Showing restraint the North's ForMin responded by calling Ms Clinton "a very funny lady" among other things. These were minor league epithets considering Pyongyang has long mastered the blistering terms of opprobrium which were a hallmark of Cold War public diplomacy. (Ah, those were the days! The days of "running dog lackeys of the Wall Street warmongering imperialist claque.")
Ms Clinton has also declared North Korea to be "friendless" while announcing that the price of readmission to the "international community" would be complete denuclearization. Presumably there would be other tariffs assessed such as the abandonment of ballistic missile development, the ending of arms exports, and perhaps the renunciation of internal human rights abuses. She has made it clear that simply returning to the Six Power Talks would bring the Hermits no reward.
At least the we're-always-ready-to-talk bunch in the Obama administration has made one firm decision. The business of extortion as usual approach of Pyongyang won't work this time. No, this time, if Dear Leader and his coterie want swag, they will have to give up the nukes first.
Ms Clinton and, presumably, the other foreign policy makers of today think the sanctions will compel "friendless" North Korea to cave in, surrender its nukes, give up its missiles, and do whatever else the "international community" might demand to stop the pain being inflicted on its leaders by the assorted embargoes. Can't you just see it now--
Kim Jong-il is told that the Italian government has seized the two custom yachts being built for him as demanded by the Security Council resolutions. "Oh, no!" He cries. Stamps his feet. Waves his arms. "Give up the atoms, right now! I can't sail a bunch of atoms! I want my boats!"
In an international exchange monitored by Jimmy Carter, the North Koreans hand over all their plutonium. And, Kim gets his luxury aquatic rides. And, peace and good will reign forever more.
Yeah, fer sure, dude.
In Reality Land the critical player, China, will cooperate with the sanctions only as long as the internal stability of North Korea is not threatened. If instability looms as it will come the next transfer of power in Pyongyang, Beijing will find appropriate low profile ways to violate the UN expressed "will of the international community." To do anything other than that would be to place Chinese national interests at risk.
There is no sign that China is particularly concerned over recent developments in North Korea. There have been no major troop movements toward the border. Neither have the Chinese been issuing any warnings to Pyonyang as they have occasionally in the past. Given that Chinese intelligence has a greater degree of penetration in the Hermit Kingdom and has had such for over a half century, there is little probability of any alarming developments in Pyongyang eluding Beijing.
There are some other considerations which must be taken into account when evaluating the probability that the current US policy of stern demands and psycho babble insults will bear any useful result.
As Ruediger Frank pointed out at a conference last month at the University of British Columbia, the military ruling circle changed policy in 2006. North Korea's short-lived flirtation with more liberal internal policies came to a screeching halt in what he termed, "socialist neoconservatism." The state took back control of all aspects of the economy and reinstituted the most pervasive form of internal security. The long standing North Korean gulag filled quickly to the brim and would overflow were it not for the high death rate in the constellation of "reform through labor" camps.
Ideological control and indoctrination became universal and unrelenting. The state sought with great success to assure absolute and unquestionable authority over every aspect of individual life in the country. Warning of the need for continued sacrifice and of the ever present threat of attack by the US and others of the "imperialist camp," the regime has forged a submissive and long-suffering population ready (if not eager) to bear whatever might be necessary to maintain the state.
In keeping with the model of success in control and indoctrination, it might be noted that the vast majority of the refugees from North Korea are female, marginal in their economic value, and normally unemployed. The flood into both China and South Korea has been one of economic and not political refugees. They are not "voting with their feet." They are looking for a job.
Arguably, North Korea is facilitating the leaving of unemployable members of society. They are clearing the decks of what was called in Nazi Germany, "useless mouths." A closer examination of the refugee stream would probably show a high proportion of people with physical or mental illnesses which can't be afforded by the state.
While there are threats to the regime's control of perceptions and attitudes such as the circulation of DVDs and CDs smuggled in from China, these are not likely to threaten the state's authority over its population. These small leaks are certainly not going to pollute the large North Korean army's loyalty.
North Korea's army constitutes a real, constant, and major threat to South Korea. The most plausible "nightmare scenario" is one of a spasm war. While the American military states it is ready for all eventualities, this would in no way lessen, let alone obviate, the consequences of a spasm war.
With a suitable pretext, a "provocation" such as the South Korean navy or coast guard stopping and searching a North Korean vessel under the provisions of the Security Council resolution--an action Pyongyang has already characterised as "an act of war"--the North could unleash a fierce barrage of missile, rocket, and tube artillery. Since some sixty percent of the South Korean industrial establishment as well as Seoul are within range, the death and destruction would be impressive.
The US and South Korea can and will respond quickly and in great force. The North has long prepared for such an eventuality. Its military and critical civilian facilities are well dug in, hardened, and protected.
China and Russia would move fast, very fast to call a Security Council meeting with a view of passing a ceasefire resolution. North Korea would quickly accept the resolution. The US and South Korea would have no viable option but to do the same. The war would be over, probably in twenty-four hours or less.
China and Russia would insist that North Korea share in the "humanitarian" and "reconstruction" aid which would be a necessary aftermath. The badly hurt South Korea would have received a potent lesson in the advisibility of a genuine "reunification" effort. This bent would be potentiated by the powerful peace faction which has been a permanent and often noisy and politically important component of South Korean life.
Regional dynamics will be changed. Changed in ways which cannot be predicted in detail.
The North Korean regime with or without Dear Leader may see such a gambit as the least undesirable of all possible evils. A spasm war would be extortion taken to the ultimate high risk, high payoff level. That does not make it an unthinkable option for Pyongyang, particularly if it sees the risks as no greater than the long term impact of the American sanction based approach.
As we found out on 7 December 41, a country when presented with a choice between the humiliating surrender to American policy demands or war, may well opt for war. Back then the Japanese reckoned that the US was too preoccupied with Germany to do other than accept an accomplished feat in Asia and the Pacific. It turned out their calculations were wrong.
However, the current realities of the American internal economic and political agendas taken with the war-weariness of the American public and the powerful leverage enjoyed by China in the Security Council may give the leaders of the Hermit Kingdom reason to believe that the spasm war gambit will pay off more than it will cost. Now, that is a threat.
So, Madam Secretary, while it may feel good to heave psycho babble terms at North Korea and be so personally satisfying to term the North, "friendless," and seem so tough to demand captituation to US policy demands as the price of friendship, it shows a certain inability on your part to get a grip on reality in all its seamy ways. Theodore Roosevelt advised that one speak softly and carry a big stick. You, Secretary Clinton, prefer to talk loudly and carry no stick at all.
No comments:
Post a Comment