The message came in four major parts. (1) The Two State Solution is the best (read "only") game in town. (2) The US is the Player-Who-Matters-Most. (3) That being said, Israel is still the country which must make a choice. It must choose between living in a friendly 'neighborhood" or continuing to exist as Fortress Israel caught in the stasis of hostility. (4) The "Arab and Muslim states" must assist the US in the heavy lifting of bringing the seemingly eternal "peace process" to an end with the implementation of the two state solution.
King Abdullah's final point puts a large onus on the Mideast's "frontline" states as well as other, more distant governments to take a firm hold on the short, dirty end of the reality stick. It includes the states of the region which have found it comfortable to both hide behind and exploit the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the sake of their own national and domestic political purposes. The Jordanian fourth point demands that the regional governments face the rage of the Islamists who will go fast boost exo-atmospheric in fury over any substantial moves to assure peace with Israel.
The Obama administration is quite obviously ready, willing and eager to do all it can to bring the Two State Solution into existence. It is quite probable that the president is willing (although certainly not eager) to brave the resistance of the Israel Lobby, which has shown quite often that it is more strident and extreme in its positions than is the government of Israel.
Obama and his close senior advisers may well view the ending of the festering, running ulcer of the Mideast as an absolute essential as a precondition for pursuing its larger, domestic agenda. To them, the risks involved with ramming a Two State Solution through are well worth running.
It is possible that Bibi's recent hairy-chested oratory regarding the Israeli readiness to abate the Iranian nuclear menace with or without US approval and support is the sort of reassuring tough talk such as he engaged in often during his last period as PM. Israelis may be a passionate people for whom politics is nearly a full-contact sport, but the government has (usually) had a good eye for the military and diplomatic realities of the day.
By all rational calculations the ball now rests well and truly in the Arabs' court. What the several governments and quasi-governmental entities do in the next few weeks will determine whether or not they are willing to meet King Abdullah's challenge or not. History gives a mixed message regarding the probability of the Arabs rising to the occasion.
It must be recalled that the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as those whose homes once were located in Israel but who are now scattered around the world are in their present situation because of repeated Arab intransigence and incompetence. For the past eighty years, back to the days far preceding the Partition and the Israeli War of Independence, the Arabs have a splendid record of blowing every opportunity for a negotiated end to their confrontation with, first, the Jewish immigrants to the Mandate, second with the UN teams charged with establishing peacefully an early version of the Two State Solution, and, finally, with the UN mission headed by Ralph Bunche who sought an end to the 1948 war on terms which were highly favorable to the Arabs.
Continuing their successful effort to prove that they were the Chicago Cubs of diplomacy, the Palestinian (as they renamed themselves) screwed their collective pooch in the negotiations which occurred under the Oslo and Madrid processes. To quote a line from an old Air Force ditty, "I'd tell you more but it make me sick."
Showing a haughty disregard for the mundane matters of changed realities on the ground, the Arab League's proposal for peace, which was brought back from the graveyard of diplomatic fatalities by Saudi Arabia, focused on demanding the clearly unacceptable by Israel. With an arrogance which must come from sitting on too much overpriced oil and listening too often to Islamist clerics, the Arab League/Saudi proposals required Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders abandoning countless billions of dollars worth of post-1967 urban development and housing expansion as if this would be of no more moment than pulling out of those miles and miles of nothing but miles and miles called Sinai.
As if that deal killer were not enough, the diplomatic oafs wanted the government and people of Israel to accept a perversion of the Israeli Right of Return granted to Jews. Specifically, the proposal would have the Jewish state accept back all those who left their homes in 1948 (or their descendants) in response to the stimulus of Israeli ethnic cleansing and Arab appeals to have faith in the soldiers of Islam. That requirement was clearly no-go considering both the financial and demographic impact it would have on Israel.
Unless and until the Arab states can see the folly of their past demarches, they will continue to be a heavy drag, not heavy lifters. Of course, the Sunni states of the Mideast do have one rather pressing reason to gain a greater appreciation of reality. That reason is Iran.
By meeting the challenge of Abdullah's point four, the "conservative" states of the Gulf as well as Egypt and even North Africa can form a "neighborhood" (to use the King's term) which is at peace internally and can form a united front against the the troublesome mullahs of resurgent Persia. (After all, even the most dedicated, observant Muslim can see the Israelis have a lot more military capacity up to and including the nuclear than do the devotees of the Mahdi in Iran.)
Then there is Hamas. Hamas, like Hezbollah, is a dependency of Iran. Unlike Hezbollah which can be controlled by Syrian and other national forces if allowed to by the US, Hamas is not susceptible to normal pressures--including the threat of armed attack. Unless and until Hamas genuinely abandons its position of denying Israel the right to exist, the US will not participate in any conversations with any hypothetical "unity" government which may emerge from the Egyptian brokered talks between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.
The probability of Hamas actually abandoning its The-Zionist-Entity-Must-Be-Destroyed line as opposed to invoking the Islam sanctioned doctrine of tactical deception for the benefit of Islam or the equally approved doctrine of agreeing to a temporary truce in order to gain an advantage for the Koran-wavers, is about as high as Nancy Pelosi genuinely welcoming Newt Gingrich back to the House. The words, "forget it!" come to mind.
In principle, the Arab states of the Mideast have the leverage to deal with Hamas. It certainly is in the interests of these states to abate the political and social nuisance represented by Hamas. It is questionable, however, whether or not the Arab states, including Jordan, have the political will and foresightedness to accurately assess the risk/benefit ratio of dealing robustly with Hamas. Even more debatable is the question of these states having the courage to take the risks of taking on Hamas even though the benefits would be vast in potential.
Peace, like war, has costs. The price of peace may be lower in blood and even treasure, but it can be higher, much higher in political and social consequences. A change in the long established pattern in the Mideast brings automatic uncertainties in its wake. No government which is inherently comfortable with the well-established and well-known readily embraces a change, a new order of affairs.
Since World War II, the Mideast, the Arab states generally, have experienced a plethora of wars, coups, countercoups and other political tumult. None of these have brought any fundamental change in either politics or social structure.
Peace in the "neighborhood" would bring real change in regional economics, politics, social structures, cultural values and norms of behavior. The real question which underlies King Abdullah's fourth point is this: Can Arabs and Muslims accept, even eagerly embrace change?
The sweep of history over the past thousand years suggests the answer to the question is a resounding, "No."
No comments:
Post a Comment