Iraq--Time To Declare Victory And Go Home

Colonel Timothy Reese was, quite a few years ago, a very smart captain. He has gone up in rank. And, stayed high in both intellect and, more importantly by far, intellectual and moral courage.

Intellect and the courage to act upon it regardless of any possible negative impact on the career trajectory abound in a (leaked) memo published in today's NYT. Although those further up the food chain in Iraq immediately claimed that the memo represented only one man's view and was not a statement of policy, Colonel Reese delivered hot metal on target regarding the state of play in Iraq at present.

In essence he contends that the US has done about all it can do and further efforts whether in US combat operations or in holding the hands of the Iraqis will be more likely to backfire than not. He does believe that the Iraqi armed and security forces are now capable of containing and expunging the remaining insurgent threats.

While that is on the optimistic side in the Geek's view, it in no way militates against either the accuracy or the trenchant nature of the colonel's core argument. His supporting architecture comes in two parts.

The first portion focuses on the present weaknesses and liabilities of the government of Iraq (GOI). Most of the points he makes in his memo are well known and have been for some time. Taken together they point to the potential of ongoing political turmoil, but not to the necessary expansion of violence. The GOI is at the very best an extremely weak reed on which to place hopes of a stable prosperous state. But that is not to argue that Iraq is already a failed state in the making.

The second line of argument focuses more concretely on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In dealing with the military side of the equation, Reese not only comments on longer standing matters but the "changes in attitude" which resulted after Maliki declared "victory" over the Americans on 30 June 09.

As armed forces reflect accurately the polity and society which created and maintains them, it comes as no surprise that Colonel Reese identifies the majority of chronic problems in the ISF as being legacies of the Baathist/Saddam era. The ISF is at root a Soviet style force with all that implies. All the US efforts to date including "massive partnering" with the ISF have not eradicated the pernicious effects of this reality.

As a result the ISF lack initiative, flexibility, forward planning, good officer-NCO-enlisted relationship dynamics, an emphasis on MOS skill training, operational rehearsals or even after action analysis. The ISF C2 is rigid and centralised in the Soviet manner--a form of political control that not only suited the Baathists and Saddam but would fit the desires of any ambitious political chieftan such as al-Maliki. (Truth in Blogging requires the Geek to admit the last was his assessment and is not contained in the Reese Memo.)

Regardless of all American urgings, the senior command and political leadership of Iraq are unable or unwilling to root out fundamental blocks to the development of a non-political, professional military. Cronyism, corruption, and political interference run rampant as does laziness and a general inability or unwillingness to acquire even the rudiments of a professional force. None of this will change, the colonel maintains, regardless of the presence or absence of US advisers or combat partners.

In his profoundly negative evaluation, the colonel is both writing in tandem with other knowledgeable observers and showing a blunt honesty not commonplace in US experience over the past few decades. It is, as Colonel Reese notes, remarkable and praiseworthy that the US has been able to bring into existence the ISF as it is, warts and all. The ISF does have the necessary minimum combat capacity to act as an internal security force if the threats do not rise above their current level. It is capable of a marginal degree of self-sustainment. And, it could get better, even much better, if the political lords and masters of the place allow it to.

Since the American withdrawal from the cities a month back and the the concomitant "victory over the Yankees" celebration headed by al-Maliki, the relations between Americans and ISF have worsened in the colonel's estimate. He notes, for example, that the ISF does not allow the US to engage in operations which are compliant with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA.)

The ISF units are unwilling to cooperate with US troops in engaging targets the US command considers high value. This attitude carries over into a reluctance to carry out even routine operations. Unstated, but implied, and certainly experienced in the closing period of the Vietnam War, ISF unit commanders are more than willing to ignore the presence and advice of Americans attached to their unit for the purpose of providing operational and training guidance.

In short, Colonel Reese is right. The "surge" worked. US combat units did break the back of the several insurgencies both sectarian and political. With the possible exception of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) the several anti-government forces have been forced onto the deep defensive and, save for suicide bombings, have only a very limited offensive capacity. American blood bought enough of a military success that the US can legitimately say it has achieved the minimum strategic goal of "not-losing."

This means that the US can and should withdraw its combat forces at a rate greater than that first intended when the SOFA was finalised. SecDef Gates has already alluded the other day to the very real possibility that an additional combat brigade will be pulled out of theater ahead of schedule.

More than ever and with more reason than ever, the time has come to shake the dust of Iraq from our boots and get on with the war in Afghanistan.

And, that's a fact, Jack!