We Won A Skirmish, But Now What?

President Obama, perhaps both coshed and cozened by the international media coverage of the seizure of Captain Richard Phillips, to say nothing of his abortive escape attempt, departed from his initial give-peace-a-chance stance to allow the use of lethal force at the discretion of the local USN commander. The result was three shots, three dead pirates and one freed captain.

All hands (except, of course, the Pirates of Puntland) are pleased with the outcome of the Maersk Alabama affair. Even the French must be happy given that they pioneered the way.

The afterglow of success will undoubtedly fade rapidly. This is inevitable given that one small victory, no matter how emotionally satisfying, does not alter the basic dynamic pitting skiff-riding gun toting thugs against the collective interests of most of the world's nations.

Along with second guessing comes political backbiting.

For example, it has been alleged that the president came late--almost too late--to the conclusion that violence and its attendant risks must be authorised and accepted. The Geek has no problem with the basic contention, provided that it is also acknowledged that the administration and president did finally get a grip on reality and make the right choice.

There are those who argue one successful mission must lead to more (hopefully) successful operations.

Shane Murphy, the executive officer on the Maersk Alabama, has taken the position that the US must take the lead role in defeating the Somali pirates. A similar position has been taken by at least one senior US Navy officer who has been quoted as saying that only by going ashore and directly attacking the pirate strongholds such as that at Ely can success over the long haul be achieved. Annie Jacobsen writing in Pajamas Media today contends that the US must take the leadership role in liberating the more than two hundred captive seamen currently held in Somalia.

Then there are the voices who counsel caution.

Hands are busily wringing over the possibility that the pirates will now become more bloodthirsty.

These anxiety ridden folks harp on just how "humane" the fishermen-turned-muggers have been. They haven't killed anyone. The Nice-Guys-Turned-Crook have even passed the satellite phone around so hostages could call home. Heck, these misunderstood Muslims have even slaughtered a goat or two with which to feast their involuntary guests.

Now, the spokesmen for pessimism announce, because of this reckless American action (they seem curiously unaware of the French precursors) the pirates will shoot first and slaughter sailors not goats. Blood will darken the Gulf of Aden where only peace and flower power were found before.

The aquatic scum of the Somali coast have done their best to stoke this particular bonfire of fear. The AK-wavers don't even like the term "pirate." No. These self-described Muslims are not maritime criminals. Perish the thought! They are "marines," "coastguards" perhaps even, "environmental protection officers." Never pirates.

But now those murderous Americans and the equally homicidal French (yes, the Puntland buccaneers remember the French raids) have changed the rules of the game. Now, vengeance is ours say the Muslim Men of the Jolly Roger.

Not to be left behind the High Minded and Lofty Thinking of the Western World are gnashing teeth in a frenzy of apprehension that the US or some other rogue nation (like the French?) will actually seek to use force in the future either to stop crime at sea or rescue the victims of that crime from the Hospitalers of Ely. While Ban ki-Moon has not yet joined the chorus, it is only a matter of time before he does so.

It has already been suggested by one of the UN SecGen's immediate subordinates that the UN declare a role for itself in collapsed states such as Somalia. He argued that since the UN has already carved out a role for itself in collapsing and rogue states ranging from former Yugoslavia to the assorted imploding states of West Africa, that it enlarge its mission to include utter failures such as Somalia.

The UN gambit comports nicely with the assorted High Minded types who have been loudly claiming that there can be no solution to maritime thuggery in the Gulf of Aden without the establishment of a firm, functioning state in place of the current morass of armed Islamist anarchy occupying the region going by the name of Somalia. The motto of this crew seems to be "We have never met a nation we don't want to build."

OK, that lays out the parameters of the debate--a term which the Geek uses generically only. Now it's time to take a closer dekko at the options on the table currently.

Building a nation in Somalia is a labor far surpassing those once undertaken by Hercules. A couple of reasons might be adduced to support this conclusion.

The first is simple. Somalia has never been more than a geographic expression inhabited by contesting tribes which was artificially elevated to the status of nation-state by the interlocking imperatives of the Cold War and de-colonization. It has no reason to exist. It has no shared heritage beyond that of tribal rivalry and playground for outside powers both European and Arab. It has no viable economic base beyond subsistence herding, agriculture, slave-trading and piracy. It has no collective political structure and, arguably, never has had one except that which may have been temporarily imposed by outside forces and internal responses to those foreign vectors.

The second is slightly more complex. In what image and likeness will the nation-state of Somalia be created? The Western style liberal, pluralistic, secular democracy?

Fer sure, dudes, that's the ticket. Dispatching that alternative is easy. Look at Afghanistan. Even in that handwork of the West, a semi-democracy with a more-or-less functioning parliamentary system look what happens when the parliament has the effrontery to pass and the president sign a law on civil status which Western liberals find objectionable. Apparently the West is all for democracy and its institutions until they produce a result which is repugnant to the West.

Then there is the Islamist alternative. An Islamic state with Sharia in effect. The question remains as to just whose interpretation of Islam and Sharia will be given pride of place. Right now that matter is being fought out (literally) between "moderate" Islamists (aka the government) and "extreme" Islamists (aka al-Shabab.) It appears that to Somali Muslims their religious debates are a full contact sport in which fatalities are to be expected.

Get a grip on reality. Nation-building is not an option unless one is smoking or otherwise ingesting a really, really righteous hallucinogen.

A massive raid on the pirate hideouts with the intent of freeing the over two hundred captive sailors is only slightly less hallucinatory. While such a raid by the US with or without the cooperation of other countries is possible in principle, there are some very real complications in practice.

The first of these is the diverse nationalities of the captive crews. At last count more than two dozen nations were represented in the hostage pool. Gaining the agreement of all the governments involved would constitute a diplomatic nightmare of the harshest sort. This is particularly true since very few of the governments would be in a position to offer forces for participation in any hypothetical raid.

The second complication is related to the first as well as having a stand-alone saliency. Not all the hostages would come through the raid alive and well. Quite possibly the majority would be either killed or wounded. In the final analysis it will not matter if captives are killed by pirate bullets or those of the "rescue raiders" or are simply in the wrong place at the wrong time.

What matters is that many would die. This is inevitable given the large number of captives as well as the uncertainties as to their location, number and location of guards, the time necessary to execute the operation and the inherent imponderables of contact.

Along with dead captives it is certain that Somali non-combatants would die as well. The gunslingers of Ely and other pirate ports do not allow the civilians to get the hell out of Dodge. The pirates not unlike Hamas value civilian shields as an inhibitor of hostile action.

Then there are assorted technical problems. If the raid were to be conducted by a multilateral force, how would functions be assigned? Unity of command retained? Intelligence shared and interpreted? How long a preparation would be required? What about rehearsals? How to make sure the targets did not gain forewarning? (Pace, Ms Jacobsen, but a raid of this magnitude takes time to prepare. You can't just send the MEU aboard the USS Boxer ashore with the directions to kick butt and take names along with rescuing the good guys.)

All that is necessary is to remember the Son Tay POW camp raid, the Mayaguez rescue debacle and the disaster at Desert One to get a realistic handle on the complexity of an operation directed at either rescuing the hostage mariners or seeking to capture/kill a significant number of the pirates ashore. Gives one pause for thought, heh?

This leaves, as the least-worst option, a plused-up version of what we and other countries have been doing to date.

Merchant ships should (sit down, all you lawyers and keep quiet) have armed security parties. Perhaps not all, but enough so as to introduce uncertainty in the minds of the Jolly Swagmen as to which ships are sufficiently soft targets to merit attention.

Mandatory convoying systems should be installed. This would be the most effective use of limited naval power resources. And, as two World Wars have demonstrated, convoys may be slower than independent routing, but they are much, much safer for the ships involved.

Maritime surveillance assets must be increased so as to allow detection of suspicious vessels in time for these to be interdicted by friendly naval units. If the stop-and-board order is not obeyed instantly and completely, lethal force must be pre-authorised and used without delay. Any survivors should be taken into custody with a view to judicial proceedings.

Hijacked vessels must be shadowed. They must not be allowed to reach the Somalian coast. If this means forcible entry at sea with the risk of friendly casualties, so be it. Again, surviving criminals should be arrested with the goal of trial.

Where should the trials take place? The best option would be in the national courts of the warship effecting the arrest. This option would obviate the ad hoc agreements such as that in place between the US and Kenya. It would also prevent jurisdictional disputes between the country having registry (often a semi-bogus or totally bogus arrangement) and that of the shipowner or to which the crew holds allegiance.

The International Convention on the Laws of the Sea seems to allow the country effecting the arrest of pirates to hold trial and inflict punishment. While not a perfect answer it is good enough. And, given the current situation as well as its probable horizontal escalation, a good enough solution which is timely beats a perfect answer coming too late.

History is replete with examples of situations where force applied and risks taken early in developing international situation would have (or, on a very few occasions, did) preclude massive violence and bloodshed later. We are at such a critical juncture right now.

We, or at least the French and Americans, have shown testicular fortitude. Now, if we (the French, the Americans and other directly involved countries) have the brains necessary to acknowledge that reality dictates that suitable violence, suitably employed, will have the best chance to abate the threat of piracy off Somalia and prevent its emergence elsewhere, there is reason to be optimistic about the future. If, however, the hand-wringing fearful and High Minded gain ascendancy, the future looks bleak, very, very bleak.