What Else Would Anyone Expect?

The NYT seems surprised to discover from its usual unnamed sources that the Pakistani army chief of staff, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, will not cooperate with US demands that his army crack down on their allies in terror.  The general is also of a mind to ramp down relations with the US to the bare minimum necessary to assure the American cash cow keeps producing its billions every year.

The reasons for Kayani's position are made clear by the paper's source(s).  They distill to internal  pressures within the armed forces of Pakistan.  As every observer of that sorry country has known for years, there are many, many members of the army's officer corps who are soulmates of the adherents of violent political Islam.  Then there are others, more secular perhaps, who take the view that the terror groups constitute a strategic asset against India.

The linkage between the two components of the officer corps is simply that Islam defines Pakistani identity, and without the forever war with India, the justification for the army as custodian of the nation and redeemer of lost land is lost.  With that loss would come the collapse of the rickety system which is the government of Pakistan.  The continued symbiosis between the instruments of state and the advocates of violent political Islam is existential for the Pakistani status quo.

The American Great Abbottabad Raid rocked both the military and the larger society.  It is impossible to overstate this.  The hypernationalistic Pakistanis took a blow in their over inflated national ego.  This consideration alone makes it necessary for the army--and its chief of staff--to cock a defiant snoot at the US. Any less would assure deligitimazation of the army and its commander.  It would even raise the credible threat of internal conflict far surpassing that already existing.

Over at the WaPo, a (relatively speaking) conservative op-ed writer bemoans the fact that the US and Pakistan have been engaged in a stereotyped dance of American warning followed by a sincere sounding Pakistani promise of decisive action which results in no real action whatsoever.  This dynamic has been repeated numerous times over the past several years.  It shows no sign of changing, Mr Ignatius sighs in conclusion..

Of course it can take no other direction.  If the game is to continue it must do so in the well worn grooves and well understood moves of the past few years.  The governing ideological, political, and mythic imperatives of the Pakistani polity and society will allow no other course of action.

It does not matter that by any set of objective considerations the US gained significant potential leverage from the Great Abbottabad Raid.  The objective realities do not outweigh the subjective ones operating on the minds of Pakistani decision makers both military and civilian.  Nor do the objective considerations count for more than a rat's feces in the estimate of the profoundly anti-American majority of the Pakistani population.

No American administration can undervalue the pervasive and deep nature of anti-American sentiment infecting the average Pakistani.  The assorted Pakistani governments over the past twenty and more years have carefully fostered the hatred and distrust of the US held by most Pakistanis.  The blame-the-US gambit has been played heavier since 9/11 and heavier even subsequent to the development of warm ties between the US and India during the second of George W. Bush's terms in office.

The government efforts at propagandizing the Pakistani population have been enhanced by the nearly universal message of hate-the-infidel-crusaders preached from the overwhelming majority of the mosques and madrasses in Pakistan.  The Pakistani identity is heavily dependent upon Islam.  With the Zia imposed program of enhanced political cohesion through Islam, it has become more so.  This means that for Pakistanis under thirty, the view of the US and its Western partners is seen through the same distorted theological lens as that of Osama bin Laden.

When this last and very important factor is added to the others, the only conclusion supported by the facts is that the US gained no leverage by the Great Abbottabad Raid and arguably lost some of its very tenuous influence to the wave of religiously exacerbated nationalism.  This means that General Kayani (and everyone else in the chain of command) can flip off the US and its demands with impunity.

The conventional wisdom in Pakistan right now is that we need them much more than they need us.  This conclusion is predicated upon the belief that without Pakistan's cooperation and assistance, we will not be able to get Taliban to the negotiating table.  Without that as cover, it will be impossible for us to withdraw forces from Afghanistan rapidly enough to assure Obama's reelection.

There is a great deal of truth to the Pakistani contention that without Islamabad the chance to ramp down our war in Afghanistan is virtually nil.  The Pakistani army and ISI do have a very great deal of influence with both Afghan Taliban and, even more, the Haqqani network.  Of course, the Paks have not yet demonstrated that they have the capacity to turn that influence into the useful result of getting both insurgent groups to agree to a power sharing deal with the Karzai regime.

Simultaneously, the movers and shakers of Islamabad are certain they can replace the US in whole or major part with China.  This is no doubt the case.  The Chinese are eager to extend their regional presence so as to place more of a squeeze on India.  They are also keen on gaining access to the mineralogical resources recently proven in Afghanistan by American geologists.  Thus, they would leap at the opportunity to enlarge their already extensive relations with Pakistan.

Two arguments are presented as to why the US has little choice but to go along with the Pakistani game.  The first is the war in Afghanistan.  The second is the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and production capacity.

The first contention is accurate at the moment.  It would be obviated by an American force reposturing.  Should we abandon the manpower and money heavy nation-building approach in favor of the special operations force predicated counter terror and counter insurgent (note the difference, counter insurgent rather than counter insurgency) one, the needs for Pakistani cooperation would be reduced to the vanishing point.

The nuclear bogyman is rather more shadow than substance.  Yes, the Fire Breathers of Islamabad have entirely too many weapons.  They have a large and expanding production base.  The stockpiles and production facilities, particularly the latter, are not perfectly secured, nor can they be.  It would do the Pakistanis well to meditate upon all the ways by which the US could neutralize both weapons stockpiles and production facilities.  True, some of the means would have the collateral effect of splattering substantial amounts of finely distributed plutonium and highly enriched uranium around quite a few square kilometers of Pakistani soil, but, such is the cost of abating an unacceptable nuisance.

Perhaps the Pakistanis have counted on President Obama continuing to be the poster boy for peace, love, flower power, and submission to the will of others.  But, in the aftermath of the Great Abbottabad Raid, they might have a few doubts about the cravenness of the current American president.

The US would be well advised to hang tough in the face of Pakistan's exercise in ego building, status quo preserving defiance.  This can be best expressed by a steep cut in the military aid to the army and an ending of all but the most essential humanitarian assistance on the civilian side.  These measures would be enhanced by the reconfiguration of American strategy and operational doctrine in Afghanistan accompanied by a quick reduction in conventional forces.

Meanwhile, in the back room, get the folks working on how to go about an exercise in unilateral and quite involuntary nuclear disarmament--of Pakistan.  And, in a gesture of friendship to the Boys of Islamabad, it might be nice to advise them to learn Chinese as the Trolls of Beijing will appreciate the effort.