Whether the president likes the reality or not, there are signs that he is being compelled to accept it. North Korea has never been interested in ending its nuclear capacity. Its only real goal has been the extortion of maximum benefits from the US, South Korea, and Japan at the lowest possible cost. The diplomatic context was simply cover for the state-to-state extortion effort, which paid off handsomely for the Hermit Kingdom of the North.
The dubious state of Dear Leader's health and the (perhaps) limited number of years left to him have marginally complicated the game of nations, North Korean style. The matter of succession makes the behavior of the North a little less predictable, but only in degree--not direction.
The Hermit Kingdom will continue its R&D efforts in both missile and nuclear technology. It will test more. It will produce more fissionable material, both plutonium and enriched uranium. It will aggressively seek to market the technology and products which it develops. And, there are customers with ready cash for these offers.
The only realistic alternative left to the US is that of containment. Of course, all along the way, from Clinton through W. Bush to Obama, the containment option has been the only one which had even the slightest toehold on reality. All the diplomacy, all the initialed and signed agreements, all the rushing from capital to capital, have been window dressing on a display of futility.
There is a fundamental question regarding the containment option. It is a critical question and the probable answer to it has always been the chief impediment to adopting the you-shall-not-cross-this-line approach before.
Will Russia and, more importantly, China, cooperate fully in enforcing a leakproof barrier against North Korea's importation of necessary technology and equipment as well as one prohibiting the export of nuclear and missile technology, components, and assembled systems?
Even though there is evidence that the Chinese government is irritated enough with the Pyongyang regime to impose some sanctions on key people in the North, this is not a reason to assume the Men of the Forbidden City are willing to go further. The Chinese will not push too hard, not because they are necessarily all that sympathetic with the Hermit Kingdom, but rather because they are apprehensive over the regional consequences of Pyongyang engaging in too risky behavior or imploding in a leadership crisis.
China is not convinced that the North Koreans if pushed too hard or gripped by an internal crisis would not attack the South. No matter how long such an attack might last (and the US commander in theater does not think it would last long), a move across the 38th parallel would be very, very destructive.
It can and has been argued that the assured destruction of the North and the highly probable termination of the current regime means the North Koreans are permanently deterred. A more pessimistic (realistic?) appraisal such as hypothesised for the Beijing leadership focuses on the what-is-there-to-lose? interpretation of motive.
Given sufficient hardship impinging on the ruling elite and the army which keeps the elite in power, there might be no reason to refrain from launching an attack in response to an arguable South Korean "provocation." This form of attack would be limited to firing missiles and artillery in a generally southern direction inflicting massive losses on the South Korean population and industrial plant. Heavily dug in North Korean ground forces would remain on the defensive with the result that casualties among any South Korean or US forces moving across the DMZ would be extensive.
American air operations would devastate exposed portions of the North Korean industrial, agricultural, and military systems but would probably not be decisive. Moscow and Beijing (the latter faced by a refugee flood) would demand an immediate UN action to secure a ceasefire.
Provided that the Pyongyang regime (with or without the presence of Kim Jong-il) could point to a plausible South Korean provocation, the ceasefire would be on terms and conditions favorable to the North. They would, undoubtedly, be accompanied by "humanitarian" aid.
This far from implausible potential is what will keep Beijing balanced carefully between appearing to cooperate with the US in the UN imposed sanction regime and doing all that it can to make certain the Pyongyang government (again with or without Kim) stays in power and does not unduly stir the Asian pot. And this, bucko, makes the containment option less than guaranteed in its outcome.
Even with its ambiguity, containment is today what it always has been--the last, best option of managing the emerging threat of North Korea as a proliferater of nuclear and missile technology. Once the Nice Young Man From Chicago now occupying the Oval can acknowledge the limits of his "narrative" regarding engagement and diplomacy, the US can focus on bringing the containment option to fruition.
Heck, keeping China and Russia on board in even a limited way will provide a Diplomats And Special Envoys Full Employment Act. There will be lots and lots of photo ops for men and women with briefcases and aides running up and down grand stairways pursued by breathless representatives of the media. And, isn't that what diplomacy is all about? Providing the appearance of getting something done without any underlying substance?
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