A Pair Of (At Least) Two Bowl Problems

As everyone familiar with the Master of Baker Street knows, the great detective was given to characterising his little problems by the number of bowls of shag which must be smoked before the correct solution might emerge. Those of the two bowl variety were above average in difficulty, sort of like a reverse two and a half with full twist in pike position off the low board.

Comes now North Korea and Afghanistan in unorchestrated symmetry each with a two bowler. (This must ruin the post-success celebration in the Erdogan Dictate Affair. NATO didn't blink and the Turkish PM received a face-saving way to back off.)

Actually, as the Geek thinks about it, the North Korean problem is closer to three bowls and the Afghan one closer to a single albeit very full bowl. Let's go with the tougher of the two first.

The Geek has to admit a more than sneaking admiration for the Commissars of Pongyang. No bunch, not even the mullahs of Tehran, have shown greater skill at sneering in the direction of the UN Security Council. The Dear Leader and his coterie have far surpassed all other regimes of whatsoever political stripe in pursuing national self-interest in the face of robust, continued opposition by the US and its associates, Japan and South Korea.

The US has drawn yet another line in the diplomatic sand. SecState Clinton and other members of the Obama administration have promised "consequences" after the Northerners launch their new, (hopefully) improved ICBM. The threatened "consequences" will undoubtedly follow the track blazed by the "consequences" imposed by the Security Council after the Pyongyang bunch pushed the Go-button on their nuclear test a few years back.

This means yet more economic sanctions.

The last time around the economic sanctions were as ineffective as pissing on a forest fire. The same crude judgement is appropriate even in advance as regards the next Security Council turn to bat.

The last time the implementation of the sanctions was left up to the individual member-states. This sort of non-enforced enforcement was the best which would sneak past Russia and China. Even if Russia continues in its current charm offensive, not much more can be expected in the near future.

The Chinese have a realistic view of the North Korean regime. In the informed view from Beijing harsh measures are ineffective in altering North Korean behavior. Certainly the historical record extending back to 1950 bears that out.

The Chinese believe, rightly or not, that they continue to have influence in Pyongyang. Beyond that, the integrity of North Korea as a buffer state is important to Beijing. That was true in the early Fall of 1950 and remains such today.

The two countries have been in a formal alliance for just shy of sixty years now. It is slightly possible that Beijing will be able to use that symbolic anniversary as a platform to nudge Pyongyang into a more cooperative stance in the Six Power Talks.

The Six Power Talks, particularly the verification of the North Korean nuclear declaration given last year, is far more important to the Chinese (and in highest probability the Americans) than the launch of an ICBM test bed. While even the most optimistic prediction for the Six Power Talks does not include Pyongyang relinquishing its current plutonium stockpile, it is not illegitimate to expect an accurate accounting of the amount of plutonium made and that on hand currently so as to assuage proliferation anxieties.

The Six Power Talks are not worth sacrificing on the alter of Security Council resolutions. The Chinese have taken this view. In all probability Russia has as well. It is debatable at best that the Kremlin is willing to fritter away the last of its diminishing influence on the Hermit Kingdom of the North in pursuit of the delusion of "punishing" Pyongyang.

If that mythical beast, a regime of tough, enforceable economic sanctions, is off the table of reality, what is left?

Military action? That's a real non-starter. And, the Denizens-in-Charge of the Hermit Kingdom know it. The issue at hand is not worth going to war over. No one is eager for a war, looking for an excuse a la Jenkin's Ear to start one.

It has been suggested that the US simply shoot the missile down. This could be done hypothetically as being a measure taken to "enforce" earlier Security Council measures. Such an action might have been in the world view of the W. Bush administration but would not comport in the slightest with the new policy matrix of the Obama administration. Dear Leader and his crew undoubtedly understand this.

Realistically, the probability for negative consequences, particularly any of a truly painful nature, range between nil and none. The probability of positive consequences coming is, regrettably, rather high.

Caught with no credible capacity to coerce, the US and its partners, Japan and South Korea, as well as its sometimes collaborators, China and Russia, have only inducements to offer. Bribery under whatever euphemism you prefer has a long and not completely dishonorable history in the practice of diplomacy.

In an important matter--and getting an accurate handle on the degree of intellectual or material proliferation the Northerners have or can engage in is important--the ends justify the means. A bribe, if it works to gain the necessary end, is completely justifiable. If the bribe does not work or if the recipient does not stay bribed, then the effort has failed. The other side has been more canny or resolute than our team.

So it goes in the whacky world of international politics.

Now for Article 132 of a draft law passed by the Afghan parliament. The language in question has effect only on the Shia minority of the population. That minority constitutes somewhere between fifteen and twenty percent. It is important to the electoral chances of President Karzai when the polls open next August.

Stripped to its essentials it requires that women unless ill in a way which would be exacerbated by the act of intercourse must provide sexual services to their husbands no less than once every four days. To Western eyes and ears this constitutes a species of marital rape.

Not that many years ago, less than twenty to err on the side of accuracy, there was scarcely a jurisdiction in the US where a man could be charged with spousal rape--even if the couple were living separately. The same legal context prevailed generally throughout the West.

Norms and the law have changed in the US as they have elsewhere to give due and proper regard to the autonomy and prerogatives of the wife even when sharing a bed with the guy. It is not surprising that reaction to Article 132 has been rapid, negative and virtually universal in Western countries.

The Article and the reaction bring into a very sharp focus the fundamental fissures in current policy for our efforts in Afghanistan. There are two in particular which have been highlighted in the past forty-eight hours.

The first, stated as a question is this: Is Afghanistan a sovereign country or not?

The second, also stated as a question is this: Is the mission of our and allied forces in Afghanistan one of defeating Taliban and al-Qaeda as a potential short term threat to our interests or is it building a modern nation-state with liberal institutions?

Both are digital questions. Each must be answered such that one and only one alternative is operative. Choosing one absolutely disallows the other. It's either zero or one, on or off.

Afghanistan is sovereign. Even Canadian Prime Minister Harper, who is High Minded even by the standards of High Minded Canada acknowledges that. Even Mr Harper admits that being sovereign means that the Afghan parliament can pass whatever legislation it wants and the president can sign it if he is of such a mind.

PM Harper qualified his admission with a statement to the effect that the Karzai government must understand that the assorted foreign assistance forces are present in Afghanistan because there are certain underlying and presumably shared understandings of human rights and kindred subjects. This position has been echoed without the bluntness of Harper's remarks by other Western leaders and highly placed officials.

The nature and extent of these presumptively shared assumptions is intimately connected with the second question: what is the goal of the war? As the Geek has argued in previous posts, a critical key to success in counterinsurgency is the existential and functional legitimacy of the government under attack. Intervenors, and keep a grip on the fact that we and our allies are just that, must refrain from any actions which serve or might serve to undercut the perceived legitimacy of the government. At the best the intervenors must take actions which serve to support the perceived legitimacy of the government.

If our goal is, as the Obama Strategy maintains, the limited one of defeating Taliban and al-Qaeda, then we must support (or at least appear to do so) the government even when it takes actions which are repugnant to some extent. This does not mean that we cannot argue to Karzai and the parliament that Article 132 may impair their legitimacy in the eyes of the population. But, if we do that, the basis must be factual not artificial. It must be documentable that the Article hurts the government with the majority to an extent which outweighs the help it may provide with the minority.

Beyond making that argument, any huffing, puffing and hyperventilating from the outsiders will simply undercut the government and hand the old but highly effective tool of linking the government to the "foreign occupiers" as a present to Taliban. Making threats, no matter how couched, how muted, how indirect to the effect that obnoxious measures such as Article 132 will result in a slackening of support for the government is a counterproductive measure.

If the American and allied forces mission in Afghanistan is more expansive than the defeat of Taliban and al-Qaeda and includes the end of nation-building with the goal of creating a liberal, pluralistic, democratic state from the congeries of ethno-linguistic groups collectively constituting the Afghan population, then Article 132 is irrelevant. We have failed already. It is time for buying a mass of one-way tickets back to the world.

From any real world perspective the only task for the US and its allies in Afghanistan is the defeat of Taliban and al-Qaeda. Any other task is doomed to failure. And, the attempt to add on tasks to the main mission assures the main mission will fail.

If our goal is what President Obama announced it to be: securing the US and the West from future terror attacks launched from Afghanistan, then get on with it.

The rights of Afghan women are important. So is the security of the United States and the West generally. Even the High Minded have to make a choice as to which has the greater priority.