Our Guy Is Tough, Not Just Likable

The image makers and message spinners reportedly are viewing the Moscow meetings between President Obama and Russian President Medvedev yesterday and the Real Power Dude of the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin, as the big chance to show that the American president is not simply a Nice Young Man From Chicago with a great smile and the divinely bestowed title of Transformer Guy. No, while he is both these things, the meetings in Moscow also demonstrate beyond any doubt that the Transformer Guy is also tougher than a posse of velicoraptors on steroids.

Wow! You bet. You could just see Obama's canine teeth becoming ever more fang-like as he shook hands with one time judo champ, Putin. Gonna put that Rooshan in his place fer sure.

The fabricators of public perceptions must be hard up considering that the big news of the mini-summit was the announcement of plans to replace the current Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty set to expire this year with one which provides for further reductions in both nuclear munitions and delivery systems. This development is both welcome and overdue. It certainly is not a mark of "toughness," however that word might be defined.

On the margins of the main topic, the related one of the proposed missile defense system was discussed. The Obama administration is not enamored of the current plans set in place by the Bush-Cheney administration.

The President belabored the obvious by averring fearlessly (and presumably with a tough glint in his eyes) that there would be no need for an ABM system if Iran was somehow to forgo its ambitions. Adding to his tough stance, Mr Obama added that no defense system could possibly impair or impede the "mighty" Russian offensive capability.

That must have made Putin, to say nothing of Medvedev (who never shot a bear in Siberia or won a judo match or been seen in the public press sans shirt), just standing in awe of Mr Obama's toughness. Further afield there can be no doubt that after this display of hardnose, hard line, refractory verbiage, the mullahocracy in Iran, the Dear Leader in the Hermit Kingdom of the North, and the Men of the Forbidden City instantly decided not to try their luck against the hard boiled President from the streets Al Capone made famous.

Presumably, the prestidigators of spin as well as those who direct their services have been perceiving a need to portray Mr Obama as not falling in the less-backbone-than-a-banana category. Perchance there is a hint of fear in the corridors surrounding the Oval that Obama may be falling into Category W (as in wimp) in the foreign affairs department.

Oh! Say it ain't so!

What could possibly be leading to the interpretation of the Presidential Posture as being closer to over cooked pasta than Krupstahl?

Could it have something to do with asymmetrical pressuring in the Mideast? Pushing on Israel to make concessions (not that the notion of a few timely giveaways is a poor idea) while giving the Arab states a walk on reciprocity?

Or, perhaps, might it have something to do with the Obama rejection of real enforcement of real sanctions against Iran even though some of the usually highly reluctant to do anything beyond natter European Union states are ready to go that way as the last, best chance to avoid the blandly termed "military option?" Is it the patented Obama method of "engagement" with a regime which is not simply repressive but using an effective combination of deeply rooted Iranian nationalism with religious zeal with the goals of regional hegemony and global influence?

Or, to add a third factor, is it acting as the running buddy of "progressive" regimes such as those headed by Hugo Chavez, Ewo Morales, Daniel Ortega, and Rafael Correa to cozen or coerce the Honduran government into reversing itself and re-installing the "progressive" Zelaya, who was removed from office according to the lawful decisions of the country's Congress and Supreme Court?

Perhaps, there was a surfeit of "likable" and a paucity of "tough" in the craven rewriting and companion distorting of history in the Cairo Address so as to fit the needs of the self-esteem challenged Muslims of the world.

Then there is the small matter of President Obama, his White House flacks, and his State department bending over and spreading their collective cheeks to offer assurances that the US had not given a "green light" for an Israeli attack on the Iranian nuclear complex just because Joe (Flapping Lips) Biden had been factually correct by saying that Israel is a sovereign state with the sole right to determine how to respond to threats it perceived as "existential." A spectacle? Yes. Edifying? No.

The list could go on. But, the Geek bores of the exercise.

Being liked is nice. Most all politicians want to be liked, even loved. However, in a famous primer for rulers, a philosopher of rulership, an Italian fellow, one Machiavelli by name, stated a brutal truism: It is better to be feared than loved.

"Feared" may be too stark a word for our sensitive and enlightened age. The word "respected" may be profitably substituted. A country, a government, a president is respected when it (or he) takes a consistent, reality based view of the world. When it (or he) sets and executes policy in a candid, straight forward manner. When it (or he) takes the world as it is without any need to pander, to genuflect, to pitter-pat around the facts, the truth, the national and strategic interests.

When and if Mr Obama and his administration can show that he and it sees the world as it is, understands what American national and strategic interests might be, comprehends what states, entities, and personalities seek to limit, constrain, or defeat our attempts to implement policies in our national interest, then the president and his administration are on the road to respect. If in addition he and it can eschew post-modernist confections suitable for the English department but not government such as espousing, at least implicitly, cultural, political, and ethical relativism, then he and it will be moving well toward the goal of respect.

And, what does respect get a country?

It gets one a fair chance at achieving a better state of peace without the horrid necessity of having to go to war first. It means being liked less, but not having to produce "tough" acts to support the earlier "tough" words.

So, Mr Obama, some free advice from the History Geek. Don't worry about being liked. Don't fret over being tough enough. Just go for a little of that R*E*S*P*E*C*T.

Only The Names Change--Not The Reality

In the two decades which have elapsed since the effective end of the Cold War, there have been any number of name changes applied to the old whore, war. We have waded through "Third Generation War," "Asymmetrical Warfare," "Overseas Contingency Operations," and, most recently "Fourth Generation War." Throughout the proliferation of names which neither describe nor distinguish effectively between types or levels of warfare, the old terms of "conventional," "irregular" (Yeech!,) and "weapons of mass destruction (WMD)" have soldiered on, brought out on occasion for use by the in-group of defense intellectuals or, for fear producing purposes, the media and politicians.

Behind the forest of terms the reality of war remains the same. It is today what it always has been. The organised application of force to a political goal by a state or a pretender to statehood. That's it. That's all war ever has been. That's all it ever will be. As the coach sez, "Time to get back to the basics."

OK. The Geek acknowledges that there has been one complication emerging with a fair bit of drama in the past twenty or so years. That complication is the existence of ideologically motivated, diffusely commanded, non-state actors whose actions range across the lines on the map called "borders" and whose political goals may be both hazy and overly ambitious.

The complication was seen developing as far back as the Seventies by a few individuals who warned that the increasing use of proxy war by both the US and the Soviet Union would create both the necessary conditions and the experienced, motivated cadre for the development of widespread "quasi-insurgencies" using trans-national terror and similar tactics to pursue political goals within and between established states. The warnings of this potential were ignored in the dynamic of the Cold War. Thus the Law of Unintended Consequences was invoked.

We are dealing with the results today. And, will be for some years to come.

In its Quadrennial Defense Review the Obama administration (or at least the Robert Gates portion of it) has simplified the clearly out-to-lunch "Quad" typology of war. Now, the US will prepare for only three types of war: conventional, irregular (again, Yeech!) and hybrid. This latter overly vague term appears to apply to everything from the old style proxy war to the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear munitions (CBRN) in the context of either of the first two categories.

Simplification is nice. In this case it may carry with it the added benefit of lowering the profile of the WMD's as a threat. Bluntly, the possibility of one of the proliferating bunch of non-state actors whether performing as proxies or on their own hook using CBRN is slim to none.

While the control of WMD proliferation is a proper focus of diplomatic effort and, arguably, the people at the Department of Homeland Security, it is not a major challenge for US forces in the field. Even in the context of homeland security the level of the threat must not be exaggerated.

Yes, it is a really fun game to develop nightmare scenarios involving CBRN employment by Islamist jihadists working for an unfriendly foreign power or on their own initiative. But, while fun, the exercise is far easier to conduct as a thought experiment than it is to execute in the real world. Making killer bugs or toxic gases in the comfort and privacy of your very own terrorist safehouse is easy to imagine--and hard to do.

Obtaining radioactive materials and putting together your very own dirty bomb is another activity that brings frissons of delight to the mind as one imagines just how easy it would be to accomplish. Again there is a (fortunately) large gap between principle and practice, theory and reality.

But, the Geek wanders a bit.

The necessities for waging successful war are well known. To counter an enemy in the field whether that enemy is a state waging conventional war or a guerrilla fighting with the tactics of hit and run, ambush, improvised explosive devices, and suicide attacks on soft targets, the same requisites for success exist.

The necessities are two in number. Here they are in order of importance. Political will. A suitable capacity.

The second category, suitable capacity, can be further sub-divided. One needs a proper doctrine or theory of victory. One must also have relevant material capabilities ranging from weapons to reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, to logistics and support, to command, control and communications. Finally, the training to the doctrine and in the use of the materiel must be both realistic and effective.

For any particular war, whether a conventional clash of firepower heavy forces or a small scale interventionary operation (which includes counterinsurgency, humanitarian operations, peace keeping and other sorts of what is now called "asymmetrical warfare") the doctrine must be tied closely and realistically to two larger, overarching considerations.

The first of these which is joined head and hip to political will. It is the political goal toward which force is being applied.

The second is the definition of victory. Without a definition of victory tied tightly to the political goal of the war, it is impossible to properly estimate whether or not one is succeeding. This is particularly true in the case of interventionary operations where there is an absence of nice, tidy lines on a map.

The doctrine itself must be flexible and capable of change during the war if it shows itself to be the wrong theory of victory. This is difficult, but not impossible as has been demonstrated in Iraq and (at least provisionally) in Afghanistan.

The political goal of the war, its definition of victory, and the theory of victory must be tied into a tightly wrapped unity. The ties that bind are several considerations which demand examination and conclusions before the first boot hits the ground. These strings of coherence are best put forth as a question.

Is our goal, our definition of victory, and our theory of victory as well as the supporting equipment and training internally consistent and coherent, and are they relevant to the human realities on the ground where we propose to operate?

In recent American wars from Vietnam to the early years of Iraq and Afghanistan it is clear that the question was neither asked nor answered. Fortunately, unlike Vietnam, in the more recent wars, the military command level showed itself to be flexible, innovative, and open to change.

As a result the US forces did accomplish the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not losing" in Iraq. In the same way the recent shift in both definition and theory of victory in Afghanistan bodes more-or-less well to retrieve a semblance of success from the jaws of impending defeat.

American political will has been tested, even severely tested, but not found dangerously wanting during the long years of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This stands in sharp contrast to the experience during the Vietnam war.

The reasons for this disparity are various, but the most important are twofold. The body count has been low, even very, very low by the standards of the earlier war. The war is being fought by people who willingly joined the armed forces including the Reserves and National Guard. The absence of draftees from the war should not be underrated as a stiffener of American political will.

Another reason which can be advanced legitimately for the continuation of political will over the past nearly eight years is the behavior of the enemy. The excesses of the Islamists, the Jihadists, must be given credit for maintaining the American backbone. At the same time that martyrdom operations give heart to the jihadists and their Islamist commanders, they have laid a foundation of revulsion and fear in the minds of Americans critical to continued acceptance--if not outright support--of the war.

Whether the Obama administration can continue the success of its predecessor in ignoring anti-war sentiments in the American population as the war continues in Afghanistan and as the first blush of success in Iraq fades under the pressure of renewed ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq to say nothing of the almost inevitable horizontal escalation of the war remains to be seen. This last factor, horizontal escalation, will prove to be the greatest test of American political will.

Since the enemy is a non-state actor capable of accepting covert state support, it has a great capacity to maintain the initiative. Far more than the ponderous organised forces of a state, the jihadists have the capacity to move from a venue where they are losing to one where they can continue the war--perhaps in the next thing to perpetuity.

While immediate attention has been focused on Pakistan and the probability that jihadists will flee the approaching Marines in Helmand crossing the border into the FATA, there are very strong indications that the wannabe martyrs are ranging further afield. Like into Somalia and Yemen. And elsewhere, such as Sudan and areas of North Africa.

The US and its allies will always be behind the curve. Unless, a critical decision is made in the very near future.

The decision?

Whether or not the US will take the initiative and try to get ahead of the jihadists by deploying significant forces to Somalia and, perhaps (questionably so considering internal politics) to Yemen. This is not an action which can be taken either lightly or unilaterally. It is not an action which fits well with the current agenda of the Obama administration or the economic realities surrounding the US.

Nonetheless it is a decision which must be made. How it is made will determine how long and how successfully we will wage the totality of the Forever War against Islamist jihadism. Which ever way the decision goes, its effects will constrain our lives for many, many years to come.

Not pleasant, eh, bucko?

The Alternative Universe Of President Obama

The Geek has a question for the White House, for the Great Obama Flack, Mr Gibbs. Here it is. Tell me, just what sort of alternative universe is the Nice Young Man From Chicago living in?

More to the point, just what sort of person does the President think is running the Theocratic State of Iran? To sharpen matters further: Does the President really, really believe that the Shia mullahs in charge of the show in Iran will suddenly shift from ideologically driven True Believers with a clear agenda into a passel of peace, love, and flower-power advocates of "give peace a chance" and "ban the bomb?"

If, indeed, the POTUS is not living in an alternative world filled with great gaseous clouds of wishful thinking riding blissfully on the winds of ignorance, then how does one explain the latest wrinkle in what passes for US policy toward what is arguably the most dangerous state on Earth?

Consider that the G-8, according to the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, is leaning toward far tougher sanctions against the mullahocracy including an absolute bar on trading in refined petroleum products with Iran. Consider further that the US is reportedly opposed to such an escalation in pressure.

Why?

Good question. The answer according to the usual anonymous but well placed US source is that such a ramp up in sanctions could backfire bringing results opposite to those desired. OMG!! You mean if the West gets tough on the mullahs, they will become even more extreme?

You gotta be kidding. Just what do the Deep Thinkers in the Obama administration believe is happening in Iran right now, this minute? Do some or all of this out-to-lunch crew really, truly think that the affairs in Iran are being directed by moderate, rational men who understand negotiation and compromise are the desired, even the necessary, means and outcome of political affairs both foreign and domestic?

There are any number of good reasons to avoid the brutal reality represented by the Iranian government. There are good reasons to wish, to hope, to pray (should one be of that inclination) that the military option remains forever unused.

But, acting in a way which seems almost carefully calculated to result ultimately in the stark choice between war a bit too late and surrender under whatsoever rubric to the dictates of a regime which is deeply and virtually irredeemably hostile to the US and the rest of the West is not one of those reasons.

Indeed, to back off from finally imposing financial and trade sanctions which will actually harm, genuinely impair, and even grievously undercut the capacity of the Iranian regime to pursue its ends is to invite the unthinkable--the employment of force against the regime and its nuclear weapons related facilities. The Obama administration must contain within its extensive ranks some person of sufficient seniority to get across the necessary understanding of reality.

The reality is simply this, get a grip on it. The last, best chance to peacefully modify Iranian behavior is the imposition of authentically crippling sanctions. This is what the G-8 ministers and at least some heads of state are proposing.

Yes, a real sanction blockade will hurt German, French, Chinese, and even American business interests. The "Billion Dollar Club" will be denied a very great deal of money. This will hurt and one can hear the screams of pain even now when the notion of toughened sanctions is simply an idea being discussed--and opposed by the Obama administration. However, much as the loss of trade will hurt, the real pain will finally be felt in Iran.

Not only should there be a complete and absolute restriction of trade in refined petroleum products, the embargo must be extended to all categories of manufactured goods. It should be extended to foodstuffs as well even though this will cause suffering among the Iranians on the street. The embargo must be both direct and indirect, that is, it must provided for automatic sanctions to be directed against any business or country which violates the primary embargo.

Anything less will prolong the political suffering in Iran as well as fail to solve the very real problem presented by the ambitions and strategies of the Iranian regime. The mullahs must finally understand that there are limits to the utility of intransigence.

Thirty years of intransigence, violation of diplomatic norms, saber-waving bluster, and support for proxies with bloody hands have so far worked quite well for the turban-topped, Koran-thumping mullahocracy. For thirty years the True Believers of Qom and Tehran have depended upon the weak will and war-averse inclination of Western countries to facilitate their ambitions. For thirty years they have been right.

Nothing will change for the better in Iran absent effective coercion applied from without. The present situation combining a clear and growing threat to the peace of the world and a blatantly stolen election followed by a barrage of repression and transparent lying which surpasses any seen before from Tehran provides the proper opportunity for the thirty years of accommodation, appeasement, and misplaced emphasis upon domestic economic interests to end.

The time is ripe for effective collective action, action which can be forced upon the less willing such as Germany and Russia. Collective action which can be focused on the most critical weak points of Iran--refined petroleum and food. Collective action which might, just might, have the force multiplying effect of bracing the emergent Iranian loss of faith in the Islamic Revolution.

Collective action, which is the only possibility to see desired changes in Iran without going to war. Collective action, which demands complete American support if it is to have any hope of working.

That means the Obama administration must get a grip on the stinging nettle of reality. The administration must rid itself of any notion that the "extremists" are not currently running the government. That shouldn't be hard. No "moderate" would do what the Iranian government has done on and after 12 June 09. If the actions and words of the mullahocracy and its mouthpieces do not spell "extremist," then the word has no useful definition.

Come on, Mr Obama, come on back to Earth with its warts, unpleasantness, and contrariness. Now is not the time to contemplate your navel in some alternative world. Take the lead! Go to the G-8 and demand the toughest sanction program the world has ever seen. Demand and use all your personal and institutional tools to gain full and complete adherence.

Go and do all you can, or you will go down in history either as the next wartime president or, worse, the greatest sell-out of national (and global) interest on record.

Bashar Hedges His Bets--Finally

Bashar al-Assad has not played the game of balancing alliances nearly as well as did his father. Neither has the son come close to the father in his ability to use proxies rather than to be used by them. Perhaps he has been learning in recent weeks. Certainly there are indications to that effect.

While there is little or no probability that Syria will abandon its Iranian connection and opt instead for one with the US, the events since 12 June in Tehran and elsewhere have raised doubts in Bashar's mind regarding the long term prospects of the Mullahocracy. Also probably factoring into the recent shift in Bashar's position is the decision by the Obama administration to send an ambassador back to Damascus ending the several years of rupture resulting from a (typically wrongheaded) Bush-Cheney decision to "punish" Syria for its alleged participation in the assassination of a Lebanese political figure.

Simultaneously Bashar has been edging Syria back to the Arab fold. This midcourse correction has been warmly welcomed by the Saudis among others. Prying Syria from the Iranian embrace has been an important aspect of the ongoing Cold War between Shia Iran and the Sunni majority of the Arab states.

Syria sent a typically indirect signal of the impending change by changing the law on so-called "honor killings." The government repealed Article 548 of the penal code which had limited the prison sentences given to men convicted of killing women suspected of "immoral" sexual conduct. The move had been sought for many years by women's rights groups within the country and will be welcomed by Western governments.

By the change the Syrian government demonstrated to hardline Islamists within Syria that the influence of extreme positions on Islam are no longer fashionable. It also alerted the West that there was no longer any perceived need to placate either the domestic Islamists or the mullahs of Qom. It was the sort of move that Assad, pere, used from time to time.

The most dramatic indication of change came with Bashar's offering of an informal invitation to President Obama to drop on by Damascus. The invitation was offered in the context of a relaxed interview on Britain's Sky News TV. With his British born wife alongside, Bashar presented a very human face which effectively rebutted George W. Bush's implied characterisation of Bashar as a leader equivalent with Kim il Sung and Saddam Hussein.

Bashar is anything but the moral or policy equivalent of the leaders of the other two countries included in Bush's (in)famous "Axis of Evil" speech. Assad, fils, is not a hardline, ambitious, oppressive dictator. He is head of state by accident. As his education as an opthamologist shows, he was never expected to follow his father in the family business. That role was to be filled by the elder brother who managed to kill himself in an automobile accident.

Bashar's western training brought with it an orientation to embracing new technologies, particularly those of information handling as well as a set of liberal orientations which were (and are) at a variance with those of his father and the close circle of elder Baathists who surrounded dad--and the son. His early efforts to broaden the political culture of Syria in the so-called Damascus Spring brought him into conflict with the Old Guard, and he had to retract his ambitions and inclinations significantly.

The political and religious conflict in Lebanon--a country often seen in Damascus as a part of Greater Syria--served to end the early experiments with liberalisation. The invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 2006 further strengthened the belief that Syria must seek reinsurance with Iran.

Bashar moved on this perception both quickly and unadvisedly. Syria did benefit from the largess of the mullahs. Weapons and other warlike stores flooded into Syria both for its own army and on consignment to the Iranian (and Syrian) proxies Hezbollah and Hamas. Iranian money also underwrote the modest infrastructure improvements undertaken in the past few years.

In return Syria provided Iran with both a forward basing capacity in the same way that Hafez Assad furnished the Soviet navy with force projection abilities during the late Seventies and Eighties. Syria also provided the real estate upon which the Iranian purchased and North Korean built plutonium production reactor was constructed.

The Israelis responded by air strikes on the reactor as well as portions of the Syrian chemical weapons facility. The one was leveled and the other badly damaged as a result.

As the attacks showed, Syria ran very real risks in its alliance with Iran. Nonetheless the alliance continued and, at least rhetorically, strengthened until very recently. The consequences of the 12 June presidential election in Iran as well as the continued invitation of increased international isolation by the mullahs and their stooges waved, if not the red flag of danger, at least the yellow caution flag.

At the same time the continued presence of the United States in the Mideast must have weighed on Bashar's contemplations. With all of its deficiencies President Obama's Cairo Address did convey the clear and unmistakable reality of continued American involvement in the region, including the search for peace between Israel and its neighbors among which Syria is a critical presence.

No matter how Bashar and his associates parsed the matter, the involvement of the US in ending the sixty years of war between the Jewish state and the Arabs was far more likely to see the return of the Golan Heights to Syrian control than was any action by Tehran. The return of the Golan has been the heart and soul of Syrian foreign policy for the past forty-two years.

Accomplishment of this end required that Syria not be the odd country out among the Arabs. It also demands the sympathetic assistance of the US. Those are the ground truths of the matter.

Putting it all together, Bashar had no real option. He had to emulate his father. Do not get too close to one country at the expense of opportunities which may present themselves by having acceptable, even if not great, relations with others. This implies a corollary: Do not allow proxies to control the sponsor.

Since President Obama made the first move, the appointment of an ambassador to Syria, it became proper, even necessary for Bashar to respond. He has. Alone among the Arab states Syria has made a move which can be construed properly as a favorable reaction not only to the Cairo Address and the ambassadorial appointment but also as a hint of movement toward a peace with Israel.

The Obama administration would be well advised to have a first task the turning of the informal invitation into a formal status. The presentation of credentials by the new ambassador might be the favorable first moment to do this. In the meanwhile some mood music from the Oval might be appropriate. Some sort of reaction to the TV interview would not be out of order.

Neither would be some words to the effect that the current administration does not share the view of Syria as "evil" laid forth by the previous incumbents. Bashar needs--and deserves--to be jollied along, encouraged, have his tentative move responded to with alacrity and vigor.

The Syrian government will not--cannot--reverse course quickly nor completely. Policy has inertia. It is akin to changing direction with a fully loaded tanker, changes come slowly almost imperceptibly, but they come.

Syria is a test case of this reality. We have to hope that the Obama administration doesn't flunk the test.

Getting Back To Business--Central America

It is time for the Obama administration to get a grip on the realities in Central and South America. Instead of wasting time, energy, political capital, and prestige on the attempt to resurrect a man, Manuel Zelaya, it should be using its efforts to seek stability in countries now being wracked with the effects of drug traffic driven crime, corruption, and violence.

The reality is simple. Sr Zelaya is shown by a recent Mexican poll to be the most disliked, distrusted, and discredited politician in Central America. Both of Honduras' major parties--including Zelaya's own--as well as the Catholic Church, the Congress, all the major media outlets and over two-thirds of the people want Zelaya out of office. Sure, this impressive majority was willing to see Zelaya finish his term in office and leave next January, but, when he seemed to be lusting after some sort of legitimate way to become Strongman For Life, both the country's Congress and Supreme Court said, "You have been here too long, get thee hence."

The Army carried out the direction of the Supreme Court and removed Zelaya. While there have been a few quite minor protests against this action, the real opposition resides external to Honduras.

Sr Zelaya has his supporters. They are headed by Hugo Chavez, a man whose love of democracy is questionable but whose distaste for the United States is monumental. Other supporters include Daniel Ortega, who once upon a time headed a group which shot its way into power but was finally forced to back down, regroup, and ultimately seek office via election. Ortega's one time companion in revolutionary arms, Miguel d'Escoto Brockman, who abandoned the priesthood to become Nicaragua's foreign minister and current president of the UN General Assembly, has served as chief cheerleader for the ousted fellow leftist from Honduras.

The lesser cheerleaders--all of whom are on the far left shores of politics and most of whom seek to emulate Hugo Chavez by gaining constitutional changes which will allow presidencies-for-life include Ewo Morales and Rafael Correa. Neither of these have shown any reluctance in supporting Sr Zelaya irrespective of his genuine popularity among the homeboys of Honduras.

Zelaya has made a close and attentive study of the ways in which the staunch upholders of Left Socialism under its new name, "Bolivarianism," sought and retained power by exploiting not only the legitimate hostility engendered among the lower orders by the exploitative actions of a distant, haughty elite but also by manufacturing fear and loathing of the United States. Doing the latter requires no great effort considering the alternating fits of total indifference and daring interventionism of varying sorts which typify whatever passes for US policy toward Central and South America.

In recent days both Chavez and Ortega have threatened military intervention on behalf of Sr Zeylaya. The deposed wannabe dictator has vowed to return to his country in triumph. In a response which is not surprising, the military and acting president of Honduras, Roberto Michelletti, have pronounced the republic to be in peril and have summoned the reserves back to the colors.

In large measure due to the urgings of Miguel d'Escoto and the out-to-lunch approach of the Obama administration, the UN has inserted itself in the dispute. The decisions of the congress and supreme court of Honduras as carried out by the military are strictly an internal affair of Honduras. There is absolutely no justification under the UN Charter for that entity to involve itself in the matter.

Admittedly the UN has consistently expanded its view of its own importance and scope of its missions far beyond those seen by the drafters of the UN Charter over sixty years ago. Some of the "mission creep" seen by the UN in recent years can be marginally justified by asserting that internal disorder resulting in refugee generation at a level which threatens the stability of neighboring countries constitutes an actual or potential "breach of the peace."

By that interpretation the UN General Assembly and Security Council have the precedent on their side should they be so bold (or ill-advised) as to further involve the organisation in the ongoing affrays in Somalia or Sudan. But, even this broad understanding of UN Charter derived authority cannot be used to excuse any meddling in the current situation in Honduras. Other than the normal "migrant" population drifting north, there are no "refugee" hordes streaming across international borders.

The Organisation of American States (OAS) has some fig leaf of respectability in its efforts to defuse any crisis which may now attend the accomplished feat of Zelaya's removal. In any such efforts the OAS would only undercut any legitimacy it may possess should it either heed or give a platform for voices such as those of the Ortega regime or that of Hugo Chavez, which have a, shall we say, badly checkered past in the transparent practice of pluralistic democracy department.

The Obama administration would be wise if it were to quit hyperventilating over the removal of Zelaya and accommodate the new reality in Honduras. We do nothing constructive by damning the new government, halting our normal course of business with the regime and its military. All we do is surrender the field to the biggest mouths of the region. That is not in our interests. Nor is it in the interests of the people, stability, and future of Honduras.

Instead the Obama administration had best focus on the proliferation of destabilizing violence related to drug trafficking which is scourging not only Mexico but other countries in Central America. The Mexican situation has deteriorated from last year as the body count shows. This has occurred in spite of the strong effort to counter the violence made by the Calderon administration;

Crime--including kidnappings, murders and lesser forms of assault--dominate the upcoming election. The Green Party has even taken the quite unthinkable step of calling for the reimposition of the death penalty for kidnapping and murder. That in and of itself demonstrates the effect the narcotrafficking based crime tidal wave has had on the Mexican population.

Mexico is not alone. The press of Guatemala is filled with reports detailing assassinations, kidnappings, run-of-the-mill robberies which sound as if they should be datelined "Juarez" or perhaps "Chicago--1930." By some accounts the body count per day runs ahead of that seen in Mexico. Overall, a person is safer in Iraq or even Afghanistan than he is in Guatemala or portions of Mexico.

The pattern is repeating itself in Costa Rica and--during Zeylaya's watch--Honduras. As has been seen over the past two decades and more, the cycle of drug trafficking, violence, and political corruption by the those involved in these criminal activities can threaten the stability of a state. Just review the history of Columbia.

If outsiders seek to exploit to their political advantage the rents in the social and political fabric made by the violence and money of drug trafficking, the resultant instability can be far more difficult, perhaps impossible, to combat. For this reason alone the Obama administration should deal with reality as it is in Honduras--and elsewhere--not play meaningless and potentially counterproductive rhetorical games over the need for democracy to be observed regardless of the outcome.

Climb down from progressive fantasyland, Mr President, your country and the region to our south needs realism. Get a grip on it.

Back To Business--Iraq And Democracy

When the neocons of the Bush-Cheney justified the Great Adventure in Regime Change, two points which were made almost to the point of occasioning projectile vomiting--at least on the part of the Geek. No, not the WMD allegations. No, not the contention that Saddam was a thoroughly icky-poo person given to brutal dictatorship and bouts of aggression.

These are the two points.

Iraq deserved democracy of the more-or-less American sort complete with an independent judiciary, a federal system, pluralism, separation of faith and state, an unfettered media and, last but most certainly not least, robust free enterprise--of a properly regulated sort.

The war effort would not cost the taxpayers a doggone red cent. In fact, the US would make a profit since our companies would have an inside track on the post-war contracts including those for developing new oil fields.

Well, golly, gee, didn't that sound just grand?

Sure. If one was ignorant of such trivia as Iraqi history; the effects of prolonged internal war; the nature of Iraqi political, social, and ethnic dynamics; and the role of nationalism in the Iraqi concepts of self. Or, to put it simply and in translation: The more things change, the more they stay the same.

As if the displacement of Saddam Hussein's regime never occurred, the Iraqi government and military are favoring France in the award of contracts covering infrastructure repair and expansion as well as military procurement. In turning away from American companies and embracing French, the government of Nuri al-Malaki is not only rolling the clock back to the Seventies when France was the number one source of weapons, it is deliberately sticking its thumb in the eye of Uncle Sam.

The favoring of French companies is not so much a triumph of Nicholas Sarkozy's personal diplomacy as it is akin to declaring "great victory" as the American troops withdrew from Iraqi cities the other day. It is an expression of nationalism, of sovereignty. It is a carefully calculated gesture of ingratitude meant to solidify Maliki's credentials as a genuine Iraqi nationalist.

Maliki has ambitions. Further, he has made no attempt to hide this reality.

Chief among these is his stated desire to rid Iraq of the "consensus democracy" which was a product of the years of transition under the heavy-handed procounsulship of Paul Bremer. The current Iraqi prime minister admits that the consensus approach might have been necessary at the beginning of the post-Saddam, post-Baath period, but it has outlived its usefulness.

Maliki is now calling for an end to the special "set-asides" built into the constitution so as to "protect" the interests of the Kurds and Sunnis. In his view these prerogatives now endanger both "true democracy" in the country and the capacity of the central government to provide essential and basic services to the totality of the population.

Each of the three major ethnic or religious communities has been guaranteed a specific senior position in the central government with the result that the tripartite head must agree if anything major is to be done. It is a clone of the old system of allocation of offices employed in Lebanon before the comfortable arrangement was blown away in the several internal wars.

The same potential is resident within the current Iraqi situation as Maliki sees affairs. He is probably, almost certainly correct in this. While the "consensus" or office and power allocation scheme was necessary to get any organic instrument approved, it carries the germs of its own destruction within it.

Maliki proposes an accurate census be followed by a redrafting of the constitution along the lines of one person, one vote without any sort of "set asides" on the national level. The result of this would be to place the center of political power with the Shia majority. In principle this may be justified.

But, it is harder to do so in practice. The rub comes in the question of protecting the rights and, to be blunt, the community ego of the minority Sunnis and Kurds. The US has elaborate structures including the Supreme Court which carry the brief of protecting minorities against the tyranny of the majority. Even so the will of the majority often tramples both the sensitivities and the rights of the minority under foot.

Iraq does not have and will not develop in the near- to mid-term any similar institutions. There are no inherent mechanisms to assure that Sunnis and Kurds will not be ground into the dust as have been the small Christian communities in Iraq during recent months and years.

The Sunnis, who long enjoyed the exercise of power under the British and then after the Baathist overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, have no reason to believe that the Shia will treat them any more gently or with any more consideration than they treated the Shia during the long years of Sunni ascendancy. The Kurds are both very well aware of and proud of their ethnic and linguistic difference from the Arabs.

More, many Kurds are fully wedded to the idea of an independent Kurdistan as the governments of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq can attest. Under any sort of "one-person-one-vote" formula, the Kurds would have more reason than ever to seek merger with their compatriots (term used intentionally and advisedly) in Turkey and Iran.

This would, of course, send the balloon straight up, pronto.

The same would occur if the minority Sunnis appealed to their coreligionists in Saudi Arabia.

Nothing in al-Maliki's stated aspirations addresses either the Kurd or Sunni difficulty other than in terms of glittering generalities of no substance. His current over emphasis on nationalism and finger-flipping Independence from the US must be intended to counter the deep fissures which underlie the Iraqi national identity.

The validity of this approach is questionable. Both Sunnis and Kurds have demonstrated the continued will and ability to counter objectionable Shia driven central governmental acts by both the threat and use of violence.

The current capacity of the purportedly non-sectarian, non-ethnic security forces and army to be either a "school for citizenship" or an effective suppressant is open to question. So also is al-Maliki's ability to refrain from using these organs of state security as an instrument of Shia (and al-Maliki personally) domination.

An argument can be made for the desirability, even the necessity, of a strongman based central government with a few democratic trappings. This mode of autocracy wearing a skinny fig leaf of democratic respectability is commonplace throughout the Mideast and North Africa. Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Libya among others have relied on this approach for political and social stability. All have succeeded to a great extent.

In so far as Iraq has a political culture and history it is in the same mold. With the bloody overthrow of the British installed monarchy fifty years ago, Iraq became a one-party state in which dissent was poorly tolerated to say the least. The result was--until Saddam miscalculated disastrously with his launching of the Iraq-Iran War and, later, the invasion of Kuwait--a level of prosperity and stability enviable in the region.

The sanguinary effusion which followed the US invasion may have made the majority of Iraqis so war weary that the acceptance, even the eager embrace of another one-party state replete with the instruments of effective repression and some pretence of democracy is not out of the question. Al-Maliki may be counting on war weariness to bring his vision of the non-consensual democracy into existence.

His own very rapid rise from obscurity to power may have emboldened al-Maliki to believe that he has what it takes to be the strongman of Baghdad. He may be right. Or, he may not.

In any event there is no doubt that he intends to see his successful semi-coalition expand in the elections scheduled for next year. He may even be somewhat honest when he states that his "National Alliance For the State Of Law" is not a Shia instrument but rather a genuine aggregation of all Iraqis who seek a rule of law, not men nor clerics, nor outside influences.

His National Alliance has not yet provided either transparency, or a government and judicial system free of corruption, or any real coming together of the three major communities, and it may never do so. But, the National Alliance has and is creating an atmosphere of nationalism, national pride, and the appearance of national Independence even as American boots still churn the sands of Iraq.

This implies that al Maliki may have the capacity to carry off what he proposes. He may create a one-party state with both repression and aspects of democracy which will be stable or at least orderly. It is the best, realistic outcome the US government can hope for.

In the alternative, the nightmare one, Iraq dissolves under the lash of Kurdish independence, Sunni demanded intervention from Saudi Arabia and, finally, Iranian entrance to "protect" the Shia from "foreign" persecution.

Ain't democracy wonderful?

Getting Back To Business--Iran And The Bomb

President Obama has allowed that he is "not reconciled" to the notion of Iran as a nuclear weapons state. He quickly tacked on that he believed the "international community" was not reconciled to the idea either.

The Obama wording is delightfully ambiguous. Does he mean that while he is not yet "reconciled" to Iran gaining a nuclear weapons capacity he might become such at some time in the nebulous future? Or, is he implying that his current status of not being "reconciled" might eventually harden into one of total irreconcilability?

The President did not deign to explain and the Associated Press reporter did not press him on the matter, preferring to elicit comments on the NBA and the death of Michael Jackson. The placement of the I-am-not-reconciled statement near the end of the interview seems to indicate that neither the president nor the reporter considered the matter of the "Mahdi Bomb" to be one of gravity.

Certainly not the gravity of the President's view of Validimir Putin's having "one foot in the past." It is, of course, Russia's (which is to say Putin's) position on Iranian matters which bode well to continue to prevent any possibility of real and effective sanctions being employed against the mullahocracy. The combination of an election conducted in the manner and with the lopsided outcome typical of the Soviet Union and its satellites with the killing repression of protesters has hardened political support in Europe and elsewhere for more effective sanctions against the Iranian government.

The outre Iranian arrest and detention of local employees of the British embassy in Tehran has united the European Union in a completely atypical desire to "do something" which might at least symbolically punish the mullahs for their egregious violation of diplomatic norms and international conventions on the status of diplomatic mission employees. The "correlation of forces" seemed to be swinging in favor of turning the screws at least a bit on Iran.

Then, along comes Putin's Russia. Let the record show that Russia fancies itself to be a member of the European community (construed broadly and when it is in Russia's interests.) Putin obviously sees himself as a European statesman (albeit one who looks better with his shirt and tie off than when trussed in full business attire.)

In a way which merits President Obama's characterization of having one foot in the past, Putin's government is opposed to any imposition of sanctions over such mere bagatelles as rigged elections, suppressed dissent, and the arrest of locals working for an embassy. As the Soviet (oops! Bad Geek,) Russian press notes with a becoming accuracy, not only is Russia the prime foreign backer of Iran in international fora, its government was the first to both recognise the re-election of Ahmedinejad and congratulate him on that feat.

Russia is building Iran's heavy water reactor which is eminently capable of producing more plutonium than the antiquated North Korean unit at Yongban. It is providing the start up fuel and other services, not all of which may have been mentioned publicly. And, along with NATO stalwarts German and France, it is in the "Billion Dollar Club"regarding last year's trade with the Islamist jihadist Tehran regime. (For the record, China is also in the club, and the US with over eight hundred million dollars of food sales is bucking for membership.)

When the "Billion Dollar Club" is considered, the harsh words of Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy for both Iran's nuclear adventure and its electoral misconduct ring hollow. Factoring in the unlimited diplomatic support of Russia and China, there are strong hints that the sanction regime espoused by the US these many years is but a mixture of empty rhetoric and wishful thinking.

Or, to put it slightly differently and focusing sharply on President Obama's call for "engagement" with the mullahs of Qom and their frontmen in Tehran, it is a quxiotic exercise at best. The President is (in the words of the Geekness who has an unmatched capacity to mangle cliches,) "honking up the wrong tree."

Which brings us to John Bolton. As readers (if any) of the Geek's maunderings will no doubt recall, the Geek is not a big fan of the neocon one-time US ambassador to the UN, Mr Bolton, who has never been in combat nor any closer to the killing and dieing than the Diplomats' Lounge at the UN, is a resolute supporter of war against countries such as Iraq under Saddam or Iran at any time subsequent to 1979.

He has re-entered the lists flying the banner of Israel. It is his position that the time has come for the Israelis to exercise the military option and abate the nascent nuclear menace of Iran. He deposes not on the probability of an Israeli success in the endeavor, apparently either considering such mundane matters as, "will it work?" to be beneath the dignity of a man of his political and intellectual sophistication or subscribing to the notion that the IAF is a collection of Supermen flying aircraft with capabilities transcending those ascribed to UFOs by mavens of that subject.

The consensus of informed and realistic opinion is that an IAF strike or strikes on the complex of hard and hardened targets comprising the Iranian nuclear research, development, and production universe would be, as Wellington said of Waterloo, "a near-run thing." The Iranian government and military have long reckoned with the possibility of an attack by either or both Israel and the US. They have taken impressive measures to make the task tougher and the results more debatable.

While the Iranians are given to bluster in the megaton range, it would be a mistake to undervalue their capacity for mischief making in response to any attack. Even if the Iranians did nothing, not even pushing the "go" button on their terrorist surrogates, the exceptionally nervous crowd known generically as "speculators" would push the price of oil to never-seen-before levels. This action without any other measure being taken by Tehran would be severely disruptive of the US and global economies.

Not a result that Mr Obama would like to deal with, particularly considering his ambitions for "transforming" many basic features of American economic and social life.

But, Mr Bolton has apparently convinced himself that even severe economic and, potentially at least, political turmoil throughout the West and much of the world which would necessarily follow an Israeli attack is of no moment. It is inconceivable that such a staunch supporter of Israel as Mr Bolton has not thought through what the reaction directed against Israel would be if a global economic shock caused by escalating oil prices resulted in the days and weeks following the bombs falling.

Or, perhaps, Mr Bolton is convinced or at least hopeful that the Iranian reaction would be so bloody, so shocking, that the world would rally as one to the defense of Israel. Perhaps not the world, but surely the US, he may have told and sold himself.

Considering the delusional state of Mr Bolton's contention that the current unrest within Iran provides an excellent opportunity for "public diplomacy" to convince the Iranian people that any attack on the nuclear facilities is not an attack on the Iranians--only their government, it is within the realm of plausibility that he has been equally self-deluded on the critical matters of global and US response to the aftershocks of the Israeli attack.

No, Mr Bolton, the Israeli option is not a good way to go.

The Geek is not in favor of a nuclear armed Iran. Iran may or may not be governed by rational men capable of understanding and acting upon the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD.) The mullahs may or may not be equal to Saddam Hussein who, when he received word via Jordan's King Hussein that the Israelis would respond with a nuclear strike to any use of chemical weapons against their country, never ordered the already loaded and good to go Scuds to be launched.

Saddam was a rational actor. The mullahs and their subordinates may or may not be such. It is a risk the US and the rest of the world should not have to entertain. Certainly the Israelis or for that matter the Sunni Arab regimes of the Gulf should not face the very real existential threat that a nuclear armed Iran would constitute regardless of the applicability of the MAD calculus.

This leaves a very unpleasant, quite brutal option. Should President Obama mutate from being merely not "reconciled" to "utterly irreconcilable," the only remaining option is that of a direct US attack on the facilities. There is no genuine doubt that the US could obliterate the nuclear constellation.

The results would not be pretty. The oil shock would come as day follows night. Unless neutralised, the Iranians would respond with conventional and surrogate or proxy forces against the US and its allies both in the region and elsewhere. The Muslim world (at least publicly) would be all frothy with expressions of hatred and demands for revenge. There would be Islamist jihadists aplenty to take up the call and act on it.

Even allies which had given at least tacit and private approval to any American attack would be afflicted with morning after regrets. These regrets would be exhibited in numerous ways, all of which would be unpleasant. Rivals to the US such as Russia and China would leap to take any and all advantages which they might see. The consequences of this feature alone are difficult to prognosticate in detail but would be both extensive and negative overall.

Indeed, a powerful argument can be mounted for the contention that an American attack, even one which was totally successful, would constitute an existential threat to the US in its aftermath. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the nascent nuclear capacity may never present a genuine, direct threat to the US. Have a problem with that? Well, then consider the asymmetry resident presently as well as in the near-term potential of a maturing missile defense technology and a (barely) emergent delivery system technology.

Since the Obama administration is not one particularly enamored with either foreign affairs or contemplating the potential of military operations with a potential for unintended consequences far worse than the threat they were oriented toward countering, it is unlikely in the extreme that the American option would be exercised. It is almost as unlikely that the Obama administration would do anything other than strain every sinew to prevent the exercise of the Bolton supported Israeli option.

So, what does that leave?

Two possibilities.

The first is a diplomatic miracle requiring Russia being induced to switch sides, China, ditto, and the French and German governments cutting their own economic throats by dropping membership in the "Billion Dollar Club." (Oh, and the US deciding that food exports to the citizens living under the current regime were no longer "humanitarian" in nature.)

The second is for President Obama to suddenly realise that he is totally "reconciled" with the idea of Iran joining the Nuclear Club.

A great set of choices, isn't it?