In their latest act the "Kids" have declared three UN agencies to be "enemies of Islam," to say nothing of being "enemies of the Somali people." Presumably the "Kids" Department of Political Affairs and Regional Administration wore a collective straight face as the statement was issued.
Backing the expulsion of the UN agencies by the forthright diplomacy of violence, the Kids sacked the compounds occupied by the UN Development Agency in the south of Somalia stealing the vehicles and equipment in the process. This approach indicates that the Kids have taken lessons in the practice of international relations from the Iranians.
Of course, lessons in diplomatic protocol are not the only support the Kids have sought and received from the outside world. As Ahmedou Ouid-Abdallah, the UN Special Representative for Somalia makes clear in an op-ed piece in today's WaPo, the Kids are no longer some sort of homegrown collection of exuberant young practitioners of Salifist/Wahhibist Islam. They may have started as a ramshackle array of homeboys in search of excitement, power, and a sense of mission, but those days are long behind them.
The "Kids" are the sharp edge of the Islamist jihadist movement. Their trigger pullers and bomb wearers come from areas far removed from the sand and blood of Somalia. The money--and much of the agenda--comes from Islamist leaning governments and NGOs which share both a given interpretation of the Koran and a deep seated hatred for the US and its allies. Both of these contentions have become so commonplace that they need no further documentation.
Also not requiring either documentation or riffling through files of classified information is the fact that jihadists who have found Iraq and Afghanistan a little too hot for their personal comfort have been heading for the more salubrious clime of Somalia. There they will meet other like minded folks from both Europe and the US, folk drawn from the mission or sensation seeking younger members of Somali expatriate communities. United in faith and hate, the jihadists, old and new, can cross-pollinate and reinforce each other's views of Islamism and the Global Caliphate.
The critical consideration is not the movement of Somalia from the Third Circle to the Second in Hell but rather what, if anything, can the "international community" do about it. Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah argues passionately that the "international community" has a (his word) "duty" to Somalia. By this he clearly means a responsibility to intervene in force to squash the "Kids" and support the Transitional Federal Government.
In principle he is correct. Given the length of the Somali coast, the volume of trade which passes that coast, and the fragility of the global economy, there is a very real measure of self-interest involved in the stability of the geographic expression called Somalia. The potentially destabilizing impact of the refugee flood upon Kenya and other countries in the region also makes a serious and realistic claim upon the consideration and action of the larger world community.
The gulf between principle and practice is huge. And, in highest probability, unbridgeable. Just who is going to do the heavy lifting in Somalia?
Not the US. As SecDef Robert Gates warned over the weekend, the American population will not support an unending effort in Afghanistan. The war there must, in his view, turn the corner within the next year or eighteen months or the political will of We the People will be exhausted with predictable consequences.
While Iraq may be winding down as Afghanistan ramps up, one thing is sure. The American public, to say nothing of the economy, cannot and will not support another expedition into a land of inhospitable human terrain and little probability of rapid, low cost success.
The same is true in the UK. Only more so. The British Parliament, press and public, is torqued off over the recent high body count in Afghanistan as a result of the new offensive strategy taking the war to the Taliban stronghold of Helmand. While the number of combat fatalities is low in both absolute and historical terms, it is becoming too much for the British political will. The stakes and goal are equally incomprehensible to the majority of the British public. The same would be true on steroids were Her Majesty's Government to send the lads to Somalia.
The days when the Empire could calmly accept the bones of their troops bleaching in the sun in some far away place for obscure reasons are long gone. The Brits, like their Yank cousins, want a clear cut success in short order at a low cost for easily understood and emotionally compelling reasons.
The rest of the governments of Europe are even more adversely inclined to sending troops to some nasty little pimple on the planet for reasons which might be understood by geopoliticians but not by the man and woman on the street. The Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, are all in the same category. Russians and Chinese support direct national interest only. The Japanese are too canny to get involved, and, anyway, their constitution forbids military employment in any endeavor which is not clearly self-defense.
So, what about Africa? That is the region with the most direct interest in containing both instability and refugees which carry the germ of instability.
The African Union has been long on paper commitments to Somalia. It has been equally short on performance. The long-on-pledges and short-on-deployment AU peacekeeping force is hard pressed keeping a mini-Green Zone around the presidential compound and the air and sea port facilities in Mogadishu. There is no real probability the situation will change.
The AU has always fielded peacekeeping forces which are notably risk averse. Assorted national contingents deployed on sundry UN sponsored peackeeping missions around the world have repeatedly demonstrated a reluctance to engage in combat which has been equalled only by the speed and eagerness with which some have sought plunder, extortion, and forced sexual favors.
The constant excuse presented by the AU as well as its member states is the lack of money and equipment. There is much to the excuse. AU forces are poorly equipped. They are also poorly paid. In addition they are poorly trained, poorly officered, and generally ill-prepared to take on an opponent that has guns and the willingness to use them.
Generally the history of the armed forces of the AU nations shows them to be very good at coups. Reasonably proficient at pushing unarmed civilians around. Better than average at looking good on a parade. And, somewhere between pathetic and mediocre at actually fighting.
The exception to this general statement is the old army of South Africa. Since the political transformation of that country, there has been no occasion for the South Africans to show whether or not their combat proficiency has declined and, if so, as is likely, how much.
The US and other countries could (and, perhaps should) pour money, equipment, and training into the AU contingents. While an exercise in upgrading the capacity of the AU member states in peacekeeping operations might have a very real benefit in the future, any positive effects would take too long to be practically applicable in Somalia. The "Kids" will have taken over the place long before a training and equipping effort would have measurable impact.
Casting around for alternatives some decision maker or another might have the bright idea of asking the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to call upon its members to hammer together an all-Islamic peacekeeping force. What an idea!
It has been argued more than a few times that Muslims understand Muslims. That Muslims would treat Muslims with greater sensitivity and thus greater effect than non-Muslims. That argument may or may not have a substructure of truth. It is also irrelevant.
Just which Muslim country or countries could be expected to volunteer forces for Somalia? And for what reason?
In principle Saudi Arabia has the capacity to send a few thousand reasonably well armed, trained, and led troops to Somalia. The Kingdom might also be persuaded that its national interests would be served by so doing. After all, Saudi clerics have long been involved in transforming the Somali version of Islam from a rather laid back sort to the austere Wahhibist version. Saudi is concerned with the stability of Yemen and the free transit of the Red Sea and adjacent waters.
However a Saudi presence, even if it were to slap the "Kids" into line would also assure the continuation of an Islamist leaning government. This might be the best of all possible outcomes from the Western perspective.
Militating against any hypothetical Saudi peacekeeping force is the fear of Iran. Iran has not given up its ambitions to be the regional hegemon in the Persian Gulf. Any decrement in the Saudi military presence at home would be to Iran's political advantage. The House of Saud is aware of this. The House is also aware that its army is the necessary final support of the House in the event of internal unrest such as is continually sponsored by Tehran.
"No thanks, we will stay right where we are," has to be the most likely reply to any call for peacekeeping assistance.
What is true with Saudi Arabia is true in spades for the rest of the Gulf states. None of these oil sheikdoms have the spare troops standing around itching for a chance to engage in real combat against real people with real guns.
Egypt might be cozened (bribed) into furnishing a few brigades, but Mubarak would be very cautious about such an exercise. The regime faces many internal threats. These will grow as Hosni grows older. A succession crisis is possible. This means the army and the government alike will want to keep all their cards in the deck, not spread some in a rather no win situation far from home.
There is a dearth of candidates for the task of putting the kibosh on the "Kids." The risks are real. The costs are potentially high. The benefits are nil or at least obscure. There is no inducements and a lot of constraints.
In short, there is no one willing in the real world to exercise the "duty" proposed by Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah. He is right in principle. Unfortunately in the gritty real world, principle is always trumped by the practical, the pragmatic weighing of risks and benefits, costs and gains.
So the tragedy produced by the "Kids" will continue. Eventually the leaders of the US and other countries may well regret not having dealt with the "Kids"now rather than the consequences later just as the US learned to regret the spineless response of the Clinton administration to the terrorist acts of al-Qaeda or our unseemly retreat from Somalia after "Blackhawk down." The real deal is that governments live in the here-and-now, the present, not the future.
"Take care of today and the future can look out for itself," seems to be the watchword of governments no matter how often it has been proven to be a destructive short-sighted way to make and execute policy. That's the way it goes--unfortunately.
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