Pipes' specific question arises from the recent Turkish opposition to the appointment of Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen to the NATO Secretary General's slot. While the issue was finessed by providing for a Turkish Deputy SecGen which provided a face-saving way for Erdogan to back down on the eve of President Obama's visit to Turkey, the question of Turkey's place in NATO remains, at least in Pipes' eyes.
Pipes contrasts the views of a former NATO SecGen, Willy Claes, and former Spanish PM, Jose Maria Aznar, with the seemingly mea culpa based remarks of Rasmussen after taking office. Both Claes and Aznar, the former as far back as 1995, saw Islamist jihadism as an enemy to NATO equal to that formerly presented by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states. Clearly both the outgoing and incoming NATO Secretaries General dissent from this position.
The real issue is not, as Pipes avers, whether or not Turkey should remain in NATO given its Muslim majority population and Islamist rooted government. That issue is bogus. Turkey will not be ejected and is quite unlikely to unilaterally withdraw from the alliance.
Turkey, as President Obama acknowledged openly in his speech before the Turkish National Assembly, is a critical piece of real estate for the West. It is also an important diplomatic fulcrum. NATO is well off with Turkey's membership. But, this should not be interpreted either in Ankara or elsewhere as granting the country a degree of say in the affairs of the alliance surpassing that of other members.
Nor should too much be made from the size of the Turkish army. It may be second in size only to that of the US within NATO but it has severe limitations. Some of these are strutural to the army. Others result from the political context in which the army operates.
(For example, the army is the final guarantor of domestic tranquility and sees itself in finest continental power style as the ultimate custodian of nationhood. This brings the army into a constant and sometimes wide open tension with the government with all the usual, predictable effects on combat efficiency and readiness.)
The underlying issue implied by but never stated in Pipes' article is this. What is NATO's mission, its reason for existence now and in the near future?
NATO has engaged in limited missions in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. Had the previous administration not dropped the military and diplomatic balls so completely, NATO's first genuinely out-of-theater operation (OOTO) in Afghanistan would have been supported more fully and actively by the alliance. It had, after all, invoked Article Five of the NATO charter for the first and only time to date in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
Considering the responsibility accruing to the administration of George W. Bush for the resultant loss of enthusiasm for the OOTO, it is impossible to conclude whether this would extend to future deployments of a similar nature. While it is never out of fashion in some American circles to bash the Europeans (indeed the Geek does so on occasion,) it is not fair to assess the political mood of Europeans such as to bar participation in OOTOs of the future, particularly if such engage the frustration and anger of the elites of European countries.
It is possible to foresee a scenario such as genocide surpassing that alleged to have occurred in Darfur exciting such European sentiments as to result in a demand for NATO action. This potential is enhanced by any apparent unwillingness or inability of the UN to take effective, prompt action in this sort of crisis. Should such a hypothetical take place in a majority Muslim country with an Islamist regime, the stance of Turkey might be important in the decision making process.
As may be inferred from this briefly outlined hypothetical, the real difficulty is that NATO has no coherent policy regarding OOTOs. Such were never forseen when the alliance was formed sixty years ago. Arguably, the formation of a realistic, consensual policy regarding OOTOs might exercise some sort of deterrent effect upon those who wish the West ill. The formulation of any such policy would necessitate both the participation and agreement of Turkey.
Or, NATO could collectively reject the OOTO concept as part of its mission portfolio. This implies that the alliance continues to exist for the one and only reason which undergirded its creation: Standing on guard against any Russian armed aggression into Western and Central Europe.
This unitary reason for existence would, of course, exacerbate the problems confronting the relations between Russia and the NATO nations, particularly those which were once part of WarPact. A formal or even de facto declining of the OOTO mission could and would be used by Russian nationalists (which group includes both Putin and Medvedev) to justify higher military expenditures as well as the games the Kremlin plays regarding access to natural gas and oil either originating in or transiting areas under its domination.
Which ever way NATO goes in the next months and years, OOTO or Watch-the-Bear, Turkey is equally important for the alliance. No OOTO can be credibly put in place without the full participation of Turkey considering the most probable venues are in Muslim countries. Without Turkey, the Southern Flank as well as the Turkic speaking Central Asian Republics are militarily and diplomatically open and vulnerable.
NATO either must be clearly defined as to its mission or sent to early retirement. This decision set must be made sooner rather than later. And, it is a decision complex which cannot be adequately undertaken without the full and effective participation of Turkey, even a Turkey which seems to be drifting ever further from the vision of Ataturk.
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