Russia And China Get It Together

The state of play in Russo-Chinese relations shows the two behemoths moving closer together on a couple of key fronts.  One is economic.  The other is diplomatic.

In economic matters it is clear that the two are close to a pricing agreement on the sale of thirty billion cubic meters of natural gas annually starting in 2015.  The deal is good for both.  There is no doubt but China needs the energy and Russia would very much like to diversify its hydrocarbon market--and pocket a good deal of cash in the process.

While the natural gas agreement is important, it must take a backseat to the increasing harmony between Moscow and Beijing in international matters.  It is clear that both are using the Libyan adventure of NATO (and, at least indirectly, the US) as the catalyst for what the Russians have termed "tight cooperation" on such key questions as the UN, R2P and interventions generally.

Both states have guarded the rights of states to be free of UN interference for decades.  Since the end of the Cold War, the stance of both in this area has become, if anything, more and more hardline.  Both countries have more than a bit of self-interest at stake in their guarding of national sovereignty as each faces recurrent political unrest.  While both signed the convention on responsibility to protect there is no doubt but each saw the document as being one of those feel-good productions like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which everybody signs but not everyone takes seriously.

The doubts held by the Lads in the Kremlin and the Trolls of Beijing regarding the interventionary ambitions of the US and the West were given a shot of growth hormone by the passage of the Security Council resolution authorizing the no-fly zone in Libya and further calling upon member states to take actions such as to protect the civilian population of that country.  While delicately (and misleadingly) worded so as to avoid a veto, the resolution was troubling to Russia and China as well as other countries such as India and Brazil because its loose wording could be generously interpreted by Western states.

That a generous interpretation was intended from the beginning was obvious in the statements of assorted leaders including President Obama which declared goals far more expansive than simply assuring the safety and humanitarian relief of endangered civilians.  As the bombs fell in ever widening patterns, the Russians took the lead in stentorian denunciations of the NATO effort.  In the past few days they have been joined in the chorus by China.

When Chinese president Hu goes to St Petersburg on 16 June to attend the "Russian Davos," it is highly probable that the opportunity will be used to further orchestrate joint Sino-Russian opposition to an extension of the no-fly mandate as well as any introduction of NATO ground forces under any guise.  The fear is the US and its NATO partners, France and England, will arm twist Secretary General Ban into requesting NATO protection for UN humanitarian operations with the result the troops will land in regime changing force.

While there is a whiff of the conspiratorial in this Russian (and Chinese) apprehension, it is not baseless.  The air campaign is not only obviously biased in favor of the rebels, it is also not working rapidly or all that well.  Despite the attrition inflicted on loyalist arsenals, the pro-Gaddafi forces still have a robust combat power, effective tactics, and political will.  Even if the rebels are no longer losing dramatically, neither are they winning in any meaningful sense of the word.

To the Russian and Chinese observer, it seems only natural that the West would seek to retrieve victory nearly lost by the introduction of ground forces.  Should this move occur before the mid-June sidebar summit, one can anticipate very vigorous resistance from both states.  They will be joined by others.  Brazil, India, South Africa, various Central Asian republics--and the members of the Arab League.

The Arab League has repented of its early enthusiasm for internationalization of the Libyan internal conflict.  This is seen by the monolithic opposition from both the AL and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to any robust action being taken against Syria.  The AL, having tossed one Arab leader off the troika, is now covering itself with self-protecting protection of Bashir al-Assad.  To circle the Arab and Muslim wagons under the protective banner of two Great Powers is comforting to the Arabs and the OIC alike.

It will be comforting as well to the African Union (AU), which has been consigned by events to the further shores of irrelevance not only in Libya but deep in the heart of the continent with the way in which the UN and France dealt with events in the Ivory Coast.  This has allowed the Russian and Chinese diplomats to pull out and play the fear of neo-colonialism card with effect.  To many in Africa as in the Arab and Muslim majority states, the specter of Western neo-colonial acts has risen from the grave (if indeed it was ever really buried, which is debatable at best).

All of this implies that push-comes-to-shove time is arriving rapidly in Libya.  Unless the NATO/rebel combine can pull a rabbit (or better yet, a dead Gaddafi) out of their collective hat, there will be very rough diplomatic waters ahead.  Renewing the no-fly zone mandate (due by 24 June) or the use of ground forces will produce a diplomatic contretemps at Turtle Bay of major proportions.  Even absent that, the opposition to future application of R2P by China and Russia backed by an impressive number of lesser states will be massive and monolithic.

Even though the current administration has been staying deep in the shadows, the US still has a bull in the herd.  Our declaratory policy is still one of Gaddafi must go.  We are still more or less committed to R2P--at least when it is convenient and doable.  We are still trying to sort out just what direction we will take with the fast and sharp changes in Egyptian foreign relations.

All of this implies the US must carve out a defensible and credible stance vis a vis both Russia and China in their current mood of totally distrusting NATO and the force they perceive to be motivating the alliance--the US.  This may mean concessions to the Russians on the ABM basing issue as well as current plans to base US aircraft in former Warsaw Pact states.  It may mean backing down a bit in Asia to mollify Chinese fears.

Both of these would be quite negative for American national and strategic interests.  Yet the temptation to offer appeasing gestures of some substance may prove all too appealing to members of the Obama administration who would like to see foreign policy concerns recede to the back burner.  After all they have an election to win in only slightly less than eighteen months, an election which will hinge far more on economic issues than foreign policy concerns.

Or, of course, Mr Obama might want to see if Boat Six can take a whack at Brother Leader.