Is The World's First "No-Sail" Zone Coming Soon?

Last year the seagoing thugs of the Somali coast took and held a record number of mariners hostage--1,016 according to the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Center.  That is up from 867 the previous year and 815 in 2008.

During the same period of time, the average duration of captivity increased.  So also did the ransom demands.  And, due to presumed impatience on the part of the pirates, the captive sailors were subjected to ever increasing degrees of deprivation as well as flat out torture.

It should be recalled that over the same stretch of time the naval opposition (to use the term generically only) to the pirates increased greatly.  It became such an in thing to do that even Iran dispatched a ship or two to operate against the skiff riding marauders of Somalia.

Despite the occasional success, occasions which have become somewhat more numerous of late largely due to the muscular efforts of some individual navies, such as that of India, the balance of power continues to favor the pirates.  There are several reasons for this, but all can be resolved to the lack of resolve on the part of the world's greater maritime powers to be deadly serious about the Somali menace to navigation.

A few weeks ago the Norwegian shipping magnate Jacob Stoll-Nielsen raised a mini-storm of disapproval when he proposed that only a "shoot-on-sight" policy would dissuade the seagoing bandits.  It seems that his approach might impair the pirates' human rights.  There was a time, not that long ago, when the general principle of law involving pirates was simple, straight forward, and universally accepted: The pirate was defined as the common enemy of mankind to be hunted down without mercy wherever and whenever encountered.  There were niceties regarding the specifics of jurisdiction; all seafaring nations were presumed to have equal claim to the pirates' bodies.

The recent tactic employed by the Somalis of using captured ships, usually fishing vessels, as "motherships" has expanded their range as far as the coastal waters of India.  This has stretched the defensive forces far beyond any reasonable limit and placed far more ships at risk.  It has also nullified the initial excuse offered by pirates and their landlubber apologists, that they were merely simple, unemployed fishermen seeking alternative sources of livelihood.  It also puts an end to the later justification: The pirates were really Somali coastguards seeking recompense for illegal foreign fishing and waste dumping.

As shipowners and operators refuse to see that their long-term interests are best served by refusing to play the ransom game and the Deep Thinkers of assorted maritime power government worry about the fine points of jurisdiction and the risks which might attend the use of more robust measures, there is another player in the game as yet unheard from.  That so far silent player is the group with the most at risk--the sailors.

An unfortunate reality is the long standing invisibility of the merchant sailor.  Even in past years when many merchant mariners were citizens of Western countries, they were ignored in the main, cast into the general darkness of dockside scum, wharf rats, transients without home, hearth, or political influence.  Shipowners and operators exploited them without end or mercy.  Even governmental bodies with legal responsibilities for their health and safety were more often negligent than attentive.

In recent years the vast majority of merchant marine personnel are from impoverished Third World countries. While officers may hail from more advanced nations, often old components of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the rest, the men who in the days of sail would have been called, "before the mast," are from deeply poor parts of the Third World.  This means that nobody, no government, no shipowner, no ship operator, no marine insurance company, no entity of potency and influence is on the side of the guys who take the risks passing through the ever expanding area of Somali pirate hazard.

As the true tales of torture pass through the ranks of merchant sailors, there is an expectable consequence.  Men are increasingly unwilling to run the gauntlet of pirates.  They are more and more reluctant to spend days with their testicles wrapped around their throats with the fear of pirate seizure ever present.  They are most assuredly unwilling to spend months as "guests" of the marauders.

While shipowners and operators willingly, if grudgingly, submit to increased insurance premiums, they are reluctant without exception to pay an equivalent bonus to crew members.  This is typical.  Historically the owners and operators of ships have done whatever they could to reduce the manning costs of their vessels--even if such put the crew at direct physical risk.

While there may always be men desperate enough to accept any degree of hazard for the less than splendid pay which is the merchant sailor's normal state, the problems of manning vessels transiting the pirate zone are increasing--and will continue to do so.  The point is coming in the not too distant future when trade, important, very valuable trade, will be impaired significantly by a lack of crews.  The economic costs to both Europe and the Western Hemisphere will be large.  Very large if the tankers outbound from the Persian Gulf terminals are hit by crew shortages.

A forward looking policy (which has been long needed and avoided for just as long) must focus on abating the pirates for once and all.  The use of the "motherships" has, as one observer put it, "industrialized" the piracy process.  This implies that the current naval efforts must be focused upon taking out the "motherships" regardless of risk to the captive crew members on board these unfortunate ships.  The identities and locations of the "motherships" is not a mystery to the international flotilla assembled in the vast expanse of threatened ocean.  Nor do the assorted warships lack the means necessary to neutralize the offensive nautical vipers nests.

Of course, the pirates should be given the chance to surrender.  When they don't (and the probability of peaceful outcome will grow slimmer over time) they must be captured or killed.  This means the high probability of innocent victims being killed as well.  That must be accepted as unavoidable collateral damage, the same as with civilians caught in the crossfire.

A robust (which is to say, effective) approach also requires the country of the capturing warship has responsibility for providing judicial and incarceration services to the "arrested" pirates.  As international law as well as national statutes already provide for this, the only consequence of note is expense.  But, that expense must be measured against the commercial detriment of a slow down in seaborne trade.

The adoption of a robust approach should be assessed against such endeavors as the current UN sponsored operations in Libya and the Ivory Coast.  In the case of the latter country, even if the present French/UN effort to oust Gbagbo proves successful, the result will be one more failed African state.  In Libya, there is no more reason to be optimistic about the outcome in the foreseeable future.

In comparison, the successful neutralization of the pirates of Somalia will be clearcut and favorable.  The tipping point will come soon.  Either the maritime countries of the world will turn their navies loose to the detriment of the pirates, or the area will become a "no-sail" zone due to the refusal of sailors to sign on to ships transiting the hazard zone.

While the choice is between self-interest and assorted feel good propositions regarding the presumed human rights of Somali gunslingers and should be easy to make, the ground truth of today is simply that Western political leaders are too timid to prefer national interest to fending off the accusations of advocacy groups without any responsibilities or real world constituency.  Such is life in the glorious 21st Century!