Good Training, Sir, Good Chow, Good Training

That standard issue statement made by untold numbers of grunts to visitors from Top Side can apply to the current operations undertaken by NATO in Libya.  Or, such is the sub-text from the meeting of the "Contact Group" on Libya as it jawed away about present and future plans today in Doha.  The only difficulty is the mess on the ground in Libya is a real shooting war complete with dead and broken bodies.

From the various accounts of the meeting, NATO resembles a budget conference between Tea Party Republicans and Pelosi Democrats.  The British and French are particularly muscular with a seeming chest thumping contest between the two partners in regime change.  At least both the Sarkozy government and the Coalition in the UK are direct and honest about their goals in Libya.  Both Paris and London want Gaddafi gone and gone yesterday.  Both are willing to use all possible means which can be more or less plausibly swept under the UN Security Council fabricated rug to do so.

Other NATO members are not so oriented.  Most want to limit the activities in the sky over Libya to be limited to preventing insofar as may be possible the killing of non-combatant civilians by either Gaddafi or insurgent forces.  The Arab states represented at Doha are quite happy with the prospect of seeing Gaddafi's posterior in the exit door but are not particularly thrilled with more good Muslim Arabs being turned into sanitation problems by infidel hot metal.

The position of the insurgents is not nuanced in the slightest.  They want to win.  They want to win quickly and at the lowest possible cost in rebel lives.  This, in turn, means they would very much like to see the US back in the game in a far more active role than providing specialized support services such as reconnaissance and mid air refueling.  Underneath diplomatic bluster, so also would most of the Europeans.

Speaking of diplomatic bluster, the Geek was struck with the statement of an unnamed (of course) French official.  This worthy opined, "There is a learning curve.  We are progressing.  The Americans are not indispensable."    He might as well have said, "Good training, sir, good chow."

From the perspective of the insurgents (to say nothing of knowledgeable observers generally), the hand-off of operations in Libya from the US to NATO has been accompanied by both a decrease in effectiveness and an increase in miscommunication, missed opportunities, and missed targets.

There is no doubt but the effort to stop Gaddafi's use of heavy weapons including mortars would be enhanced by the re-introduction of AC-130 Spectre gunships, A-10 Warthogs, and Apache helicopters.  These platforms along with precision munitions and the vast experience gained by the pilots and weapons operators in Iraq and Afghanistan would permit engaging small, high value targets with a low order probability of unacceptable levels of collateral damage and death.

The record of the AC-130s in Iraq indicates that even individual snipers can be taken out without harm to nearby non-combatants.  This would neutralize one of the government loyalists most effective and terror producing tactics.  While the Americans coming back to the war in a frontline role would enhance the chances of the insurgents and markedly reduce those of Gaddafi and sons, this is an irrelevant consideration.

What is relevant is shown in the dual meetings of what are separate but overlapping coalitions in Doha.  The takeaway from the dual meetings as well as the hallway chatter is simply that there is no agreement among all the involved parties as to the nature of the goal of the war let alone a definition of victory or a general theory of victory.

The insurgents have no reservations about their goal--remove Gaddafi and all those connected with him.  Victory would come when Gaddafi either took the next plane to the Retirement Home For Hardworking And Unappreciated Dictators, or, better, commenced to examine the root systems of daisies.  Their theory of victory even includes a nearly mandatory role for the US.

France comes in as a close second to the rebels with a robust goal and definition of victory.  The UK is not far behind.  Then comes the long straggle of states in favor of Gaddafi's leaving but many shades of difference as to timing, means, and methods of transition.  For example, there are those who plump for a ceasefire first with the problem of Gaddafi to be solved by negotiation.

The US by having handed off to NATO has reduced its capacity to lead.  And, leadership is what the Contact Group and other parties need most of all.  Some state has to develop a goal and the means by which it will be accomplished and then twist diplomatic arms until there is agreement.  Not consensus, not universal approbation, but sufficient agreement that the instruments of national power can be orchestrated appropriately.

There is a very real difficulty here.  Other than a hazy desire for regional stability, the US has no bull in the Libyan herd.  Yes, we might all agree that Gaddafi is a throughly unpleasant fellow with no perceptible redeeming characteristics, but that does not constitute a national interest.  We may all be in favor of that amorphous thing called "democracy," but a mere fondness for or belief in democracy does not make its promotion a national or strategic interest.

Gaddafi has not ordered an attack upon Americans or American interests in a mort of years.  He may be a terroristic soulmate of Osama bin Laden but having not acted upon his predilection recently, the US does not have the justification it enjoys with respect to bin Laden.  In short, while it might be good for all concerned if the US were to take the lead in Libya, the country has no reason to do so.

The Obama administration has done little in the areas of foreign or national security policy with which the Geek can agree.  But, the resigning of leadership in Libya is one with which he does find himself in reluctant tandem with the Clueless Guy in the Oval.  The Europeans, the British, the French, the Italians most of all, have bulls in the Libyan herd.  So, to a lesser extent do other members of both NATO and the European Union.  So also do members of the Arab League, particularly those members in North Africa.

It may disappoint the insurgents, but the US should sit this one out.  For the French, the British, and the rest, it is good training.  It is about time for the Europeans to learn how to run complex coalition operations.  It is time for them to find out if their forces, their systems, their training, their doctrine are as good in the real world of shooting as they have been on the drafting board and training area.

There is only one question: How good is the chow?