It is an operational concept which should have been executed years ago. We did not have sufficient forces in country then. We do now. Now we must deny sanctuary to Taliban and its affiliates all through the border region if we are going to accomplish the minimum strategic goal of "not-losing."
We must destroy Taliban as a militarily potent force in the critical border region if we are going to deny the Islamist jihadists any belief that they have, will or even can defeat the US militarily. In short, a successful carrying of the war to Taliban in south Afghanistan is a necessary, even a sufficient prerequisite for achieving the Obama announced end state of removing Taliban and its ilk as a threat to the US and its western allies.
The new American capacity for offensive military action in southern Afghanistan has alarmed the Pakistani military. It has been reported that Ashfaq Kayani, the General Big of Islamabad's army is most perturbed by the prospect of US troops actually doing something useful near the border.
His reasons?
Humanitarian. The fire-breathing Pakistani warrior is gravely concerned that American operations might cause a flood of refugees across the border placing a burden for relief efforts which Islamabad could not shoulder given the current global economic situation.
Just in case the Americans don't buy that argument, General Kayani has a backup. US offensive actions might result in Taliban (whether that of the Afghan variety or the Pakistani twin is unclear) making further efforts to interdict the Khyber Pass supply route.
The first of these contentions is inherently bogus from the American perspective. As the Marine Corps Commandant James Conway correctly noted, no one can be certain where the jihadists might move under American pressure. It might be added that any numbers regarding civilian displacement or jihadist fugitives are softer than soft.
One caveat is needed. If General Kayani has better information, perhaps based on HUMINT, than does the US, he might be correct in his apprehensions of a refugee torrent washing across the almost non-existent border.
The odds are good that Kayani has superior intelligence concerning Taliban numbers and intentions, including that of purposely generating hordes of refugees. Given the long-standing relations between the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Taliban in Afghanistan, such an eventuality exceeds mere certainty by a West Texas mile or two.
Taliban in Pakistan has long been in the habit of using civilians as a shield for its Heroic Fighters For Islamic Purity as has been recently, publicly acknowledged by the new Interior Minister in Islamabad. The movers-and-shakers of Taliban are knowledgeable in the ways of the West. These men are well aware of the rapidity with which the ever-so-sensitive Western chattering class can weep, wail and cry over the fate of "innocent civilians" caught in the sights of weapons wielded by Americans or other Westerners.
Like their politically calculating religious compatriots in the Gaza Strip, the leaders of Taliban count upon the bodies of dead civilians to snatch victory from the clutches of military defeat. It makes strategic political sense to the intensely cynical men behind the black turban wearing trigger pullers of Taliban to force civilians to catch the (literal) flak and, with their blood, gain the victory which combat alone would deny the Islamist jihadists.
The Western elites have shown a remarkable ability and willingness to displace responsibility for the deaths of non-combatants from its legitimate residence on the doorstep of Hamas to the Israeli Defense Forces. There is no reason to assume that the dark minds of Taliban have failed to notice that unjustified Western opprobrium forced the IDF to halt their incursion into the Gaza Strip without first having destroyed the combat potential and structural integrity of Hamas.
Rather than face defeat and destruction at the hands of the US Marines, the Taliban will cheerfully shove the civilian population in the area of operations out of their homes and down the paths to Pakistan. No doubt Taliban will assure that civilians die. They will make sure that cameras are available to flash images of torn corpses and wailing survivors to the world.
General Kayani has telegraphed Taliban's most likely strategic and operational response to the forthcoming American offensive operations. This was not his intent. It is the result. The Americans have been (fore)warned.
The US has three options now.
The first, most obvious was conveyed by General Conway. It is blunt, a good Marine's view of reality. "But in any event, we've got to do what we've got to do in the south."
The second is to prepare for the refugee contingency. The US can offer requisite humanitarian assistance to Islamabad. The Americans can--and should--insist that the government and military forces of Pakistan be good to go in handling refugees. This includes having the capacity to effectively separate Taliban wolves from the civilian sheep. A further pro-active step would be re-emphasizing the rules of engagement which serve to limit collateral casualties.
The final option is to call off the planned offensive sweep. The Americans could simply say, "Golly-gosh, General Kayini, we never thought about that. You're right. Can't have all those poor civilians stumbling through the mountains, maybe even getting hurt. Sprained ankles and who knows what other catastrophes."
"Alright, Geek, maybe you're right on that fugitive from firepower thing, but what about the supply route? What if Taliban ups the ante by attacking there?"
Right, bucko, what if they do?
The Khyber Pass main supply route (MSR) is and always has been the most vulnerable component of the entire US/NATO/Other Concerned Nations effort in Afghanistan. The inherent vulnerability of the MSR has been worsened by the Pakistani military's less than resolute defense of it.
When assessing the liability of the MSR to interdiction, it is necessary to consider the capacity of Taliban (both varients, Afghan and Pakistani) to sever the artery. In the past this capacity has shown both expansion and contraction. It is legitimate to posit that Taliban will seek to expand its capabilities if the American offensive is conducted in such a way as to afford the black turbans the time and excess manpower necessary.
Unless one is willing to believe that American planners have their collective head inserted very far into an anatomically improbable location, it is most likely that the US has taken the MSR interdiction response into consideration. The tempo of combat operations will be such that it is diminishingly likely that Taliban will have the luxury of time, or, surplus manpower.
While General Kayini no doubt wishes otherwise, his warning about the Khyber Pass places a focus on the second factor which must be assessed when considering MSR vulnerability. It is necessary to evaluate the will and ability of the Pakistani military to defend the MSR, to prevent its disruption.
To date the defense efforts have been less than impressive. Even though the security services of Pakistan have had access to intelligence information from American assets, the ISI, constabulary and army have shown no particular inclination to take pro-active action, nor even to respond to an attack with notable effectiveness.
General Kayini has conducted an ancient bureaucratic and military maneuver, (generally dubbed CYA.) His dark and dismal warning of the MSR being severed and the flow of necessary supplies being choked severely is actually meant to excuse in advance the inevitable failure of the army, ISI and constabulary to either prevent or quickly neutralise threats to the MSR.
The Geek has a question for you, General Kayini. Which are you? A senior commander in the military of a dedicated and resolute ally in a joint effort against a serious enemy? A faltering member of a deliquescent regime? A sympathiser with Taliban?
You see, General, it's confusing. Your job title gives one answer. Your "warnings" give others.
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