongoing inability to play hard ball. We too can play the extortion game. Give Pakistan an option: Islamabad can either both sit down and shut up, get serious in the FATA and squash the Haqqanis and the others, or we will well and truly tilt more in the direction of India. A closer alliance between India and the US would give the army and government of Pakistan something very, very important to think about. At the very least, it would make their dream of another rematch with India a suicidal folly. At most, it would empower India in Afghanistan thus further cutting back on Pakistan's goal of strategic depth and a sphere of influence in the Islamic nations of the Central Asian Republics.
This tilt-to-India threat is a hard ball option but one which does not run the political risks of simply getting the hell out of Afghanistan. As such it is a rational and realistic way to overcome the Pakistani's game of lie and extort. But, its realism alone means the Obama administration would never consider it. More's the pity.
The Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Mike Mullen, grabbed the stinging nettle the other day when he stated categorically in the Pakistani English language newspaper Dawn as well as the TV service Geo that we knew perfectly well that the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) maintained its ongoing relationship with the Haqqani network, the most deadly American adversary in Afghanistan. The long-standing and very strong connection between ISI and the Haqqani crew has been the worst kept secret in Washington for years now. Mullen, bringing it into the open on an official level only hours before meeting mano a mano with his Pakistani counterpart, did the cause of honesty between alleged allies a great and long overdue service.
The response from the government and military of Pakistan was not one of either embarrassed silence or humiliating acknowledgement of the truth of the allegation. Of course not. The Army Chief of Staff, Ashfaq Kayani, was quoted as denouncing the Mullen statement as "negative propaganda." The brazen effrontery of the general would be breath taking had it come from anyone other than a senior Pakistani official.
However, bald face lying is a tried and true approach practiced by Pakistani officials in and out of uniform. The finance minister, straight face firmly in place, averred that it was "largely a myth" that Pakistan had received billions of US dollars in aid from the Great Cash Cow pastured in Washington, DC. In the real world, the US has provided twenty or so billion bucks in the years since 9/11. Of this mountain of money, roughly half has come under the auspices of the program entitled "Coalition Support Funds." Much of the money shifted to Islamabad under this program has been not been properly documented or accounted for.
Other funds have flowed under other programs such as the civilian development oriented Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill. Still more money has been expended under assorted military assistance programs including those which have provided Pakistan with big ticket items such as F-16s with little utility in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism efforts. In short, the money has been authorized, appropriated, and in major part expended all to the benefit of Pakistan. Still, the finance minister felt obliged to carry on with a lie so humongous as to make Dr Goebbels blush.
On the extortion side of the twin prong offensive, the Pakistanis have reiterated their demands for more intelligence sharing on the part of the US--allegedly so the Paks can get on with the job of acting upon it--and transferring our UAV technology to Pakistan--supposedly so that they and not us can use Predators and Reapers to take out Haqqani network and Taliban figures in the FATA. Actually these demands are not simply extortionate, they are part of the keep-on-lying tactic.
The Pakistanis want access to our most sensitive intelligence sources, methods, and practices so that Islamabad will know all that we know about the connections between Pakistan and the assorted groups under the protection of ISI. After all, the highest goal of any intelligence service is finding out in detail what the enemy's spooks know and don't know about your operations. As KGB bent every effort to penetrate MI6, MI5, OSS, and CIA, so now does Pakistan's ISI want to penetrate our intelligence operations. There is no desire to act upon American intelligence with any goal in mind other than better protecting and facilitating the operations of the Haqqani network and other like minded groups. (Sure, the Paks would use our information to neutralize individuals or sub-groups that have wandered too far off the reservation, but that is scarcely a benefit from our point of view.)
The Pakistani military has long drooled after our UAVs. The generals and the spooks have had a perpetual case of the woodies ever since the first Predator launched its first Hellfire. From their perspective, the UAVs represent a fine way of countering the Indian doctrine of "Cold Start," even better by being lower signature than their new short range battlefield missiles. One must never forget that India and only India is the "main enemy" in the estimate of the Pakistani military.
The US has offered to provide Pakistan with eighty-five Ravens. These small, short range, and non-lethal UAVs are "drones" and thus meet the demand for access. It is doubtful that the Pakistanis will be satisfied with this sop. Eighty-five Ravens do not change the calculus of forces as between India and the Muslim Republic.
After his carefully titrated dose of honesty, Admiral Mullen went back onto the standard message. Our relationship with Pakistan is strong. They are our close and important allies in the war on terror. Pakistan's cooperation is critical for success in Afghanistan. Stopping terror in the FATA is the key to universal and permanent peace. Yadda-yadda, dabba-dabba-do and harrumph!
Let's get down, dirty, and honest here. The US could get out of Afghanistan right now without any real decrement in its security. It could leave that sorry piece of real estate without any meaningful increase in the risk of terror acts directed at the American homeland. True, it would be better if we were to engage in one hellacious crescendo of lethal violence directed at each and every important al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Haqqani network figure we could pinpoint. It would be preferable if, so to speak, we leave doing what we should have done when we first went in--launch a destructively punitive blow at the bad guys of violent political Islam.
This means admitting reality. Afghanistan will become what it both wants to be and will be forced by the Pakistanis to be--an Islamic nation living in a hollow state. The FATA will remain what Islamabad wants it to be--the safe haven of violent political Islam. Both are acceptable outcomes provided the government and military of Pakistan understand that should any jihadist with any connection to either the FATA or Pakistan dominated Afghanistan harm a hair on Uncle Sam's head, we will be back. Back not as an occupation force or a nation-building crew but as a destructive force of such a punishing nature as to make the floods and cyclones of the past appear to be gentle love pats from a benign mother nature.
It would not harm our interests either short- or long-term interests if the lying extortionists of Islamabad were made to understand and appreciate that our interests and those of India were far more closely coincident than were ours and those of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In truth we have been cozying up too close for too long with the loser on the sub-continent. India and the US have far more shared norms and values, far more coinciding interests. Tilting ever more in the direction of India is in our interests--and against those of Pakistan.
Consider that last sentence for a moment. It suggests a viable alternative should the Obama administration demonstrate its ongoing inability to play hard ball. We too can play the extortion game. Give Pakistan an option: Islamabad can either both sit down and shut up, get serious in the FATA and squash the Haqqanis and the others, or we will well and truly tilt more in the direction of India. A closer alliance between India and the US would give the army and government of Pakistan something very, very important to think about. At the very least, it would make their dream of another rematch with India a suicidal folly. At most, it would empower India in Afghanistan thus further cutting back on Pakistan's goal of strategic depth and a sphere of influence in the Islamic nations of the Central Asian Republics.
This tilt-to-India threat is a hard ball option but one which does not run the political risks of simply getting the hell out of Afghanistan. As such it is a rational and realistic way to overcome the Pakistani's game of lie and extort. But, its realism alone means the Obama administration would never consider it. More's the pity.
Wednesday, April 20, 2011
He's Back And He's BAAAD!
Vladimir Putin, every Russian's "Good Czar" was at his self-promoting, uber-nationalist best speaking to the Duma yesterday. The assembled parliamentarians--most of whom are card carrying members of Putin's United Russia Party--interrupted the Czar's speech with applause a number of times. It was almost like the good old days when the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union spoke to his adoring sycophants.
The Putin speech gave one the impression that it is a tryout for next year's presidential campaign. If so one wants to know one fact above all else: Have Vladimir and his one time protegee, Dimitri Medvedev, reached an agreement on executing another swap of offices or will Vlad of the Bare Chest be squaring off against Dimitri the Techno-Nerd?
In either event the smart money will be on Putin. Many of the reasons for this contention are to be found in the substance and tone of yesterday's speech. At the very core of Putin's remarks as of his worldview is nationalism, pure and quite unapologetic nationalism.
This puts Czar Vladimir at a sharp contrast with Dimitri the Sophisticated. Medvedev is quite cosmopolitan in comparison with Putin. He is familiar with the West and is happy with his familiarity. Dimitri sees much in Western economics, technology, society, and politics worthy of translation into Russian. He does not see the West, either the EU or the US, as a threat--now or into the far future. If Russia faces a threat in Medvendev's view, it comes from within, from corruption, from inefficiency, from outdated technology, from lack of venture capital, from disease, from alcohol, from despair.
Putin incarnates all the ancient and defining characteristics of Russian nationalism, the free floating fear of outside threats, the sense of inferiority in comparison with the West, the belief that either a state must expand or it will collapse, the sullen withdrawal into plotting a future caper when challenged or defeated in a current ploy. Like the Russian people generally over the long sweep of the centuries, Putin can swing almost instantly between grandiose euphoria of triumphs in the making to profound, Arctic nights of bleak and cold feelings of failure. As has been the case so often with so many of his predecessors--both czars and commissars--Vladimir is eager to be suspicious, alert to the faintest hint of potential threat, trembling on the ragged edge of paranoia, and quite sure that no matter how well affairs are going at the moment, the knife in the back and the kick in the groin are soon to happen.
Putin's speech reflected all of these characteristics. It was ripe, over ripe, with hosannas onto Vladimir the Brilliant, Vladimir the Resolute, Vladimir the Unbelievably Successful. It was also stuffed with dire warnings of unspecified foreign threats looming over Russia's present and future. Putin demanded that Russia be stronger, much stronger, in order to counter these threats. He declaimed more than once that not only did Russia need more, newer, and better weapons of all categories, it needed more births, more children, more sturdy Russian citizens to carry the burden of defending against the array of unspecified but potentially lethal threats confronting nation and state.
Putin took credit and warned of the need to do more, much more, to improve the economy. Because Putin was so prescient as to have practiced a form of economic autarchy, Russia had come out of the global recession faster and in better shape than all other states. He warned that only by following the Putin Paradigm and avoiding "sharp moves and ill-conceived experiments" could Russian prosperity be continued and expanded. This was a less than well-concealed blow directed against Dimitri who is open to both "moves" and "experiments" imported from the Big Boys of the G-whatever. Even more pointed was his follow-on comment, "those who are weak will get advice from foreign visitors on which way to go and what policy course to pursue."
Ouch!
However, the observation might have been directed as well at the US which has a sorry record extending from Bill Clinton through George W. Bush to Joe Biden of offering gratuitous and semi-insulting advice to various Russian leaders, including both Putin and Medvedev. The lesson for future American politicians is simple: Never stoke a Russian's inherent bent toward holding on to his inferiority complex.
The Russian prime minister, the once and (perhaps) future president, rejected any notion that Russia might be swept by a people power movement such as those which have so visibly perturbed the Arab states. Putin assured any nervous auditors that as long as his firm and steady hand is on the helm and as long as his wise and farsighted mind is on the job, the policies of his government will keep the Russian people happy and fully in support of the government.
In line with his keep-the-peasants-happy philosophy of governance, Vladimir the Most Generous and Compassionate took pride in his past and projected increases in state pensions, welfare programs, and the birth incentive scheme. In addition, the workers and peasants could take joy in the proposed weapons acquisition program, the best part of a trillion dollars over the next five or so years. The same constituency would receive benefits beyond counting from the Putin Economic Diversification Plan which would reduce Russia's dependency on resource exploitation. (This served to steal some of Medvedev's thunder as he has been plumping this approach for years now.)
While Good Czar Vladimir did not name any specific "foreign threat," the repeated references to such plays well to the natural and historically deeply rooted Russian fear of invasion. There are several candidates for the title of "main enemy."
One, of course, is the old standby, the US. The technological asymmetries between the US and Russian military forces do not operate to Russia's advantage. The aging and decrepit nature of so much of the old Soviet military machine particularly in the strategic and force projection categories must be worrisome to a crew given to paranoia. The difficulties experienced to date in bringing a new ICBM online have done nothing to reduce the apprehensions of American superiority rampant in the highest levels of Russian political and military life. While the Boys in the Kremlin know perfectly well they have nothing to fear from the current American administration, they cannot be sure that We the People will not toss another George W. Bush, or, worse, Ronald Reagan, into the Oval.
A credible alternative is China. Putin along with the entire military high command is very well aware that the vast majority of China's nuclear delivery systems have Russian zip codes in their reentry vehicles. They also fret over the basing of the large and increasingly competent Peoples Liberation Army. It is clear from the locations of the bases that China is not poised to go to war with Vietnam--or India. So, much as the US is getting Xanax moments from China's adventures in naval construction, the Russians are having an even larger need for Valium from the positioning of the ground combat forces.
There is a prevalent, vague anxiety over the intents of NATO and the EU with respect to the "near abroad," those constituents of the former Soviet Union which have gone their own independent ways since the early Nineties. The Kremlin will not be ready to sleep with any degree of soundness unless and until it has reestablished operational dominance over places such as Georgia and the Ukraine. Strategists in Putin's service undoubtedly see these former glacis states as potential points of conflict between Russia and an expansionist oriented NATO/EU combine. (Hey! Paranoia does not require realism simply rationality.)
Then there are the Muslims. The ongoing operations against purveyors of violent political Islam in the North Caucasus represent but one part of the emerging challenge presented by militant Islam. The difficulties currently experienced by several of the now independent Central Asian Republics have already spilled over into Russia and show strong signs of doing more of the same in the near future. Coupled with ideological appeal and backed by Iran, the advocates of violent political Islam are poised to be a "foreign threat" without equal. They are a "main enemy" in the process of being created.
Vladimir Putin is a vastly skilled and able Russian politician. He understands nationalism of the Russian sort and uses it to advance his claim on the throne. As a Russian nationalist he is guided in foreign affairs by one guiding principle--the national interests of Russia. Given the high probability of his being elected president once again next year, there is a strong likelihood the US will be dealing with him for some years to come. In a way he is the best possible interlocutor for the US to have in the Kremlin. He is a prime example of what you see is what you get. This means he will continue to be a very difficult person with whom to make a diplomatic deal, but his motives and goals will never be obscure or hazy--and once he has made a deal he will stick with it, provided such is in Russia's national interest.
The Deep Thinkers of the Obama administration would be well advised to parse Putin's speech very closely and carefully. To do so is to understand the man and his policy context. To blow off his speech as mere politics, or to deprecate Putin as an imitation Western politician is to do him and us a great disservice. Vladimir is not just another politician or one more Russian dictator. No, he is the Good Czar, and a Good Czar with a totally Russian soul.
The Putin speech gave one the impression that it is a tryout for next year's presidential campaign. If so one wants to know one fact above all else: Have Vladimir and his one time protegee, Dimitri Medvedev, reached an agreement on executing another swap of offices or will Vlad of the Bare Chest be squaring off against Dimitri the Techno-Nerd?
In either event the smart money will be on Putin. Many of the reasons for this contention are to be found in the substance and tone of yesterday's speech. At the very core of Putin's remarks as of his worldview is nationalism, pure and quite unapologetic nationalism.
This puts Czar Vladimir at a sharp contrast with Dimitri the Sophisticated. Medvedev is quite cosmopolitan in comparison with Putin. He is familiar with the West and is happy with his familiarity. Dimitri sees much in Western economics, technology, society, and politics worthy of translation into Russian. He does not see the West, either the EU or the US, as a threat--now or into the far future. If Russia faces a threat in Medvendev's view, it comes from within, from corruption, from inefficiency, from outdated technology, from lack of venture capital, from disease, from alcohol, from despair.
Putin incarnates all the ancient and defining characteristics of Russian nationalism, the free floating fear of outside threats, the sense of inferiority in comparison with the West, the belief that either a state must expand or it will collapse, the sullen withdrawal into plotting a future caper when challenged or defeated in a current ploy. Like the Russian people generally over the long sweep of the centuries, Putin can swing almost instantly between grandiose euphoria of triumphs in the making to profound, Arctic nights of bleak and cold feelings of failure. As has been the case so often with so many of his predecessors--both czars and commissars--Vladimir is eager to be suspicious, alert to the faintest hint of potential threat, trembling on the ragged edge of paranoia, and quite sure that no matter how well affairs are going at the moment, the knife in the back and the kick in the groin are soon to happen.
Putin's speech reflected all of these characteristics. It was ripe, over ripe, with hosannas onto Vladimir the Brilliant, Vladimir the Resolute, Vladimir the Unbelievably Successful. It was also stuffed with dire warnings of unspecified foreign threats looming over Russia's present and future. Putin demanded that Russia be stronger, much stronger, in order to counter these threats. He declaimed more than once that not only did Russia need more, newer, and better weapons of all categories, it needed more births, more children, more sturdy Russian citizens to carry the burden of defending against the array of unspecified but potentially lethal threats confronting nation and state.
Putin took credit and warned of the need to do more, much more, to improve the economy. Because Putin was so prescient as to have practiced a form of economic autarchy, Russia had come out of the global recession faster and in better shape than all other states. He warned that only by following the Putin Paradigm and avoiding "sharp moves and ill-conceived experiments" could Russian prosperity be continued and expanded. This was a less than well-concealed blow directed against Dimitri who is open to both "moves" and "experiments" imported from the Big Boys of the G-whatever. Even more pointed was his follow-on comment, "those who are weak will get advice from foreign visitors on which way to go and what policy course to pursue."
Ouch!
However, the observation might have been directed as well at the US which has a sorry record extending from Bill Clinton through George W. Bush to Joe Biden of offering gratuitous and semi-insulting advice to various Russian leaders, including both Putin and Medvedev. The lesson for future American politicians is simple: Never stoke a Russian's inherent bent toward holding on to his inferiority complex.
The Russian prime minister, the once and (perhaps) future president, rejected any notion that Russia might be swept by a people power movement such as those which have so visibly perturbed the Arab states. Putin assured any nervous auditors that as long as his firm and steady hand is on the helm and as long as his wise and farsighted mind is on the job, the policies of his government will keep the Russian people happy and fully in support of the government.
In line with his keep-the-peasants-happy philosophy of governance, Vladimir the Most Generous and Compassionate took pride in his past and projected increases in state pensions, welfare programs, and the birth incentive scheme. In addition, the workers and peasants could take joy in the proposed weapons acquisition program, the best part of a trillion dollars over the next five or so years. The same constituency would receive benefits beyond counting from the Putin Economic Diversification Plan which would reduce Russia's dependency on resource exploitation. (This served to steal some of Medvedev's thunder as he has been plumping this approach for years now.)
While Good Czar Vladimir did not name any specific "foreign threat," the repeated references to such plays well to the natural and historically deeply rooted Russian fear of invasion. There are several candidates for the title of "main enemy."
One, of course, is the old standby, the US. The technological asymmetries between the US and Russian military forces do not operate to Russia's advantage. The aging and decrepit nature of so much of the old Soviet military machine particularly in the strategic and force projection categories must be worrisome to a crew given to paranoia. The difficulties experienced to date in bringing a new ICBM online have done nothing to reduce the apprehensions of American superiority rampant in the highest levels of Russian political and military life. While the Boys in the Kremlin know perfectly well they have nothing to fear from the current American administration, they cannot be sure that We the People will not toss another George W. Bush, or, worse, Ronald Reagan, into the Oval.
A credible alternative is China. Putin along with the entire military high command is very well aware that the vast majority of China's nuclear delivery systems have Russian zip codes in their reentry vehicles. They also fret over the basing of the large and increasingly competent Peoples Liberation Army. It is clear from the locations of the bases that China is not poised to go to war with Vietnam--or India. So, much as the US is getting Xanax moments from China's adventures in naval construction, the Russians are having an even larger need for Valium from the positioning of the ground combat forces.
There is a prevalent, vague anxiety over the intents of NATO and the EU with respect to the "near abroad," those constituents of the former Soviet Union which have gone their own independent ways since the early Nineties. The Kremlin will not be ready to sleep with any degree of soundness unless and until it has reestablished operational dominance over places such as Georgia and the Ukraine. Strategists in Putin's service undoubtedly see these former glacis states as potential points of conflict between Russia and an expansionist oriented NATO/EU combine. (Hey! Paranoia does not require realism simply rationality.)
Then there are the Muslims. The ongoing operations against purveyors of violent political Islam in the North Caucasus represent but one part of the emerging challenge presented by militant Islam. The difficulties currently experienced by several of the now independent Central Asian Republics have already spilled over into Russia and show strong signs of doing more of the same in the near future. Coupled with ideological appeal and backed by Iran, the advocates of violent political Islam are poised to be a "foreign threat" without equal. They are a "main enemy" in the process of being created.
Vladimir Putin is a vastly skilled and able Russian politician. He understands nationalism of the Russian sort and uses it to advance his claim on the throne. As a Russian nationalist he is guided in foreign affairs by one guiding principle--the national interests of Russia. Given the high probability of his being elected president once again next year, there is a strong likelihood the US will be dealing with him for some years to come. In a way he is the best possible interlocutor for the US to have in the Kremlin. He is a prime example of what you see is what you get. This means he will continue to be a very difficult person with whom to make a diplomatic deal, but his motives and goals will never be obscure or hazy--and once he has made a deal he will stick with it, provided such is in Russia's national interest.
The Deep Thinkers of the Obama administration would be well advised to parse Putin's speech very closely and carefully. To do so is to understand the man and his policy context. To blow off his speech as mere politics, or to deprecate Putin as an imitation Western politician is to do him and us a great disservice. Vladimir is not just another politician or one more Russian dictator. No, he is the Good Czar, and a Good Czar with a totally Russian soul.
Tuesday, April 19, 2011
Some Days The World Is So Boring It's Hard To Stay Awake
There are days when the affairs of the world are ever so interesting, inherently fascinating and filled with reasons to alternate between laughter and tears, between an attack of the go-get-'ems and black depression. Today is not one of those days. Today is one of total tedium. It is a day where the same old, same olds triumph.
There is, for example, another example of the Obama administration teeing off to triple bogey a critical hole in the Mideast/North African course. You may have heard of the minority group in Algeria known as the Kabyles. This bunch is a subset of the indigenous dwellers of the mountainous interior of North Africa, the Berber. In Algeria the Kabyles number some ten million out of a total population of just under thirty-five million. Not an insignificant minority.
The Kabyles are Muslim but lean strongly in the secularist direction. They have a long and well established record as being hostile to groups such as AQIM which espouse violent political Islam. Their own more or less official militias have a history of keeping the peace in their home mountains which has benefited the Algerian government on numerous occasions including the long and very lethal insurgency during the Nineties. Over the years, including those of the Algerian insurgency against France in the Fifties and early Sixties, the Kaybeles have been strongly pro-Western. They remain such today--for the moment, at least.
The Kaybles are not satisfied with their current relations with the central government and have demanded a referendum on autonomy. Their search for government agreement on the proposed referendum has so far been without success. As a result the Kabyles have come to Washington seeking assistance in achieving their goal.
To date the Obama administration has given the Kaybele representatives the coldest of shoulders if not quite the bum's rush. All the heavyweights at the Pentagon and in the National Security Council are "in conference" when the Kabyles call or stop by. Text messages and voice mail go unanswered. Over at Foggy Bottom the supplicants are received but only by low level functionaries. (Perhaps the Kabyles would get further if they invited the Secretary of State to dinner; the lady does have a real fondness for the swank and swan of a diplomatic do.)
Demonstrations are planned to back the demand for the autonomy referendum. And, should those prove fruitless, the potential for violence is high, even very high. The history of the Kabyles is punctuated by periods during which these folks exhibited a very high competence at guerrilla war. Just ask the French about the Rif War and some of the other frontier fracases which marred their rulership.
The Kabyles have the capacity to put a very large, very highly motivated, reasonably well-armed force in the field. A Kabyle insurrection would provide the most severe test experienced by the Algerian government during its half century of existence. At the least the country would be destabilized to a degree tantamount to armed anarchy.
The Obama administration still has some influence in Algeria. It would be in the best interests of the US, Algeria, and the region if it were to place its weight behind the Kabyle referendum demand. An autonomous Kabyle state would not impair Algeria's existence or capacity to function. Nor are the Kabyles unreasonable. They understand the meaning of the word "compromise" and would be willing to work out one using the US as a mediator. For some reason or another they still trust us and our intentions.
The situation with the Kabyles in Algeria is so touchy and time sensitive that Mr Obama cannot do what he is famous for doing--temporizing until it is clear which side is winning. This is an emerging crisis where we cannot play catch-up; we must be ahead of the wave or it will crush us.
Over on the Korean Peninsula it appears that the Hermits of the North are cranking up for a third nuclear test. The tunnels are under construction. The combination of Northern determination and American jawboning has convinced the South to drop its (legitimate) requirement that the North apologize for the attacks last year before commencing bi-lateral talks either stand-alone or on the sidelines of a renewed Six Power Talk. It is easy to see that the North is after a restart of the Six Power Talks not to end its nuclear program for such will not happen, but rather to extort aid, particularly food, from the other participants, South Korea most of all.
After some brief excursions into pushing back against the Northerners and their sponsors in the Forbidden City, the Obama administration has reverted to its default posture of passivity coupled with a touching childlike faith in diplomatic conversations of a multi-lateral sort. The Obama signed order prohibiting the importation of anything made in North Korea to the US is not a departure from passivity-as-usual. Nor is it an effective means of coercing the North.
In short, the risk taking, in-your-face policies of the North are again proving successful. The US lacks the will and imagination necessary to impose any meaningful costs upon the Hermit Kingdom of the North. The Obama administration has no options at the present beyond bootless palaver with a rogue regime backed by a notoriously self-interested major power.
To zip back to the Mideast. All the Obama administration can do is look on with white knuckles and tight lips as Egypt moves one more step to full and normal relations with Iran. The movement of Cairo closer and closer to Tehran has alarmed both Israel and Saudi Arabia.
From the perspective of Israel, the growing affection between the two countries is a genuine national security threat. The transitional military government has already relaxed its tight controls on the Gaza border such that warlike stores can flow with greater ease to Hamas. Cozying up to Iran bodes to increase the flow all the more as well as to provide greater state cover for the Hamas threat.
To the House of Saud the partial resurrection of normal diplomatic relations constitutes a species of diplomatic treason. The Saudis see the move as a defection from the Arab camp to the opposition, the Persian Shiites. Given the demonstrated involvement of Iran in the unrest in Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud must be feeling a highly unpleasant frisson of fear with this development.
From the Washington point of view, the new diplomatic outreach is not a major development but it is one which runs directly counter to the announced American policy of "isolating" Iran. It represents a failure of this policy, a failure inflicted by a government which owes a goodly percentage of its successful existence to date to the backroom efforts of the US.
The Egyptian move is a tribute to the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and akin groups on the transitional military government. It implies that the Egyptians have concluded they can safely singe the beard of Uncle Sam if by so doing they can secure their flank against the domestic advocates of political Islam. The challenge for the administration is convincing the Egyptians that they have something real to lose if they get too close to Iran.
One last stop in today's trip from monotony to ennui: Africa, specifically Nigeria. The improbably named Goodluck Jonathan has won the presidency in an election generally conceded to have been the most fair, most honest, most open in that country for two or more decades. The Christian geologist turned politician won quite convincingly. He did overwhelmingly well in the Christian oil rich south and performed surprisingly well in the Muslim majority north.
No sooner than the ballots had been counted and the results verified than the Muslims in the north picked up machetes, torches, guns, and clubs with the view of killing Christians and burning churches. The death toll was rather modest as such affairs go in Africa's most populous country, but the potential for ongoing violence continues unabated. The Muslims (or at least some) are of the belief that Goodluck's victory somehow violated the informal rotation in office scheme which sees Muslim and Christian alternate in the presidency. As a consequence they allege vote fraud and look for someone to kill, something to burn.
Nigeria is fifty percent Muslim, forty percent Christian with the balance being primary adherents of traditional animist belief systems. The Christian south has the oil. The Muslim north has lots of dirt, rocks, and people. While apologists for the Muslim violence have averred the cause is the maldistribution of wealth, the substantial cause of violence is the political Islam message pumped out in mosque after mosque. The efforts of the local apostles of violent political Islam have been backed in their play by international groups including al-Qaeda.
Without very strong support from civilized states, including the US, the newly elected regime will have its plate all too full. To put it bluntly but not in oversimplified form, Nigeria is on the edge of prolonged, slow motion internal war powered by religion--at least on one side. At least for the next few weeks or months, Nigeria is trembling on the edge of becoming the Congo with oilfields. With armed advocates of violent political Islam in the north and the MEND insurgents in the Niger delta, the prospect for energetic dissassembly are high.
This is not a situation in which the Obama administration can adopt a watch-and-wait approach profitably. Neither can it sit on the sidelines until it becomes evident that the wrong side is wining or the state has tumbled into collapse. Robust and stalwart support for the elected government is needed urgently and quickly. The support may have to go beyond the level of presidential phone calls or statements. But, the US does get a fair amount of oil from the place and that should factor into administration decision making.
However if the past is but prologue as so often appears to be the case, the current administration will temporize, stand back, appeal to the "international community," and generally wring its hands over the limits of American power. Of course, it is not power which is lacking but rather two other commodities--wit and will. No matter how long on words Mr Obama and his team might be, they are woefully and persistently wanting in both wit and political will.
And, bucko, that is what makes today so damn boring.
There is, for example, another example of the Obama administration teeing off to triple bogey a critical hole in the Mideast/North African course. You may have heard of the minority group in Algeria known as the Kabyles. This bunch is a subset of the indigenous dwellers of the mountainous interior of North Africa, the Berber. In Algeria the Kabyles number some ten million out of a total population of just under thirty-five million. Not an insignificant minority.
The Kabyles are Muslim but lean strongly in the secularist direction. They have a long and well established record as being hostile to groups such as AQIM which espouse violent political Islam. Their own more or less official militias have a history of keeping the peace in their home mountains which has benefited the Algerian government on numerous occasions including the long and very lethal insurgency during the Nineties. Over the years, including those of the Algerian insurgency against France in the Fifties and early Sixties, the Kaybeles have been strongly pro-Western. They remain such today--for the moment, at least.
The Kaybles are not satisfied with their current relations with the central government and have demanded a referendum on autonomy. Their search for government agreement on the proposed referendum has so far been without success. As a result the Kabyles have come to Washington seeking assistance in achieving their goal.
To date the Obama administration has given the Kaybele representatives the coldest of shoulders if not quite the bum's rush. All the heavyweights at the Pentagon and in the National Security Council are "in conference" when the Kabyles call or stop by. Text messages and voice mail go unanswered. Over at Foggy Bottom the supplicants are received but only by low level functionaries. (Perhaps the Kabyles would get further if they invited the Secretary of State to dinner; the lady does have a real fondness for the swank and swan of a diplomatic do.)
Demonstrations are planned to back the demand for the autonomy referendum. And, should those prove fruitless, the potential for violence is high, even very high. The history of the Kabyles is punctuated by periods during which these folks exhibited a very high competence at guerrilla war. Just ask the French about the Rif War and some of the other frontier fracases which marred their rulership.
The Kabyles have the capacity to put a very large, very highly motivated, reasonably well-armed force in the field. A Kabyle insurrection would provide the most severe test experienced by the Algerian government during its half century of existence. At the least the country would be destabilized to a degree tantamount to armed anarchy.
The Obama administration still has some influence in Algeria. It would be in the best interests of the US, Algeria, and the region if it were to place its weight behind the Kabyle referendum demand. An autonomous Kabyle state would not impair Algeria's existence or capacity to function. Nor are the Kabyles unreasonable. They understand the meaning of the word "compromise" and would be willing to work out one using the US as a mediator. For some reason or another they still trust us and our intentions.
The situation with the Kabyles in Algeria is so touchy and time sensitive that Mr Obama cannot do what he is famous for doing--temporizing until it is clear which side is winning. This is an emerging crisis where we cannot play catch-up; we must be ahead of the wave or it will crush us.
Over on the Korean Peninsula it appears that the Hermits of the North are cranking up for a third nuclear test. The tunnels are under construction. The combination of Northern determination and American jawboning has convinced the South to drop its (legitimate) requirement that the North apologize for the attacks last year before commencing bi-lateral talks either stand-alone or on the sidelines of a renewed Six Power Talk. It is easy to see that the North is after a restart of the Six Power Talks not to end its nuclear program for such will not happen, but rather to extort aid, particularly food, from the other participants, South Korea most of all.
After some brief excursions into pushing back against the Northerners and their sponsors in the Forbidden City, the Obama administration has reverted to its default posture of passivity coupled with a touching childlike faith in diplomatic conversations of a multi-lateral sort. The Obama signed order prohibiting the importation of anything made in North Korea to the US is not a departure from passivity-as-usual. Nor is it an effective means of coercing the North.
In short, the risk taking, in-your-face policies of the North are again proving successful. The US lacks the will and imagination necessary to impose any meaningful costs upon the Hermit Kingdom of the North. The Obama administration has no options at the present beyond bootless palaver with a rogue regime backed by a notoriously self-interested major power.
To zip back to the Mideast. All the Obama administration can do is look on with white knuckles and tight lips as Egypt moves one more step to full and normal relations with Iran. The movement of Cairo closer and closer to Tehran has alarmed both Israel and Saudi Arabia.
From the perspective of Israel, the growing affection between the two countries is a genuine national security threat. The transitional military government has already relaxed its tight controls on the Gaza border such that warlike stores can flow with greater ease to Hamas. Cozying up to Iran bodes to increase the flow all the more as well as to provide greater state cover for the Hamas threat.
To the House of Saud the partial resurrection of normal diplomatic relations constitutes a species of diplomatic treason. The Saudis see the move as a defection from the Arab camp to the opposition, the Persian Shiites. Given the demonstrated involvement of Iran in the unrest in Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud must be feeling a highly unpleasant frisson of fear with this development.
From the Washington point of view, the new diplomatic outreach is not a major development but it is one which runs directly counter to the announced American policy of "isolating" Iran. It represents a failure of this policy, a failure inflicted by a government which owes a goodly percentage of its successful existence to date to the backroom efforts of the US.
The Egyptian move is a tribute to the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and akin groups on the transitional military government. It implies that the Egyptians have concluded they can safely singe the beard of Uncle Sam if by so doing they can secure their flank against the domestic advocates of political Islam. The challenge for the administration is convincing the Egyptians that they have something real to lose if they get too close to Iran.
One last stop in today's trip from monotony to ennui: Africa, specifically Nigeria. The improbably named Goodluck Jonathan has won the presidency in an election generally conceded to have been the most fair, most honest, most open in that country for two or more decades. The Christian geologist turned politician won quite convincingly. He did overwhelmingly well in the Christian oil rich south and performed surprisingly well in the Muslim majority north.
No sooner than the ballots had been counted and the results verified than the Muslims in the north picked up machetes, torches, guns, and clubs with the view of killing Christians and burning churches. The death toll was rather modest as such affairs go in Africa's most populous country, but the potential for ongoing violence continues unabated. The Muslims (or at least some) are of the belief that Goodluck's victory somehow violated the informal rotation in office scheme which sees Muslim and Christian alternate in the presidency. As a consequence they allege vote fraud and look for someone to kill, something to burn.
Nigeria is fifty percent Muslim, forty percent Christian with the balance being primary adherents of traditional animist belief systems. The Christian south has the oil. The Muslim north has lots of dirt, rocks, and people. While apologists for the Muslim violence have averred the cause is the maldistribution of wealth, the substantial cause of violence is the political Islam message pumped out in mosque after mosque. The efforts of the local apostles of violent political Islam have been backed in their play by international groups including al-Qaeda.
Without very strong support from civilized states, including the US, the newly elected regime will have its plate all too full. To put it bluntly but not in oversimplified form, Nigeria is on the edge of prolonged, slow motion internal war powered by religion--at least on one side. At least for the next few weeks or months, Nigeria is trembling on the edge of becoming the Congo with oilfields. With armed advocates of violent political Islam in the north and the MEND insurgents in the Niger delta, the prospect for energetic dissassembly are high.
This is not a situation in which the Obama administration can adopt a watch-and-wait approach profitably. Neither can it sit on the sidelines until it becomes evident that the wrong side is wining or the state has tumbled into collapse. Robust and stalwart support for the elected government is needed urgently and quickly. The support may have to go beyond the level of presidential phone calls or statements. But, the US does get a fair amount of oil from the place and that should factor into administration decision making.
However if the past is but prologue as so often appears to be the case, the current administration will temporize, stand back, appeal to the "international community," and generally wring its hands over the limits of American power. Of course, it is not power which is lacking but rather two other commodities--wit and will. No matter how long on words Mr Obama and his team might be, they are woefully and persistently wanting in both wit and political will.
And, bucko, that is what makes today so damn boring.
Monday, April 18, 2011
Libya And The Credibility Of NATO
NATO has been with us for more than a half century now. It served its purpose well during the Cold War by providing Europe with a credible capacity to commit suicide. It was this American furnished capacity which convinced the Soviet Union time and time again that there was nothing to be gained by either invading Europe or merely threatening to do so. Occupying a radioactive wasteland was not a profitable foreign policy course of action.
With the ending of the Cold War, the demise of NATO was cheerfully forecast in numerous quarters both in the US and Europe. As was the case with Mark Twain, reports of death were premature. Still the Big Question remained: What role would NATO serve with the end of the Warsaw Pact/Soviet threat?
The affray in former Yugoslavia which marked so many of the years otherwise dominated by Whitewater and assorted Ladies of the Oval Office appeared to provide an alternative mission for the semi-defunct alliance. At the time, you may recall, there was debate over whether or not the US had a bull in the Bosnian herd. More than a few Deep Thinkers of the Clinton administration believed it to be a purely European matter. A few held the contrary opinion, that the fate of ethnic and religious minorities in the rapidly and energetically disassembling one time country presented a challenge to American values and norms.
The European house was divided on the issue. Some political leaders and public intellectuals remembered that World War I had its origins in the conflict zones of Bosnia and adjacent areas. While the analogy was both poor and unconvincing, it did take hold on some imaginations. But others held different views. Germany, for example, stood back while providing assistance to one of the successor mini-states, Croatia.
Finally, the US did what the US was expected to do--make a decision and provide leadership. The Clinton administration having been convinced by advocates of air power that a few strikes from the blue would suffice to bring the Serbs to their senses authorized an air interdiction effort to be conducted under the official auspices of NATO. With the aid of a few anemic air forces from others of the alliance, the US did "shock and awe" the Serbs. There were more than a few collateral civilian casualties as when the bombers visited Belgrade. The deaths and destruction did not do the trick, so ground forces were ultimately (and quite reluctantly) added to the force package.
The US did step back a bit after the opening weeks of the intervention, but there is no doubt the heavy lifting was performed by American forces both air and ground. When the dust settled, there was a general agreement that NATO had passed the test, imposing peace and saving Muslims from the killing fields. This conclusion can be debated but was nonetheless almost universally accepted. NATO had a new lease on life.
The Bosnian precedent was in play when NATO after 9/11 invoked Article V of the charter for the very first time and joined with the US in the invasion of Afghanistan. This nasty little war started with whoops of unrestrained enthusiasm. Now, a decade later the enthusiasm is not even a dim memory, and most of the NATO contingents still in country are seeking the earliest departure date possible.
Other NATO members who joined the invasion have long since gone. Part of the reason for the early bailouts and reluctant remaining can be assigned to the pathetic leadership offered by the Bush/Cheney administration, particularly their decision to march off to Iraq with the job in Afghanistan barely begun let alone finished. The Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq was not widely supported in NATO. Even in those NATO members which accompanied the US on the road to Baghdad, the support was not deep and had no real potential to be prolonged.
The combination of "mission leap" in Afghanistan and invading Iraq undercut the capacity and political will of NATO for out-of-theater operations. Worse, the style and strategy of the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld crew severely eroded American leadership in the alliance. A widespread distaste for being seen as instruments of a made-in-the-USA policy with no authentic European interests grew to the mutual disadvantage of both the US and NATO.
It is within this context that the NATO operations in Libya must be considered. The actions must also be viewed against the backdrop of the Obama understanding of multi-lateralism and American leadership in such. Context and backdrop frame the current operations in Libya. The manner in which the framing operates does much to explain why and how the credibility of NATO is at stake.
The importance of credibility resides not with the continuation of NATO. The alliance will soldier on. Rather it lies with how NATO is seen by states hostile to either or both Europe and the US. This list includes the obvious--Iran--and the less self-evident or longer term such as Pakistan, Russia, China, and non-state actors having state support or safe haven.
To be a credible instrument of deterrence, the alliance must be seen and generally understood as possessing both the military means and political will necessary to wage effective war at all levels of the intensity spectrum from the smallest asymmetrical conflict to full bore conventional war with or without a nuclear aspect. Any perceived failure by NATO in either military means or political will can erode the deterrent potential of NATO as it can that of any individual nation-state.
When the newly muscular Nicholas Sarkozy determined that France would be on the mythical "right side of history," he could have opted to put together a "coalition of the willing" in the manner of George W. Bush on the eve of invading Iraq. There was at least one other "willing" state, the UK. Between them, Sarkozy and Cameron could have induced (dragooned?) other states into joining the coalition. But, Sarko and Cameron did not take this route.
The reason is easy to see. As had been shown so plainly and painfully by the US and its "coalition" in Iraq, such ad hoc assemblages have lesser legitimacy than that possessed by older, well established systems such as NATO. The most legitimate but most inhibiting route of all was that taken by Sarkozy and Cameron--a Security Council resolution with ultimate execution under the flag of NATO. The biggest insect in the ointment was not the Security Council--even though, as might have been anticipated, the resolution was too limited to allow the accomplishment of the ultimate goal, the removal of Gaddafi--but rather the role and attitude of the US as defined by the Obama administration.
The US had even less national and strategic interests in play with respect to Libya than it had in the Bosnian affray. The uber-realist Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, could adduce only the most hazy of interests in play--that of regional stability--to justify any American involvement in Libya. Had American decision making been left to the dictates of realism, there would be no US aircraft in the sky over Libya. However, idealism had its very effective advocates within the administration, the Three Furies of Hilary Clinton, Samantha Powers, and Susan Rice.
Siding with the Three Furies, the Clueless Guy In The Oval then had two critical decisions to make. The first was definition of the goal of military operations, would they be restricted to the no-fly and protect the civilians substance of the Security Council resolution or would they be expanded to include the president's expressed desire to rid Libya of Gaddafi. The second was the role to be played by the US: Would we lead the exercise which implied doing the majority of the heavy lifting or would we hand off to some other executive entity such as NATO and retire to a support position in the relative shadows?
As was to have been expected, Mr Obama split the difference or, to err on the side of accuracy, sat down firmly between two stools on both issues. Operationally, the US and others would abide by the restrictive provisions of the resolution while rhetorically overkilling Gaddafi. We would run the show--and do the overwhelming majority of the work--for a few days and hand off to NATO while doing a few specialized missions.
The firm sitting between two stools in each matter has set up NATO for a perceived failure. By limiting the operations to the narrow focus allowed by the Security Council resolution while continuing to exercise the most belligerent oratory, the US has acted to strengthen the political will of Gaddafi and his sons while simultaneously leading the rebels to believe that we and NATO would assure their victory. Our hand off to NATO knowing that the alliance lacked not only the basics such as adequate stockpiles of precision munitions and aircraft as well as the most important consideration of all--unity of political will--was not only ill-advised it set up the alliance for a perceived failure.
While there are cheerleaders for NATO who argue eloquently for the alliance, proclaiming that after a rough start matters are improving rapidly, it is hard to accept these arguments at face value. In point of fact there can and will be no certain security for the non-combatants of Libya as long as Colonel Gaddafi is in charge. The Security Council resolution was predicated upon the R2P doctrine. This means that the removal of Gaddafi must be subsumed in the overall orientation to protecting non-combatants. This does not mean handing the rebels a victory as so many of their amorphous leadership seems to believe but simply the ending of Brother Leader's rule.
The Obama administration should have made US support for the Sarkozy/Cameron program contingent upon the removal of Gaddafi being placed front and center as the public goal of the air effort. Anything less constitutes an exercise in futility.
The removal of Gaddafi requires more than the establishment of a no-fly zone. It requires more than the partial neutralization of armor, artillery, or other heavy weapons. The protection of non-combatants as well as the removal of Gaddafi demands the defeat of Gaddafi's armed forces.
The defeat of the Gaddafi loyalists requires the application of overwhelming force in as time limited a manner as possible. High combat tempo requires large forces. NATO lacks these as was well understood by the US. By handing over responsibility to NATO, the US condemned Libya and the Libyans to a prolonged war in which more people would die and more destruction occur than otherwise would have been the case.
The paucity of forces available to NATO, which has been compounded by the very limited inventories of precision guided munitions as well as the absence of interoperability between some NATO air forces and readily available American PGMs, has assured the air campaign has been characterized by missed opportunities and incomplete successes. Yes, some tanks and tube artillery have been destroyed, but more tanks, more tubes, and more Grad launching trucks remain often unmolested despite clear skies and good, actionable intelligence.
As the days have gone by in their bloody progress with stalemate seemingly more certain with every sunset, the military competence and political will of NATO collectively are increasingly open to question. The use of cluster munitions against civilian population centers most notably Misrata as well as the resolute rhetoric employed by Saif Gaddafai recently all bespeak of enhanced will on the part of the current regime to keep itself in power.
The US did not exercise the leadership expected of it. President Obama did not act as President Clinton did with respect to Bosnia. This did not sit well with the countries of NATO oriented toward ending Gaddafi's reign. Nor did the US leaving the frontline for a support position sit well either. Regardless of national pride and irrespective of the burdens put on the US forces by other commitments, only the Americans have the force necessary to carry out a high tempo operation across the full breadth of Libya. There was, no doubt, an expectation that the US would do what it has always done in the past--lead and fight.
When the US did not behave as expected--and as Mr Obama himself warned a year or so back in Trinidad--there was consternation in NATO. There has also been a degree, a high degree of despair, among the rebels who hoped and expected more from NATO--and the US.
The situation has reached a point that the credibility of NATO as a deterrent is at stake. The generally perceived failure of the alliance to suppress the fourth rate military of Gaddafi to a point that it doesn't threaten non-combatants on an hourly basis has undercut its value. This implies the US now has a national interest in play in Libya--the perceived credibility of our longest standing military alliance. Perhaps the time has come for the Americans to get off the bench and back into the war. We have a good enough reason to.
With the ending of the Cold War, the demise of NATO was cheerfully forecast in numerous quarters both in the US and Europe. As was the case with Mark Twain, reports of death were premature. Still the Big Question remained: What role would NATO serve with the end of the Warsaw Pact/Soviet threat?
The affray in former Yugoslavia which marked so many of the years otherwise dominated by Whitewater and assorted Ladies of the Oval Office appeared to provide an alternative mission for the semi-defunct alliance. At the time, you may recall, there was debate over whether or not the US had a bull in the Bosnian herd. More than a few Deep Thinkers of the Clinton administration believed it to be a purely European matter. A few held the contrary opinion, that the fate of ethnic and religious minorities in the rapidly and energetically disassembling one time country presented a challenge to American values and norms.
The European house was divided on the issue. Some political leaders and public intellectuals remembered that World War I had its origins in the conflict zones of Bosnia and adjacent areas. While the analogy was both poor and unconvincing, it did take hold on some imaginations. But others held different views. Germany, for example, stood back while providing assistance to one of the successor mini-states, Croatia.
Finally, the US did what the US was expected to do--make a decision and provide leadership. The Clinton administration having been convinced by advocates of air power that a few strikes from the blue would suffice to bring the Serbs to their senses authorized an air interdiction effort to be conducted under the official auspices of NATO. With the aid of a few anemic air forces from others of the alliance, the US did "shock and awe" the Serbs. There were more than a few collateral civilian casualties as when the bombers visited Belgrade. The deaths and destruction did not do the trick, so ground forces were ultimately (and quite reluctantly) added to the force package.
The US did step back a bit after the opening weeks of the intervention, but there is no doubt the heavy lifting was performed by American forces both air and ground. When the dust settled, there was a general agreement that NATO had passed the test, imposing peace and saving Muslims from the killing fields. This conclusion can be debated but was nonetheless almost universally accepted. NATO had a new lease on life.
The Bosnian precedent was in play when NATO after 9/11 invoked Article V of the charter for the very first time and joined with the US in the invasion of Afghanistan. This nasty little war started with whoops of unrestrained enthusiasm. Now, a decade later the enthusiasm is not even a dim memory, and most of the NATO contingents still in country are seeking the earliest departure date possible.
Other NATO members who joined the invasion have long since gone. Part of the reason for the early bailouts and reluctant remaining can be assigned to the pathetic leadership offered by the Bush/Cheney administration, particularly their decision to march off to Iraq with the job in Afghanistan barely begun let alone finished. The Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq was not widely supported in NATO. Even in those NATO members which accompanied the US on the road to Baghdad, the support was not deep and had no real potential to be prolonged.
The combination of "mission leap" in Afghanistan and invading Iraq undercut the capacity and political will of NATO for out-of-theater operations. Worse, the style and strategy of the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld crew severely eroded American leadership in the alliance. A widespread distaste for being seen as instruments of a made-in-the-USA policy with no authentic European interests grew to the mutual disadvantage of both the US and NATO.
It is within this context that the NATO operations in Libya must be considered. The actions must also be viewed against the backdrop of the Obama understanding of multi-lateralism and American leadership in such. Context and backdrop frame the current operations in Libya. The manner in which the framing operates does much to explain why and how the credibility of NATO is at stake.
The importance of credibility resides not with the continuation of NATO. The alliance will soldier on. Rather it lies with how NATO is seen by states hostile to either or both Europe and the US. This list includes the obvious--Iran--and the less self-evident or longer term such as Pakistan, Russia, China, and non-state actors having state support or safe haven.
To be a credible instrument of deterrence, the alliance must be seen and generally understood as possessing both the military means and political will necessary to wage effective war at all levels of the intensity spectrum from the smallest asymmetrical conflict to full bore conventional war with or without a nuclear aspect. Any perceived failure by NATO in either military means or political will can erode the deterrent potential of NATO as it can that of any individual nation-state.
When the newly muscular Nicholas Sarkozy determined that France would be on the mythical "right side of history," he could have opted to put together a "coalition of the willing" in the manner of George W. Bush on the eve of invading Iraq. There was at least one other "willing" state, the UK. Between them, Sarkozy and Cameron could have induced (dragooned?) other states into joining the coalition. But, Sarko and Cameron did not take this route.
The reason is easy to see. As had been shown so plainly and painfully by the US and its "coalition" in Iraq, such ad hoc assemblages have lesser legitimacy than that possessed by older, well established systems such as NATO. The most legitimate but most inhibiting route of all was that taken by Sarkozy and Cameron--a Security Council resolution with ultimate execution under the flag of NATO. The biggest insect in the ointment was not the Security Council--even though, as might have been anticipated, the resolution was too limited to allow the accomplishment of the ultimate goal, the removal of Gaddafi--but rather the role and attitude of the US as defined by the Obama administration.
The US had even less national and strategic interests in play with respect to Libya than it had in the Bosnian affray. The uber-realist Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, could adduce only the most hazy of interests in play--that of regional stability--to justify any American involvement in Libya. Had American decision making been left to the dictates of realism, there would be no US aircraft in the sky over Libya. However, idealism had its very effective advocates within the administration, the Three Furies of Hilary Clinton, Samantha Powers, and Susan Rice.
Siding with the Three Furies, the Clueless Guy In The Oval then had two critical decisions to make. The first was definition of the goal of military operations, would they be restricted to the no-fly and protect the civilians substance of the Security Council resolution or would they be expanded to include the president's expressed desire to rid Libya of Gaddafi. The second was the role to be played by the US: Would we lead the exercise which implied doing the majority of the heavy lifting or would we hand off to some other executive entity such as NATO and retire to a support position in the relative shadows?
As was to have been expected, Mr Obama split the difference or, to err on the side of accuracy, sat down firmly between two stools on both issues. Operationally, the US and others would abide by the restrictive provisions of the resolution while rhetorically overkilling Gaddafi. We would run the show--and do the overwhelming majority of the work--for a few days and hand off to NATO while doing a few specialized missions.
The firm sitting between two stools in each matter has set up NATO for a perceived failure. By limiting the operations to the narrow focus allowed by the Security Council resolution while continuing to exercise the most belligerent oratory, the US has acted to strengthen the political will of Gaddafi and his sons while simultaneously leading the rebels to believe that we and NATO would assure their victory. Our hand off to NATO knowing that the alliance lacked not only the basics such as adequate stockpiles of precision munitions and aircraft as well as the most important consideration of all--unity of political will--was not only ill-advised it set up the alliance for a perceived failure.
While there are cheerleaders for NATO who argue eloquently for the alliance, proclaiming that after a rough start matters are improving rapidly, it is hard to accept these arguments at face value. In point of fact there can and will be no certain security for the non-combatants of Libya as long as Colonel Gaddafi is in charge. The Security Council resolution was predicated upon the R2P doctrine. This means that the removal of Gaddafi must be subsumed in the overall orientation to protecting non-combatants. This does not mean handing the rebels a victory as so many of their amorphous leadership seems to believe but simply the ending of Brother Leader's rule.
The Obama administration should have made US support for the Sarkozy/Cameron program contingent upon the removal of Gaddafi being placed front and center as the public goal of the air effort. Anything less constitutes an exercise in futility.
The removal of Gaddafi requires more than the establishment of a no-fly zone. It requires more than the partial neutralization of armor, artillery, or other heavy weapons. The protection of non-combatants as well as the removal of Gaddafi demands the defeat of Gaddafi's armed forces.
The defeat of the Gaddafi loyalists requires the application of overwhelming force in as time limited a manner as possible. High combat tempo requires large forces. NATO lacks these as was well understood by the US. By handing over responsibility to NATO, the US condemned Libya and the Libyans to a prolonged war in which more people would die and more destruction occur than otherwise would have been the case.
The paucity of forces available to NATO, which has been compounded by the very limited inventories of precision guided munitions as well as the absence of interoperability between some NATO air forces and readily available American PGMs, has assured the air campaign has been characterized by missed opportunities and incomplete successes. Yes, some tanks and tube artillery have been destroyed, but more tanks, more tubes, and more Grad launching trucks remain often unmolested despite clear skies and good, actionable intelligence.
As the days have gone by in their bloody progress with stalemate seemingly more certain with every sunset, the military competence and political will of NATO collectively are increasingly open to question. The use of cluster munitions against civilian population centers most notably Misrata as well as the resolute rhetoric employed by Saif Gaddafai recently all bespeak of enhanced will on the part of the current regime to keep itself in power.
The US did not exercise the leadership expected of it. President Obama did not act as President Clinton did with respect to Bosnia. This did not sit well with the countries of NATO oriented toward ending Gaddafi's reign. Nor did the US leaving the frontline for a support position sit well either. Regardless of national pride and irrespective of the burdens put on the US forces by other commitments, only the Americans have the force necessary to carry out a high tempo operation across the full breadth of Libya. There was, no doubt, an expectation that the US would do what it has always done in the past--lead and fight.
When the US did not behave as expected--and as Mr Obama himself warned a year or so back in Trinidad--there was consternation in NATO. There has also been a degree, a high degree of despair, among the rebels who hoped and expected more from NATO--and the US.
The situation has reached a point that the credibility of NATO as a deterrent is at stake. The generally perceived failure of the alliance to suppress the fourth rate military of Gaddafi to a point that it doesn't threaten non-combatants on an hourly basis has undercut its value. This implies the US now has a national interest in play in Libya--the perceived credibility of our longest standing military alliance. Perhaps the time has come for the Americans to get off the bench and back into the war. We have a good enough reason to.
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