What's Really Interesting In The Mideast

In the great swath of territory extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Himalayans, the areas of North Africa, the Mideast, and Northwest Asia, the big noise has centered on the "Arab Spring,"  The main focus of interest over the past few weeks has been the shooting war in Libya.  It isn't the only place where bullets, bombs, and IEDs are flying, falling, and exploding, but it is the most recent.  So, the media, the politicians, the international organizations, and We the People are not yet suffering from attention overload disorder.

Subsidiary points of fascination are found with the incarceration of the two Mubarak boys and the impending arrest of their aged and ailing dad, the ongoing face off in Yemen and the repressions in Bahrain and Syria.  The hardy perennial of the Israeli-Palestinian Question has wilted of late save only when a refreshing burst of outrageous violence is perpetrated by one or another of the Zany Congeries of Gaza.

While Libya and the other specific "hot spots" of the Mideast get the spotlight, they are actually quite boring, lacking fundamental and long term interest.  The future is not impossible to predict in broad outline.  A form of semi-democracy will come to pass in Tunisia and Egypt--primarily to the benefit of the Muslim Brotherhood in the second case.  Libya will enter the stasis of stalemate unless and until Gaddafi catches a bullet or two--or until he has a sudden desire to decamp with his tent and his billions to some country which is not a signatory to the Statute of Rome.  Then Libya will simply be in stasis, a set of more or less rival tribes in search of a common center--and not finding it.

In Yemen it really will not matter if or when Saleh departs.  The place is either (1) a failed state or (2) a hollow one with operational dominance residing elsewhere.  (Of this more in a moment or two.)

Bashir al-Assad will stay in power.  A judicious mix of reforms more apparent than real plus repression will assure the Baathist regime stays where it has been for the past half century and more.  However, the processes of reform and repression loop directly into the really interesting dynamics of the Mideast.

The same is true with respect to Bahrain.  There is little to no chance of a sea change in the structure of authority in the kingdom.  However, the details of how the game plays out, including the degree to which Bahrain becomes one more hollow state, relate directly to the really interesting dynamic at work in the Mideast.

The only matter of fundamental interest, fundamental importance, and potential long term significance currently extant in the Mideast is not the usual suspect--the Israeli-Palestinian Question--but rather the cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.  This cold war, which has intensified continually for the past twenty years and with a high delta V in recent weeks, impacts directly and substantially the state of play in Yemen, the future of Bahrain, the direction of the Assad government--and the answer to the Israeli-Palestinian Question.  It also exercises profound effect upon the internal affairs of Lebanon, the direction of Egyptian Islamist politics, and a host of other inter- and intra-state affairs.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have never been known for their close and amiable relationship.  Part of the reason may be found in religion--Shiite Iran versus Wahhabist Sunni Saudi Arabia.  Part of the reason has been purely geopolitical--which country will be the front porch dog in the Gulf region and exercise a large measure of operational dominance over the Mideast generally.

Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the rivalry has grown in a major way.  The mullahs and ayatollahs are True Believers for whom the demands of Shia beliefs powerfully enhance the interests of state.

Iraq at one time played a very important role as a buffer between Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as being a force of its own acting to prevent regional hegemony by either Iran or the Kingdom.  Those days ended with the American invasion.

The overthrow of Hosni Mubarak took another restraining player off the board.  As the most populous Arab state with a long record of exercising leadership in the often fractured Arab world, Egypt served to both moderate Saudi ambitions for regional hegemony and buttress Saudi opposition to Iranian efforts in the direction of dominance.

The removal of both Iraq and Egypt has served to clear the decks for a more direct and higher stakes confrontation between Tehran and Riyadh.  From the perspective of the ancient rulers of the Kingdom, the policies of the US have become a marker of despair.  The reaction of King Abdullah and his closest relatives has not been anger so much as terminal frustration.

For years (decades would be more accurate) the Saudis have tried repeatedly to convince the US that Iran is the major threat to the region--and not Israel.  Insofar as peace between the Israelis and Palestinians was an issue, it was such simply because the continued conflict served to advance Iranian interests.  As far back as 2002 when the Saudis proposed peace and normalization of relations between all of the Arab League states and Israel in return for a peace agreement predicated upon Israel observing the pre-Six Day War borders, the justification offered to their American interlocutors was that of pulling Iran's fangs.

To the present day the position of the Kingdom on the Israeli-Palestinian Question is dictated by the Iranian strategic threat.  This implies strongly that the Kingdom would accept significant modifications of the 2002 proposal.  King Abdullah and company would, for example, be quite willing to see territorial modification by agreed upon land swaps, drop any Palestinian "right of return," and even accept a limited Israeli security presence along the Jordan valley.  The comparative inflexibility of the Obama administration's stance on the "settlements" issue both surprised and disappointed the Saudis who were actually somewhat optimistic when the direct bi-lateral talks commenced all those months ago.

It is probable that the Saudis have been equally frustrated by the American position on Syria during the W. Bush administration and its Obama successor.  From the viewpoint of Riyadh, the US pushed Syria into the Iranian embrace.  It is self-evident that the fit between secularist Syria and Shiite Iran is both poor and unnatural.  It is a marriage forced by the American pressure for isolation.

The sub-text of the unrest in Syria and the Assad government's responses to that unrest hints at a backroom battle between the Iranians and the Saudis.  There is no doubt but the Iranians have provided assistance in the repression.  The bouts of reformist rhetoric from Bashir including his most recent promise to end the forty-eight year long "state of emergency" sometime next week point to Saudi influence and (in highest probability) blandishments.

Much of Iran's status as an ally of Syria has been bought and paid for.  Syria has a desperate need for infusions of cash on a scale that economically strapped Iran can no longer meet.  The infinitely deep pockets of the Kingdom would have no such difficulty.  Bashir is a very pragmatic and practical man who comes with instincts which push him in the direction of reform.  He is also very much afraid of religious extremism.  If (and this is a big if) the Saudis can restrain their predilection to export Wahhabism along with their cash, it would be far safer for Bashir to cozy up with the Kingdom than to continue his current flirtation with the ayatollahs.

The Baathists of Syria are very well aware that Wahhabism brings extremism as desert rains bring fast blooming flowers.  As a result the Syrians will be very, very cautious about what may come along with any Saudi assistance.  It is probable given the slight moves to reform at home made by King Abdullah that the Saudis are far more willing to disconnect Wahhabism from policy based aid now than in past years.

The Saudi monarchy has been watching American policy regarding Bahrain with the closest of scrutiny.  After the US moved to help ease Hosni Mubarak from power, alarm bells went off throughout the Kingdom.  If the US appears to be doing the same in Bahrain, there is no doubt but the Kingdom will simply take the place over.  Bahrain is too strategically important to the Kingdom to allow otherwise.  Riyadh is convinced (rightly) that Iran is neck deep in the unrest among the Shiite majority in Bahrain and will not sit back thumbs twiddling while Iran moves in.  This is as unlikely as Riyadh kicking back and chilling out as Iranian agents move around freely in the Shiite (and oil) heavy Eastern Province.

The movers and shakers of the Kingdom are also dismayed by the seeming indifference of the US to Iranian efforts in subversion in countries as far removed as Afghanistan and Indonesia, Yemen and the Philippines.  It boggles the Saudis collective mind that the US has not moved to counter even the Iranian's demonstrated efforts in Afghanistan to assist the Taliban.  If we can view that with equanimity, we must be totally out to lunch regarding the hostile nature of Iran everywhere in the world.

The greatest anxiety and distrust of the US revolves around the bootless American campaign to prevent the Iranian development of an atomic bomb.  If Iran acquires a nuclear capability or even a credible breakout capacity, it is over for Saudi Arabia--game, set, and match.  The most rudimentary nuclear arsenal either in hand or on the close horizon gives Iran regional hegemonic status.  It would also make Iran immune to pressure generally as has been the case with nuclear capable Pakistan.

US policy under President Obama has been irresolute beyond the level of rhetoric.  As far as the Kingdom is concerned, the purchasing of weapons is a prudent move but not one which will secure Saudi Arabia against the Iranian threat or achieve the hegemonic status desired by King Abdullah and the rest of the family.  Even selling our most advanced ballistic missile defense system would be no more than one more prudential move.  The ultimate interests and goals of the Kingdom demand a neutralization of the Iranian nuclear program.  This is not likely to occur with the current administration, or so the Saudis have concluded.

The Saudis have acted on this conclusion recently.  The House of Saud has made outreach moves toward the Trolls of Beijing as well as the Guys in the Kremlin.  Such a demarche would have been unthinkable even a short year ago.  The weakness of the current administration has given the Saudis no choice but to look for a strong horse wherever such might be found.

While the Saudis have sought either alternative strong horses or to man up the Obama administration, the Iranians have become more certain in their own success.  This is not simply reflected in the typically overblown oratory of Ahmedinejad and others but in the increasing activity of Iranian agents of influence in Iraq, in Yemen, in Indonesia, and in the Central Asian Republics.  It has been reflected as well in the enhanced flow of equipment to Taliban.  And in the tighter connections with Turkey.  And Venezuela.  And elsewhere.

The correlation of forces (to use that fine old Soviet term) currently favors Iran in the cold war with Saudi Arabia.  The House of Saud knows this.  It knows the reason as well.  The reason is simple.  It can be expressed in one word: Obama.