Affairs in Swat have ended on a basis that is favorable from Islamabad's perspective. That is provided one does not look too closely at the problems of resettlement of the internally displaced persons (IDP) and reconstruction of battered towns and infrastructure.
Perhaps motivated by the apparent rapidity and low cost of the operation into Swat, the Pakistani army did not even pause for breath before charging into South Waziristan. As the lads at the top of the army food chain must have know, South Waziristan is a much tougher proposition than was the case in Swat.
South Waziristan and its partner, North Waziristan, have been the home of long standing to Taliban and its principle figure, Baitullah Mehsud. Mehsud has many supporters in this part of the FATA. Even those tribals who are not following the Taliban banner lose no particular love for the central government. This means that the human terrain is even more rugged than the physical--and the topography of the Wazirisatans makes the back side of the moon look smooth and soft in comparison.
The army has quite a few miles of very, very bad road ahead of it in this second phase of the anti-Taliban campaign. That the army recognises the difficulties in taking the war to Taliban on the ground of South Waziristan is evident in reports alluding that the Pakistanis intend to maximise the use of air power and minimise the employment of grunts on the ground.
At first sight this approach might seem ill-advised considering that civilians will inevitably be killed by air and artillery strikes. This would be true unless, as seems likely, the goal of the military in this stage of countering Taliban is the organizational disruption of the insurgents.
Organizational disruption including leadership decapitation and the destruction of base or training facilities is a better approach than would be the alternatives of "search and destroy" or "clear and hold." While the disruption approach does not eliminate all needs for ground forces, it does limit the numbers and thus the risks and casualties involved. Taliban is heavily dependent upon the personalities of and personal loyalty to identifiable leaders. Removing these figures and destroying necessary base, training, and supply facilities can lead rapidly to both demoralisation and disintegration of Taliban.
The process could be speeded significantly if Baitullah Mehsud and his subordinates make more mistakes such as authorising suicide attacks against mosques or other clearly off-limits soft civilian targets. As events have already shown, attacks of this nature can turn the local tribal population against Taliban with lethal results for the Islamist jihadists.
The success of an organizational disruption approach can also be facilitated by a continuation (or escalation) of the American program of Predator launched Hellfire missiles. As insurgent websites have noted, the CIA run program has cost significant leadership cadre casualties to say nothing of having spread fear and concomitant demoralisation within the ranks of Taliban (and al-Qaeda.) The bare fact that the Pakistani government protests have never progressed beyond the pro forma level shows that Islamabad recognises reality.
A development which is far more worrying to Pakistani military and governmental chiefs than the Predator missiles is the probable impact of the new US-UK offensive into Helmand province, Afghanistan. The (to put it politely) porous border between Helmand and the two Waziristans means that Islamist jihadists retreating before the Anglo-American offensive will cross into Pakistan. At this point they become de facto reinforcements for Baitullah Mehsud's gunsels.
The Pakistani military high command is quite well aware of an unpleasant lacking in the tactics of organizational disruption. By themselves disruptive techniques do not bring victory. It is necessary finally to send the troops into the contested region and winkle the holdout hardcore jihadists from their caves, bunkers, and village redoubts in a way which is up-close, personal and, thus, risky. Almost by definition the fugitive fighters from Afghanistan will be in the number of holdout hardcore wallahs who must be confronted face-to-face by the Pakistani army.
The apprehension of the task in Waziristan being complicated and lengthened by the flux of fighters fleeing the Anglo-American attack is not caused by any particular lack of enthusiasm for combat in the Pakistani army. It is not noteworthy in its aversion to either risk or combat.
Rather the fear of losses or excess expenditure of time in confronting Taliban in South Waziristan comes from a simple reality of Pakistani national security life. The senior command of the military as well as the civilian government is fighting Taliban with one eye focused on India.
Since Day One of Pakistan's independent history, the great bogeyman has always been India. The great apprehension has always been an Indian attack. An attack which would be notionally facilitated by the Pakistanis being preoccupied fighting an internal threat.
The constant distrust, fear (and a fair amount of loathing) of India has not only driven several ultimately inconclusive Indo-Pakistani wars, it is the beating heart of all Pakistani national security policy. This means that Pakistan is under tremendous pressure to wind up the struggle against Taliban as quickly as possible and at the lowest possible cost in the lives of its regular army personnel.
It is in this context that the latest balloon floating from Islamabad must be assessed. Major General Athar Abbas asserted that the Pakistani military is in contact with the leadership of the Taliban in Afghanistan. That the Pakistanis can bring the Taliban to the peace conference table. That the Pakistanis will do this in return for "concessions" on the part of the US regarding the role of India in Afghanistan.
This admission by MGen Abbas that his men are in contact with Omar and other senior Taliban figures confirms the long believed reality that the Pakistanis created Taliban. It is not surprising that within hours the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) denounced the reports as "totally baseless, fabricated, and unfounded as well as being taken out of context."
Leaving aside the all-too-obvious internal contradiction contained in the ISI statement, the sheer vehemence of the words does all but confirm the accuracy of General Abbas' remarks. He is offering to bring Omar and company to the table with the Karzai government if the US will act quickly and decisively to limit, preferably end, the growing presence and influence of India in Afghanistan.
The offer contains several advantages for Pakistan. If Omar and the other Taliban heavies come to talk peace with Karzai, there is no real need for the Anglo-American attacks in Helmand to continue. This lowers the threat of Afghan jihadists becoming Pakistan's problem. Second, levering India out of Pakistan's defensive depth--Afghanistan--lowers the overall level of anxiety in Islamabad.
The offer also has a great advantage for Mr Karzai and the others in his pseudo-government. They can probably work the "peace process" so as to stay in power. And, staying in power is the alpha and omega of life for the Karzai regime. A protracted "peace process" coupled with a ceasefire in place would benefit all the internal actors in Afghanistan's bloody drama, both insurgent and status quo. It would also benefit the uncommitted majority by lowering their chances of being caught in one crossfire or another while assuring that the booty of foreign aid would continue to flow.
There is even an advantage for the Obama administration and others of the International Security Assistance Force. A commencement of "peace talks" linked with a ceasefire in place would limit the number of dead bodies coming out of Afghanistan. It would lower the direct and indirect costs of a war which might otherwise continue for another couple of years before petering out.
Finally, the Abbas proposal would allow the US and others to claim with a straight face that the foreign forces were not militarily defeated. Obama and other leaders can even argue with a degree of superficial plausibility that Taliban, by entering into peace talks, was tacitly admitting that it had been defeated in the field.
In short, the Abbas notion has much to recommend it to many of those interested in the Afghan conflict. It may not be a bad idea. It shouldn't be rejected reflexively.
Of course, the key questions remain. Can the Pakistanis pull off their end of the process? Can the US roll back India's presence in Afghanistan? And, should it?
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