Are The Pirates Of Somalia An Overstated Threat?

John Patch is a thoughtful, experienced man. He has been a Navy surface warfare officer, an intelligence analyst and now teaches at the Army War College. In a tightly reasoned and well argued piece on the US Naval Institute website he contends that the threat posed by the Jolly Swagmen of Somalia is overstated and that the US runs the real risk of basing policy on the emotions of the moment rather than a realistic assessment of national and strategic interests.

The Geek respectfully disagrees with the first part of Patch's argument. The Geek does not, however dissent from the latter component.

That emotion is running above the Plimsoll line with the hostage drama currently underway cannot be denied. The US mainstream media are awash in it. Fox News, for example, characterises the aquatic muggers of Somalia as being the "grave challenge" prophesied by Joe Biden months ago, a challenge which is virtually insoluble. One time Swift boat officer and now Senator John Kerry has called for a "policy debate" on the "growing threat of piracy." There are reports that unidentified "national security officials" are considering cruise missile or Hellfire strikes on al-Shabab "training camps" in Somalia.

Given these indicators it is difficult, no, impossible to argue that emotion is not outstripping reason and realpolitik with respect to the speedboat driving marauders.

"So, what's wrong with a little honest emotion, Geek? What's wrong with wanting to squash the pirates like a bunch of overripe grapes?"

"Yeah, Geek, just yesterday you were leading a cheering section for the French commandos and their president. A little inconsistent, wouldn't you say, Geeko?"

No, the Geek doesn't believe that he is being inconsistent in the least. His position is that the pirates of Somalia constitute a serious American national and strategic interest challenge. A challenge that must both be understood correctly and met in a realistic, prompt manner.

The threat presented by the pirates is more long term than short run. This is true despite the difficulties, delays, inefficiencies and increased expenses the pirate attacks and their necessary counters cause for the shipping industry.

There are several interlocking consequences of the piracy and the so far ineffective responses from the governments of major powers. These sequelae are of equal importance as they serve to reinforce each other.

The first consequence is horizontal escalation of piracy. The Niger River delta is a very likely place for imitative actions. There are others, including those in Southeast Asia.

A decade ago the Peoples Republic of China acted robustly against pirates threatening traffic to and from that country in several maritime chokepoints. Chinese naval vessels took dramatic action including the arrest of entire pirate crews. Quite often the arrests were followed by both trials and executions. As a result piracy was all but completely suppressed. It is making a comeback as a result of the Somalian successes and all but total immunity to adverse consequences.

The second consequence flowing from the conveyor belt of pirate victories is the increase of money available to assorted Islamist/jihadist groups. While it is impossible to audit the pirates' accounts so as to parse between cash going into criminal pockets (including transnational syndicates) and that sticking to the fingers of Islamists, there is no doubt but that the figure is substantial. Admittedly the ransom dollars lining Islamist pockets is small compared to the take from the Afghan opium trade. However not all Islamists have access to the narco-profits of Afghanistan but may have their hands cupped below the pirates' cash stream.

The third, and perhaps most important, consequence over the longer haul is simply precedent. As was the case a decade and more ago, the longer the US and other major western powers appear to be helpless giants before the threats presented by a few bold individuals, the more groups and states harboring ill-will toward the US and the West will be emboldened and empowered to pursue their hostility.

There is no doubt that the unseemly withdrawal of US forces from Somalia executed on orders from President Clinton following the Blackhawk Down incident sent a message of American lack of resolve, political will and capacity to accept casualties to those such as Osama bin Laden who wanted very much to hear and heed. The flaccid and often totally irrelevant responses to terror attacks conducted by the Clinton administration reinforced the image of the US as an inept and irresolute employer of armed force.

During the same years as well as in the decade following, the American concern about the quality and reliability of "actionable intelligence," the existence of "legal authorities," and worry over the necessity of reducing friendly fatalities were interpreted by Islamists as meaning that the US and the American public lacked the intestinal fortitude for waging effective war and seeing its own citizens and soldiers die in the pursuit of national interest. From the perspective of the Islamist jihadist this meant the US was at an automatic and permanent disadvantage.

The bottom line?

Simple and unpleasant. Uncle Sam could have his beard tweaked, his groin kicked without real risk to the tweaker and kicker.

Events to date in Afghanistan and Iraq have not undercut the force of the initial conclusion. Neither has the American response to the pirates of Somalia. At least not yet.

In short a failure to effectively and promptly address the challenge of the Jolly Swagmen particularly now that they have attacked the US directly will parallel in effects the failures of the Clinton presidency to meet in an appropriate up-close-and-personal way the attacks on Americans and American interests. This, Mr Patch, is what makes the seagoing thugs of Somalia an important threat to American national and strategic interests today.

It is because the matter--the consequences--are so important that we cannot react from emotion. Nor can we delay in our response.

In dealing effectively with the problem it is important to get a grip on a couple of basic realities. The first of these is that dealing with the pirates does not require creating a functioning full-featured government in Somalia. This contention is much loved not only by the High Minded who wish to see an ever-growing role for the UN but also by those who wish a plausible means by which action against the pirates can be delayed indefinitely.

All that is necessary is that the risks to pirates be increased and the rewards of piracy reduced. The second of these may be accomplished by nothing more lethal than an Executive Order prohibiting companies doing business in the US from paying ransom under whatsoever name. There is no problem there. Or, at least, there shouldn't be. Paying ransoms simply means there will be more demands for ransom. The shipping industry knows that; it just wants some cover to preclude ransom payment in the future. The Executive Order does that.

Risk to pirates can be increased only through the use of force. This means killing people. High Minded folks and lawyers alike may feel their knees knocking over this prospect, but it is reality. As long as people believe there is no risk involved they will be ready, willing and eager to raise the Jolly Roger and cruise for booty.

Of course the use of force, particularly in a situation such as that currently underway in the ocean off Somalia carries the very real risk of friendly casualties, even friendly fatalities. The French operation the other day underscores that distasteful fact. A French citizen died during the successful rescue raid.

Islamist jihadists have long believed that they, in the words of one of their number, "love death more than the (Americans) love life." The Somali Muslim pirates in the lifeboat with their hostage, Captain Phillips, must share this belief. Why else would they not only have vowed Phillips will die if a rescue operation is attempted but also demand a two million dollar ransom for the captain?

As a matter of effective policy the life of a hostage must be written off as soon as the person is seized by hostiles. While such a stance is repugnant to natural human sentiments, sentiments have no role in policy formulation and execution.

Hostage takers, particularly those such as the Somalis who exhibit mercenary as well as self-protective motivation, want to write a narrative in which the hostage plays the leading role. Their narrative cannot be allowed to stand. It must be rewritten. The hostage must not occupy center stage.

The captor not the captive must stand front and center in the spotlight. His fate and not that of the hostage must be the focus of interest. The captor as well as potential future captors must be invited to consider their own future, their own chances of life or the type of death that awaits.

In order to make the lives of Americans (and others) safer in the future it is necessary to disabuse the pirates of Somalia as it is Islamist jihadists generally that the US government is so tender hearted and soft minded that it will allow national interest to be sacrificed for the life of a single American. Life is precious to us. Life is so precious that sometimes it must be protected by death.

The US must use force. Against the pirates. Even at the risk of an American dying in the process. The scope of force employment can, and perhaps should, include the homeport of the pirate crew responsible for the attempted seizure of the Maersk Alabama. It should, perhaps must, include the capture or sinking of pirate motherships and skiffs even when such are not directly threatening a merchant ship.

Use of force means that lives will be lost. Some of these lives will, inevitably, be "innocent." Policy must accept this and public opinion led to do so as well. The guiding star must be a historical truism that is so commonplace as to be trite. It is far, far better that a few lives be taken early in the game than many, many lives be lost later.