The Egyptian Foreign Policy "Reset" Button

One upon a time Egypt was a power to be reckoned with, even to be feared.  No, kiddies, not in the time of Ramses or one of the other big time pharaohs but fifty years ago when Gamal Abdel Nasser was running the show.

Nasser built much of his personal power on projecting Egypt very large on the international scene.  The fertile mind and great energy of the one time colonel turned dictator was responsible for the phenomenon of pan-Arabism.  In addition, he was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement.  Nasser rapidly became the bete noir of John Foster Dulles to say nothing of so alienating both the British and French governments that these two allies linked up with Israel in a conspiracy to commit aggressive war against Nasser's Egypt.

Throughout it all, through all the defeats in war, the ups and downs of regional and global diplomacy, all the twists and turns of playing the Cold War game, the Egyptian public felt very, very good about themselves, their country, and their leader.  Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, also played the foreign policy game well.  And, better yet for the Egyptians, he played the Great Game of War far better than had Nasser with the  result that the Egyptian army and people reclaimed their long lost testicles in 1973 with the Yom Kippur War.  Sadat followed that with the best diplomatic volte face in years when he switched sides from the Soviets to the Americans.

Egyptians walked tall and talked loud, punching well above their weight in the global arena.  They continued to do so right on to and past the signing of the Camp David Accords.  But, not long after Mubarak replaced the assassinated Sadat, the Egyptian diplomatic power house faded to black.

True, Egypt helped this process when signing the Camp David Accords resulted in Cairo being shunned by the other "frontline" states of the Arab League.  However, far more important than this brief episode was the decision made incrementally by Hosni Mubarak to link Egypt's domestic political tranquility and economic well being to the US policy interest of maintaining Mideast peace.  Egypt withdrew from the diplomatic arena in all save a few, carefully selected, peace enhancing ways.

As long as Mubarak followed this approach of quiescence, the US overlooked the lack of democracy and the abundance of repression in Egypt.  Additionally, the US provided huge amounts of money desperately needed by Egypt to keep consumer prices on basic commodities low.  It was a decent bargain for both sides.

The bargain gave rise to a persistent belief among Egyptians that Mubarak was nothing more than an American lapdog.  This belief was and is emblematic of a proud people's reaction to their country and government having gone from the top ranks of diplomatic players to the silent majority of states that don't matter.

While subsidiary in importance to purely domestic issues, the shrinking of Egypt's global status was not absent in the overthrow of Mubarak.  The chant, "Stand tall, you are Egyptian!" speaks to that issue bluntly and clearly.

The tossing over of Mubarak assured that Egypt would shortly embark upon a new course of diplomacy.  It was a given that this new course would be one which kept the US at least at an arm's length.  It was a given that Egypt would edge closer to Iran.  It was a given that Egypt would be far more solicitous of the Palestinian cause.

Implied in these givens was the high probability that Egypt's new course would be one which did not meet with the approbation of the Saudis.  A further implication running in tandem with the first is that insofar as Egypt moved closer to Iran, the more it would find itself caught in the crossfire of the Saudi-Iranian cold war.

While there are some experts on the Mideast who think that the triangular dynamic of thirty years ago--Egypt, Iran and Turkey--exists unchanged today the reality is different, far different.  Even thirty years ago, the triangle was morphing into a quadrilateral with Iraq.  Today it is again a four cornered array with Saudi Arabia as the fourth.  The degree to which Iran influences Turkish policy is debatable, but there is sufficient community of interest between Ankara and Tehran to wonder if any meaningful daylight exists between the two.

From the vantage point of Riyadh, the prospect of Egypt, reinvigorated with the new politics of a post-Mubarak epoch, linking at all with Iran would be both threatening and totally unacceptable.  This raises the stakes for the US.

Were it not for the upticking Saudi-Iranian cold war, the US could view any changes in Egypt's diplomatic posture with a high degree of equanimity.  The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is not in danger.  Not even a government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood would rip up that particular piece of paper.  To do so would be quite unacceptable to both the US and the European Union, the two money bags upon which Egypt's basic fiscal health and thus political stability depends.

The prospect of an Egypt given to greater denunciation of the US and Israel is not amusing but neither is it a challenge to the good order of the region.  Even a greater degree of support for Hamas on the part of Cairo is not a game changer--except for the possibility for levering Hamas away from sole dependence upon Iran by way of Syria.  The US, Europe, and Israel could all deal with this level of change on the part of Egypt.

It is the Saudi-Iranian cold war which alters the dynamic in a fundamental way.  Right now the Saudis are counting the house, seeing who is potentially with them--and against them.  Affairs are looking a bit bleak from the Saudi point of view.  Syria is still in Tehran's hip pocket.  Iraq is run by the Shiites--and the last of the US forces is scheduled to be out in mere months.  And, Egypt is moving slowly but surely into the gravitational field of Iran.  Jordan is an embattled semi-nonentity.  Yemen is close to collapse--or, in a best case, suitable as a hollow state under direct Saudi control.

To the Saudis nothing is secure beyond their fellow feudal rulers of Sunni belief in the Gulf states.  For this reason if no other the Kingdom will be looking to the Obama administration to put some muscle on the Egyptians not to wander too far off the old reservation.  This will bring Washington into direct confrontation with the needs of the transitional government as well as whatever and whoever succeeds it to establish its bona fides as an independent actor with potency on the global and regional stages.

The resulting balancing act will be both difficult and demanding for the current administration.  It has shown itself remarkably tone deaf to the nuances of regional politics as well as the internal affairs of the several key countries.  It has also compiled a record of being indecisive and slow to act.  When the preoccupations of an active campaign for reelection and the domestic politics of divided government facing monumental difficulties are factored in, the probability of the administration or the president acting in a timely and effective fashion is low to say the least.

When the full weight of what is in process hits home it is likely that both Mr Obama and Ms Clinton will wish they were safely back in the senate voting "present" on pieces of controversial legislation.