Why Not?--It's A Growth Sector

The NYT rather breathlessly has reported that the infamous founder and long time proprietor of Blackwater, (the security firm best known for shooting wholesale lots of Iraqi civilians), has a new enterprise underway.  The one time Navy SEAL and current billionaire has been beavering away hiring and training a mercenary force for the United Arab Emirates.

Working from his new home in Abu Dhabi, the reclusive Mr Prince contracted with Shiekh Mohammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the local crown prince, to provide a battalion of foreign, non-Muslim troops available for instant service both domestically and out of country.  Prince's company, Reflex Responses (R2,) has been working with a headhunting outfit in Latin America to recruit South American personnel with military experience. The resulting catch has been drawn primarily from Columbia, a country with a large pool of recently retired veterans presumably with combat experience.

Other personnel, presumably of officer and NCO levels as well as trainers, have been found in the large number of men with experience in recent African wars as well as Afghanistan and Iraq.  Many of these are from special operations backgrounds and probably have extensive experience as well as excellent training and high motivation.  The recruiting of trainers, officers, and special operators in the wake of prolonged, nasty little wars is not hard.  As the Geek knows from a personal perspective, not only are there few civilian jobs for which years as an 11 Bravo or similar represent a plus, many men also find that they come truly alive in combat and deeply miss this feeling later.

There have been more difficulties finding competent enlisted men.  Apparently, the Colombians have not lived up to expectations either as to proficiency or even physical fitness.  One result has been a scaling back of the projected size of the unit from nine hundred men to just over half that number.  Also, it seems that some of the boys from down south have been less than happy with the prison like environment in which they are forced to live and work--a special compound in Zayed Military City, which itself is located way the hell and gone out in the sand dunes.  Even with a base pay of a hundred and fifty bucks a day and occasional forays to houses of ill-repute, morale is not at its highest.

There may be problems with staffing, but these pale into mere nothingness compared with the potential for difficulties with the US government.  While the company, R2, being chartered in the UAE is exempt from US laws, any American providing training, let alone serving in a combat role with the 529 million dollar outfit, risks running afoul assorted federal laws including that dealing with international traffic in arms.  The State Department allows it is aware of Mr Prince's latest gambit and is investigating if for potential violations.

Eric Prince is not on the Obama administration's "A" list.  Thus there is a good to excellent probability that the huge Federal Foot will seek to squash his endeavor, or at the least, limit it by threatening any American with the temerity to sign on with R2 and its "subsidiaries."  The same may apply with respect to the governments of Australia, South Africa, and the UK.  Should the Obama "team" decide to do so, the diplomatic squeeze will be placed on all these as well as France.

The US has never been comfortable in the slightest with the notion of privatizing war.  In the aftermath of the Vietnam affray when more than a few ex-grunts sought service in one or another of the wars of Africa, the US government was not amused and showed its lack of humor by actually seeking to prosecute at least a few of the trigger pullers for hire.  More recently, the US was not pleased with an outfit called Executive Outcomes.  This business, like R2, was engaged in the mercenary trade and had a Prince connection.  It did not last long after coming to light in the MSM of the US and Western Europe.

In this case the US might be well advised to take a more detached view.  The UAE is critical to stability in the region.  It (or at least one or another of its components) have joined with NATO in the Libyan no-fly zone adventure.  And, unique for Gulf countries, members of its special forces have actually fought in Afghanistan.  (Good training, sir, good chow, good training!)

Of the UAE's eight million residents, only one in eight is actually indigenous.  The other seven are outsiders whose loyalty to the status quo is questionable at best.  The vast labor encampments in which many of the foreign workers live are all potential breeding grounds of violent political unrest.  The elite of the UAE rest very uneasily on a heaving mound of people with much reason for alienation.

Then, of course, the infrastructure of the oil fields and associated facilities upon which the UAE depends is both extensive and highly vulnerable.  The combination of a large number of politically marginalized workers, soft and critical infrastructure, and an exploitative elite does not bode well for long term peace and tranquility.

The armed forces of the UAE are well equipped, well trained (primarily by foreigners, most notably Australians), and reasonably well officered.  They are, however, microscopic given the internal security needs of the Emirates.  Complicating the situation is the hostility between the UAE and regional bad boy, Iran.  Much of this focuses on small islands in the Gulf claimed by both.  The Iranians have established a presence on one of the previously unoccupied islands.  The UAE wants very much to displace the Iranians or, at least, equal them by occupying another of the islands.  (The cause of the real estate dispute is, no surprise, oil and natural gas.)

The standing up of a completely reliable, well trained, well equipped force of even modest size would constitute a significant uptick in the internal and external security abilities of the Emirates.  The emphasis has been placed on reliability.  Thus, the requirement that all members of the new establishment be both of foreign origin and non-Islamic religion.  While the other considerations--training and equipment--are secondary, it is evident that the Emirates are not oriented to slighting either.  The oil sheikhs want the best local security money can procure.

They went to the right man with Eric Prince.  There is no questioning his commitment to high quality private armed forces.  This is what he was all about with Blackwater.  It is what he is all about with R2.  It is self-evident that he is possessed by a belief that authoritarian regimes are in and of themselves good.  It is equally self-evident that he is of the view that such regimes can be best served in their security needs by utterly loyal, completely professional, and absolutely detached military forces.

This means mercenary forces.  As long as they are paid well and on time--and not placed in positions of undue risk, mercenaries are immune to the political winds, the passing fancies of time and societal temper.  A despot who contracts with a high quality purveyor of high quality mercenaries (like Eric Prince) can rest easily knowing his repressive wishes will be carried out quickly and completely without any qualms of religious sentiment or political repercussions.

Mercenaries are not as much of an asset when it comes to offensive war--too risky, don't you know?  This implies that a Prince Battalion or Prince Brigade will not perturb the regional balance.  Rather, the unit would serve as a backup guarantee of regime maintenance and territorial integrity.  Overall, it is easy to argue that the UAE has made a smart investment which should be simply ignored by the US and others who seek a stable Gulf region.

The problem with overlooking the mercenary movement in the UAE exists because of Mr Prince.  The man is a lighting rod of no mean length.  He attracts, no, invites hostility and animus.  It is unfortunate that the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi could not find a better prince to command his new force than the one named Eric.