In spite of the more-than-welcome and long overdue minor change in US-Cuban relations announced by Obama a few days ago and Raul Castro's spring-loaded, favorable response, the always-open mouth of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez is working (that is to say, talking) overtime to assure Cuba is the central focus of the Summit. Supported by the other left-leaners of LatAm, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa and Daniel Ortega, Chavez has been riding the Cuban horse for all it is worth.
In a very real sense Chavez needs Cuba more than Cuba needs him. More specifically, Chavez needs Cuba as it has been for nearly fifty years--standing on the outside of the Organization of American States (OAS) with its nose pressed against the glass. For Chavez, the ideal situation is one where the US continues with its long established and totally failed policy of isolating Cuba. If Cuba is kept on the outside, Chavez has no serious rival for the post of chief spokesman for the--stand by for standard issue, approved socialist terms-- underprivileged, marginalised, exploited majority of the LatAm population. At least within the halls of the OAS.
More, any continued exclusion of Cuba from the OAS and akin bodies gives Chavez an ongoing, perfect issue to prop up his claims of Yankee Imperialism and Wall Street Capitalist Exploitation. He needs this if he is to continue to enjoy the influence he has currently. He needs it even more if he is going to extend the Bolivarian agenda to more of Latin America.
Chavez is not going from triumph to triumph even considering his victory in his long running effort to amend the Venezuelan constitution so that he may become president-for-life. The decline in global oil prices which will persist for some time to come, perhaps measured in years, have eroded his much hyped re-armament program. At the same time the loss of petrobucks has undercut Chavez' ambitious social welfare program.
At the same time the bluster and bullying which have emanated from Caracas in great torrents at an ever increasing volume have caused more than a little nervousness in neighboring countries including Columbia and Brazil. Both countries, particularly the latter with its newly proven off-shore oil and natural gas reserves as well as a very well established and technologically competent industrial base, possess the capacity and (potentially) the will to contest Chavez' ambitions.
Hugo Chavez has been in the habit of nearly breaking his arm by patting himself on the back for having blocked the passage of the US supported hemispheric free trade agreement at the last Summit of the Americas. His success was far more shadow than substance.
There were other, more important, factors in play which taken in concert gave more than sufficient reason for a refusal to rush into a free-trade pact. The negative consequences of globalisation as well as the specific policies forced upon South American countries by the International Monetary Fund in support of globalisation and privatization were increasingly apparent to responsible LatAm governmental figures. Also, George W. Bush had made himself more than slightly detested in the region to a degree which made certain that anything he wanted would be resisted to the last trench.
If Mr Chavez is going to maintain high profile relevance in the councils of state throughout the region, he needs Cuba as a club with which to beat the US. Without the example of Cuba the Great Man of the Bolivarian Movement has nothing to enhance his credibility when attacking the US as an arrogant, imperious hemispheric hegemon. He has to hope (and pray, if Bolivarians are in the habit of doing such) that the US will not take any rapid steps toward full normalisation of relations with Cuba.
He has two reasons for hope. The first is that American domestic politics will inhibit any Obama administration action beyond the small, symbolic steps that have already been taken. The second is that of working on the egos of the Castro brothers with a view toward seeing them impose unacceptable conditions for accepting normalisation.
Giving Chavez has even more reason to believe he has some real chance of delaying or derailing normalisation is the fact that President Obama needs political cover for further, faster progress toward undoing a half century of bad American policy. This need has been made explicit by the president's requirement that Cuba make some genuine moves toward authentic political liberalization.
Given the very touchy Cuban understanding of nationalism and threats to it, making and meeting American demands for political changes is about as demanding a job as defusing an IED while wearing boxing gloves. Chavez has the ear of one or both Castro brothers. We can be sure what he is whispering (shouting?) in them is carefully calculated to make the job of "de-isolating" Cuba tougher, much tougher.
Chavez probably will push the mute button on his anti-American noise machine at least part of the time in Port of Spain. This will not be due to any respect Chavez may feel for his American counterpart. It won't even be a consequence of Obama's (to use the new MSM buzzword) "rock star" status in LatAm. Rather the relative low volume of Chavez diatribes will be propelled by a natural desire to see the new American president not be cast in the role of victim. Chavez is too good a local politician not to know that the same folks who cheered his attacks on W. Bush would rush to the defense of Obama.
As observers ranging from Nicholas Sarkozy to Mexican newsmedia have noted at some length, President Obama is very long on show but very, very short on relevant substance. Obama both acknowledges and justifies the truth of this observation in a rather backhanded way.
The Obama mantra, "I'm here to listen" is a very useful tool for avoiding policy pronouncements while at the same time appearing to be the polar opposite of the universally detested W. Bush. Up to a point the Listen-Don't-Talk gambit is fine, even excellent.
However much foreign leaders may feel flattered by the attention directed to their words by an American president, the gambit can only be taken so far. Even though it is good for American presidents to hear the concerns, hopes and anxieties of his foreign counterparts (after all there is a good chance he will actually learn something) there comes a point when people want to hear the American chief of state.
They want to know what US policy is and will be. They want a firm point around which to rally their own gambits, their own demarches, their own positions. This is true of allies and enemies alike. The universal expectation is that the US will have a policy for or against which their own might be mobilized and directed.
The crucial need for an American president speaking candidly on a matter of policy substance is underscored by the roles of Cuba and Venezuela at the Summit of the Americas. Throughout Latin American there has been little, if any, support for the US policy of Cuban isolation. This is what gives Chavez much of his clout.
If--as likely as Osama bin Laden converting to Catholicism--President Obama would announce that the US has dropped all objections to Cuba's rejoining the OAS in time for its May meeting, LatAm leaders would be happy, very happy to listen. There would be a couple of exceptions to this, like Chavez, Morales, Correa and Ortega.
But why should we listen to them?
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