France's reasonably robust and undeniably given to realism president, Nicholas Sarkozy, had wanted the amphyctony of financial and industrial might to take genuine action sooner, as in right now, but was outflanked by the Obama administration which is fearful of any "tough" action "backfiring" and, presumably, allowing extremists to put their hands on the levers of power in Tehran. The Nice Young Man From Chicago was joined in the effort to block meaningful economic sanctions by Russia which is pursuing its own interests in Iran.
Germany apparently did what Germany does so well--waffle and equivocate. Sure, the prospect of a nuclear armed Iran does bother some in the Berlin government, but the prospect of losing billions of dollars worth of business in Iran shakes the Krauts a lot more.
The Chinese president probably made his regime's typical noises about the incorrectness of meddling in the "internal affairs" of Iran before departing with undue haste to deal with the latest outbreak of Islamic unrest in the far west of China. On the up side, the fleeing of the Grand Mandarin from the Center Kingdom made the job of the spin doctors much easier.
And spin they did. The Americans whirred and whirled faster than the Iranian centrifuges. The usual posse of unnamed "senior officials" reportedly gave credit to President Obama for having convinced Dimitri Medvedev that the Iranian efforts in nuclear R&D represented a real threat to Russia.
Pleeeze! Give it a rest. And, give us a break!
The Russian government nominally headed by Medvedev but actually honchoed by the "very tough, very smart, and very unsentimental" (to use President Obama's words) Vladimir Putin is perfectly well aware of the potential threat represented by Iran--with or without nuclear arms. Russians tend to be realists in foreign policy matters. As a result the Kremlin has more faith in its own ability to counter the Iranian menace than it does in the ability of different nations with different national interests to collaborate effectively on stopping Iranian ambitions.
Should the day come when the lads in the Kremlin determine to their own satisfaction that the mullahocracy represents a genuine threat, steps will be taken immediately to abate the nuisance. There will be no gnashing of teeth over the "morality" of taking whatever actions are being considered, no consultations with other governments, no seeking UN approval, no hoping that Washington will flash a "green light." None of that sort of thing. Simply a decision leading to action.
One can be sure that the Kremlin will (and probably already has) conveyed the unpleasant possibilities which will befall Tehran should its acts be perceived in Russia as representing an unacceptable level of challenge. While the mullahs may well ignore any Russian warnings, they do so at their peril.
The factors which work to Tehran's advantage when dealing with the US or the West generally do not apply with the Russians. US and Western actions whether genuine sanctions or use of the "military option" are inhibited by a wide range of fears. Governments, whether French, German, British, Italian, or US hate to see their businesses lose contracts and money. More, all of these governments are loath to threaten let alone use force for fear of the Iranian responses and the chaos which might be unleashed on the oil market.
Russia is immune or nearly so to these considerations. Indeed, invocation of the "military option" by the US or Israel is welcomed by the Kremlin--they help Russia's sales of high price, high tech weapons to the Islamic Republic. The potential of Iran turning its Islamist jihadist proxies loose would be scarcely noticed by the Kremlin against the background noise of assorted Islamist jihadist insurgencies already in progress. The "unleashing" of Iranian proxies would assist the Russians in achieving a final solution for the Islamists by muzzling foreign critics of the muscular measures the Russians usually employ in countering insurgents.
And, lest anyone forget, speculation driven spikes in global oil prices can only benefit Russia.
With all of that as context, it is easy to dismiss the "senior American official's" characterization of Obama's come-to-Jesus meeting with Medvedev as flat-out tergiversation. The real deal is simply that Russia is playing the game of nations vis-a-vis Iran far better than is the Obama administration.
In any event the G-8 and the Obama administration have given the mullahocracy and its re-elected frontman, Ahemdinejad, another two months or so to dither, drivel, obfuscate, and bluster. As they do, the foregoing the centrifuges will continue to spin bringing Iran's stock of low enrichment uranium to the level necessary for a rapid breakout in the production of weapon's grade stuff.
The delay taken together with the G-8's apparent acceptance of the electoral facts on the ground after an initial outburst of huffing, puffing, and general hyperventilation make the mullahs and their designated mouthpiece feel more and more secure in their belief that the US and the West generally will never actually do anything which runs the slightest risk.
There is no impetus for any change in either policy or tactics in the latest round of delay. No matter how often one "senior White House official" or another declares that American and Western patience is running thin, there is no reason for the mullahs to believe this to be the case. Dark hints of something bad is going to happen simply haul no freight with the turban-tops of the Islamic Republic.
The record of American and Western actions over the thirty years since the fall of the Shah show that the US and other countries are very, very long on words and very, very short on action. There is simply no basis for the Iranians to conclude that it will be any different when the G-20 convenes in Pittsburgh.
All the Iranians have to do is continue what they have been doing so well and for so long. Hang tough. Talk tough. Make counter accusations. Stonewall. Stonewall some more. And, when all else fails--stonewall some more.
Absent a backroom putsch within the clerical circles of Iran, the Obama administration has only three choices. Accept Iran as a nuclear power along with all that implies. Go for genuine sanctions including restrictions on food sales in the hope this will work. Be ready to say, "You realise, this means war."
The Obama crew might remember a lesson of history: The longer a country waits to make the hard choices, the harder the choices are to make.
No comments:
Post a Comment