Only The Names Change--Not The Reality

In the two decades which have elapsed since the effective end of the Cold War, there have been any number of name changes applied to the old whore, war. We have waded through "Third Generation War," "Asymmetrical Warfare," "Overseas Contingency Operations," and, most recently "Fourth Generation War." Throughout the proliferation of names which neither describe nor distinguish effectively between types or levels of warfare, the old terms of "conventional," "irregular" (Yeech!,) and "weapons of mass destruction (WMD)" have soldiered on, brought out on occasion for use by the in-group of defense intellectuals or, for fear producing purposes, the media and politicians.

Behind the forest of terms the reality of war remains the same. It is today what it always has been. The organised application of force to a political goal by a state or a pretender to statehood. That's it. That's all war ever has been. That's all it ever will be. As the coach sez, "Time to get back to the basics."

OK. The Geek acknowledges that there has been one complication emerging with a fair bit of drama in the past twenty or so years. That complication is the existence of ideologically motivated, diffusely commanded, non-state actors whose actions range across the lines on the map called "borders" and whose political goals may be both hazy and overly ambitious.

The complication was seen developing as far back as the Seventies by a few individuals who warned that the increasing use of proxy war by both the US and the Soviet Union would create both the necessary conditions and the experienced, motivated cadre for the development of widespread "quasi-insurgencies" using trans-national terror and similar tactics to pursue political goals within and between established states. The warnings of this potential were ignored in the dynamic of the Cold War. Thus the Law of Unintended Consequences was invoked.

We are dealing with the results today. And, will be for some years to come.

In its Quadrennial Defense Review the Obama administration (or at least the Robert Gates portion of it) has simplified the clearly out-to-lunch "Quad" typology of war. Now, the US will prepare for only three types of war: conventional, irregular (again, Yeech!) and hybrid. This latter overly vague term appears to apply to everything from the old style proxy war to the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear munitions (CBRN) in the context of either of the first two categories.

Simplification is nice. In this case it may carry with it the added benefit of lowering the profile of the WMD's as a threat. Bluntly, the possibility of one of the proliferating bunch of non-state actors whether performing as proxies or on their own hook using CBRN is slim to none.

While the control of WMD proliferation is a proper focus of diplomatic effort and, arguably, the people at the Department of Homeland Security, it is not a major challenge for US forces in the field. Even in the context of homeland security the level of the threat must not be exaggerated.

Yes, it is a really fun game to develop nightmare scenarios involving CBRN employment by Islamist jihadists working for an unfriendly foreign power or on their own initiative. But, while fun, the exercise is far easier to conduct as a thought experiment than it is to execute in the real world. Making killer bugs or toxic gases in the comfort and privacy of your very own terrorist safehouse is easy to imagine--and hard to do.

Obtaining radioactive materials and putting together your very own dirty bomb is another activity that brings frissons of delight to the mind as one imagines just how easy it would be to accomplish. Again there is a (fortunately) large gap between principle and practice, theory and reality.

But, the Geek wanders a bit.

The necessities for waging successful war are well known. To counter an enemy in the field whether that enemy is a state waging conventional war or a guerrilla fighting with the tactics of hit and run, ambush, improvised explosive devices, and suicide attacks on soft targets, the same requisites for success exist.

The necessities are two in number. Here they are in order of importance. Political will. A suitable capacity.

The second category, suitable capacity, can be further sub-divided. One needs a proper doctrine or theory of victory. One must also have relevant material capabilities ranging from weapons to reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, to logistics and support, to command, control and communications. Finally, the training to the doctrine and in the use of the materiel must be both realistic and effective.

For any particular war, whether a conventional clash of firepower heavy forces or a small scale interventionary operation (which includes counterinsurgency, humanitarian operations, peace keeping and other sorts of what is now called "asymmetrical warfare") the doctrine must be tied closely and realistically to two larger, overarching considerations.

The first of these which is joined head and hip to political will. It is the political goal toward which force is being applied.

The second is the definition of victory. Without a definition of victory tied tightly to the political goal of the war, it is impossible to properly estimate whether or not one is succeeding. This is particularly true in the case of interventionary operations where there is an absence of nice, tidy lines on a map.

The doctrine itself must be flexible and capable of change during the war if it shows itself to be the wrong theory of victory. This is difficult, but not impossible as has been demonstrated in Iraq and (at least provisionally) in Afghanistan.

The political goal of the war, its definition of victory, and the theory of victory must be tied into a tightly wrapped unity. The ties that bind are several considerations which demand examination and conclusions before the first boot hits the ground. These strings of coherence are best put forth as a question.

Is our goal, our definition of victory, and our theory of victory as well as the supporting equipment and training internally consistent and coherent, and are they relevant to the human realities on the ground where we propose to operate?

In recent American wars from Vietnam to the early years of Iraq and Afghanistan it is clear that the question was neither asked nor answered. Fortunately, unlike Vietnam, in the more recent wars, the military command level showed itself to be flexible, innovative, and open to change.

As a result the US forces did accomplish the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not losing" in Iraq. In the same way the recent shift in both definition and theory of victory in Afghanistan bodes more-or-less well to retrieve a semblance of success from the jaws of impending defeat.

American political will has been tested, even severely tested, but not found dangerously wanting during the long years of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This stands in sharp contrast to the experience during the Vietnam war.

The reasons for this disparity are various, but the most important are twofold. The body count has been low, even very, very low by the standards of the earlier war. The war is being fought by people who willingly joined the armed forces including the Reserves and National Guard. The absence of draftees from the war should not be underrated as a stiffener of American political will.

Another reason which can be advanced legitimately for the continuation of political will over the past nearly eight years is the behavior of the enemy. The excesses of the Islamists, the Jihadists, must be given credit for maintaining the American backbone. At the same time that martyrdom operations give heart to the jihadists and their Islamist commanders, they have laid a foundation of revulsion and fear in the minds of Americans critical to continued acceptance--if not outright support--of the war.

Whether the Obama administration can continue the success of its predecessor in ignoring anti-war sentiments in the American population as the war continues in Afghanistan and as the first blush of success in Iraq fades under the pressure of renewed ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq to say nothing of the almost inevitable horizontal escalation of the war remains to be seen. This last factor, horizontal escalation, will prove to be the greatest test of American political will.

Since the enemy is a non-state actor capable of accepting covert state support, it has a great capacity to maintain the initiative. Far more than the ponderous organised forces of a state, the jihadists have the capacity to move from a venue where they are losing to one where they can continue the war--perhaps in the next thing to perpetuity.

While immediate attention has been focused on Pakistan and the probability that jihadists will flee the approaching Marines in Helmand crossing the border into the FATA, there are very strong indications that the wannabe martyrs are ranging further afield. Like into Somalia and Yemen. And elsewhere, such as Sudan and areas of North Africa.

The US and its allies will always be behind the curve. Unless, a critical decision is made in the very near future.

The decision?

Whether or not the US will take the initiative and try to get ahead of the jihadists by deploying significant forces to Somalia and, perhaps (questionably so considering internal politics) to Yemen. This is not an action which can be taken either lightly or unilaterally. It is not an action which fits well with the current agenda of the Obama administration or the economic realities surrounding the US.

Nonetheless it is a decision which must be made. How it is made will determine how long and how successfully we will wage the totality of the Forever War against Islamist jihadism. Which ever way the decision goes, its effects will constrain our lives for many, many years to come.

Not pleasant, eh, bucko?