It Was A Good Day, But Not The Final Day

The death of Osama bin Ladin is good--and long overdue--news.  The means of the man's demise is a credit to what is arguably the best special operations unit in the world today, Boat Six of the Navy's SEALs.  The consequences of this termination with extreme prejudice are easy to overstate.

Also easy to overstate is the decisive courage of President Obama.  The most annoying aspect of the aftermath of the Raid At Abbottabad has been the praise lavished on the Guy in the Oval.  Much has been made as well of the lack of unanimity among the presidential advisors concerning the raid.  Lack of unanimity is a good thing--it would have been better, much better for the US had there been more dissent from the group think during the run up to the Bay of Pigs or the adventure in regime change in South Vietnam which resulted in the death of the authoritarian ruler, Diem, and the onset of a decade of political chaos in the insurgency and American riddled republic.  And, to be sure, it would have been better had the White House crew of George W. Bush had a few more dissidents and a lot fewer team players.

When the interminable number of National Security Council meetings--five--finally came to an end, the president took the only rational choice available--a commando style operation.  The stand-off alternatives might not have done the job correctly as was the case with the recent attack in Tripoli which missed Gaddafi the dad but did manage to kill his youngest son and three of that man's children.  Or, even if the stand-off alternative did succeed, there would have been even less convincing proof of Osama's death than is the case currently.  And, not a trivial consideration, only the up-close-and-personal approach would have the positive collateral of collecting useful material to keep intelligence analysts occupied.

Of course, there would have been those in the NSC or supporting staff who would have feared a replay of "Blackhawk Down"--a prospect which came oh-so-close when one of the birds either suffered a mechanical malfunction or combat damage and had to be left on the ground.  Others might have felt a pucker factor over the possibility of American combat fatalities and how that would play at home.  Still others might have dreaded a complete debacle equivalent to that at Desert One.

Since no special operations senior commander would be so out of touch with reality as to guarantee success, there was a risk with the operation, but the use of Boat Six went a very long way to mitigate that consideration.  So also have the vast improvements generally in the tactics, techniques, and materiel of special operations.  When night fell, the use of the commando raid option was the only way to go--other than to convince oneself that the intelligence just was not sufficient and let the moment go by ungrasped.

There is, in the real world at least, never enough intelligence.  It is rare to the point of being nonexistent for a Two Shop--including CIA--to say, "This is the real deal, one hundred percent sure thing."  For an intel weenie to say such a thing would be identical to the Spec Ops guy saying success would be certain.  In this case, even given the chance that the narrative released by the Obama administration regarding the long, winding, and rough road traveled is a cover for simple penetration, the correlation of intelligence factors was strong, even very strong--and it just doesn't get any better than that.

One cannot help but wonder if the decision making process was so lengthy because so many lawyers must have been involved.  It rather appears that the actual planning and rehearsal for the raid took less time than did the five meetings of the NSC and who knows how many confabs between the legal counsel for the principals.  It may  even be that the factor tilting the final decision in favor of the on-the-ground option were legal considerations, specifically the existence of a remote chance that bin Laden could have been taken prisoner.  No matter how slight that chance might be and no matter how certain it was that Osama or those around him would offer armed resistance thus allowing fire to be returned, the legal fiction of a possible arrest was maintained.  That would have been impossible using the stand-off options.

The theoretical option of turning over the "actionable intelligence" to the Pakistanis was, no shock here, a non-starter.  Outside of Islamabad, is there anyone willing to hazard the view that the Pakistani army, Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, and government had no idea that Osama had been living in a nice, large, and well furnished semi-prison located cheek-to-cheek with a major military academy and a large army base for some years?  Similarly, is there anyone, again outside of Pakistan, who would argue with a straight face that Osama could not have lived on the outskirts of Abbottabad without a "support service" furnished by Pakistanis, and not just ideological soulmates operating as private citizens?

The movers and shakers of Pakistan will have to do a lot of fast talking--something at which they are quite experienced and competent.  The Obama administration will not put too much pressure on the Koran loving senior men at ISI or in the army.  Congress, particularly the House, is not likely to be quite so easy going--and they control the flow of bribes to Islamabad.  Even considering that factor, the odds are in favor of the US going along with some (very) modest changes in Pakistani behavior and public protestations of innocence in a manner not unlike that of earlier administrations and congresses (think Panay Incident.)

The removal of bin Laden from the board does not change the Great Game of countering terror conducted by proponents of violent political Islam in any significant way.  The global movement has sufficient inertia, manpower, and experience to keep on going and growing even with the loss of Osama to the welcoming arms of seventy-two virgins.  Even if the US is able to follow on by removing the al-Qaeda number two man, al-Zawahiri, it will not make an end to to violent political Islam as  practiced by Taliban, AQIM, AQAP, or any of the other groups.

In short, the Abbottabad Raid has been an emotionally satisfying moment in a long and bloody war with years if not decades yet to run.  It demonstrated not only the very high competence of the US in a very demanding form of military operation but also the dedication the country can have over two administrations of vastly differing political ideologies and world views.  It also has shown that Mr Obama like JFK has the capacity to wreak havoc when his masculinity has been challenged--which bin Laden has done to a degree not equaled even by JKF's bete noir, Fidel Castro.

The game will go on.  The war between the civilized states and the reactionary, barbaric proponents of violent political Islam will continue.  Obama will get a bump in the polls.  His reelection chances may even have been enhanced.  On the upside, Osama bin Laden will not be around to enjoy life and the Great Game.