If Anything General McChrystal Is Optimistic

Although the mandated sixty day strategy review is nowhere near complete, early reports hint that the new commander, Gen Stanley McChrystal, will request an increase in the number of combat and support troops over and above the additional 21,000 already in the pipeline. Sending more troops, both trigger pullers and trainers, will undoubtedly raise the hackles of "progressive" supporters of President Obama who want to see the war in Afghanistan liquidated, not expanded.

Arguably, the effort in Afghanistan was misoriented from the beginning. It should have been a simple, straightforward punitive expedition. The goal should have been confined to teaching both al-Qaeda and its host, the Taliban government of Afghanistan, the error of their ways. The US and allies should have limited their efforts to killing and capturing as many al-Qaeda and Taliban personnel as possible. Exercises in "nation building" should have been eschewed.

Such was not the case. Instead the American administration and its allies opted to both fight a war on the cheap and create a modern, liberal, pluralistic democracy complete with an independent judiciary, a free media, a non-religious basis and the other attributes of an early 21st Century Western nation-state.

Not surprisingly and completely predictably this overly expansive, not to say megalomaniac, mission resulted in failure. Now, the US and its allies have two choices: Admit defeat and leave, or expand the military effort so as to achieve the minimum strategic goal of "not losing." That second alternative was the one finally followed in Iraq with results which are not disappointing.

The recently inaugurated offensive in Helmand province involving cooperative actions by the US Marines and British forces is an indication of what is yet to come. In this operation the allied forces and the minuscule Afghan National Force contingent (some 640 men attached to the Marines, small but the largest that could be scraped together) are not engaging in yet one more exercise in futility called "search and destroy." This time the friendly forces are going to clear the territory and stay there.

This is precisely what needs to be done. Successful counterinsurgency demands that the war be taken to the insurgents--up close, personal, and constant. Success also demands that the counterinsurgents provide security for the uncommitted majority of the population. This means the troops have to be there, on the ground, over time, taking risks. It even means that the foreign counterinsurgent, the Marine, the soldier, takes the bullet that was meant for some indigenous civilian.

Only by providing a security shield that is virtually leakproof can the counterinsurgent provide the necessary precondition for the provision of essential governmental services, the assurance of trade and commerce, the addressing of all the other needs of life. Security comes first. All else must mark time until the first is achieved.

Clearing and holding provides security. It also provides a reason for the locals to both have hope in the future and a reason to believe in the capacity and good will of their governments at all levels.

On the down side, clearing and holding is very, very manpower intensive. While assorted technological goodies may facilitate the tasks of locating the bad guys and killing or capturing them, men, lots of men, are required to provide the "hold" part of clear and hold. It takes a lot of boots on the ground to provide the presence which will be taken increasingly by the locals to mean safety, safety in which to seek and receive essential services in the many ways people define the term.

Given the size of the disputed territory as well as its ruggedness and the availability of a convenient cross-border sanctuary as well as the number of years during which the insurgents have entrenched themselves, the task of clearing and holding is going to take a lot more men than the number already committed to the theater.

The increase in numbers applies to the Afghan National Forces (ANF) as well as the American (and, at least in principle, those of other countries represented in the International Security Assistance Force.) Boosting the ANF to a minimum reasonable number in a timely fashion will require a great increase in the number of trainers and advisers. The lion's share of these will be provided by the US.

It seems reasonable that the US will have to deploy at least another twelve thousand combat troops and four to six thousand in support and training roles by the middle of next year. The alternative to doing this will be defeat. The defeat will be slow, and inflicted primarily by the enervating effects of a war dragging into its second decade with no end in sight.

To achieve the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not losing" will require that the US and its associates, including the ANF, gain a clear military upper hand by the middle to end of 2010. This does not require a Taliban surrender or even a US "Mission Accomplished" banner. All that is necessary is for the Taliban armed effort to peter out, to progressively ramp down until the number of enemy initiated incidents falls to near zero. At his point the US and other foreign forces can withdraw leaving the endgame to the locals to play out as they desire.

Success in the military sphere does not require success in the political or social. The nature of local politics, the makeup and norms of society and culture, are purely local affairs. As is the case in Iraq, the outcome may well not meet the highest American standards, desires, or expectations.

That is all irrelevant. What matters in Afghanistan--what mattered in Iraq--is simply that the Islamist jihadists are left without any claim no matter how slight or how manufactured that they have defeated the forces of the US and its allies. General McChrystal apparently understands this as well as he understands the requirements of successful counterinsurgency. For the moment, at least, he deserves a salute for getting it right.