Big Question--Which Way For The Syrian Army?

Dictators fall when the army stands by with folded arms.  That has been the one big lesson of the so-called "Arab Spring."  Where the army or at least a significant portion of it has stood firm with the challenged jefe grande, the Mr Big of the place has retained at least a fair semblance of power.

This difference is the distinction between Egypt and Tunisia on the one hand and Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain on the other.  This, in turn, makes the stance of the Syrian army key to the course developments will take in that dissent torn state.

Optimists (those who favor the speedy end of the Baathist regime) point out that while the majority of the armed services command structure like that of the multi-member intelligence community is comprised of Alawites or individuals from another minority religious community, the overwhelming majority of the rank and file are Sunnis.  Thus, the optimists conclude, when push comes to shove the army will divide against itself with the numerical majority siding with the Sunni dissidents.

In support of this interpretation the optimists note that most of the killings to date have been executed either by members of the Baathist militia groups or one of the several intelligence services, most often that nominally belonging to the air force.  The army has been in place but has not done much if any of the actual trigger pulling.  The optimists also point to information flowing from Syria regarding the lethal purges of low ranking officers who refuse to participate in the suppression as well as reports of incidents of collective disobedience on the part of several different army formations.

The pessimists (those who are not particularly in sympathy with a rapid regime change in Syria) interpret matters somewhat differently.  They underscore the existence of selected elite units with a higher percentage of loyalist personnel in all ranks as well as superior equipment and training.  They also point to the array of privileges enjoyed by many members of the armed forces--and not simply senior officers.  Most tellingly, the pessimists highlight the role played by the army in Syria and the indoctrination to this role practiced every day in all armed forces units.

Of the several arguments offered by the pessimists, it is the last which has the greatest force.  It is also the basis for concluding that there is little, if anything, the US can do to foster a climate of indifference to the fate of the Baathist regime within the armed forces generally.

Like all national forces, the prime roles of the Syrian defense establishment is protecting the territorial integrity of the state as well as the sovereignty of the government.  The Syrian armed forces are primarily focused on Israel but have demonstrated secondary foci on Jordan and Iraq.  These lesser interests have faded even more in recent years.

In addition, the Syrian armed forces are conceived as being instruments of power projection.  Importantly, the services see this role as critical.  The venue for power projection is Lebanon.  Syria has a deep and defining belief that Lebanon is part of Greater Syria. a part ruthlessly ripped away from the larger part by the colonial powers of France and England.  The "lost province" of Lebanon has remained lost due to the sinister and exploitative manipulations of Israel and its key sponsor, the US.

It is critical that the Syrian armed forces remain constantly on the alert so as to reclaim Lebanon should the slightest opportunity present itself.  The role of power projection even more than the defensive mission warding off or defeating an aggressive Israeli move is key to the extra benefits received by the armed forces and their personnel.

The unique combination of traditional territorial defense and power projection seeking the return of lost territory makes the Syrian army unique.  The closest analogy would be the army of France between 1872 and 1918.  The redemption of "lost provinces" in each case makes the army not only more loyal to the regime and meriting extra rewards but also assures that the army is less likely to take actions which might weaken the state and make the return of the lost land less probable.

The Syrian armed forces, particularly the army, have shown greater competence in combat than other Arab states during both the 1967 and 1973 wars.  In the latter, the Syrians despite having been set up by the Egyptians for failure came within one defensive line of breaking through the IDF positions and overrunning northern Israel.  The last second arrival of IAF fighter-bombers made possible by US intelligence regarding the Egyptian force distribution and positions, stopped the aggressive and well managed Syrian armored thrust at what was literally the last possible moment.

All ranks of the Syrian forces are robustly indoctrinated with the "glorious" record and equally "glorious" mission of reclaiming the lost province of Lebanon.  This indoctrination includes the Sunni draftees.  As a result it is pushing the envelop to see the army splitting on sectarian lines at the expense of its own identity and future relevance.

It is not as if the Baathist regime relies on indoctrination alone.  Serious internal security operations are conducted only by those elite units with unquestioned loyalty predicated upon the existential concerns of their members.  Other units, units with large undigested chunks of Sunni draftees are kept disarmed in their camps.  The least reliable units are also fully penetrated by agents of the several military counterintelligence formations.

The Syrian high command is quite literally death on any sign of disloyalty or disobedience.  This brutal reality is well known and understood within the military.  This knowledge is quite an inhibition in and of itself.

The correlation of forces militates against any army action resembling those of the Egyptian and Tunisian armies.  It also makes the probability of wholesale revolt within the army far from likely.  This makes a copy of the Libyan dynamic the next thing to impossible.

The same correlation of forces limits the influence of the US upon the armed forces of Syria.  Not only does the US lack the sort of direct connection it had with the Egyptian army, it has no plausible inducements to offer the army should that body cooperate with the anti-regime movement.  There is literally nothing Washington can offer to match let alone replace the self-defined role of the Syrian army as both guarantor of the state and liberator of the lost province.  No amount of new equipment, no amount of money or advice can begin to equal the intrinsic force of the role the armed forces see for themselves.

Nothing less than an armor plated guarantee of (1) a return of the Golan Heights and (2) a Syrian "free hand" in Lebanon could sway the armed forces from loyalty to the current regime.  These are both beyond the capacity of the US to offer.

Even if the Baathists are compelled to rely upon the three brigade equivalents of absolutely loyal minority manned units as well as the air force for suppression of the dissidents, these would prove sufficient to the task of drowning the anti-regime movement in blood.  Thus the only question is whether or not the Baathists have the political will to use all necessary force to stay in power regardless of the views of the "international community."

So far the answer is simple and blunt.  The regime does have the will.