Another Attack Of Sanity At The Pentagon--Good!

In a move that will no doubt cause much tooth gnashing among the High Minded who expected some sort of "Peace Dividend--The Sequel" with the election of Barack Obama, the Pentagon has decided to include China as a baseline component of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR.) This move which is long overdue constitutes a species of victory for the denizens of the Five Sided Wigwam by the banks of the Potomac who have a firm grip on reality.

China has been making massive investments in its military structure. Much, if not most, of the money underwriting the unprecedented defense improvements has come from the United States. This, of course, is the unintended, but easily foreseeable, consequence of the Clinton administion's opening of trade with China. It is proving true that the prime beneficiaries of the neo-liberal Clinton move are not Walmart shoppers but Chinese soldiers, sailors and airmen.

It is not likely that the Men of the Forbidden City are chomping at the bit to challenge the US to a mano a mano war. Rather, they are intending to cast a large, a very large shadow over Asia and the Pacific while simultaneously limiting the ability and credibility of any potential American response.

At the same time the improvements in the Chinese defense establishment will serve the goal of inhibiting the Russians in the Great Game for influence in Central Asia. The same massive restructuring will assure that no viable challenge can emerge from another rapidly developing country with which China has historically had rocky relations. That country is India.

Finally, the Senior Mandarinate of the Middle Kingdom aspire to a global position which will serve to further ambitions for access to both resources and markets throughout the world. A very strong and evident military capacity translates quickly and effectively to the sort of diplomatic leverage which constitutes Great Power status and the accompanying benefits.

China is an ancient, proud, intensely nationalistic country which long ago dropped the self-imposed isolation which had characterised much of the past thousand years. It is recreating the China of a long ago period which saw large Chinese fleets on the coast of Africa acquiring both knowledge and tribute from far away places and potentates. Had the Chinese emperor not willfully abandoned the outward orientation of the empire, China would have emerged as a, perhaps the, major player in the earliest days of European exploration and colonization.

China was not there to oppose the European expansion not because China was backward technologically or politically to the several European states nibbling on the margins of Africa and the Western Hemisphere. China was not there because the government of the day chose to withdraw from the world's stage.

During the reign of Mao the Chinese made tentative steps back to engagement with the larger world. At that time the effort came to little or nothing because the country lacked the necessities of Great Power status. Other than minor encroachments in Albania and Tanzania, the Chinese might as well have stayed home for the benefits their outreach efforts produced.

Thanks to the Neo-liberal economic ideology of the Clinton years and the rush by the High Minded to believe that open, free trade would make conflict between nations impossible, the Chinese now possess the prerequisites of Great Powerdom. They have both the ability and the political will to make their mark on the globe.

In a real sense China, or, more accurately, the American mythology of China, has made the country the bane of our existence. Way back when, a century or so ago, the US declaration of the Open Door made us see ourselves the special protector of China against rapacious colonial powers. That foreign policy delusion set the US on a collision course with the emerging Japanese Empire.

More recently the myth of China as attached hip and shoulder with the Soviet Union in the global Communist menace demanded implacable hostility to Beijing. It also justified sending the troops to South Vietnam among other, lesser, bad foreign policy choices.

Then the US bought into the myth that China had turned both free enterprise and democratic. This belief which might have been true in part but was not accurate overall provided the basis for the New Open Door--a door open to inexpensive Chinese goods flowing one way and US dollars flowing the opposite.

Far from making China our new, best friend or at least a cooperative partner in the march of capitalism, privatization and globalism, this action has allowed the Men of the Forbidden City to become far more effective enemies. Other than maintaining the stability of the US economy, the Beijing regime shares few, if any, national interests with the United States. Even those other interests which might be held in common such as ending Somalian piracy will be pursued by the Chinese in ways and using means not necessarily compatible with those of the US.

In the piracy patrol context it might be noted that the Chinese flotilla liaises with but does not operate with the international force, CTF 151. The Chinese naval vessels confine their direct escort duties to protecting ships carrying cargoes to or from China or flying the Chinese flag. Other than that their anti-piracy acts have been limited. Not so limited are excursions into African ports and waters providing opportunities for showing the flag and giving officers a familiarity with distant waters of interest to Beijing.

As manifested by their espionage efforts, both traditional and cyber based, as well as the lack of overt, enthusiastic cooperation with the US on matters such as nuclear non-proliferation, the Chinese have no great bent toward either accepting American claims of unchallenged Great Power status or failing to challenge these claims whenever and wherever possible. Bluntly, China is not a friend. It is not a partner. It is not an active or potential general purpose ally of the US.

Overall, it would be imprudent in the extreme to leave China out of the QDR. China, along with, or, perhaps even more than, Russia, is a potential armed adversary of the US. In both cases the probability of direct war is very low. In both cases the potential for diplomatic rivalry is high and getting higher.

Whether the High Minded and Lofty Thinking like the idea or not, the credible capacity and political will to use military force in support of diplomacy is a vital component of foreign policy. Unless the American military is seen as capable of waging symmetrical war with China (or Russia) our ability to operate in the world is impaired--perhaps fatally. It is not necessary to become a neocon ninnie of the Bush-Cheney sort to accept that the US will not be perceived as a Great Power, even in a multi-polar world, without a credible full-threat military capacity.

By placing China in the QDR along with failing or failed states, Islamist jihadism, nuclear proliferation and the still willing to growl Russian bear, the Pentagon is trying to assure that the US will not surrender its place in the world. This may (no, more likely, will) stick in the craw of the Blame-America-First crowd, but the effort is necessary.

That President Obama has allowed the inclusion of China in the QDR hints that he may be a closet realist. That he isn't willing to see the US diminished in its global potency--regardless of his somewhat spineless performance during segments of his recent Grand Tour. This possibility undoubtedly will inflame the "progressive" elements in his base.

Only time will tell if Mr Obama has the testicular fortitude to stand up to the High Minded, the "progressives" the The-World-Is-Best-Off-Without-Us crowd. If he fails this test, well, the Geek hopes he personally isn't too old to learn Chinese.

The President Misuses History One More Time

In common with most politicians (OK, most people) the current POTUS likes to select snippets of history which line up with whatever position he is arguing or justifying at the moment. At last night's prime-time news conference, Mr Obama took a historical leap to support his contention that outlawing "torture," even when effective in acquiring information was a good idea because it was moral.

The president averred that no less a statesman and nationalist than Winston Churchill refused to continence the use of torture against German prisoners of war or detainees during the height of the Blitz. Purportedly the reason for this stance was its immorality.

Let's go to the videotape.

If, indeed, the oft repeated but never properly documented Churchill tale is true, there is a very good reason for refusing to torture or otherwise "intensively interrogate" Luftwaffe prisoners--other than the fact there was no intelligence imperative to do so. The mistreatment of German PoWs would result in the similar mistreatment of British soldiers, seamen and airmen in Nazi hands. The fear of quid pro quo was an absolute deterrent--on both sides of the battleline.

Churchill's lack of concern over morality per se is readily demonstrated from the well-documented historical record.

The British PM had no problems with authorising the fire bomb raids against the civilian residential districts of German cities. The intent of the attacks was put forth bluntly in numerous internal memorandums. The intent was to kill as many civilians as possible. And, terrorise those who were not killed.

Unlike the Blitz where the German bombing of purely civilian targets (defined here to be limited to residential districts and excluding civilian facilities such as railroads, docks and warehouses which had military utility) was the result of technological deficiencies which precluded accurate bombing of war related factories, the British air effort as it matured in 1942 was deliberately aimed at killing and terrorising the civilian population of Germany. The British knew what they were doing. They knew so well that they lied to the American government and public.

The British government from the PM on down believed (correctly) that the Americans were too High Minded and otherworldly to understand and support the terror campaign. So, the British referred to it as "the worker de-housing program." Churchill and the others did this with a straight face.

In the interests of inter-Allied cooperation and harmony, the administration of FDR did not dissent from the British effort. However, when the Brits tried to convince the Americans to join with them in incinerating German men, women and children, the attempt failed. Our ostensible reason was the unsuitability of American aircraft and crew training to missions other than daylight precision bombing.

The real deal was different. The senior leadership of the Air Force as well as the civilians in charge of the government recoiled at the notion of intentionally targeting civilians. While none of these men were opposed to killing civilians, they did insist that such be an ancillary, a corollary to the bombing of factories or other infrastructure components directly useful to the war effort.

The reasons for rejecting a pure counter-civilian terror campaign were twofold. The first was the belief it would not work. The reasoned conclusion that far from undercutting morale or war production, a terror effort would strengthen both. The accuracy of this view was amply demonstrated by post-war analysis of production statistics that proved production went up along with the tonnage of bombs dropped and number of workers "de-housed."

The second reason was moral. There were men, both in uniform and in mufti, who would not continence direct attacks on civilians. This course of action, even if effective, would be morally wrong.

It is evident that Churchill did not buy the morality argument for a nanosecond. But, he needed the US and was unwilling to argue the morality issue with FDR, although there are hints that he wanted to.

If Winnie was annoyed at our moral sensibilities in the area of terror bombing, he would have thrown a hissy-fit over our reaction to his big idea for (a) revenging the Blitz and (b) making D-Day unnecessary. Winston Churchill, the alleged paragon of morality according to the president's understanding of history, wanted to bomb Germany's urban areas with anthrax.

That's right, bucko, anthrax. Its qualities and characteristics were well known to the British. The boffins of that "tight and sceptered isle" had experimented with it in the pre-war years. It had been successfully weaponized. An early production plant was churning the spores out in limited quantities at an old immigration inspection station in Canada.

The Americans, working from British specifications, were in the process of building an industrial production plant capable of making the bug in ton quantities when Churchill developed (Whether on his own or through the machinations of his science advisor, Lord Cherwell, is unclear.) his notion of using biological warfare to devastate the German population.

Even the architects of the "worker de-housing program" were shocked and horrified by this idea. Apparently morality is flexible. Burning civilians to death is OK. Germs are not OK.

The argument against the anthrax employment was based, however, not on matters of morality as it was well understood that such would cut no ice with Winston. Rather, the British opponents contended correctly that use of anthrax would render large parts of Germany uninhabitable for generations after the war. This effect would run counter to Churchill's post-war goal of stopping the plague of Bolshevism east of the Elbe.

At the same time the Americans, having caught word of Churchill's idea, dragged their feet in getting the Pine Bluff production facility on line. Without American industrial grade production, there simply would not be sufficient agent to undertake the scheme. This deliberate slow-down was undertaken with the tacit approval of FDR, whose moral sense would have been outraged by the concept.

Yes, bucko, FDR was a very moral man when it came to methods of fighting war. Don't believe this?

Come with the Geek to the island of Iwo Jima. The Navy and Marine Corps planners knew that this island would be an extremely tough place to take. It was very heavily fortified with miles of deep tunnels and hundreds of well sited bunkers. Further, the place was exceptionally well defended by over 22,000 troops who were quite willing to die in place. Thus, it would be very costly in American lives.

The planners suggested that the US stand off-shore and drench the place with mustard agent. They argued that the nature of the defenses and the utter absence of civilians as well as the prior use of chemical weapons by the Japanese in China combined to make Iwo Jima the perfect place for the US to resort to chemical means.

The capstone of the planners' argument was simply that the use of mustard gas would save American lives. Potentially, the landing would be unopposed.

FDR said, "No." He would not go down in history as the first American president to authorise the use of chemical weapons in a non-retaliatory context. His reasoning was strictly moral in its basis.

The moral sensibilities of FDR were responsible for 6,825 American combat deaths.

Whether that exchange was justified can be argued endlessly.

Fairness requires mentioning that FDR raised no moral objection to the use of mass firebomb raids against Japanese cities. These raids were far more destructive than their equivalents in Germany burning square mile after square mile of predominantly civilian residential districts. President Roosevelt accepted the argument that the Japanese scattered small factories throughout these residential areas. That was true, but it can be argued that the killing of more than 100,000 civilians in one raid on Tokyo was not morally justifiable.

Certainly, FDR's successor had no moral qualms regarding the use of nuclear bombs on Japanese targets in the hope that doing so would save the US from the enormous losses forecast to accompany an invasion of the home islands. The moral correctness of Truman's decision can be and has been debated without any resolution for the sixty-four years since the mushroom clouds grew over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

President Obama was poorly advised to cherry pick his history. Not only did he pick the wrong cherry, the internal contradiction of his position on the use of "torture" in the interrogation of captured terrorist suspects illustrates the the problem of using morality as a basis for policy.

Prohibiting the use of mustard agent against Iwo Jima cost American lives. Its use would have saved an unknowable number of these.

Similarly, the use of nuclear weapons against Japan saved an unknowable number of lives, both American and Japanese. The non-use of this option might have resulted in no additional loss of life given the collapsing nature of Japanese political will and economy under the twin pressures of the blockade and Soviet invasion of North China. We will never know. History's tape runs in one direction only with no rewind possible.

The president acknowledged that the use of waterboarding and other, similar methods did provide useful information. Information which may well have saved lives. At the same time Mr Obama implied that the use of "torture" lessened American security by eroding the firm moral foundation which separates us from our Islamist enemies.

This (to quote one MSM outlet) "nuanced" view of the torture controversy has not ended debate and doubt over whether the morality of means outweighs considerations of effectiveness. It is a question which is fundamentally unanswerable.

It is an ancient question, asked countless times over the centuries. Does the end justify the means or do evil means pollute even the most worthy of ends?

The president provided no answer. He didn't even ask the question correctly.

The Latest From Our Allies In Islamabad

The US is embarking on large scale operations in southern Afghanistan. That is the mission of the newly deployed Marine forces. The radical notion is to take the war up close and personal to the al-Qaeda and Taliban jihadists in their core zone along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

It is an operational concept which should have been executed years ago. We did not have sufficient forces in country then. We do now. Now we must deny sanctuary to Taliban and its affiliates all through the border region if we are going to accomplish the minimum strategic goal of "not-losing."

We must destroy Taliban as a militarily potent force in the critical border region if we are going to deny the Islamist jihadists any belief that they have, will or even can defeat the US militarily. In short, a successful carrying of the war to Taliban in south Afghanistan is a necessary, even a sufficient prerequisite for achieving the Obama announced end state of removing Taliban and its ilk as a threat to the US and its western allies.

The new American capacity for offensive military action in southern Afghanistan has alarmed the Pakistani military. It has been reported that Ashfaq Kayani, the General Big of Islamabad's army is most perturbed by the prospect of US troops actually doing something useful near the border.

His reasons?

Humanitarian. The fire-breathing Pakistani warrior is gravely concerned that American operations might cause a flood of refugees across the border placing a burden for relief efforts which Islamabad could not shoulder given the current global economic situation.

Just in case the Americans don't buy that argument, General Kayani has a backup. US offensive actions might result in Taliban (whether that of the Afghan variety or the Pakistani twin is unclear) making further efforts to interdict the Khyber Pass supply route.

The first of these contentions is inherently bogus from the American perspective. As the Marine Corps Commandant James Conway correctly noted, no one can be certain where the jihadists might move under American pressure. It might be added that any numbers regarding civilian displacement or jihadist fugitives are softer than soft.

One caveat is needed. If General Kayani has better information, perhaps based on HUMINT, than does the US, he might be correct in his apprehensions of a refugee torrent washing across the almost non-existent border.

The odds are good that Kayani has superior intelligence concerning Taliban numbers and intentions, including that of purposely generating hordes of refugees. Given the long-standing relations between the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Taliban in Afghanistan, such an eventuality exceeds mere certainty by a West Texas mile or two.

Taliban in Pakistan has long been in the habit of using civilians as a shield for its Heroic Fighters For Islamic Purity as has been recently, publicly acknowledged by the new Interior Minister in Islamabad. The movers-and-shakers of Taliban are knowledgeable in the ways of the West. These men are well aware of the rapidity with which the ever-so-sensitive Western chattering class can weep, wail and cry over the fate of "innocent civilians" caught in the sights of weapons wielded by Americans or other Westerners.

Like their politically calculating religious compatriots in the Gaza Strip, the leaders of Taliban count upon the bodies of dead civilians to snatch victory from the clutches of military defeat. It makes strategic political sense to the intensely cynical men behind the black turban wearing trigger pullers of Taliban to force civilians to catch the (literal) flak and, with their blood, gain the victory which combat alone would deny the Islamist jihadists.

The Western elites have shown a remarkable ability and willingness to displace responsibility for the deaths of non-combatants from its legitimate residence on the doorstep of Hamas to the Israeli Defense Forces. There is no reason to assume that the dark minds of Taliban have failed to notice that unjustified Western opprobrium forced the IDF to halt their incursion into the Gaza Strip without first having destroyed the combat potential and structural integrity of Hamas.

Rather than face defeat and destruction at the hands of the US Marines, the Taliban will cheerfully shove the civilian population in the area of operations out of their homes and down the paths to Pakistan. No doubt Taliban will assure that civilians die. They will make sure that cameras are available to flash images of torn corpses and wailing survivors to the world.

General Kayani has telegraphed Taliban's most likely strategic and operational response to the forthcoming American offensive operations. This was not his intent. It is the result. The Americans have been (fore)warned.

The US has three options now.

The first, most obvious was conveyed by General Conway. It is blunt, a good Marine's view of reality. "But in any event, we've got to do what we've got to do in the south."

The second is to prepare for the refugee contingency. The US can offer requisite humanitarian assistance to Islamabad. The Americans can--and should--insist that the government and military forces of Pakistan be good to go in handling refugees. This includes having the capacity to effectively separate Taliban wolves from the civilian sheep. A further pro-active step would be re-emphasizing the rules of engagement which serve to limit collateral casualties.

The final option is to call off the planned offensive sweep. The Americans could simply say, "Golly-gosh, General Kayini, we never thought about that. You're right. Can't have all those poor civilians stumbling through the mountains, maybe even getting hurt. Sprained ankles and who knows what other catastrophes."

"Alright, Geek, maybe you're right on that fugitive from firepower thing, but what about the supply route? What if Taliban ups the ante by attacking there?"

Right, bucko, what if they do?

The Khyber Pass main supply route (MSR) is and always has been the most vulnerable component of the entire US/NATO/Other Concerned Nations effort in Afghanistan. The inherent vulnerability of the MSR has been worsened by the Pakistani military's less than resolute defense of it.

When assessing the liability of the MSR to interdiction, it is necessary to consider the capacity of Taliban (both varients, Afghan and Pakistani) to sever the artery. In the past this capacity has shown both expansion and contraction. It is legitimate to posit that Taliban will seek to expand its capabilities if the American offensive is conducted in such a way as to afford the black turbans the time and excess manpower necessary.

Unless one is willing to believe that American planners have their collective head inserted very far into an anatomically improbable location, it is most likely that the US has taken the MSR interdiction response into consideration. The tempo of combat operations will be such that it is diminishingly likely that Taliban will have the luxury of time, or, surplus manpower.

While General Kayini no doubt wishes otherwise, his warning about the Khyber Pass places a focus on the second factor which must be assessed when considering MSR vulnerability. It is necessary to evaluate the will and ability of the Pakistani military to defend the MSR, to prevent its disruption.

To date the defense efforts have been less than impressive. Even though the security services of Pakistan have had access to intelligence information from American assets, the ISI, constabulary and army have shown no particular inclination to take pro-active action, nor even to respond to an attack with notable effectiveness.

General Kayini has conducted an ancient bureaucratic and military maneuver, (generally dubbed CYA.) His dark and dismal warning of the MSR being severed and the flow of necessary supplies being choked severely is actually meant to excuse in advance the inevitable failure of the army, ISI and constabulary to either prevent or quickly neutralise threats to the MSR.

The Geek has a question for you, General Kayini. Which are you? A senior commander in the military of a dedicated and resolute ally in a joint effort against a serious enemy? A faltering member of a deliquescent regime? A sympathiser with Taliban?

You see, General, it's confusing. Your job title gives one answer. Your "warnings" give others.

Ain't This New Flu Something!

At first the Geek was, well, not quite overjoyed, but certainly pleased when the Flu Alarm buzzed loudly over the weekend. It is not that the Geek feels a thrill of happiness at the prospect of disease, suffering, fear and death in a country which already has too many thoroughly unpleasant matters confronting it. The Geek is something of a cold dude, but not this far over the edge.

Rather his pleasure came from the opportunity to observe how governments--including that of the US--would respond to an excellent simulacrum of a major member of the counterterrorist's closet of anxiety--biowar. The H1N1 virus at work in Mexico and, to a much lesser extent, in other countries ranging from the US and Canada to New Zealand and Europe is a fine representative of an infectious agent having the characteristics of a anti-personnel biological weapon.

The somewhat misnamed "swine flue" (this particular H1N1 has genetic components from swine, avian and human flu variants) appears to have good human-to-human transmission, reasonably high lethality among the young adult population (at least in Mexico,) low, but not too low latency period and some difficulty in accurate diagnosis. These are all characteristics of a desirable biological agent.

Already we have witnessed the primary impact of any biological weapon directed against the civilian population. The "swine flue" has engendered a fear response from governments, extra-governmental agencies such as the World Health Organisation and private citizens. The last has been best illustrated by the impact on the handful of deaths and not much larger number of suspicious infections in Mexico on the stock and commodity exchanges of the world. (Big Pharma shares went up. The broader markets from Asia to New York slumped as did oil futures as investors shook in their pants over the prospect of economic dislocation.)

In Mexico the straws of public opinion blowing in the gale of fear point in the direction of rapidly blooming distrust in the government. Contradictory views ranging from the notion that the government is overreacting to the belief that the government is still not telling the entire truth converge only on the point of expressing a negative relation between government and citizen.

In the US various and sundry calming official voices including that of President Obama have sought to assure the public that there was no reason to panic. Calming mood music has accompanied the declaration of a public health emergency. This declaration is said to be a mere precaution so that first responders can be properly briefed, hospitals put on alert as to the necessity of having bed availability contingency plans up dated and good-to-go. Further, We the People are told this declaration is a prerequisite for the release of anti-flue vaccines and medications from the strategic stockpile.

Other governments ranging from Hong Kong (which is using its unfortunate experience with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) a couple of years back to prepare for the new flu) to the EU members are taking measures and playing soothing tunes resembling those heard in the US. China has gone so far as to ban pork imports from portions of North America despite the scientific fact that the disease cannot be contracted from pork products, particularly after cooking. (One must be forgiven for hearing echoes of the theme music from The Empire Strikes Back in this, the home of food contamination.)

It is important to note that the current state of incipient(?) panic around the world as well as the awesome media coverage of the outbreak (currently over 25,000 hits on Google News) are predicated upon a very, very small number of deaths confirmed to have been caused by H1N1. Even this small number has not been parsed as to such contributory factors as an initially incorrect diagnosis, or unavailability of health care.

On the one hand the rapid publication of the news of the new flue can be considered praiseworthy. An axiom of public health is that rapidity of identifying a potential epidemic assures the most rapid and complete countering of the disease. On the other hand, a very high profile exposure of a disease outbreak assures an emotionally driven overreaction on the part of people who can identify with the victims. Fear of public fear drives public policy on the part of governments. And, fear driven policy may very well not be good or effective policy.

The goal of a terrorist is to provoke widespread fear by undertaking an action of such a high profile nature that people at a great distance from the action identify themselves as potential victims. This self-selection of victim status gives rise to fear. ("I'm scared because it might have been me." or "I'm scared because the next time it might be me.")

As soon as fear rises and spreads in a foul tide driven to even higher levels by the ministrations of the media, the terrorist has accomplished his primary goal. When governments respond to the tide of fear in diverting resources to meet a threat that may well not exist or undertaking actions which introduce frictions and inefficiencies into the social and economic activities of a country, the terrorist has accomplished his secondary goal. He has influenced both public and government in a way which is inimical to the best long-term interests of the target nation and state.

Because of its unseen nature and possibly quite lethal effects, the biological agent is a terrorist's wet dream. Disease is always frightening. Infectious disease breeds particular fear. This is more true in countries such as the US or those of the EU where infectious disease is no longer a routine hazard of life.

Influenza is not a minor matter. As the global pandemic of 1918-19 demonstrates, it can be an extremely lethal enemy. What is most intriguing about the impact of the "Spanish Flu" of 1918-19 in the US is not its morbidity (just over one in four Americans was infected.) Nor is it the lethality of the disease which killed more than a half-million here during the four months the epidemic raged.

The most singular aspect of the American experience with the "Spanish Flu" was what didn't happen. Despite the high loss of life and the disproportionate concentration of cases and deaths in crowded urban centers, there was no panic. There was no panic in the country generally. There was none in the most heavily hit areas.

Americans wore masks. Avoided theaters and sports events. They got sick. They died--and buried their dead. They went on with life. They sucked it up and pressed on. There were no recriminations. No accusations of government laxness. No demands that the government do more the next time. Press, pulpit and politics alike may have mourned the deaths, but they went no further.

We were not terrorised.

Neither were We the People shaking in our socks when the "Asian Flu" pandemic of 1957 fetched up on our shores. Globally this outbreak killed around two million, seventy thousand in the US. Unlike 1918 vaccinations were available and employed, but their efficacy was and is a matter of some debate. The important characteristic of the 1957 experience was the same as that of forty years earlier. There was no panic. No set of recriminations. No demands that the government "Do something!" No need for Ike to go on TV and ask the public to be calm in the face of the storm.

The stoic acceptance of disease and death which marked the 1918-19 pandemic or the similar lack of fear presented in 1957 is not possible today. It will not be possible tomorrow should bioterror emerge from some shadowy far away place.

This is not because Americans are lacking the character and backbone of their ancestors. Rather it is the necessary result of infectious disease having been controlled. Sure, there are still exceptions, the sexually transmitted diseases, hepatitis, new tuberculosis strains all come to mind. But, the control of infectious disease has been thorough enough for a long enough time that the mere thought of a lethal disease transmitted in the air around us has a power to scare which it lacked in past decades.

We have been living for some years now where good health is believed to be a basic right of Americans. We are proud of living in a Germicidal Age. With anti-bacterial, anti-viral wipes in our hands and germ slaughtering soap in our dishwashers and showers, we are confident that no mere germ will discommode us, let alone kill us.

We have been set up by our own success, by our own fear and loathing of the world of the microbe, to be scared out of our collective suck by the thought of an epidemic in our midst, of the air in our lungs right now being the possible agent of our death. Now, with the reflexes built in by our experiences with routine potential or actual disasters, we expect the government, the federal government to take action, to reassure us.

The "swine flu" of Mexico and elsewhere is providing not only governments (and those who watch governments for fun and profit,) but We the People and our institutions generally with an excellent opportunity to see just how well we can cope with both the actualities of disease and the penumbra of fear which surrounds disease. It is a laboratory experiment so to speak for how well we and our government could deal with the so-far only hypothetical danger of biological terrorism.

It is a lab test which we best not fail. Not only for the usual reasons such as preventing illness and death or social and political disorganisation which might well accompany a genuine pandemic. There is another reason, a sort of T. rex in the bathroom reason.

The bad guys of the world, the men of the black turbans and death wish are watching as well. And, learning.

Sunni And Shi'a--Edging Toward Alliance?

The news out of Iraq riding the blast waves of suicide bombers points once again to the ongoing sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shi'a. The conventional wisdom well reinforced by daily experience is the centuries of rivalry, fear, loathing and killing which have separated Sunnis and Shi'as is alive, well and precludes any unity between the two.

Even if a common goal exists between the Islamists of both, they will never act in common. Faced by a common threat, the two will not fuse, not fight as one but constantly fritter away strengths in internecine strife.

Until recently there has been little evident reason to question the conventional wisdom. There has been no visible evidence to suggest any potential of change in the long extant dynamic.

The first real hint of rapprochement has emerged from a seemingly unlikely source, the Muslim Brotherhood. Yousef Nada posted a lengthy and well considered article on the Muslim Brotherhood's official website.

Nada contends that there is no religious justification for Sunnis to view Shi'as as apostates. Rather Twlever Shi'a should be understood as a Fifth School of Islam, an equal with the Four Schools of Sunni. He argues that the split between Sunni and Shi'a is purely political and does not represent any binding understanding of the sacred writings of Islam.

This position was criticised almost immediately by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood's Supreme Guide's staff, Mahmoud Ghazian. The response held that Nada's views were strictly personal and ran counter to the tenets of Sunni doctrine as well as the stance of the Muslim Brotherhood today as well as at its beginning.

Then came the surprise. The Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Muhammad Mahdi 'Akef, disagreed with Ghazian. The Supreme Guide concluded that Nada's position was essentially correct. That the division between Sunni and Shi'a was far more political than religious in nature.

What politics and political realities seemed to dictate ages ago, 'Akef seemed to be saying, now could be reversed in acknowledgement of shifts in the political landscape. 'Akef paid a large measure to the changes in political realities in recent decades as he assessed the impact of the Iranian Revolution on the fortunes not only of Iranian Muslims but on the Islamic community globally.

His assessment is highly favorable. Indeed, it would be quite hard for the most dedicated Iranian nationalist to find a single syllable in 'Akef's presentation which was less than laudatory for the Revolution or its leader.

Clearly there is a strong tendentious flavor to the entire three section exchange. One cannot help but suspect the entire point-counterpoint-concluding point trialogue was a set up, a pre-planned pseudo-debate with the end goal of laying the groundwork for a working relationship between the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood and the Shi'a mullahs of Iran and their clients Hezbollah and Hamas.

Perhaps the Geek should be forgiven for thinking that this Muslim Brotherhood gambit is redolent with the fragrance of the Popular Front days of Soviet diplomacy in Western Europe in the days prior to World War II. But, the idea of Iranian Shi'a mullahs climbing into bed with the Sunnis of the Muslim Brotherhood is far less disquieting in many ways than the long ago bedding of Soviet Communists with those most hated of political scum, the Socialists.

"Hold on there, Geek! Those Sunni bombers in Iraq don't seem to be in a hurry to kiss and make up with the Shi'a they are killing."

Right, bucko, so it seems. We are well advised not to play the religious motivation too heavily in the Iraqi context. In Iraq it is not religion-as-politics, but, rather, politics-as-religion. The Sunni powered, al-Qaeda denominated insurgency in Iraq is all about regaining the ascendancy lost in the wake of the American invasion. As you will recall, the long dominant Sunni minority held the Shi'a majority in political subordination and a fair degree of cultural reprobation.

The thwacking great boot of the US invasion kicked the nifty (from the Sunni perspective) status quo into small, bloody fragments. Scared, shaken and deeply angered by the sudden change in fortune, the Sunnis, who had long been more secular than observant, suddenly discovered the power of belief to motivate fighters and suicide bombers alike. Religion is a tool to be invoked, used and exploited, but the goal is rigorously political--the re-acquisition of lost power.

Similarly the Iranians have been invoking, using and exploiting the mystical faith of Shi'a and its history as a political tool. To the mullahs of Tehran it is neither a matter of politics-as-religion or religion-as-politics but rather, religion-is-politics. The very able and resolute men at the top of the Iranian religious and political structure are pursuing the goal of regional hegemony--at the very least.

The opponents of Iranian hegemony are by and large Sunni in their affiliation. The most wealthy and potentially influential of these opponents, Saudi Arabia, is not simply Sunni but of the austere, demanding Wahhibist interpretation of Sunni doctrine. The Saudi Wahhibists, not unlike the Sunni insurgents of Iraq, are playing the politics-as-religion gambit seeking to spread Saudi authority through the Mideast (and far beyond their main region of interest) by exporting Wahhibism with its intense rejection of Shi'a as apostasy.

The Muslim Brotherhood is seeking to outflank the Saudi ploy by employing a "Popular Front" strategy of seeking an apparent melding or at least an alliance between Sunni and Shi'a. The Brotherhood has a portfolio of goals starting with the re-establishment of Islam as the solid foundation of Mideast politics but extending far beyond that initial end.

The potential of even a relatively short-lived tactical alliance between Iran and the Brotherhood is (or should be) of major concern to the secularist regimes such as that of Egypt. For decades now the secular leaning rulers of Egypt, Syria, Iraq as well as the purportedly Islamic "conservative" sheikdoms of the Gulf have depended on a continuation of antipathy between Sunnis and Shi'as to continue their regimes. The Brotherhood's new gambit threatens the continuation of the so far successful approach of "divide and rule."

The imponderable in play, the perhaps "knowable unknown" is the degree to which the assorted highly inflated egos of the leadership of the Brotherhood, its "national" subordinates and the mullahs of Iran and Iraq can accommodate themselves to the requirements of a political relationship of mutual goals and shared perceptions of threat. In any uneasy alliance, the question of just who will be "first among equals" surpasses all others. Absent the sort of iron discipline that could be imposed by Joe Stalin seventy years ago, the clash of egos and parochial interests can destroy the possibilities raised by unity.

The Popular Front could and did survive the pre-war stresses of national politics and personal ego only to be shattered by the Nazi-Soviet pact in August 1939. After that fatal wound, it could never be effectively resurrected in the post-war years despite repeated Soviet efforts in that direction. The Popular Front was a weapon which could be used only once.

Whether the Muslim Brotherhood effort will prove successful to even the slightest extent is yet to be demonstrated. It is too early to predict success or failure. It is not too early to see the exchange on the Brotherhood's website as other than what it is--a wakeup call to policy makers in the West. It is a clear warning that the reign of conventional wisdom is over.

Meet A Pair Of Historical Illiterates

Our current Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, is in a neck to neck race with her Clinton administration predecessor, Madeleine Albright, for the title of Historical Clutz of the Year. Both women recently have demonstrated awesome ignorance of important realities of history which have policy implications. These implications are far from trivial.

Dr Albright in her most recent incarnation as a ramrod of the US-Muslim Engagement Project and chief author of its hot off the computer report recommending new forms of public and private diplomacy to further dialogue with Islamic governments displayed an appalling and dangerous lack of historical knowledge. One of her whoppers lacks policy import but is indicative of the profound depth of her ignorance.

Specifically she opined, "in my study of religions, in many ways Islam is maybe the most democratic religion because there is nobody between you and God." What! Has the one time academic never run across a small movement which emerged five hundred or so years ago? It goes by the name, Protestant Christianity. Among the major founders of this insignificant movement was Martin Luther who railed against the Catholic Church's use of intermediaries between man and God. His plaint was echoed by every other early leader of Protestantism with the exception of the branch known as the Church of England.

If these events are entirely too remote in the dim reaches of the past for a political scientist like Dr Albright to give credence, perhaps she should acquaint herself with American history. She might take a dekko at the Puritans. They were, after all, a far from unimportant group in the founding of what became the United States of America. This bunch, in common with many other Protestant denominations, practiced democracy in the election of preachers.

Other Protestant communities echoing or expanding upon customs developed in the UK or on the Continent had democratic organisation of their church governance. And, some, such as the Baptists and Methodists, put a very heavy emphasis upon the personal nature of the relation between believer and God.

So, even if Dr Albright, in her study of religions, never ran across that portion of the message delivered by the Wandering Sage and Healer, Jesus, which held the nature of the relation between man and God was both personal and profound and had no need for either intermediaries or sacrificial rituals, she should have enjoyed at one time in her education some nodding acquaintance with the realities of Christianity as it developed in post-Reformation years. She might also have noticed in her study of religion the powerful influence enjoyed by Muslim clerics to say nothing of the potent only semi-permeable membrane of the four schools of Sunni which constitute a very real intermediary between individual and deity.

Her misapprehension of Turkish history is more critical in its policy implications. Turkey, as Turkish historians have long noted, became a secular democracy only because of the skill, iron will and vision of Attaturk coupled with the structural collapse of the Ottoman culture, polity and social organisation at the end of World War I. The change from Islamic autocracy to secular democracy did not come easily, quickly nor completely.

Turks who subscribe today to the secular vision of Attaturk know just how fragile the non-Islamic world view is on the Turkish people. This is the root cause of the pervasive fear of backsliding into the Islamic past whenever the Islamist rooted ruling party makes a move to readopt some feature of traditional Muslim life such as headcovering for women.

Like Dr Albright, the Geek hopes that Turkey succeeds in its yet incomplete task of coupling Islamic religous structures and beliefs with a secular democracy including such necessary adjuncts as an independent judiciary, pluralism, and open expression. But, unlike the former Secretary of State, the Geek is unwilling on the face of the evidence to date to declare that Turkey is a success story which points the way for a US policy based on grafting democracy on to the hostile vine of Islamic--and, even more, Islamist beliefs and world view.

Secretary of State Clinton's historical empty headedness deals with events of the recent past--the closing days of the Reagan administration and that of his successor, George H.W. Bush and has an immediate, direct and negative impact on current US policy in the Afpak area of operations. As reported in the Pakistani Daily Times, the Secretary foisted responsibility for Taliban on the US. At least in part.

She averred that the US abandoned Pakistan as the Soviets prepared to withdraw the Red Army from Afghanistan. In her presentation to a Congressional committee she dilated on this proposition,

There is a very strong argument, which is: It was not a bad investment to end the Soviet Union, but let’s be careful what we sow, because we will harvest. So we then left Pakistan. We said, okay, fine, you deal with the Stingers that we have left all over your country. You deal with the mines that are along the border. And by the way, we do not want to have anything to do with you

To use far from diplomatic language, that is a crock!

The real deal is not so simple. It reflects no real credit on the decision making capacities of either the Reagan administration or that of H.W Bush. But, it in no way contributes to the always present Pakistani desire to see their country as a victim.

In real history--as opposed to the Clinton theory of history--the government of Pakistan had wanted to take over operational control of the US proxy war in Afghanistan. This eagerness increased in direct proportion to the likelihood of a Soviet pullout. The government, military and intelligence service of Pakistan all argued that they could deal far, far better than could the US given ethnic, religious and linguistic similarities between Pakistani and Afghan.

The swirling morass of Afghan groups each competing with all the others for the seat at the head of the governing table when the Red Army left constituted a bewildering and exhausting challenge for the American personnel charged with sorting out the endgame state of play. This actuality did not change the view of many on the ground in Peshawar and environs that the US should keep its hands on rather than turn the mess over to Islamabad.

There was a good reason for this view. The Pakistanis had their own agenda for post-Soviet Afghanistan. They had their own national interests in play in the region. They had their own agent groups, their own candidate for the role of client government in Kabul.

All the Paks wanted from Uncle Sam was a wide open money spigot. Do that, the Islamabad regime stated repeatedly, and we will do the rest. You need not worry your little American heads over the matter.

A series of decisions extending over several months both before and after the Soviet withdrawal incrementally transferred authority over the post-war Afghan government to the Pakistanis. The Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence were good to go on matters. They had a well-primed candidate to take over in Kabul. Taliban.

Taliban, with the aid of ISI and the Pakistani military shot, hacked and bribed their way to power. Not uncontested power to be sure. That pesky Northern Alliance refused to turn its toes up regardless of the best efforts by both Taliban and its sponsor in Islamabad.

The rest, as they say, is history.

History, as the Geek well knows, is susceptible to manifold interpretations, revisions of revisions and the all the other distortions which characterise the development of historical mythology. All too often the myth of history rather than a rational interpretation of actual cause and effect serves as a base of policy. When that happens, the record shows, the result is less than pleasing.

Secretary of State Clinton's tragi-comic and very weird understanding of what role the US played in the creation of Taliban was delivered to a dangerous audience--Congress. A Congress which is considering how much more money to fling at Islamabad and with what goal(s).

Perhaps (to be as charitable as possible) SecState Clinton is not as much of an airhead on history as she appears. Perhaps she is being true to her training as a lawyer. As a good lawyer she is framing what this sort of person calls a "theory" and forcing by distortion the facts to fit the theory. Perhaps she is out to guilt trip the Congress into meeting the Administration's need for more money for Pakistan.

Well, it's a charitable gloss. And, every now and then, the Geek likes to be soft, sweet and nice.

Swatting Swat

The sound of knees knocking is getting louder in London. And, Islamabad. In both places the wind is up over fears that the US might get muscular. Do a Bush, so to speak, on the Taliban in Swat.

With almost palpable bitterness the usual anonymous source in Islamabad told his British interlocutor that the Obama administration had "pressurised" the Pakistani government over the expansion of Taliban's armed force into Buner with such vigor that the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) "ordered" the black turban wearing gunslingers to get out of town--or at least out of sight.

Maulvi Khalil responded by an ostentatious movement of his trigger pullers from the urban area to the surrounding hills. They left their threatening banners and a foul taste of fear behind. One could imagine an echo of the Terminator's ominous words, "I'll be back."

From the perspective of both London and Islamabad the highly public expressions of concern by high level US personnel carried an implied message: "If you don't push Taliban back, we will."

The implied (or to be more accurate, the inferred) ultimatum was taken seriously enough that the Pakistani ambassador to the US made the customary rejoinder.

The US needs to relate its comments to the ground realities in Pakistan instead of the mood in Washington. Most Pakistanis are not supportive of the Taliban way of life, but at the same time widespread anti-Americanism confuses many Pakistanis into having a conflicting view.

A fair idiomatic translation of this exercise in diplomatic-speak would be, "You Yanks don't see things the way we want you to see things so you are wrong."

Maybe. Quite possibly not.

The ambassador is a member of the Pakistani urban elite. Western educated, soft in his practice of Islam, open to the reality of the Twenty-first Century, willing and able to either ignore or scoff at the barbarism of the Taliban as long as its repugnant acts take place on the far frontier.

A number of reasonably well-conducted surveys of Pakistani public opinion indicate a widespread support for the goals of Taliban, most importantly the implementation of Sharia. While there may be disapproval of and disgust with some of the measures taken by Taliban such as a fondness for decapitation and flogging as well as a love of beards and veils, this does not do much to detract from the appeal of Taliban as long as it is an abstract, romanticised distant presence.

The urban elite has been able, like the ambassador, to ignore or discount the possibility that the non-elite majority of their fellow Pakistanis may be quite willing to see the corrupt, oppressive and inefficient current governing structure replaced by Taliban--swords, guns and whips included. At least, those of the "lower orders" believe Taliban goes by the Quran and espouses ideals they would like to see in action. It can't be worse and may be better than the status quo.

It is important to bear in mind that the outrage which greeted the video of a teenage girl being publicly flogged or the more recent and far more nauseating footage of a dude in a black turban casually shooting down a man and a woman believed by Allah's True Believers to have been adulterers was quite limited in its demographics. More, the outrage was very, very limited in duration.

Stories of Taliban's offensive acts such as those caught on tape have much longer legs in the West than they do in Pakistan. Here we want to see rejection of barbaric behavior and our media gives us what we want. In Pakistan the emphasis is different. For example, the main complaint about the flogging tape was that the whipping should have been administered in private, not on a public street. Regarding the shooting video, the reaction outside the urban elite was along the lines of "They shouldn't have let that reporter have a phone."

The take away is simple. Most Pakistanis, the majority of the hoi polloi, the non-elite mass of folks, harbors no distaste of Taliban. Or, if they do, it is outmatched by the dislike and distrust of the government and those aligned with the government.

The lack of Taliban inspired fear and loathing extends to the Army. All indicators point to Islamism having reached a new high point among military personnel both enlisted and of junior officer rank. A reason not to use the regular army in anti-Taliban operations beyond the usual preoccupation with the presumed Indian threat is there is no real will to combat in the Army. Operations against Taliban in the FATA last year gave proof that few if any grunts had any desire to close with and kill the enemy.

Use of the poorly trained, poorly equipped and pathetically commanded paramilitary forces in counter-Taliban operations provided and provides the Pakistani high command with the option of appearing to do something against the insurgents without either really doing anything or running the risk of "collective disobedience among the Islamist polluted soldiers. Trucking a couple of hundred paramilitary bullet-catchers into Buner was meant not as a serious counter to the black turbans. Rather it was a sop thrown in the general direction of the US. A means of showing resolve to those pesky Americans.

The movement of the hemi-demi-semi troops of the constabulary into the district also allowed Taliban to withdraw giving the reason as one of desiring to spare the civilian population any harm. As a result there was a slight residuum of gratitude to leaven the fear which Taliban left in its wake.

For the moment the balance of power in Swat and conterminous territory remains in stasis. Taliban can come back. The Army is not geared for a fight. The elite is quivering on the banks of denial. The men in the markets and the women at home both hope that things won't get a whole lot worse before they get better.

And, American options beyond jawboning remain limited in the extreme.

Other than sending Predators and Reapers over Swat there is not much we can do to directly counter the Taliban advance. The efficacy of UAV launched missiles is (or can be) tactically useful. On the larger scale this means of war fighting holds little potential for decisiveness. Absent a hit on the command cadre of Taliban in Swat there is no probability of an impact on the operational level of the war. There is no chance of a strategically decisive hit. Taliban has too deep a bench for that to happen.

The US lacks the troops, money, political will or diplomatic support to put boots on the ground. The only exception to that is the eventuality that puts Taliban or one of its associated groups in close proximity to any portion of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

Only that desperate extremity would allow, let alone demand, the direct insertion of US forces on the ground. Were that evolution to come to pass the incursion would last only so long as was necessary as to assure the nuclear weapons or materials were secured or otherwise removed as a potential threat.

However, the myth of President Obama donning George W. Bush's cowboy hat and picking up the former president's six shooters is useful in giving the Pakistanis a short acting backbone injection. The problem comes in that the Crazy American Thesis loses effect with repetition.

We did it once. We probably cannot do it again.

The best thing we can do is to let Taliban take over some more territory. Act more barbarously. Alienate more Pakistanis. Show elite and the others alike that there is no romance and much blood in the Taliban agenda and actions.

Once A Mexican, Always A Mexican

Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Relations, Patricia Espinosa Cantellano, while at a working session of a government entity called the Office of Mexicans Abroad insisted that the basis for a new relation with the United States must rest on something she termed, "global migratory reform." In an effort to define what was meant by this, the Secretary invoked an ideological dictum closely resembling that put forth by the Nazi Party's office charged with relations between the Fatherland and Germans living elsewhere in the world.

In both cases, Germany in the 1930's and Mexico today, the core belief is, "we are all one nation and identity knows no borders." She went on to note that from the standpoint of the Mexican government no Mexican who lives beyond the current borders of Mexico ceases to be a Mexican simply as a result of that geographic nicety. (Or, perhaps such minor matters as acquiring citizenship in the new location.)

In the 1930s the US government became concerned over the potential for subversion sponsored or facilitated by the Nazi Party's overseas outreach efforts based on the arguably spurious idea of "once a German, always a German." FDR himself authorised the FBI to undertake covert intelligence efforts against German groups which might be conduits or tools of German foreign policy in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of World War II.

The Nazi sympathizing groups never constituted more than a small percentage of the totality of the German or German descended population of the US. That was, of course, reassuring to the administration and the larger American public, particularly given the ongoing anti-immigrant sentiment in the US.

The invocation of the Once-Means-Forever doctrine by Secretary Cantellano is bothersome not because it drags in its wake grounds for fearing Mexican subversion or Mexican espionage but rather because it implies an increasing aggressiveness on the part of Mexico to assure that the US will be the safety valve. The Secretary is demanding that the slogan, "Go North, young Mexican" will resound with success in the months and years to come.

Not to put too fine a point on the matter, Secretary Cantellanto, if not exactly declaring war on the American right to control its southern border, is at least issuing one more call for that border to be reduced to the status of fiction. Considering the frequency and vehemence with which other, lower ranking members of the Mexican governing elite have made the same demand, the Secretary is not straying from the policy reservation but rather raising the political prestige stakes in play.

In her call for a resurrection of the Folkwanderung which marked the end stage of the Roman Empire, the Secretary is once more demonstrating the poverty, not to say bankruptcy, of ideas for how to address Mexico's endemic poverty, maldistribution of wealth, deficiency of infrastructure, weakness of private sector investment and the fundamentally reactionary bent of Mexican hyper-nationalism. Corruption, pervasive inefficiency, irrationally prickly nationalism, the wealth gap and, quite simply, too many people are not new. All have been a blight on the Mexican social, economic and political landscape for generations.

In the finest tradition of never-do-today-what-can-be-put-off-until-tomorrow, the Mexican elite has never made any serious attempt to address these problems, which have moved slowly and inexorably for decades pushing the Mexican ship of state closer and closer to the rocks. In a country, a culture, where even "revolutionaries," socialists and reformers are intensely conservative and slower to act than a tortoise at high noon, this is no surprise. It is, however, a tragedy.

The Mexicans of the hoi polloi deserve much better than the treatment they receive and have received for generations from the elite of the country. Their ability and willingness to suffer, to accept exploitation and even lick the (Mexican) boot which kicks them is the stuff of legend. So also is their capacity for violence, cruelty and red killing rage on those occasions when the stops are pulled on long repressed hurt and hatred.

The rage is there powered by frustration, loss of faith in the future (or even the here and now) and the increased recognition that the hoi polloi will never be "rescued" from its misery by creative and effective moves on the part of the elite, the State, the political parties, or the Church. The lethal Mexican internal "war on drugs," like the violence waged between cartels and the surging crime generally are the symptoms of the rage within.

The mutilated remains of a tortured soldier or cop or even journalist is not so much a symbol of the lethal combination of guns and much money in play as they are a hint of hatred and a warning to each and every member of the elite--you can be next. Even if that is not the intent, it is the way in which the elite is interpreting it.

Change is needed in Mexico. Deep, pervasive, structural changes in the relation between elite and hoi polloi which are reflected quickly and effectively in economic, social and political affairs. These changes are long overdue. Everyone knows that, even if only deep in the heart of hearts.

The elite knows it. The bitter reality is that the knowledge will not be acted upon. To err on the side of accuracy, the knowledge can not be acted upon. The exceptionally conservative, not to say reactionary, nature of Mexican society and polity (where else is there a political party with a name quite so internally contradictory as "The Institutional Revolutionary Party"?) assures an almost infinite resistance to change.

King Status Quo reigns without rival in Mexico. This rulership demands that the government move heaven and earth to displace responsibility for the current sick state of the system on some villain outside itself. While there is much truth to the oft repeated assertion that the US is responsible for the high body count of the past few years because the drugs are coming North and (some but only some) weapons head in the opposite direction, the elite's barrage of blame fired at Uncle Sam is both overwrought and overblown.

Far more important for the Mexican elite's desperate campaign to keep King Status Quo on his throne than the (comparative) bagatelle of the drug trade is the necessity of maintaining an open border to the North. People have to flow North. Money has to flow South.

The Mexicans who brave the harsh passage north are highly motivated, desperate folks who would be insurgents without the possibility of finding a better future as "overseas" Mexicans who loyally send money to the family they leave behind. The men and women who make a break for the North are the men and women who would morph into wolves munching on the innards of the elite.

The dilemma for the US is not simple. It is not an easy circle to square. The Mexicans who cross the border are quite often, even typically, the best of the immigrant model which has so benefited the US in so many ways for so many, many years. In the main these "wetbacks" are hardworking, law abiding people who, if they decide to stay here, are a plus for the country.

Many, perhaps most, of the undocumented people coming North will eventually head back South. In the past this pattern has played itself out with nationalities as diverse as Norwegian and Italian. A rhythm of ebb and flow. Come to the US, work hard, send some money home, save the rest, and, eventually head back to the old country. There were men who repeated the cycle several times before finally coming to rest in either the new or the old land.

In the past the US had no particular nor pressing need to control or even monitor the coming and going of immigrants. They came and either stayed or left. The US government and We the People were by and large indifferent to the outcome. At the time American employers exploited the immigrants. As time went by We the People came grudgingly to recognise that the country as a whole had benefited from these birds of settlement and passage alike.

Whether Secretary Cantellano and others of the elite want to admit it or not, times have changed. The Good Old Days of uncontrolled borders are gone forever. The sovereignty of a nation has become increasingly determined by its ability to control the borders of the state, by its capacity to decide who can--and cannot--enter its jurisdiction.

Economic considerations are part of the mix. Employers (big shock here) want limited limitations on immigration so as to put downward pressures on wages. Employees and unions (huge shock here) want maximal restrictions on migration.

There are factors far transcending the concerns of "economic man." The most trenchant of these is implied by Secretary Canellano's comment. This most high powered factor has also been basic in all disputes over immigration in this country for the past century and more.

"Who are we?" That is the question. The question of American identity. We Americans have always suffered from bouts of identity crisis. This should come as no surprise. We are and always have been a nation of nations. We share little as core identifying features beyond a handful of common beliefs and shared mythology. Not even an "official" language binds us together. Only the most insubstantial fabric of values, beliefs and mythic words serves as a basis for the tapestry of national identity.

The problem of national identity comes into sharpest focus in the US along the fault line which separates our elite from our hoi polloi. It has become quite fashionable in recent years among the chattering class component of our domestic elite to disparage nationalism or even the notion of a basic "American" national and cultural identity as being hopelessly outdated and dangerously reactionary.

That Joe the Plumber and others like him or those such as Sarah Palin who both speak for and resonate with the Joes of the country vehemently disagree with this stance du jour. To these people, the numerical majority of We the People, there is a unique American identity which must be inculcated within and accepted by those who come to our country for employment (even temporary) or residence (perhaps permanent.)

The elite see no problem inherent in a policy of immigration reform which would comport well with the Mexican notion of open borders. The hoi polloi want a very restrictive policy arguing that an influx of immigrants including any form of "amnesty" for illegals already in the country would put severe stress upon the social fabric of the US and introduce social and cultural changes which would carry the potential of disruption.

The border of the US and Mexico has become the symbolic battleground for a greater conflict. This second, deeper conflict exists in both countries. In both it is identical. In both it extends far beyond the question of borders and migration.

It is the conflict between elite and hoi polloi. The struggle between those who by virtue of education, occupation, social status see themselves as being fully equipped to govern, to rule, to dictate--and everyone else.

And, class warfare under whatsoever guise is the longest, hardest war of all. A war without borders and often without the potential of truce, let alone an ending.

Doing The "Heavy Lifting"

Jordan's King Abdullah II has delivered the same message to the White House and Congress. The other intended recipients of the King's views were the congeries referred to as the "Arab and Muslim" states.

The message came in four major parts. (1) The Two State Solution is the best (read "only") game in town. (2) The US is the Player-Who-Matters-Most. (3) That being said, Israel is still the country which must make a choice. It must choose between living in a friendly 'neighborhood" or continuing to exist as Fortress Israel caught in the stasis of hostility. (4) The "Arab and Muslim states" must assist the US in the heavy lifting of bringing the seemingly eternal "peace process" to an end with the implementation of the two state solution.

King Abdullah's final point puts a large onus on the Mideast's "frontline" states as well as other, more distant governments to take a firm hold on the short, dirty end of the reality stick. It includes the states of the region which have found it comfortable to both hide behind and exploit the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the sake of their own national and domestic political purposes. The Jordanian fourth point demands that the regional governments face the rage of the Islamists who will go fast boost exo-atmospheric in fury over any substantial moves to assure peace with Israel.

The Obama administration is quite obviously ready, willing and eager to do all it can to bring the Two State Solution into existence. It is quite probable that the president is willing (although certainly not eager) to brave the resistance of the Israel Lobby, which has shown quite often that it is more strident and extreme in its positions than is the government of Israel.

Obama and his close senior advisers may well view the ending of the festering, running ulcer of the Mideast as an absolute essential as a precondition for pursuing its larger, domestic agenda. To them, the risks involved with ramming a Two State Solution through are well worth running.

It is possible that Bibi's recent hairy-chested oratory regarding the Israeli readiness to abate the Iranian nuclear menace with or without US approval and support is the sort of reassuring tough talk such as he engaged in often during his last period as PM. Israelis may be a passionate people for whom politics is nearly a full-contact sport, but the government has (usually) had a good eye for the military and diplomatic realities of the day.

By all rational calculations the ball now rests well and truly in the Arabs' court. What the several governments and quasi-governmental entities do in the next few weeks will determine whether or not they are willing to meet King Abdullah's challenge or not. History gives a mixed message regarding the probability of the Arabs rising to the occasion.

It must be recalled that the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as those whose homes once were located in Israel but who are now scattered around the world are in their present situation because of repeated Arab intransigence and incompetence. For the past eighty years, back to the days far preceding the Partition and the Israeli War of Independence, the Arabs have a splendid record of blowing every opportunity for a negotiated end to their confrontation with, first, the Jewish immigrants to the Mandate, second with the UN teams charged with establishing peacefully an early version of the Two State Solution, and, finally, with the UN mission headed by Ralph Bunche who sought an end to the 1948 war on terms which were highly favorable to the Arabs.

Continuing their successful effort to prove that they were the Chicago Cubs of diplomacy, the Palestinian (as they renamed themselves) screwed their collective pooch in the negotiations which occurred under the Oslo and Madrid processes. To quote a line from an old Air Force ditty, "I'd tell you more but it make me sick."

Showing a haughty disregard for the mundane matters of changed realities on the ground, the Arab League's proposal for peace, which was brought back from the graveyard of diplomatic fatalities by Saudi Arabia, focused on demanding the clearly unacceptable by Israel. With an arrogance which must come from sitting on too much overpriced oil and listening too often to Islamist clerics, the Arab League/Saudi proposals required Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders abandoning countless billions of dollars worth of post-1967 urban development and housing expansion as if this would be of no more moment than pulling out of those miles and miles of nothing but miles and miles called Sinai.

As if that deal killer were not enough, the diplomatic oafs wanted the government and people of Israel to accept a perversion of the Israeli Right of Return granted to Jews. Specifically, the proposal would have the Jewish state accept back all those who left their homes in 1948 (or their descendants) in response to the stimulus of Israeli ethnic cleansing and Arab appeals to have faith in the soldiers of Islam. That requirement was clearly no-go considering both the financial and demographic impact it would have on Israel.

Unless and until the Arab states can see the folly of their past demarches, they will continue to be a heavy drag, not heavy lifters. Of course, the Sunni states of the Mideast do have one rather pressing reason to gain a greater appreciation of reality. That reason is Iran.

By meeting the challenge of Abdullah's point four, the "conservative" states of the Gulf as well as Egypt and even North Africa can form a "neighborhood" (to use the King's term) which is at peace internally and can form a united front against the the troublesome mullahs of resurgent Persia. (After all, even the most dedicated, observant Muslim can see the Israelis have a lot more military capacity up to and including the nuclear than do the devotees of the Mahdi in Iran.)

Then there is Hamas. Hamas, like Hezbollah, is a dependency of Iran. Unlike Hezbollah which can be controlled by Syrian and other national forces if allowed to by the US, Hamas is not susceptible to normal pressures--including the threat of armed attack. Unless and until Hamas genuinely abandons its position of denying Israel the right to exist, the US will not participate in any conversations with any hypothetical "unity" government which may emerge from the Egyptian brokered talks between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.

The probability of Hamas actually abandoning its The-Zionist-Entity-Must-Be-Destroyed line as opposed to invoking the Islam sanctioned doctrine of tactical deception for the benefit of Islam or the equally approved doctrine of agreeing to a temporary truce in order to gain an advantage for the Koran-wavers, is about as high as Nancy Pelosi genuinely welcoming Newt Gingrich back to the House. The words, "forget it!" come to mind.

In principle, the Arab states of the Mideast have the leverage to deal with Hamas. It certainly is in the interests of these states to abate the political and social nuisance represented by Hamas. It is questionable, however, whether or not the Arab states, including Jordan, have the political will and foresightedness to accurately assess the risk/benefit ratio of dealing robustly with Hamas. Even more debatable is the question of these states having the courage to take the risks of taking on Hamas even though the benefits would be vast in potential.

Peace, like war, has costs. The price of peace may be lower in blood and even treasure, but it can be higher, much higher in political and social consequences. A change in the long established pattern in the Mideast brings automatic uncertainties in its wake. No government which is inherently comfortable with the well-established and well-known readily embraces a change, a new order of affairs.

Since World War II, the Mideast, the Arab states generally, have experienced a plethora of wars, coups, countercoups and other political tumult. None of these have brought any fundamental change in either politics or social structure.

Peace in the "neighborhood" would bring real change in regional economics, politics, social structures, cultural values and norms of behavior. The real question which underlies King Abdullah's fourth point is this: Can Arabs and Muslims accept, even eagerly embrace change?

The sweep of history over the past thousand years suggests the answer to the question is a resounding, "No."

The High Minded Are Out To Lunch--Again

The recent self-examination of the Israeli Defense Force by the Israeli Defense Force was (hang on to your seat, bucko) self-exculpatory. But, self-exculpatory does not equal either a whitewash or a mass of crass tergiversation.

While stopping short of calling the IDF effort a blatant crock of caca, Amnesty International showing its typical partiality strongly implied that conclusion in its response to the IDF report. The group's press briefing referred to the report as "lacking credibility" and branded it as failing to account for either the totality of all (purported) civilian casualties or the observations made on the spot by Amnesty International sources.

Amnesty International holds the conceit that its observers are so Noble and High Minded that there is no way any of their spot reports could reflect any sort or semblance of agenda beyond a Lofty Thinking concern for the well-being of innocents caught in harm's way. This dubious assumption goes unquestioned by those who rely on the same High Minded notions as the fine folk at Amnesty.

The real problem of Amnesty International's critique is the group's failure to consider the culpability attendant upon Hamas' choice of battlefield. Amnesty must be aware, at least dimly, that Hamas acts under the color of government in the Gaza Strip. After all, they shot their way to power fair and square so the best trigger men won the election of blood. This means that Hamas had the responsibility to act in a way which protected the people living under their sway.

This responsibility was not only abdicated, it was tossed in the trash heap. Hamas made no effort to restrain those of its membership or those aligned with other armed factions to fire rockets against Israeli civilian targets. It did nothing to halt or even slow the flow of munitions and weapons to men dedicated to kill Israelis even if they died in the effort.

Beyond that, Hamas elected to place defensive positions in civilian structures. Hamas made the decision to allow the emplacement of offensive missiles in or near mosques, schools (including those operated by the UN) and residential areas. Hamas allowed, even encouraged the intermixing of civilians and armed personnel so as to assure that the IDF would have no option other than the killing of civilians in the effort to neutralise Hamas gun and bomb slingers.

It is quite true that there is an obligation, a duty, laid upon military forces to restrict to the greatest practical extent the harming of unarmed people including wounded combatants as well as non-combatants. There are those within the Legion of the High Minded who argue that a military must be willing to accept higher levels of casualties in order to assure that not a single civilian hair be harmed.

The duty placed upon military commanders and those under their command to refrain from inflicting harm on civilians is balanced by a long recognised duty that the defending forces and government take all necessary measures to protect their non-combatants. While the IDF may have been less, much less than ideally scrupulous in avoiding unnecessary damage and loss of life to civilians, Hamas was even more guilty of having taken no measures to protect those under their authority and, logically, protection.

The record of history is filled with excesses of civilian death during time of war. The days of Frederick the Great who sought to wage war so that neither the peasant in his field or the merchant in his counting house would notice its presence are long gone. Changes in the technology of war are the minor factor in this death of "civilized" or at least, civilian-free war.

The greater responsibility lies with governments. Governments, whether the offender or the defender, have proven increasingly willing to place civilians at the same or even greater risk as the front line grunt.

Hamas has taken this tendency to its logical (albeit criminal) extreme of actively choosing to fight a war in the most heavily populated portion of its mini-state. Hamas made the cynical and cold-blooded decision to assure maximal civilian loss of life and property in the hopes of winning the battle for international sympathy and support. Hamas knowingly and with calculated aforethought sought to place the IDF in a position where it would either have to bear the international onus of killing civilians or lose an unacceptably high number of its own soldiers.

Hamas well understood, indeed, counted upon the unfortunate democratic weakness which afflicts not only Israel but the US and other countries. The political unacceptability of too many body bags.

The US could not accept the number of bags coming home from Vietnam. This lesson was not lost upon others.

It was not lost on countries and pretenders such as Hamas who seek to wage a war of political will against a democratic adversary. Hamas bet its collective butt on the proposition that the IDF would both kill civilians and end the operation before it became or could become conclusive.

Right now, Amnesty International, whether its leadership knows it or not, is willing to acknowledge it or not, is acting according to the Hamas authored script. It is a propaganda arm of an admitted terrorist organisation pretending to the role but not the responsibilities of a legitimate government: Hamas.

What the IDF did with its report was self-justification. What Hamas did to provoke the necessity of the report was frankly criminal. What Amnesty International and others of the High Minded and Lofty Thinking sort are doing is not criminal, but it is facilitating the success of criminals.

It is regrettable that Amnesty International lacks the intelligence necessary to assure that its sentiments are not perverted by a gang of True Believing thugs.