And Still The Blood Flows---

Yesterday the Syrian security forces killed more than one hundred anti-government protesters.  Today it was more of the same as snipers in civilian clothes were reported to be engaging funeral processions in suburbs of Damascus.  It is looking more and more like Bashir al-Assad is losing control of the situation as the old truism of the dead dictating policy is once again operative among the long repressed and fearful folks of Syria.

While still too early to start an inquest on the Fall of the Baathists, it does seem that Bashir miscalculated in his mix of pseudo-reforms and blunt repression.  His father, Hafez, skipped the reform gambit, relying on repression pure and simple.  It is self-evident that Bashir is not a chip off the old block, but is actually inclined to being a reformer as he has so often proclaimed.

As Bashir's allies and mentors in Tehran could (and undoubtedly have) advised, forget about gestures of reform when faced by mobs in the streets, just go ahead and kill them.  The mixed messages from the top of the tree in Damascus which started in the immediate wake of the very first protests have given the impression of a weak will being in charge.  Having wrong footed it from the get-go, the Syrian regime must now play catch up in the break-their-will-by-killing-enough-of-them game.  As events in Yemen have made crystalline, this is not the way to go. Unless you are willing to toss in the towel and get the next stage out of Dodge (hopefully with immunity from prosecution.)

It may still be possible for the Baathists to kill their way to remaining in office, but it will take a very great deal of killing for that to happen.  This opens the question of how much killing will other states accept.  How many bodies must be piled up in how short a time to force some sort of international collective action perhaps even of the Libyan sort?

In a way the Syrian government is quite fortunate that the Libyan adventure in humanitarian protection is underway.  The difficulties which have been encountered in what too many civilian leaders in the West incorrectly assumed would be a quick, cheap, and easy operation against the opinion of military commanders, particularly those of the US, have put a deep chill on any notion of imposing a peaceful regime change on Bashir et al.

No one well oriented in time and place would consider Syria to be the easy nut to crack that Libya appeared to be.  The Syrian defense capacities are orders of magnitude greater than those possessed by Libya, and the army, although conscript in nature, has not yet turned on the regime.  An attack by outsiders would be certain to keep the armed forces loyal to the government.  It would even turn back some civilians from the path of opposition to that of support.  To belabor the obvious, the military option is a non-starter--even if the Security Council could be cozened into one more R2P predicated resolution.

Nor is Syria all that easy to isolate either diplomatically or economically.  Unless and until Iran concludes that Bashir cannot survive, Syria will have its support and assistance.  Given the success shown by Iran in avoiding and evading sanctions, this support is not trivial.  Iran is not likely to give up on Syria quickly or easily considering the importance of Syria to Iranian diplomatic and paramilitary ambitions in the region.  However, if the mullahs see the end is near--or even merely probable--it can be expected they will open contact with the opposition so as to protect their investment in Syria and ongoing access to the proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.

The clandestine war between Iran and Saudi Arabia has a new front in Syria along with the older one in Iraq. The majority of the Syrian population is Sunni which gives Saudi Arabia a form of home court advantage which it lacks in Iraq.  That plus the money the House of Saud can pass around gives the Kingdom quite a leg up over the mullahs.  So, it is probable that Iran will stick with Bashir until the bitter end with the Saudis doing all they can to encourage the anti-government forces.

This implies more pressure will be put on the US to at least go full throated in its rhetoric of condemnation.  The Saudis would expect the US to go beyond words into the realm of sanctions.  This is possible but meaningless in effect.  As events have shown elsewhere and repeatedly, sanctions of all sorts are very weak weapons whose effects, if any, are long in coming.  Still, the US will have to go through the motions not only to placate the Saudis but also to sooth the bruised sensitivities of various components of the Obama base.

In the past the Baathists have shown a willingness to kill on levels undreamed of by Gaddafi and company.  The imperatives to do the same now exist.  The government, the higher ranks of the military, the security services, the elites aligned with these are all comprised of minorities including the Alawites and Christians who would be at great risk should Muslims given to violent political Islam gain the ascendancy.  Considering that the long outlawed Muslim Brotherhood still exists with the organizational competence necessary to gain political dominance, the fear of losing one's life felt by many in the regime's higher and mid-ranks is realistic.

Not even the Israelis are sure that removing Bashir and the Baathists would be a good idea.  The current regime may be highly anti-Israeli and almost as stridently anti-American, but the Syrian government is predictable, does keep the peace, can keep out of Hezbollah initiated wars, and does restrain more than a few terrorist groups.  As the Geek has argued in previous posts, it is still possible to wean the Syrians away from the Iranian orbit and even onto the first faint path of true reform--but it takes Israel recognizing the reality that it can't keep the Golan Heights any longer.

As coercion is not a viable option in Syria, perhaps the time has come for the administration to focus on inducements.  The only inducement which matters so much to Bashir and the Baathists that they would be willing to drop the Iranian connection and consider real reforms is the return of the Golan.  The problem is simply that time is the most important commodity right now and this means the administration and Israel must do something both are loath to do--work fast for a dramatic solution to a real and bloody problem.