The ultimate justification for the current inchoate effort by France, the UK, and others including the less than eager US is The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which doctrine derives from a 2005 outcome document concerning the massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia which was adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly. This action can be seen best as a collective catharsis of collective guilt by an "international community" awestruck by what it had "allowed" to occur.
The heart of R2P is the notion that should a state fail to protect its citizens from "genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity," the international community has the obligation to undertake the protective task. The doctrine as adopted by the UN is an outgrowth of the earlier concept holding that the UN could call upon member states to intervene should internal political disruption produce a potentially destabilizing refugee stream. Both artifacts of the General Assembly fall far outside the mandate of the UN as conceived.
(It is worth noting in this context, the framework of R2P, that the three people in the senior ranks of the Obama administration who pushed hardest for the Libyan intervention are connected in one way or another with both the doctrine and the two slaughter ridden venues from which it emerged. Former Harvard professor and current National Security Council heavyweight Samantha Power is a specialist in genocide, our Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice has long been an advocate of robust intervention to prevent any repetition of Rwanda, and SecState Hilary Clinton has been proud of her presidential husband's brave move in mounting out the air and later ground intervention in Bosnia.)
The foundation of both R2P and its precursor can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and companion international agreements or conventions including those falling under the general term "Geneva Convention." Despite the grandiose title of the Human Rights document and regardless of the expansive goals of the others, the Geneva Convention and all the rest, are not consensus documents representing any global set of norms and values. They are creations of the West, of Europe and the US along with other, Western leaning societies and cultures such as those of South and Central America.
The adoption of the several conventions and declarations by all members of the UN in no way obviates the basic reality that the ideas, the norms and values to which official assent has been given, are Made in the West and are the unique outcome of Western history. This ground truth can be inferred from the assorted reservations which have garlanded the official acceptances on file. Many of these reservations, such as those entered by various Muslim majority states, demonstrate a rejection of Western norms, values, and ideas regarding both "universal" rights and limitations on acceptable means of waging war.
Don't get your knickers in a knot over the use of the word "Muslim" in the preceding paragraph. The uniquely Western nature of the norms and values embodied in the referenced documents owes little to religion per se. Back down, Christians or Jews, this is not a slam on the ideals contained in your sacred writings. The core of all religions is universally in favor of peace, love, flower power, and urge the eschewing of war other than those of the "just" kind. Of course there have been wars fought over the meaning of the word "just."
The Western origin of the norms, values, and ideals embodied in the referenced conventions emerge not from religion and sacred sentiments but rather from a more base emotion: disgust. Over the centuries Europeans fought wars of a uniquely bloody nature. They also fought wars with nauseating regularity. And, Europeans, particularly the English and, later, the Americans, fought wars with a single minded absolutism which came to the highest fruition with the hectatomb of World War II.
From the Thirty Years War to the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon to World Wars I and II, the Western Way of War provided object lesson after object lesson in the need to somehow regulate and modulate war so as to ensure the lowest cost of lives, particularly the lives of non-combatants, and the least possible damage to non-military targets. As a result there was a development of norms which were far more often honored in the breech than in the observance.
The attempts to regulate both war and governmental treatment of civilian populations which proved most likely to fail were those predicated upon religious strictures. The Catholic Church made numerous moves to limit and control war. All failed. Far more efficacious were limitations on war were those based on national self-interest. The long centuries of very limited (and quite inconclusive) war which spanned the period between the Thirty Years War and the conflicts of Napoleon were the result of self-interest pricked by the recognition that unlimited, absolute war was as destructive of the victor as the vanquished.
In a companion way the limits that governments increasingly imposed upon themselves in the suppression of internal unrest or mere interpersonal violence were the consequence of a growing recognition that social and political good order and stability required polite and restrained behavior. The code of the gentleman which emerged in England and was copied faithfully in the US was the result of this recognition. The growth in fits and starts of representative and increasingly democratic government was likewise the consequence of a blossoming realization that inclusion was far more beneficial than suppression.
After the suppression of the Paris Commune and the ending of the American War Between the States, the internal good order was more and more facilitated by a concern on the part of the government for the rights, dignities, and status of the civilian population. During the same period the first stumbling efforts to codify the off and on practices of limiting inter-state conflict were made as well.
But it took the massive, unprecedented industrialized mass murder of the two World Wars to prod the West, or at least those states in the West left standing when the Second World War ended, to make a concerted effort to impose their collective internal and international values, norms, and ideals in a set of international conventions. It is from this soil of blood and guts that the plant of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the expanded Geneva Convention grew. The UDHR was adopted quickly with the formal inauguration of the UN. The conventions, like the UN itself, were the product of Western experiences over centuries and the expression of norms, values, and ideals were forged in the fires of war.
This, then, is the background of the current idiocy in Libya.
The question which must be addressed is simply this: How relevant is this Made in the West artifact to the situation in Libya (and Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, or others yet to be born?)
In plain point of fact R2P is a doctrine to be applied on an ad hoc basis only. This means that there is no end to the implied hypocrisy of any specific application. Is it not hypocritical to bomb one's way to peace, stability, and civilian safety in Libya but not the Ivory Coast? Or, Yemen? Or, should the body count cross some mythical line yet to be determined. Bahrain? Syria?
Then there is the necessary corollary of hypocrisy--base opportunism. The existence of R2P allows cover for opportunism, for the disguised pursuit of national interest. It is this rather than any legitimate apprehension of feeling the military wrath of the "international community" which propels the solid opposition of Russia and China to any UN interference in the internal affairs of a state. Other countries, such as India, which have had experience with internal unrest and a concomitant bloodstained suppression, may view R2P and its precursor with a jaundiced eye.
The experiences of intervention under one name or guise or another also predisposes African and Latin American states against R2P and its companions. The pervasive fear of intervention which can be seen throughout Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Mideast is totally legitimate, every bit as legitimate and history based as the Western expression of "universal" norms and values. The two are fundamentally antipodal and will remain that way into the future as far as one can see.
The uncertainties regarding the relevance of R2P as well as the potential narratives of "hypocrisy" and "opportunism" are in play with respect to the divisions which have become so evident in Europe. The sharp distinctions between the Western created conventions and the culturally and historically determined "reservations" put in place by Arab and Muslim states have become every bit as high profile. It is, for example, not naivete but a difference in perceptions of norms and values which provoked the expressions of shock and dismay from the Arab League over the reality that imposition of a no-fly zone required that bombs be dropped and missiles fired.
In short, the Libyan Affair has again demonstrated a long standing historical truism. The best guide to foreign relations is self-determined national and strategic interest. While principles can and have played a constructive role in determining both national interest and foreign policy, basing a war (for that is what it is, regardless of euphemism) on the "universal" principles embodied in R2P and its foundation conventions is not wise. Nor is it likely to be productive in the longer term regardless of the specifics occurring in the shorter run.
In sum, President Obama was misguided in the extreme when he succumbed to the importuning and arguments of three special pleaders, Powers, Rice, and Clinton. Grabbing the coattails of Sarkozy and his personal view of R2P was not a mistake: it was, as Talleyrand famously put it, "a blunder."
Friday, March 25, 2011
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
"The Europeans Wanted The No-Fly Zone---"
There is a historically based truism about war--even a very small war hiding behind an euphemistic moniker and a poetic code name. The truism can be summed accurately in a single word: unity. There must be a unity between political goal and military goal. There must be a unity between the goal and what can be termed the "definition of victory." There must be a unity--or at least a tight cohesion--between the definition of victory and the "theory of victory," which is the specific mix of military and non-military means intended to result in victory. Finally, there must be a unity of command so as to assure that all forces employed are marching to the same band.
Unity in all the forms mentioned is critical to war waged by a single power. It is even more critical when the war is undertaken by a coalition.
To date Operation Odyssey Dawn (as the Americans term the effort in Libya) or Operation Ellamy (as the Brits have dubbed it) fails in most of the ways listed above. There is no unity of political goals as between the several coalition members. There is no unity between political and military goal as regards the US. There is no unified definition of victory. Thus, there can be no definition of victory. Nor can there be a unified theory of victory. And, looking forward, the unity of command and common effort is nowhere to be seen.
Operation Odyssey Dawn has been through yesterday a predominately American effort. Nearly two thirds of all sorties have been flown by US aircraft. American planes flew 212 sorties while the British and French as well as other NATO states contributed 124. This trend continued during the past twenty-four hours with the Americans flying 113 sorties and the other twelve coalition partners contributing 63. This is an improvement on the 85 percent Made in America record of a couple of days earlier. The overwhelming majority of the 162 Tomahawk missiles fired were American (the British have fired a dozen or so from a submarine which represents a goodly chunk of the 64 Tomahawks in the British inventory.)
In this respect the operation represents business as usual. Way back when during the days of H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton the no-fly zone was primarily an American effort. The US flew five sorties for every one undertaken by the UK. (The French were not involved at all.) The situation was much the same during the Bosnian affray.
All this "joint" effort has put a lot of hours on the airframes of American aircraft. It would be interesting to know how many hours had accumulated where and when on the F-15E Strike Eagle which crashed in Libya as the result of an "equipment malfunction." The use--perhaps bordering on overuse--may be one reason the US military seems anxious to pass the baton to someone else in Libya.
It is not the only nor even the primary reason the US is looking so eagerly for an early exit from its current leadership role. Leaving aside the motives and their worthiness, the most important consideration is whether or not the American bowing out will help or hinder the gaining of unity in all the forms mentioned.
The primary requirement, the requirement from which all subordinate forms of unity descend, is that of political goal. With respect to Libya this seems to be quite elusive. The French seem to be wedded to an endstate which sees Gaddifi gone. The British have acknowledged they have no exit plan, which implies the absence of a final political goal. The American president has drawn a line between an expansive political goal and a very, very narrow military one. The Germans are opposed to everything which may bring with it the possibility of someone shooting someone. The Turks are likewise inclined. The Arab League is adrift in a sea of confusion bordering on despair.
The upshot of this sorry state of affairs is there is little if any probability of a unified political goal emerging regardless of who or what finally takes over the political direction of the war. With this reality in place at the most foundational level, it almost doesn't matter who runs the actual conduct of daily operations. But, politics guides that as well. The UK with phlegmatic realism understands that NATO has the command and control capacity to run a coalition war. The French and others are against this for the frankly political reason that NATO is Western and as such will alienate the Arab states whose political cover is essential for the effort.
The internal political contradictions and tensions which afflict not only the AL but many of the member states as well prevents the League from adopting and keeping to a unified political goal or even collaborating with non-Arab states in formulating one for the Libyan Question. This reality makes an imitation of the ISAF in Afghanistan a fiction. (Not that the ISAF is a model of unity--consider the risk averse nature of many contributor countries such as Germany whose ROE's virtually prevent firing an angry round.)
When night falls there will be a cobbled together simulacrum of a central political directorate. Command and control of daily, routine operations will devolve to someone, perhaps the French or a joint Anglo-French body, or, just maybe, NATO. The political directorate will not make the hard choices of the what-do-we-do-next? sort of decisions which will be popping up in a very unpretty way shortly. These matters will be kicked back to the national leaders. The notion that the assorted leaders of the main players (which will continue to include the US as only the US has many critical capacities such as enough aircraft) will achieve a consensus on the questions of what-now? is hallucinatory at best.
The yawning gap between President Obama's declaratory policy--"Gaddafi must go"--and the no-American-boots-on-the-ground pledge underscores the impossibility of coming to effective terms with the what-now? genre of questions. The vast differences in motivation among the assorted NATO states which have contributed aircraft of basing facilities further exacerbates the question.
The American stance toward the effort in Libya is epitomized in the quote giving this post its title. Of course this view ignores the vast differences in motives and intents within the "Europeans." Frankly, the effort is the brainchild of France and the UK. This allows the inference that these two should be the political directorate, but such is totally unacceptable to all others.
So the necessary unities will not exist. This redounds to Gaddafi's advantage. The greatest irony in this is simply that should Brother Leader come out of the current fracas still in power, the states with the most to worry about are those of the Arab League. Given Gaddafi's past love affairs with terror groups and the current political tumult in most Arab states, his capacity for mischief is unlimited.
A line from an old Jefferson Airplane song is relevant: "Go away or go all the way in." This is the fundamental dilemma facing the mock coalition in the sky over Libya. The states with the most dogs in the fight are those of the Arab League. The collective and individual unwillingness of these states to address the ground truth in play in Libya right now constitutes a major failure of political will and acumen. In time this failure may well lead to more failed states where Arabic is the language.
Unity in all the forms mentioned is critical to war waged by a single power. It is even more critical when the war is undertaken by a coalition.
To date Operation Odyssey Dawn (as the Americans term the effort in Libya) or Operation Ellamy (as the Brits have dubbed it) fails in most of the ways listed above. There is no unity of political goals as between the several coalition members. There is no unity between political and military goal as regards the US. There is no unified definition of victory. Thus, there can be no definition of victory. Nor can there be a unified theory of victory. And, looking forward, the unity of command and common effort is nowhere to be seen.
Operation Odyssey Dawn has been through yesterday a predominately American effort. Nearly two thirds of all sorties have been flown by US aircraft. American planes flew 212 sorties while the British and French as well as other NATO states contributed 124. This trend continued during the past twenty-four hours with the Americans flying 113 sorties and the other twelve coalition partners contributing 63. This is an improvement on the 85 percent Made in America record of a couple of days earlier. The overwhelming majority of the 162 Tomahawk missiles fired were American (the British have fired a dozen or so from a submarine which represents a goodly chunk of the 64 Tomahawks in the British inventory.)
In this respect the operation represents business as usual. Way back when during the days of H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton the no-fly zone was primarily an American effort. The US flew five sorties for every one undertaken by the UK. (The French were not involved at all.) The situation was much the same during the Bosnian affray.
All this "joint" effort has put a lot of hours on the airframes of American aircraft. It would be interesting to know how many hours had accumulated where and when on the F-15E Strike Eagle which crashed in Libya as the result of an "equipment malfunction." The use--perhaps bordering on overuse--may be one reason the US military seems anxious to pass the baton to someone else in Libya.
It is not the only nor even the primary reason the US is looking so eagerly for an early exit from its current leadership role. Leaving aside the motives and their worthiness, the most important consideration is whether or not the American bowing out will help or hinder the gaining of unity in all the forms mentioned.
The primary requirement, the requirement from which all subordinate forms of unity descend, is that of political goal. With respect to Libya this seems to be quite elusive. The French seem to be wedded to an endstate which sees Gaddifi gone. The British have acknowledged they have no exit plan, which implies the absence of a final political goal. The American president has drawn a line between an expansive political goal and a very, very narrow military one. The Germans are opposed to everything which may bring with it the possibility of someone shooting someone. The Turks are likewise inclined. The Arab League is adrift in a sea of confusion bordering on despair.
The upshot of this sorry state of affairs is there is little if any probability of a unified political goal emerging regardless of who or what finally takes over the political direction of the war. With this reality in place at the most foundational level, it almost doesn't matter who runs the actual conduct of daily operations. But, politics guides that as well. The UK with phlegmatic realism understands that NATO has the command and control capacity to run a coalition war. The French and others are against this for the frankly political reason that NATO is Western and as such will alienate the Arab states whose political cover is essential for the effort.
The internal political contradictions and tensions which afflict not only the AL but many of the member states as well prevents the League from adopting and keeping to a unified political goal or even collaborating with non-Arab states in formulating one for the Libyan Question. This reality makes an imitation of the ISAF in Afghanistan a fiction. (Not that the ISAF is a model of unity--consider the risk averse nature of many contributor countries such as Germany whose ROE's virtually prevent firing an angry round.)
When night falls there will be a cobbled together simulacrum of a central political directorate. Command and control of daily, routine operations will devolve to someone, perhaps the French or a joint Anglo-French body, or, just maybe, NATO. The political directorate will not make the hard choices of the what-do-we-do-next? sort of decisions which will be popping up in a very unpretty way shortly. These matters will be kicked back to the national leaders. The notion that the assorted leaders of the main players (which will continue to include the US as only the US has many critical capacities such as enough aircraft) will achieve a consensus on the questions of what-now? is hallucinatory at best.
The yawning gap between President Obama's declaratory policy--"Gaddafi must go"--and the no-American-boots-on-the-ground pledge underscores the impossibility of coming to effective terms with the what-now? genre of questions. The vast differences in motivation among the assorted NATO states which have contributed aircraft of basing facilities further exacerbates the question.
The American stance toward the effort in Libya is epitomized in the quote giving this post its title. Of course this view ignores the vast differences in motives and intents within the "Europeans." Frankly, the effort is the brainchild of France and the UK. This allows the inference that these two should be the political directorate, but such is totally unacceptable to all others.
So the necessary unities will not exist. This redounds to Gaddafi's advantage. The greatest irony in this is simply that should Brother Leader come out of the current fracas still in power, the states with the most to worry about are those of the Arab League. Given Gaddafi's past love affairs with terror groups and the current political tumult in most Arab states, his capacity for mischief is unlimited.
A line from an old Jefferson Airplane song is relevant: "Go away or go all the way in." This is the fundamental dilemma facing the mock coalition in the sky over Libya. The states with the most dogs in the fight are those of the Arab League. The collective and individual unwillingness of these states to address the ground truth in play in Libya right now constitutes a major failure of political will and acumen. In time this failure may well lead to more failed states where Arabic is the language.
Tuesday, March 22, 2011
American Ethics And American War
The Geek wrote this post last August. Somehow it never got published. Admittedly there is a reference in the next paragraph which is dated but the overall subject is still timely considering the accusations which have been made regarding the infliction of civilian casualties during Operation Odyssey Dawn. The agenda driven and the poorly informed as well as the opportunistic and gullible always either peddle or buy the line holding Americans are as kill crazy as a ferret in the chicken house.
Frankly the accusations by Amnesty International to the effect that the US has violated international law and the ethics of warfare by its actions in Yemen (see immediately preceding post) rankle the Geek no end. This short take is a personal note to the tender hearted, high minded, lofty thinking, and historically ignorant lawyerly types at Amnesty International as well as other, similarly inclined NGOs and their sympathizers at the UN.
Frankly the accusations by Amnesty International to the effect that the US has violated international law and the ethics of warfare by its actions in Yemen (see immediately preceding post) rankle the Geek no end. This short take is a personal note to the tender hearted, high minded, lofty thinking, and historically ignorant lawyerly types at Amnesty International as well as other, similarly inclined NGOs and their sympathizers at the UN.
Just over sixty-five years ago President Franklin Roosevelt was briefed on the planned invasion of Iwo Jima. He was told the island was heavily defended by a large, well dug in defensive force with orders to hold until the last man. The goal of the defenders was to inflict a maximum number of casualties on the American forces with the larger intent of weakening American political will so as to allow an end to the war on terms very favorable to the Japanese.
The president was also told that there were no people on the island other than members of the Imperial Japanese armed forces. No civilians. No dragooned Korean laborers. No "comfort women." It was a pure military target with only soldiers, sailors, and airmen present. Killing them was well within the laws of warfare.
Finally, the president was advised that American fatalities would be very high. Higher even than the hectatombs of Tarawa or Peleliu. The US military high command unanimously held that the best means of attack would be standing off and drenching the island with chemical munitions, particularly the most potent one we had in our arsenal, mustard agent. There was no danger of retaliation. The Japanese had no means and the Germans were effectively defeated at this point.
FDR was told bluntly that using chemical weapons would save thousands of American lives and would not cost one Japanese life more than would be the case with a conventional invasion.
Faced with this stark choice the president said, "No." He would not cross the ethical Rubicon of being the first to use chemical weapons in WW II. (This despite the well documented use of both chemical and biological munitions by the Japanese in China.)
The ethically (or morally) based decision of FDR condemned more than six thousand US Marines to death.
The invasion of Iwo Jima constituted a tribute to human courage and endurance which will reflect glory on the Marines and the country which produced them for generations to come as well as the most famed photograph of World War II for Americans. But, there is no doubt that the men who died as well as their families, friends, indeed, the nation as a whole, would have cheerfully exchanged glory for the lives of those who were killed in the black sands of Iwo Jima.
Mr Roosevelt preserved his moral purity. He, perhaps, protected the ethical integrity of the US. To the president and many others later, during peacetime, with the luxury of considering both ethics and their cost in human lives, the decision was the correct one. And, arguably it was; it did establish a limit during the closing days of a war in which all previous limits had been not only transcended but obliterated.
The Geek has seen no signs that later presidents became any less conscious of ethics as a limiting factor in war. Presidents have made grave mistakes in deciding where and against whom and with what means war must be waged. However, the mistakes have been far more often than not on the side of caution, conservatism, on the side of limiting both the scope of war and the lethality of the means employed.
Get a grip on this, Amnesty: The US is not given to using disproportionate means. It is not given to employing weapons with undue breadth of effect. It is not in the habit of using too much. It is far more common to use too little.
Even though those of Amnesty International love to hate America. Even though they are all members of the Blame America First club, the historical realty, the ground truth, is the US attempts (often without success to be sure) to fight with the least force possible, to kill as few as feasible, to take all due, and many undue precautions to exempt civilians and non-combatants from harm.
Hey, AI, you all may not like it, but that is the nature of history. Get over your chronic inability to see affairs as they actually have been and are.
Gaddafi Stays On Message While The US Doesn't Have One
It would be easy to admire Gaddafi's tenacity if, indeed, he had any other option. With an International Criminal Court indictment hanging over his head and very few safe havens to contemplate, Gaddafi has little choice other than to fight on. As a result it is a no-brainer to see why Brother Leader has stayed on message.
The brain sweat comes in with a question. Why is it necessary for the US, the assorted European states, the members of the Arab League, and African Union to make it so much easier for the Colonel to keep on keeping on? Why do all these players seem to have an agenda calculated to assure that not only will Gaddafi maintain power, he will be around to cause enormous amounts of trouble until and unless the indirect pressures of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation take effect?
The Arab League has walked back from its walk back concerning the imposition of the no-fly zone--"What! You mean you have to fire missiles and drop bombs?" Apparently working under the assumption that Muslims wouldn't lie about such a matter, the Arab League took Gaddafi's word for appalling civilian casualties but then were convinced just possibly the Gaddfi noise machine was exaggerating the body count.
But the Arab League trepidations found a quick echo in the foreign ministers of both the EU and NATO. For the last couple of days, the loudest sound in Europe has been that made by knees knocking with fear. Given that few of the countries represented in either group is noted for resolution in the face of the uncertainties which come with every use of military means, this is no surprise. It is so unsurprising that it would be a very real shock if the Gaddafi family--some of whose members are very well acquainted with Western ways--had not counted upon this sort of division and worked assiduously to provoke it.
The opposition which has come from one of the Boys in the Kremlin and the Trolls of Beijing is also no shock. Again it was so expectable that it bends the mind to believe that once again the Gaddafi family was not counting upon it. The offers by the Gaddafi family to cancel the current oil and natural gas leases and offer them to other countries including China, Russia, and India show some base cunning at work. The pursuit of divide and conquer particularly with assemblages which are already divided needs no deep thinking. The payoff has been handsome with India, Brazil, and South Africa joining Russia and China in a chorus of very loud denunciation.
Public support within the US and UK for the current ill and perhaps mis-defined military mission runs around one in three. It may be higher in France as its citizens seem to be willing to take pride in their country doing something which is compatible with both national interests and national values. However, the low support in the US has shown itself in the opposition presented to "Obama's War" from the left, right, and center of both parties.
Much of the opposition is predicated upon the all too obvious dichotomy between the goals of the current air operations and the Obama declaratory policy which holds, "Gaddafi must go." The lack of congruence between the stated goals and the declaratory policy is guaranteed to undercut public confidence and, thus, support for the effort. President Obama has either been very economical with the truth or quite hallucinatory regarding the endgame in Libya.
Other very obvious disconnects between US actions and policy in Libya with its actions and policies elsewhere in the Arab states also undercuts both understanding and support. We are in an active shooting war with the announced aim of protecting civilians from an arbitrary and brutal regime in Libya while being merely "concerned" when the same is taking place in Yemen albeit on a arguably lesser scale. The Obama administration has not even worked itself up to the level of being concerned when it comes to the situation in Bahrain, which leads to the conclusion that oil is thicker than blood given the close cooperation between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.
The lack of coherent goals couples with distaste for the war against Gaddafi and the fear of upsetting the always sensitive Muslims to provide the interesting lack of eagerness on the part of everyone to take over the lead in Libya. The Obama administration is quite keen on passing the baton to someone else. But there is a palpable lack of takers. Even if NATO showed willingness to do the job, the Arab League has opposed the idea as have NATO members Turkey and France. Given the need for all decisions to be made by consensus, Turkish and French opposition kills the concept.
Perhaps France is angling for the job. Assuming the command and control resident with French forces is up to the job, there is no objection to this. Even the subordination of American combat units to such a command has precedent. In this context it might be recalled that the US handed over command during the Dominican Republic intervention in 1965 to Brazil. American combat forces including ground units served as a part of an Organization of American States task group with the complete approval of the US Congress and media of the day.
Perhaps the muscular and ambitious Nicholas Sarkozy, who has done more than any other single person to push for the current intervention without a salient goal, is or will have second thoughts as the gravity of the "what next?" question sinks in. There can not be a single observer well oriented in time and place who believes the no-fly zone even with the add-on of strikes against Gaddifi's forces will provide for a stable, secure outcome. The current operation will not and can not remove Gaddafi and without this there is no possibility of an outcome even tangentially favorable to Western interests and values.
In the best case the current operation will end with Libya divided into two zones. The eastern one will remain under Gaddafi. The western one will eventually fall under the sway of advocates of violent political Islam. All must remember that the west, Cyrenaica, was not only the fountainhead of insurgency against Italy but also the homeland of a very austere form of Islam derived from the old Salifist doctrine. This is a connection which is as true today as it was a century ago. We must not forget or overlook this ground truth.
The policies and actions of the West are riddled with internal contradictions. They are laden with ambiguities. They are freighted with uncertainties to a degree surpassing previous "optional" wars such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is no surprise that support for the effort is narrow and very shallow.
All that can be written with certainty is that the world will be a nastier and more fearful place should Gaddafi remain in power even over a truncated form of Libya. It is equally certain that in war unlike other forms of human endeavor, a full loaf is infinitely preferable to a half loaf. And, what is being done right now is a half loaf approach at best.
The brain sweat comes in with a question. Why is it necessary for the US, the assorted European states, the members of the Arab League, and African Union to make it so much easier for the Colonel to keep on keeping on? Why do all these players seem to have an agenda calculated to assure that not only will Gaddafi maintain power, he will be around to cause enormous amounts of trouble until and unless the indirect pressures of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation take effect?
The Arab League has walked back from its walk back concerning the imposition of the no-fly zone--"What! You mean you have to fire missiles and drop bombs?" Apparently working under the assumption that Muslims wouldn't lie about such a matter, the Arab League took Gaddafi's word for appalling civilian casualties but then were convinced just possibly the Gaddfi noise machine was exaggerating the body count.
But the Arab League trepidations found a quick echo in the foreign ministers of both the EU and NATO. For the last couple of days, the loudest sound in Europe has been that made by knees knocking with fear. Given that few of the countries represented in either group is noted for resolution in the face of the uncertainties which come with every use of military means, this is no surprise. It is so unsurprising that it would be a very real shock if the Gaddafi family--some of whose members are very well acquainted with Western ways--had not counted upon this sort of division and worked assiduously to provoke it.
The opposition which has come from one of the Boys in the Kremlin and the Trolls of Beijing is also no shock. Again it was so expectable that it bends the mind to believe that once again the Gaddafi family was not counting upon it. The offers by the Gaddafi family to cancel the current oil and natural gas leases and offer them to other countries including China, Russia, and India show some base cunning at work. The pursuit of divide and conquer particularly with assemblages which are already divided needs no deep thinking. The payoff has been handsome with India, Brazil, and South Africa joining Russia and China in a chorus of very loud denunciation.
Public support within the US and UK for the current ill and perhaps mis-defined military mission runs around one in three. It may be higher in France as its citizens seem to be willing to take pride in their country doing something which is compatible with both national interests and national values. However, the low support in the US has shown itself in the opposition presented to "Obama's War" from the left, right, and center of both parties.
Much of the opposition is predicated upon the all too obvious dichotomy between the goals of the current air operations and the Obama declaratory policy which holds, "Gaddafi must go." The lack of congruence between the stated goals and the declaratory policy is guaranteed to undercut public confidence and, thus, support for the effort. President Obama has either been very economical with the truth or quite hallucinatory regarding the endgame in Libya.
Other very obvious disconnects between US actions and policy in Libya with its actions and policies elsewhere in the Arab states also undercuts both understanding and support. We are in an active shooting war with the announced aim of protecting civilians from an arbitrary and brutal regime in Libya while being merely "concerned" when the same is taking place in Yemen albeit on a arguably lesser scale. The Obama administration has not even worked itself up to the level of being concerned when it comes to the situation in Bahrain, which leads to the conclusion that oil is thicker than blood given the close cooperation between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.
The lack of coherent goals couples with distaste for the war against Gaddafi and the fear of upsetting the always sensitive Muslims to provide the interesting lack of eagerness on the part of everyone to take over the lead in Libya. The Obama administration is quite keen on passing the baton to someone else. But there is a palpable lack of takers. Even if NATO showed willingness to do the job, the Arab League has opposed the idea as have NATO members Turkey and France. Given the need for all decisions to be made by consensus, Turkish and French opposition kills the concept.
Perhaps France is angling for the job. Assuming the command and control resident with French forces is up to the job, there is no objection to this. Even the subordination of American combat units to such a command has precedent. In this context it might be recalled that the US handed over command during the Dominican Republic intervention in 1965 to Brazil. American combat forces including ground units served as a part of an Organization of American States task group with the complete approval of the US Congress and media of the day.
Perhaps the muscular and ambitious Nicholas Sarkozy, who has done more than any other single person to push for the current intervention without a salient goal, is or will have second thoughts as the gravity of the "what next?" question sinks in. There can not be a single observer well oriented in time and place who believes the no-fly zone even with the add-on of strikes against Gaddifi's forces will provide for a stable, secure outcome. The current operation will not and can not remove Gaddafi and without this there is no possibility of an outcome even tangentially favorable to Western interests and values.
In the best case the current operation will end with Libya divided into two zones. The eastern one will remain under Gaddafi. The western one will eventually fall under the sway of advocates of violent political Islam. All must remember that the west, Cyrenaica, was not only the fountainhead of insurgency against Italy but also the homeland of a very austere form of Islam derived from the old Salifist doctrine. This is a connection which is as true today as it was a century ago. We must not forget or overlook this ground truth.
The policies and actions of the West are riddled with internal contradictions. They are laden with ambiguities. They are freighted with uncertainties to a degree surpassing previous "optional" wars such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is no surprise that support for the effort is narrow and very shallow.
All that can be written with certainty is that the world will be a nastier and more fearful place should Gaddafi remain in power even over a truncated form of Libya. It is equally certain that in war unlike other forms of human endeavor, a full loaf is infinitely preferable to a half loaf. And, what is being done right now is a half loaf approach at best.
Monday, March 21, 2011
Woosh! There Goes Yemen Down The Potty
You know things must be bad when Somali refugees start leaving. This is happening in Yemen, so there is little hope that the place will escape failed state status. Of course you can't blame these hyper vigilant survivors of a war without fronts. They learned up close and personal that he who hesitates is dead.
The Yemeni army is fractured. Several units have "mutinied" with the result that former comrades-in-arms are now shooting each other. The army is reflecting the other divisions which have occurred in Yemen subsequent to the quite ill-advised use of highly trained and skilled snipers to kill dozens assembled outside the University of San'a last Friday protesting the thirty-two year old dictatorship of Abdullah Saleh. As Talleyrand once observed of a particularly stupid bit of political murder committed by his boss, Napoleon, "Sire that was worse than a crime. It was a blunder."
How much of a blunder Saleh has been discovering the past forty-eight hours. The chief tribe in this tribal assemblage, his tribe, has called for his ouster. Several cabinet members--including fellow tribesmen--called it quits over the killings as did ambassador after ambassador. Now the army has joined in with a senior officer, a commander of the northern district among others and a half-brother who has carried heavy internal security freight among others, leading the parade to opposition.
On the international scene, France continuing its leadership of the free and democratic countries, has become the first state to demand Saleh step down ASAP. How long will it be before other countries in the West, for example the UK, join the chorus?
According to assorted "experts" the continued collapse of Yemen places the US in the space between a rock and a hard place. After all, we are reminded, Yemen is a key ally in the fight against Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula.
Sure it is.
When evaluating the role of Saleh and Yemen in any contest with AQAP, it is critical to recall that Saleh took over South Yemen, the former Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, with the assistance of tribesmen who fought under the banner of violent political Islam. Subsequently, these same folk have constituted the majority of the high command of the anti-terrorist units and a heavy percentage of the actual security force trigger pullers. This ground truth along with Yemen's tribal nature may be the reason that Yemen has had a singular lack of success in suppressing AQAP.
It can be argued with some legitimacy that a failed Yemen right across the narrow straight from the long failed Somalia will exacerbate greatly the menace to navigation presented by the Merry Buccaneers Of Puntland. A large grain of truth resides in that contention, but not a large enough one to make of it a pearl of wisdom.
The Yemeni coastguard rivals the Yemeni counter-terrorist forces for ineffectiveness. This has not been remedied in the slightest by US aid.
Yemen is, has been and will be, whether or not Saleh stays in power, a source of jihadists and pirates alike. The reason for that is the nature of the human terrain of Yemen. The deep tribal nature of the place, the extreme poverty which besets the majority, the appeal of the most austere form of Islam, the cultural imperative of tribal solidarity against any outsider combine to assure Yemen is a fertile breeding place for jihad of all sorts.
Nor is the situation in Yemen going to be altered in any meaningful way by the introduction of democracy or any other form of exported "nation-building" including massive economic assistance. It is critical, foundational, to remember that Yemen is not a nation in any recognizable sense of the word. Rather it is a collection of rival tribes collected under a single flag which none recognize as being real.
Senior American decision makers headed by Defense Secretary Gates have warned that fragmentation of existing states will not contribute to stability. While he made that warning with specific reference to the notion of a Libya partitioned into western and eastern components, his proposition is flatly wrong. When a state, be it Libya, Yemen, or Somalia, is the artifact of well-intentioned Western diplomats, it is not an authentic affair. Having never been a reality in the minds of most people living there, fragmentation along tribal or cultural lines is a viable option.
It can be argued on the basis of history, both European and non-Western, that nations and the states they create emerge slowly, painfully, and organically from internal imperatives and external pressures. Only a nation and concomitant state so created can withstand stresses such as those seen in Libya or Yemen.
This suggests strongly that the collapse of Yemen into its component parts is not a bad idea even if the near-term consequences bear no resemblance to a stroll though paradise. Only by falling apart will there be any hope of Yemen ever coming together in a stable way.
The best policy for France, the UK, or the US is to stay away. Even if Saleh becomes a perfect imitation of Gaddafi, which is unlikely given the internal dynamics of Yemen, the West must restrain its impulses to impose peace, craft a settlement calculated to keep Yemen intact under some sort of imitation Western liberal government.
There is a lesson from Afghanistan which may be learned once more in Libya. Outsiders cannot create a nation-state from a traditional, tribal society for which the entire notion of the nation and the state are literally unthinkable. As was once said, "Don't try to teach a pig to sing. It won't work. It will annoy the pig."
The Yemeni army is fractured. Several units have "mutinied" with the result that former comrades-in-arms are now shooting each other. The army is reflecting the other divisions which have occurred in Yemen subsequent to the quite ill-advised use of highly trained and skilled snipers to kill dozens assembled outside the University of San'a last Friday protesting the thirty-two year old dictatorship of Abdullah Saleh. As Talleyrand once observed of a particularly stupid bit of political murder committed by his boss, Napoleon, "Sire that was worse than a crime. It was a blunder."
How much of a blunder Saleh has been discovering the past forty-eight hours. The chief tribe in this tribal assemblage, his tribe, has called for his ouster. Several cabinet members--including fellow tribesmen--called it quits over the killings as did ambassador after ambassador. Now the army has joined in with a senior officer, a commander of the northern district among others and a half-brother who has carried heavy internal security freight among others, leading the parade to opposition.
On the international scene, France continuing its leadership of the free and democratic countries, has become the first state to demand Saleh step down ASAP. How long will it be before other countries in the West, for example the UK, join the chorus?
According to assorted "experts" the continued collapse of Yemen places the US in the space between a rock and a hard place. After all, we are reminded, Yemen is a key ally in the fight against Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula.
Sure it is.
When evaluating the role of Saleh and Yemen in any contest with AQAP, it is critical to recall that Saleh took over South Yemen, the former Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, with the assistance of tribesmen who fought under the banner of violent political Islam. Subsequently, these same folk have constituted the majority of the high command of the anti-terrorist units and a heavy percentage of the actual security force trigger pullers. This ground truth along with Yemen's tribal nature may be the reason that Yemen has had a singular lack of success in suppressing AQAP.
It can be argued with some legitimacy that a failed Yemen right across the narrow straight from the long failed Somalia will exacerbate greatly the menace to navigation presented by the Merry Buccaneers Of Puntland. A large grain of truth resides in that contention, but not a large enough one to make of it a pearl of wisdom.
The Yemeni coastguard rivals the Yemeni counter-terrorist forces for ineffectiveness. This has not been remedied in the slightest by US aid.
Yemen is, has been and will be, whether or not Saleh stays in power, a source of jihadists and pirates alike. The reason for that is the nature of the human terrain of Yemen. The deep tribal nature of the place, the extreme poverty which besets the majority, the appeal of the most austere form of Islam, the cultural imperative of tribal solidarity against any outsider combine to assure Yemen is a fertile breeding place for jihad of all sorts.
Nor is the situation in Yemen going to be altered in any meaningful way by the introduction of democracy or any other form of exported "nation-building" including massive economic assistance. It is critical, foundational, to remember that Yemen is not a nation in any recognizable sense of the word. Rather it is a collection of rival tribes collected under a single flag which none recognize as being real.
Senior American decision makers headed by Defense Secretary Gates have warned that fragmentation of existing states will not contribute to stability. While he made that warning with specific reference to the notion of a Libya partitioned into western and eastern components, his proposition is flatly wrong. When a state, be it Libya, Yemen, or Somalia, is the artifact of well-intentioned Western diplomats, it is not an authentic affair. Having never been a reality in the minds of most people living there, fragmentation along tribal or cultural lines is a viable option.
It can be argued on the basis of history, both European and non-Western, that nations and the states they create emerge slowly, painfully, and organically from internal imperatives and external pressures. Only a nation and concomitant state so created can withstand stresses such as those seen in Libya or Yemen.
This suggests strongly that the collapse of Yemen into its component parts is not a bad idea even if the near-term consequences bear no resemblance to a stroll though paradise. Only by falling apart will there be any hope of Yemen ever coming together in a stable way.
The best policy for France, the UK, or the US is to stay away. Even if Saleh becomes a perfect imitation of Gaddafi, which is unlikely given the internal dynamics of Yemen, the West must restrain its impulses to impose peace, craft a settlement calculated to keep Yemen intact under some sort of imitation Western liberal government.
There is a lesson from Afghanistan which may be learned once more in Libya. Outsiders cannot create a nation-state from a traditional, tribal society for which the entire notion of the nation and the state are literally unthinkable. As was once said, "Don't try to teach a pig to sing. It won't work. It will annoy the pig."
Well, Now We're In--Why Should We Not Lead?
Yesterday Secretary of State Clinton warranted to the world's media that the US was not playing a leading role in the aerial intervention in Libya. She assured all who would listen that American forces were playing only a supporting role in the complex operation of establishing a no-fly zone and, to follow the wording of Admiral Mike Mullen, get Gaddafi's forces to move back to garrison.
It seemed passingly strange that Ms Clinton would sound that particular note considering the widespread reports that it was her pressure which finally carried the day against the opposition of Robert Gates and Admiral Mullen. The most charitable characterization of her comment is that it carried Obama's water. There is no doubt but Mr Obama would have been far, far happier to sit this particular fracas out while letting more robust governments such as those of Nicholas Sarkozy and David Cameron do the heavy lifting.
As the Obama administration's handling of most of the political unrest in the Mideast and North Africa has shown clearly, the president and his "team" seek a world in which the US is not a leader but rather a dutiful follower of consensus achieved elsewhere by others. There may be many reasons lurking in the intellectual shadows surrounding this strange course of action, but two overt mechanisms are evident. The president fears being equated with George W. Bush and his "Freedom agenda." The president and at least some of his closest adherents eschew the crude realities of nationalism and national interest as well as the necessary concomitant, the US as a Great Power.
It was not statesmanship which forced the president and his people to cower behind a berm of contradictory messages regarding Libya ranging from the overly bellicose--Khadafi must go!--to the humbly pacifistic--this is a matter for the Libyan people. It was not statesmanship which compelled Mr Obama to stand in the darkness downstage as David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy marched upstage, grabbing the spotlight as they did so. It was not statesmanship, carefully calculated and deliberately decided policy which caused the POTUS to hide the US military lamp in the bushel of military nothingness which is the current British defense establishment or allow the French to jump in first, grabbing attention and credit as their zoomies occupied the safe sky over Benghazi.
Mr Obama's motives were far more mundane, not to say base than the requirements of global diplomacy. He was afraid. Fearful of looking like George W. Bush. Affighted of having to make the very tough decisions which must be made in the next few days and weeks. Frightened of losing his base and of alienating further the independents of the American electorate--a non-trivial consideration in that the Obama 2012 campaign is already well underway.
Then, of course, there is the hovering cloud of apprehension caused by uncertainty as to just what Arab and Muslim states and populations will say and do as the missiles and bombs fall on Libyan soil and heads. Mr Obama--and a good many others--is quite scared of the unpredictable consequences of Muslim sensibilities being outraged by the realities of warfare--even of imposing the no-fly zone demanded by the Arab League.
There are two reasons why the US and other civilized states should be involved in Libya. One is severely pragmatic--preventing Gaddafi from staying in power and presenting an ongoing threat to the civilized world, perhaps a much worse one than previously. The other is not at all practical; rather it is one of ideals, of principles, of values and norms. Gaddafi's conduct in recent days is repugnant to even the most loosely defined standards of acceptable governmental conduct.
The reality right now is that the air strikes and no fly zone may well leave Gaddafi in power. This possibility has been acknowledged by Admiral Mullen. This eventuality would render nugatory all the efforts made by the present coalition. Yes, it would be nice if someone close to Gaddafi would be so kind as to grease him. But that is what George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton both hoped would be the fate of Saddam Hussein. The providential assassination is not a firm base for policy.
The necessary inference is a ground operation may prove necessary. Such need not be an army which would remain in occupation, a military force providing security during an exercise in nation-building. British ForMin Hague has left the door more than ajar for an invasion. If the actual goal of the current operation is--as it should or must be--the removal of Gaddafi and the prevention of a bifurcation of Libya, it is hard to see how that may be accomplished without the introduction of ground forces.
The prospect of a replay of the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq can be nullified by careful limitation of the ground force mission to the defeat of Gaddafi's troops and the removal of Gaddafi. There would then be no responsibility for long term presence in a stability role while the do-gooders practice nation-building. While some sort of nation-building is no doubt required, this should be undertaken by the Arab League or the UN with "stability" forces being provided by the former under the auspices of the latter. This would allow Western combat forces to be withdrawn without the horrid endgame seen in Iraq and without the never ending counterinsurgency of Afghanistan.
It the US wants stability in Libya it must bend every effort to assure that Gaddafi is removed, Libya not partitioned, and any ground commitment be short and focused. We cannot do this by playing support to a coalition headed by France and the UK. We can only obtain the goals we want by exercising the leadership role the world--including Cameron and Sarkozy--want.
Everyone has had a brief glimpse of a world political order without the US front and center. No one found it to be as happy a place as they may have imagined or wished.
It seemed passingly strange that Ms Clinton would sound that particular note considering the widespread reports that it was her pressure which finally carried the day against the opposition of Robert Gates and Admiral Mullen. The most charitable characterization of her comment is that it carried Obama's water. There is no doubt but Mr Obama would have been far, far happier to sit this particular fracas out while letting more robust governments such as those of Nicholas Sarkozy and David Cameron do the heavy lifting.
As the Obama administration's handling of most of the political unrest in the Mideast and North Africa has shown clearly, the president and his "team" seek a world in which the US is not a leader but rather a dutiful follower of consensus achieved elsewhere by others. There may be many reasons lurking in the intellectual shadows surrounding this strange course of action, but two overt mechanisms are evident. The president fears being equated with George W. Bush and his "Freedom agenda." The president and at least some of his closest adherents eschew the crude realities of nationalism and national interest as well as the necessary concomitant, the US as a Great Power.
It was not statesmanship which forced the president and his people to cower behind a berm of contradictory messages regarding Libya ranging from the overly bellicose--Khadafi must go!--to the humbly pacifistic--this is a matter for the Libyan people. It was not statesmanship which compelled Mr Obama to stand in the darkness downstage as David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy marched upstage, grabbing the spotlight as they did so. It was not statesmanship, carefully calculated and deliberately decided policy which caused the POTUS to hide the US military lamp in the bushel of military nothingness which is the current British defense establishment or allow the French to jump in first, grabbing attention and credit as their zoomies occupied the safe sky over Benghazi.
Mr Obama's motives were far more mundane, not to say base than the requirements of global diplomacy. He was afraid. Fearful of looking like George W. Bush. Affighted of having to make the very tough decisions which must be made in the next few days and weeks. Frightened of losing his base and of alienating further the independents of the American electorate--a non-trivial consideration in that the Obama 2012 campaign is already well underway.
Then, of course, there is the hovering cloud of apprehension caused by uncertainty as to just what Arab and Muslim states and populations will say and do as the missiles and bombs fall on Libyan soil and heads. Mr Obama--and a good many others--is quite scared of the unpredictable consequences of Muslim sensibilities being outraged by the realities of warfare--even of imposing the no-fly zone demanded by the Arab League.
There are two reasons why the US and other civilized states should be involved in Libya. One is severely pragmatic--preventing Gaddafi from staying in power and presenting an ongoing threat to the civilized world, perhaps a much worse one than previously. The other is not at all practical; rather it is one of ideals, of principles, of values and norms. Gaddafi's conduct in recent days is repugnant to even the most loosely defined standards of acceptable governmental conduct.
The reality right now is that the air strikes and no fly zone may well leave Gaddafi in power. This possibility has been acknowledged by Admiral Mullen. This eventuality would render nugatory all the efforts made by the present coalition. Yes, it would be nice if someone close to Gaddafi would be so kind as to grease him. But that is what George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton both hoped would be the fate of Saddam Hussein. The providential assassination is not a firm base for policy.
The necessary inference is a ground operation may prove necessary. Such need not be an army which would remain in occupation, a military force providing security during an exercise in nation-building. British ForMin Hague has left the door more than ajar for an invasion. If the actual goal of the current operation is--as it should or must be--the removal of Gaddafi and the prevention of a bifurcation of Libya, it is hard to see how that may be accomplished without the introduction of ground forces.
The prospect of a replay of the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq can be nullified by careful limitation of the ground force mission to the defeat of Gaddafi's troops and the removal of Gaddafi. There would then be no responsibility for long term presence in a stability role while the do-gooders practice nation-building. While some sort of nation-building is no doubt required, this should be undertaken by the Arab League or the UN with "stability" forces being provided by the former under the auspices of the latter. This would allow Western combat forces to be withdrawn without the horrid endgame seen in Iraq and without the never ending counterinsurgency of Afghanistan.
It the US wants stability in Libya it must bend every effort to assure that Gaddafi is removed, Libya not partitioned, and any ground commitment be short and focused. We cannot do this by playing support to a coalition headed by France and the UK. We can only obtain the goals we want by exercising the leadership role the world--including Cameron and Sarkozy--want.
Everyone has had a brief glimpse of a world political order without the US front and center. No one found it to be as happy a place as they may have imagined or wished.
Saturday, March 19, 2011
Syrian Immune System Challenged--Or Compromised?
Not that many days ago the Syrian jefe grande y supremo, Bashir al-Assad, decreed that Syria was "immune" to the political unrest spreading contagion like across North Africa and the Mideast. Most observers around the world quickly agreed, nodding heads solemnly as they commented on how Bashir's anti-Israel and pro-Iran stance enjoyed widespread support among the common folk of the country.
That crowd sourced opinion may be correct. It is also irrelevant. Few people on the Syrian street place foreign policy on the head of the list of things liked or otherwise about the Syrian status quo. There are far more pressing issues confronting most people in Damascus or the parched former farmlands of the country's northeast.
At first, events--most notably the failure of the expat called and organized first day of "rage"-- seemed to confirm both Bashir's self-assessment and the views of the experts. Even later protests in Damascus were far more fizzle than the fanfare of revolution.
But the situation changed in a town far from Damascus, Daraa. While protests occurred yesterday in five cities including Damascus, Daraa was the spot where the game possibly changed. For reasons not yet clear, the security forces opened fire with lethal results for five civilians. The powers that be reacted quickly and, from initial reports, properly. Investigations and prosecutions were promised. Even if the guilty proved to be security officials, prosecution was guaranteed, "regardless of rank."
The situation in Daraa was not defused by the governmental actions. Today, at the funerals for two of the men killed, the security forces used tear gas to disperse demonstrators. As is the case quite often with funerals, the one held today served as a platform for launching political protests. More than a few of the ten thousand close personal friends of the deceased took to the streets with a vengeance. In the customary point-counterpoint style of Mideast politics, the security forces pushed back with gas and mass arrests.
The new opposition group which has given itself the moniker of "The March 15 Revolution," has made the now obbligato move of establishing a Facebook page. Not surprisingly, it has blamed the regime for the deaths. Assorted human rights groups including the now ever present Human Rights Watch has backed the claims of the March 15 Revolution. The outside world responded in a way completely compatible with the protocol which has been established in the wake of the "Jasmine Revolution" and its follow-ons. The US and UN both jawboned away. Ban Ki-Moon called the lethal suppression "unacceptable." The White House condemned the use of force "strongly."
The government has sealed Daraa so confirmation of the events, body count, and number arrested is difficult or impossible. The government undoubtedly sees the move as necessary not only to prevent outsiders viewing Syrian dirty laundry but also as a means of quarantining the fatal virus of political challenge and change.
The events in Daraa are noteworthy if for no other reason as having been the most deadly outbreak of political violence since the Kurds got uppity in 2004. Back then security forces killed at least twenty-five in the northeastern city of Qwamishli and left another one hundred plus wounded. Politics, particularly those of a dissenting sort, constitute a full contact sport in Syria.
Any protests of any sort do rattle the regime's cage. It should be recalled that Syria has been under a "State of Emergency" since the Baath Party took control in 1963. That is one whacking big emergency--fifty-seven years and counting.
Even the typically youthful (median age of population is 21.7 years according to the CIA World Factbook) Syrians remember the bloodletting in the city of Hama. At that place Bashir's father, Hafiz, suppressed an uprising orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood at a cost in lives which makes Gaddfi's efforts of late look like a festival of peace, love, and flower power. The city was virtually destroyed by heavy artillery, air attacks, and tanks. As many as one hundred thousand were buried in the rubble.
Syria's current problems must be set against the inhibitory effects of the Hama legacy. Syria has been hit hard by the global recession of recent years. Unemployment and its equally sickening twin underemployment are rampant--particularly among the critical segment, educated youth. The governmental deficit is very large and not likely to do other than grow in the next few years. A harsh and prolonged drought has worsened the already critical water shortage such as to severely cripple agriculture and turn large numbers of previously decently well off farmers into proprietors of dust bowls.
The combination of rapidly declining water supplies, shrinking oil production, a rapidly growing population, and a public economy skewed toward military procurement has place enormous pressure on the government to meet public demands. It has already terminally derailed Bashir's ambitious schemes for reform and modernization. The honeymoon with Bashir which started when he succeeded dear old dad proved to be short as the new kid found out what reality was all about.
Paradoxically, the inept response of the Bush/Cheney administration to the murder of Prime Minister Hariri served to rekindle the honeymoon. The diplomatic mistreatment of Syria unified the population behind the Bashir government. The American inspired isolation as well as the ongoing US stance of ignoring the Golan Heights in favor of the West Bank and Gaza not only reinforced public support for Bashir but gave the regime the impetus needed to cozy ever closer to Tehran. (The old cliche about shooting oneself in the foot comes to mind.)
Bashir is not Hafiz. This means that while the Syrian security and internal intelligence services are highly competent and omni-present, the government will not rely solely on the jackboot of repression. In an important symbol of this, Bashir has stated he will go personally to Daraa not only to assure the investigation is undertaken as promised, but, more importantly, to offer his condolences to the families of the dead. It is certain the meetings will receive first story coverage on Syrian state TV.
Bashir and his wife are both media savvy and understand the West better than the majority of Mideastern political figures. Bashir also understands the ways and means by which perceptions can be manipulated effectively within Syria. It is probable he will turn the deaths in Daraa to the regime's advantage.
Overall, the majority of the population continues to rally on Bashir's side. It is probable this applies even to the spearbearers of the current unrest--educated young people. Solidifying and expanding this support requires some major efforts to address the most critical problems, lack of jobs and lack of water. One way this might be done (if the budget deficit allows or Iran is sufficiently generous) is a new public works program aimed at capturing and transporting more water to the dessicated farmlands.
The US might be well advised to take another look at the Golan Heights. The peace process between Palestinians and Israelis is more than simply moribund--it is stone cold stinking dead. The only viable available option for reviving the corpse is that of the Golan Heights. Israel can live very well without the Heights or even the ski resort and water in that area. It has no legitimate reason to cling to the ground given the changes in military technology and the record of the past thirty years of border tranquility.
Movement on the Golan would help stabilize Bashir's government. In this context it must be noted that he is not an odious dictator but rather a canny authoritarian who is operating a country which is a going concern, secular, possessed of a national identity, and capable of being an outpost of the civilized world against the advocates of violent political Islam. Even Syria's stance regarding Lebanon is not unrealistic or overly ambitious. Overall, Syria under Bashir is a Syria poised to incrementally enter the ranks of those states more democratic than not.
But, for any of this to happen, for Syria to turn its back on Iran, abandon any nuclear pretensions, drop Hezbollah and Hamas, inch toward real reform, requires a strong government, a stable government, a secure government. For this, there can be no better outside aid than assistance in getting Syrian land back to Syrian control.
That is a project worthy of the Deep Thinkers most urgent and earnest attention.
That crowd sourced opinion may be correct. It is also irrelevant. Few people on the Syrian street place foreign policy on the head of the list of things liked or otherwise about the Syrian status quo. There are far more pressing issues confronting most people in Damascus or the parched former farmlands of the country's northeast.
At first, events--most notably the failure of the expat called and organized first day of "rage"-- seemed to confirm both Bashir's self-assessment and the views of the experts. Even later protests in Damascus were far more fizzle than the fanfare of revolution.
But the situation changed in a town far from Damascus, Daraa. While protests occurred yesterday in five cities including Damascus, Daraa was the spot where the game possibly changed. For reasons not yet clear, the security forces opened fire with lethal results for five civilians. The powers that be reacted quickly and, from initial reports, properly. Investigations and prosecutions were promised. Even if the guilty proved to be security officials, prosecution was guaranteed, "regardless of rank."
The situation in Daraa was not defused by the governmental actions. Today, at the funerals for two of the men killed, the security forces used tear gas to disperse demonstrators. As is the case quite often with funerals, the one held today served as a platform for launching political protests. More than a few of the ten thousand close personal friends of the deceased took to the streets with a vengeance. In the customary point-counterpoint style of Mideast politics, the security forces pushed back with gas and mass arrests.
The new opposition group which has given itself the moniker of "The March 15 Revolution," has made the now obbligato move of establishing a Facebook page. Not surprisingly, it has blamed the regime for the deaths. Assorted human rights groups including the now ever present Human Rights Watch has backed the claims of the March 15 Revolution. The outside world responded in a way completely compatible with the protocol which has been established in the wake of the "Jasmine Revolution" and its follow-ons. The US and UN both jawboned away. Ban Ki-Moon called the lethal suppression "unacceptable." The White House condemned the use of force "strongly."
The government has sealed Daraa so confirmation of the events, body count, and number arrested is difficult or impossible. The government undoubtedly sees the move as necessary not only to prevent outsiders viewing Syrian dirty laundry but also as a means of quarantining the fatal virus of political challenge and change.
The events in Daraa are noteworthy if for no other reason as having been the most deadly outbreak of political violence since the Kurds got uppity in 2004. Back then security forces killed at least twenty-five in the northeastern city of Qwamishli and left another one hundred plus wounded. Politics, particularly those of a dissenting sort, constitute a full contact sport in Syria.
Any protests of any sort do rattle the regime's cage. It should be recalled that Syria has been under a "State of Emergency" since the Baath Party took control in 1963. That is one whacking big emergency--fifty-seven years and counting.
Even the typically youthful (median age of population is 21.7 years according to the CIA World Factbook) Syrians remember the bloodletting in the city of Hama. At that place Bashir's father, Hafiz, suppressed an uprising orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood at a cost in lives which makes Gaddfi's efforts of late look like a festival of peace, love, and flower power. The city was virtually destroyed by heavy artillery, air attacks, and tanks. As many as one hundred thousand were buried in the rubble.
Syria's current problems must be set against the inhibitory effects of the Hama legacy. Syria has been hit hard by the global recession of recent years. Unemployment and its equally sickening twin underemployment are rampant--particularly among the critical segment, educated youth. The governmental deficit is very large and not likely to do other than grow in the next few years. A harsh and prolonged drought has worsened the already critical water shortage such as to severely cripple agriculture and turn large numbers of previously decently well off farmers into proprietors of dust bowls.
The combination of rapidly declining water supplies, shrinking oil production, a rapidly growing population, and a public economy skewed toward military procurement has place enormous pressure on the government to meet public demands. It has already terminally derailed Bashir's ambitious schemes for reform and modernization. The honeymoon with Bashir which started when he succeeded dear old dad proved to be short as the new kid found out what reality was all about.
Paradoxically, the inept response of the Bush/Cheney administration to the murder of Prime Minister Hariri served to rekindle the honeymoon. The diplomatic mistreatment of Syria unified the population behind the Bashir government. The American inspired isolation as well as the ongoing US stance of ignoring the Golan Heights in favor of the West Bank and Gaza not only reinforced public support for Bashir but gave the regime the impetus needed to cozy ever closer to Tehran. (The old cliche about shooting oneself in the foot comes to mind.)
Bashir is not Hafiz. This means that while the Syrian security and internal intelligence services are highly competent and omni-present, the government will not rely solely on the jackboot of repression. In an important symbol of this, Bashir has stated he will go personally to Daraa not only to assure the investigation is undertaken as promised, but, more importantly, to offer his condolences to the families of the dead. It is certain the meetings will receive first story coverage on Syrian state TV.
Bashir and his wife are both media savvy and understand the West better than the majority of Mideastern political figures. Bashir also understands the ways and means by which perceptions can be manipulated effectively within Syria. It is probable he will turn the deaths in Daraa to the regime's advantage.
Overall, the majority of the population continues to rally on Bashir's side. It is probable this applies even to the spearbearers of the current unrest--educated young people. Solidifying and expanding this support requires some major efforts to address the most critical problems, lack of jobs and lack of water. One way this might be done (if the budget deficit allows or Iran is sufficiently generous) is a new public works program aimed at capturing and transporting more water to the dessicated farmlands.
The US might be well advised to take another look at the Golan Heights. The peace process between Palestinians and Israelis is more than simply moribund--it is stone cold stinking dead. The only viable available option for reviving the corpse is that of the Golan Heights. Israel can live very well without the Heights or even the ski resort and water in that area. It has no legitimate reason to cling to the ground given the changes in military technology and the record of the past thirty years of border tranquility.
Movement on the Golan would help stabilize Bashir's government. In this context it must be noted that he is not an odious dictator but rather a canny authoritarian who is operating a country which is a going concern, secular, possessed of a national identity, and capable of being an outpost of the civilized world against the advocates of violent political Islam. Even Syria's stance regarding Lebanon is not unrealistic or overly ambitious. Overall, Syria under Bashir is a Syria poised to incrementally enter the ranks of those states more democratic than not.
But, for any of this to happen, for Syria to turn its back on Iran, abandon any nuclear pretensions, drop Hezbollah and Hamas, inch toward real reform, requires a strong government, a stable government, a secure government. For this, there can be no better outside aid than assistance in getting Syrian land back to Syrian control.
That is a project worthy of the Deep Thinkers most urgent and earnest attention.
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