Happy Talk--But, There Is Bad News Coming

The Pentagon spin machine has released its latest Congressionally required semi-annual appraisal of the state of play in Afghanistan.  By and large it is 108 pages of happy talk, soothing mood music, a sort of happy-days-will-be-coming-soon-(maybe.)  The same tone, very upbeat, but with a slight note of caution obtains in the news release issued as a cover letter on the report.

The report spends fifty-three pages in consideration of the security situation in-country.  Much of the good news is contained in this section.  It is clear that operations over the past several months have shifted the initiative to the the ISAF/US/ANF coalition.  The insurgents despite their capacity to undertake high visibility attacks, plant IEDs, and generally give the appearance of still being in the fight have lost the initiative and seem to have lost some of their will to combat.

The Local Security Program which dates back to General McChrystal and is the descendant of the Vietnam War Combined Action Platoon Program as well as the much deprecated Regional Forces-Popular Forces ("Ruff-Puffs") has been developing with a fair degree of success even given the opposition of the Karzai government and the inherent corruption and inefficiency of the Afghan Interior Ministry.  Should this trend continue over the next six months, it bodes well for long term stability as only a credible locally based force with primary loyalty to the area it is protecting can assure Taliban and the other insurgent groups cannot and will not return after the foreigners leave.  It is clear that more external support for the development of the local forces is required.  It is equally evident that more pressure must be placed on Kabul to allow the local forces to develop and deploy.

The same applies to the Afghan Local Police.  This organization (to use the term generically and loosely only) is not only a necessary complement to the Local Security Program's Village Stability Operations, it provides the only governmental presence which is directly observable by and accountable to the local folks.  Thus it is a critical instrument of government which, if operating correctly, will go toward countering the impression of the Afghan National Police and Army as corrupt, distant, and non-responsive.  Again, Kabul has dragged its feet in allowing and encouraging the development of the Afghan Local Police due to its customary fear of losing control of the population--as if it actually ever had any such control.

The report way understates both the importance of these locally oriented efforts and the resistance to them which is presented by the central government.  This is unfortunate and raises doubts about the future ability of the Pentagon (and considering the impending change of management) the Agency to evaluate progress or lack thereof in Afghanistan.  The low balling of the local initiatives also erodes the ability of Congress to assure American dollars and manpower is put to the best possible use.

The thirty-five pages covering the development and deployment of the Afghan National Army and Police is optimistic but not overly so.  The report does note the severe problem presented by the very, very low level of basic literacy among the recruits.  It pays some attention to the chronic willingness of ANF&P personnel to desert, change sides, or "go rogue."  Overall, the attrition affecting the ANF&P represents a major challenge in meeting the ambitious goals for force size.  It may be necessary for Kabul to institute a draft of some sort which would open a very large can of very vicious political and tribal worms.

The subtext of the pages considering the procurement process for the ANF&P hints at but, unfortunately, does not state the difficulties presented by pervasive corruption.  The problem is that the corrupt actions are not simply those of locals but involve representatives of foreign firms offering both equipment and materiel.  It is easy to see the political/diplomatic considerations which demanded a heavy foot on the soft pedal.  Even if justifiable, this absence of accuracy misleads the reader, congressional, media, or private citizen.

Because of the mis-definition of the mission in Afghanistan as one of "nation-building" rather than one of punishment and deterrence, the report wanders at some length into the areas of governance and "reconstruction and development" as well as counternarcotics.  All of these areas may be of very real relevance to the Afghan population, but they are tangential at best to the US and its foreign allies.  The goal of assuring that Afghanistan does not and will never again provide a safe haven to groups practicing violent political Islam does not require the construction of a faux Western nation-state from the tribal warp and woof of the local population.

Unfortunately, the military does not question the importance of these civilian goals any more in this report than it has in previous efforts or in the decision making process regarding the nature and character of the military efforts in-country.  The underlying assumption that nation-building is central to effective counterinsurgency rides along in splendor, unquestioned, undoubted in this report.  A close reading of the sections regarding nation-building shows a surplus of fine sounding mood music, lofty words, and even loftier ambitions coupled with barely whispered lyrics concerning the sorry record of nearly unmitigated failure in all areas.

One lack is noteworthy due to its sheer obviousness.  There is not a word about religion or the role of religion in facilitating instability within the country.  Nor is there any consideration of the centrality of tribal affiliation and loyalties to the challenges of facilitating the construction of a unitary national identity and state in Afghanistan.  The leaving aside of the two most important features of individual and group self-identification so as to not consider their impact on the goals of nation-building is an inexcusable flaw in the report as it was in predecessors.  The complete absence of such key features skews the ability of any reader to accurately appreciate what can and cannot be done in-country along with what has and has not been accomplished.

A total of three, that's right, three pages was spent considering Afghanistan in its regional engagement context.  Considering that the Taliban and Haqqani network as well as the survivors of al-Qaeda would have been sent to Paradise years ago had Pakistan not been such a close and inviting ally, the failure to accurately and comprehensively consider the regional engagement aspect of the conflict is a fine example of moral and intellectual bankruptcy.

All and all this semi-annual exercise in shading reality resembles the everything-is-perfect-and-getting-better approach of the Pentagon during the Vietnam War.  One can only wonder if the denizens both in the Five Sided Wigwam and Afghanistan are deluding themselves or simply hoping to delude the rest of us--particularly the money givers on the Hill.

As if to prove the cautionary notes of impending problems and setbacks contained in the report are not only accurate but in their accuracy buttress the marginal credibility of the entire exercise, there are now two shop mutterings of Taliban major attacks coming in the next few days.  No details of course, just the vague words about casualties and ultimate Taliban failure.  It is a fine example of salvation through good timing or, to use the invisible motto over the entrance at Langley, "Thank God for coincidence."