Monday, April 6, 2009

North Korea Ain't The Problem Not Europe Either

It's not even Iran. The real problem isn't even Afghanistan, not completely.

The real deal challenge is Pakistan. The Obama administration's Afpak strategy puts an onus on the Pakistani government and military to operate effectively as a partner in the mutual campaign against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces located in the FATA. Afpak envisions Pakistan as agreeing with the US contention that Taliban and akin Islamist jihadist groups constitute an existential threat to its existence.

The prospect of the government of Pakistan collapsing like a wall of sand before the Taliban tsunami shivers the timbers of the Obama ship of state. It should. But, that is not what is important.

What is important is the view from inside Pakistan. From the perspective of governmental officials, senior military commanders, Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence personnel, even from the worm level view of Pakistani troopies, townsmen and peasants in the hills. How do all these folk of varied potency and prominence see life? To what extent do they see an Islamist (as opposed to merely Islamic) Pakistan as a terminal condition, a threat to be avoided at all costs?

To put the matter slightly differently: Which is the greater existential threat in the eyes of Pakistanis great and small, Taliban and Sharia or India?

If, like a person well oriented as to time and place, you answered, "India," you are bang on.

The roots of the fear and loathing which are the emotional context of relations between India and Pakistan extend back centuries. Back to the time of the Mogul takeover of the Sub-continent. Back to the centuries of slow motion genocide committed by the Muslim overlords against the subjugated Hindu majority.

Regardless of the best efforts of that Saint of the High Minded, Gandhi, as the end of the Raj loomed near, the worm turned and Muslims died en masse. At the time of Partition the railroad tracks were (in some places quite literally and in others only figuratively) slick with Muslim blood.

Since then the struggle over Kashmir has assured that animosity has not lessened. Acting to exacerbate the loathing and hatred on the Pakistani side of the line is the fact that India has won the open wars which have been fought and seems little more than slightly inconvenienced or annoyed by the guerrilla and terror attacks in the disputed region.

India has the much larger population, economy and industrial base. It possesses strategic depth in comparison to Pakistan. Despite the various fissures which criss-cross the Indian human terrain, it has the necessary political and social cohesion to mount a successful war against Pakistan.

Such a war whether waged with or without nuclear weapons would be a major disaster for India.

For Pakistan a war if fought under current conditions would mean simply the end. Fini. El Finito. That is an existential matter to say the least.

In comparison the collapse of the current government would mean simply that Islam would reign supreme. Considering we Paks are all good Muslims, what's the problem? Sure, it would be an Islam of a particularly severe and totalistic nature, but what's wrong with that? Or so the typical Pakistani-on-the-street would ask.

It is true that Sharia Taliban style would prove onerous to some Pakistanis, particularly those of the educated, Western oriented elite. A Taliban controlled Pakistan would be repugnant to the West, to the US even if the Obama Disarmament Fairy whisked away the Pakistani nuclear weapons with a wave of a magic wand.

But (and here is the the humongous "but") this external view and reactions would not matter to the vast majority of the Pakistani population. Nor would it matter to the army and intelligence service of Pakistan.

Indeed, a Taliban/Sharia run Pakistan would constitute a strategic plus vis a vis India. It would provide for a more unified population acting under the strongest of imperatives--a linked national and religious identity. Beyond that, as mentioned in previous posts, a Taliban/Sharia based Pakistan would allow for the expansion of strategic depth into Afghanistan and perhaps beyond into at least some of the Central Asian Muslim majority republics. A Sharia base would provide a greater basis for full rapprochement with Iran.

Even this (necessarily) brief adumbration provides a sufficient architecture to hold a conclusion. The possibility, no, the strong probability of Pakistan "collapsing" in the next six to twelve months is not viewed with general alarm in Islamabad--or elsewhere in the country. Regardless of hectoring (or pleading) from Washington, the Pakistani majority whether civilian or military does not and will not see Taliban as an existential threat.

India alone holds that claim.

Yes, a nuclear weapons equipped, potential trans-national terrorist protecting, Taliban governed Pakistan is an unpleasant potential to contemplate from the perspective of Inside The Beltway. A Taliban dominated Pakistan with powerful tentacles extending into and possibly beyond Afghanistan may, but not necessarily will, present a threat to the US and its allies extending into the fog of the future.

However, there may not or is not much we can do about it.

Even if the government of Pakistan and its senior military commanders wake up tomorrow with a complete and absolute commitment to working in close partnership with the US in an effective counterinsurgency program directed against Taliban, there is no high (or perhaps even realistic) probability that such would prove effective in the short time available. Taliban has a firm hold on much of the FATA. By agreement with the government it runs Swat and Malakand. It has strong and growing support in the general population.

In short, the political/military struggle between Taliban and the government is Taliban's to lose.

And, they still have the potential to lose it. Or at least make conditions such that the government and senior military decide to join with the US developed program. Taliban may yet alienate enough of the not-yet-committed population so the government and military will refocus from combat on the plains of Punjab against India to the slog in the hills against the Islamist jihadists of Taliban.

Enough suicide bombings, enough armed assaults with fatalities among unarmed civilian or semi-civilian targets will do the job of shifting public opinion and support to the government. Enough beheadings of captured soldiers or paramilitary personnel will do the same among the snuffies in the ranks of the Pakistani security forces who are currently leaning toward Taliban. Enough floggings on video followed by telephone interviews with Taliban spokesmen saying "if we were in full control she would have been shot," will assure that the Western-leaning elite becomes monolithic in its support of the government against the Islamists.

The last best hope for the Obama Afpak strategy lies not with exhortations or with foreign aid directed to "counterinsurgency infrastructure support." It lies rather with the possibility, no, the probability that Taliban will act in ways which mobilize support to the government.

There is recent precedent for this hope. The Islamist jihadists of Iraq behaved in such barbaric ways as to push people to form and support the Awakening Councils and Concerned Local Citizens. In Afghanistan way back before 9/11 Taliban excesses were undermining their support in the country and strengthening the potency of the Northern Alliance. In Swat in just a few weeks Taliban has started to erode the original gratitude for peace, for a decrease in hanging corpses and midnight gunfire, which was initially felt by the residents.

There is a lesson in this. A lesson less for the Deep Thinkers of the Obama administration than for the government, military, intelligence personnel of Pakistan, even for the observant Muslims of the country. Here it is. Simple to say and easy to understand.

Sharia in the abstract has much to recommend it. In practice, particularly as implemented by Islamic jihadists such as Taliban, Sharia is the writ of the gun-thug, the rule of the zealot with sword and whip, the law of the psychopathic True Believe before whom all must cringe in absolute submission--or die.

Pathetically or not, the "Pak" portion of Afpak depends upon the Pakistanis awakening to the reality that Sharia in the hands of Taliban and those of similar Islamist jihadist belief may bring peace. The peace of silent fear. Or the graveyard.

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