With almost palpable bitterness the usual anonymous source in Islamabad told his British interlocutor that the Obama administration had "pressurised" the Pakistani government over the expansion of Taliban's armed force into Buner with such vigor that the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) "ordered" the black turban wearing gunslingers to get out of town--or at least out of sight.
Maulvi Khalil responded by an ostentatious movement of his trigger pullers from the urban area to the surrounding hills. They left their threatening banners and a foul taste of fear behind. One could imagine an echo of the Terminator's ominous words, "I'll be back."
From the perspective of both London and Islamabad the highly public expressions of concern by high level US personnel carried an implied message: "If you don't push Taliban back, we will."
The implied (or to be more accurate, the inferred) ultimatum was taken seriously enough that the Pakistani ambassador to the US made the customary rejoinder.
A fair idiomatic translation of this exercise in diplomatic-speak would be, "You Yanks don't see things the way we want you to see things so you are wrong." The US needs to relate its comments to the ground realities in Pakistan instead of the mood in Washington. Most Pakistanis are not supportive of the Taliban way of life, but at the same time widespread anti-Americanism confuses many Pakistanis into having a conflicting view.
Maybe. Quite possibly not.
The ambassador is a member of the Pakistani urban elite. Western educated, soft in his practice of Islam, open to the reality of the Twenty-first Century, willing and able to either ignore or scoff at the barbarism of the Taliban as long as its repugnant acts take place on the far frontier.
A number of reasonably well-conducted surveys of Pakistani public opinion indicate a widespread support for the goals of Taliban, most importantly the implementation of Sharia. While there may be disapproval of and disgust with some of the measures taken by Taliban such as a fondness for decapitation and flogging as well as a love of beards and veils, this does not do much to detract from the appeal of Taliban as long as it is an abstract, romanticised distant presence.
The urban elite has been able, like the ambassador, to ignore or discount the possibility that the non-elite majority of their fellow Pakistanis may be quite willing to see the corrupt, oppressive and inefficient current governing structure replaced by Taliban--swords, guns and whips included. At least, those of the "lower orders" believe Taliban goes by the Quran and espouses ideals they would like to see in action. It can't be worse and may be better than the status quo.
It is important to bear in mind that the outrage which greeted the video of a teenage girl being publicly flogged or the more recent and far more nauseating footage of a dude in a black turban casually shooting down a man and a woman believed by Allah's True Believers to have been adulterers was quite limited in its demographics. More, the outrage was very, very limited in duration.
Stories of Taliban's offensive acts such as those caught on tape have much longer legs in the West than they do in Pakistan. Here we want to see rejection of barbaric behavior and our media gives us what we want. In Pakistan the emphasis is different. For example, the main complaint about the flogging tape was that the whipping should have been administered in private, not on a public street. Regarding the shooting video, the reaction outside the urban elite was along the lines of "They shouldn't have let that reporter have a phone."
The take away is simple. Most Pakistanis, the majority of the hoi polloi, the non-elite mass of folks, harbors no distaste of Taliban. Or, if they do, it is outmatched by the dislike and distrust of the government and those aligned with the government.
The lack of Taliban inspired fear and loathing extends to the Army. All indicators point to Islamism having reached a new high point among military personnel both enlisted and of junior officer rank. A reason not to use the regular army in anti-Taliban operations beyond the usual preoccupation with the presumed Indian threat is there is no real will to combat in the Army. Operations against Taliban in the FATA last year gave proof that few if any grunts had any desire to close with and kill the enemy.
Use of the poorly trained, poorly equipped and pathetically commanded paramilitary forces in counter-Taliban operations provided and provides the Pakistani high command with the option of appearing to do something against the insurgents without either really doing anything or running the risk of "collective disobedience among the Islamist polluted soldiers. Trucking a couple of hundred paramilitary bullet-catchers into Buner was meant not as a serious counter to the black turbans. Rather it was a sop thrown in the general direction of the US. A means of showing resolve to those pesky Americans.
The movement of the hemi-demi-semi troops of the constabulary into the district also allowed Taliban to withdraw giving the reason as one of desiring to spare the civilian population any harm. As a result there was a slight residuum of gratitude to leaven the fear which Taliban left in its wake.
For the moment the balance of power in Swat and conterminous territory remains in stasis. Taliban can come back. The Army is not geared for a fight. The elite is quivering on the banks of denial. The men in the markets and the women at home both hope that things won't get a whole lot worse before they get better.
And, American options beyond jawboning remain limited in the extreme.
Other than sending Predators and Reapers over Swat there is not much we can do to directly counter the Taliban advance. The efficacy of UAV launched missiles is (or can be) tactically useful. On the larger scale this means of war fighting holds little potential for decisiveness. Absent a hit on the command cadre of Taliban in Swat there is no probability of an impact on the operational level of the war. There is no chance of a strategically decisive hit. Taliban has too deep a bench for that to happen.
The US lacks the troops, money, political will or diplomatic support to put boots on the ground. The only exception to that is the eventuality that puts Taliban or one of its associated groups in close proximity to any portion of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.
Only that desperate extremity would allow, let alone demand, the direct insertion of US forces on the ground. Were that evolution to come to pass the incursion would last only so long as was necessary as to assure the nuclear weapons or materials were secured or otherwise removed as a potential threat.
However, the myth of President Obama donning George W. Bush's cowboy hat and picking up the former president's six shooters is useful in giving the Pakistanis a short acting backbone injection. The problem comes in that the Crazy American Thesis loses effect with repetition.
We did it once. We probably cannot do it again.
The best thing we can do is to let Taliban take over some more territory. Act more barbarously. Alienate more Pakistanis. Show elite and the others alike that there is no romance and much blood in the Taliban agenda and actions.
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