Defense, Diplomacy, And Development

Those three words constitute a sort of mantra which issues from the mouth of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton at every opportunity.  They also define much of the debate soon to be entered into by the congress as the US makes another of its fitful attempts to come to grips with the deficit and the government's chronic inability to live within its means.

When congress in its collective excuse for wisdom makes the attempt to limit American expenditures, it will be traveling a road already passed over by the British Parliament.  The Coalition government of Cameron and Clegg  inherited a financial debacle from the Labor predecessor which has necessitated deep and painful cuts in all areas of the British budget.  High on the list of those cut was the Ministry of Defense.

The British military, naval, and air services were not simply cut, they were mangled.  The Royal Air Force now possesses the fewest aircraft since before the first shots of World War I.  The Royal Navy in its entirety would not be adequate to provide anti-air and anti-submarine screening for a single US aircraft carrier.  The Royal Army has shrunk to a level which would preclude a successful replay of either the Falklands War or even the intervention in Sierra Leone.

Bad is this seems, there are more cuts in the pipeline.  Dr Liam Fox, the Minister of Defense, has promised more whacks will be taken as soon as the British wrap up their ground presence in Afghanistan.  While Dr Fox specifically mentioned "redundant" vehicles, it is generally understood that the draw down in forces will go beyond vehicles and to the troops who ride them, drive them, and fire their guns.  At least another brigade equivalent in the general purpose forces will permanently case its colors.

Given that Prime Minister Cameron is chomping at his bit to hit the Afghan exit, the next ramp down of British military capacity will come sooner rather than later.  Even though the prime minister and his defense colleague assure the British public (and the US government) that the UK will remain capable of "broad spectrum" operations and will retain its "superb" special operations forces and will acquire more of the new generation of submarines, doubt as to British capacities to join with allied forces in combined and joint operations must linger.

It is clear that the British expect the US to retain its military capacities unscathed by the same budgetary and financial forces which have buffeted the UK.  The same thinking seems to apply generally across Western Europe.

How this wishful thinking can be maintained in the face of accelerating American force withdrawal from Europe boggles the imagination.  There are currently 42, 000 US personnel in Europe.  By 2015 the figure will drop to 37,000.  In comparison there were 213,000 stationed in Europe as the Berlin Wall fell.  And, that number was down from the high point in 1962 of nearly 277,000.

The American justification for the continued retreat from Europe is purely financial.  The aggregate GDP of the European Union is ten percent greater than that of the US.  At the same time the combined defense budgets of the EU states is a mere fraction of that imposed on the US.

It is worth noting that the logic of withdrawal has a momentum of its own.  Force strengths like rocks tend to roll down hill.  And, the imperatives of finance can far outstrip the power of gravity.

The US will lose some significant tactical flexibility and rapidity of response by pulling out of Europe.  It will take measurably longer to move force across an ocean.  More importantly, the interposition of an ocean between the US and the likely conflict areas of the Mideast and Africa provide an important political distance between any future flareup and the decision makers inside the Beltway.  Political and psychological distance is far more critical in slowing or preventing a response than the mere add-on of a few thousand miles.

It may be that this consideration will be moot by the time 2015 rolls around.  There is no way that the American defense department is going to be spared the budget trimming meat ax.  President Obama has made that clear.  Outgoing SecDef Gates has concurred, wholeheartedly.  At least four hundred billion dollars will go over the next decade.  Probably more.  Perhaps even a lot more depending upon the electoral fortunes of the defense conservatives of the Republican Party.

Implicit in the mantra of Secretary Clinton is the hope that insofar as the "defense" leg of the triad is shortened, the legs of "diplomacy" and "development" will be elongated in compensation.  This hope is both false and misplaced.  There is no powerful base of support for either diplomacy or development.

For many of We the People, even among those who are most aware of global politics and the Game of Nations, "diplomacy" is seen as a quasi-mysterious process involving gobs of talk, rounds of dinners, and photo ops.  Whatever it is that diplomats do and with whatever results, there is no belief that it should cost much money.  "Diplomacy" is something like a wand which is waved at vexing problems rather than a useful tool of state in the estimate of many outside of that dismal profession.  So, why does it need money?

"Development" is in even worse shape in the mind of many of us.  Foreign aid is tantamount to an obscenity in the estimate of many conservatives both in and out of congress.  At best it is seen as a form of bribery, a form of rent-a-friend which all too often does not pay off.  At worst it is conceived of as a way of furthering corruption in the recipient country while fostering tumor-like growth in the bureaucracy which doles it out.

Again the recent experience in the UK points at the limits of both debate and understanding when it comes to diplomacy and development.  Critics of the Coalition have pointed with disdain to the Cameron proposal to increase the development budget of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office by more than a third at the same time that the British military is undergoing enforced, unilateral disarmament.

Advocates of the British move argue that by fostering education, good governance, and economic development in unstable or collapsing states, the need for military intervention or active defense against terror attacks originating in such places will be obviated.  The same points have been advanced here not only by Secretary Clinton and others in Foggy Bottom but also by Secretary Gates.  If anything Mr Gates has been a more robust proponent of foreign aid as a means of precluding later military action than have the denizens of State and USAID.

In principle it is hard to dissent from the perspective that prevention through foreign development assistance is far preferable to sending in the Marines at some future date.  In principle a strong case can be made for the effective use of foreign aid as a means of helping to create political and social tranquility within a recipient country such as to preclude it becoming a failing state.  In practice, though, it is far easier to identify the examples where foreign aid has not brought about either internal political and social harmony and progress or bribed the recipient government into accepting American policy leadership.

The Cold War landscape is carpeted with the corpses of failed foreign aid programs.  Africa is littered with the results of foreign aid driven corruption, inefficiencies, and betrayed expectations of a better life.  The same is true in large swaths of Asia and Latin America.  The aid has not been simply from the US.  Americans are not the only people to have failed in the development through aid game.  All who have played it have experienced more failures than successes.

Nor did the situation change with the end of the Cold War.  One need look no further than Pakistan than to see that truism at work.  But, if more convincing is necessary, all that is needed is to take a peek at the totality of those receiving development assistance at the government-to-government level to see that lack of success trumps success by a huge margin.

The palpable lack of success in the government-to-government development efforts will go a very long way to assure that budget cutters will find the funding for these programs a politically attractive target even though very few real dollars will be saved even if the totality of US foreign aid in all categories were to be zeroed out.  Slashing here is one of those look-good, feel-good votes that are so attractive to politicians unwilling and unable to make tough decisions.

While diplomacy is no magic wand to be waved at international problems and development no anodyne for internal debacles, both are necessary, even valuable, complements to defense.  The "vanilla" diplomacy of building upon coinciding national interests as well as carefully targeted development aid focusing on projects which are modest in scale, immediate in visible effects, and sustainable over time by local resources alone can go along way to limiting the need for more robust measures--and cost a lot less.

At the same time it must be recognized that "vanilla" diplomacy and targeted development have very real limits.  There are states which require a coercive approach.  There are states which will collapse and fail or have governments come to power which are not only adverse to the interests of the US and its allies but are willing to use asymmetrical means to demonstrate this.

In these contexts it must be remembered that all forms of coercive diplomacy rest finally upon the material ability and political will of the US to employ force in support of its policies.  Likewise the hostile state must be defanged.  The collapsed or collapsing state might well require outsiders come and impose peace.  In all these eventualities, eventualities which will become more rather than less likely over the next decade or two, credible and relevant military force is necessary if a positive outcome from the perspective of the US is desired.

Schoolrooms in Pakistan will not necessarily prevent violent political Islam from taking firm and continuing root there.  Nor will clinics in Yemen assure the place does not collapse into a welter of internal warfare.  Sudan will not become a thriving multi-ethnic, multi-religious, democratic state simply because some donor or another pumps in buckets of cash.  The same caveats may be made with respect to many other psuedo-states.

These unpleasant ground truths imply strongly that planners, both those dealing with budgets and those whose game is international strategy, must put defense first.  This does not mean the US is condemned to be an impoverished bunker, but it does mean that the existence of a full-spectrum and flexible military capacity cannot be sacrificed on the alters of diplomacy and development.

Nor does it mean the cost of budgetary sanity is surrender to hostile forces.

It does mean, however, that the congress and administration must be intelligent and realistic in their world view.  That, unfortunately, is probably too much to expect.