A few years ago the US military started hiring cultural anthropologists and embedding them in combat units in Afghanistan. The idea was a better appreciation of cultural mores would make for more sensitive and effective use of combat power--that we could avoid the negative consequences of door kicking and mosque invading which had produced a wave of backlash in much of Iraq. This notion was a good one and did have some real benefits for US effectiveness.
But, it was too limited.
In Afghanistan as in Iraq before as well as in Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, even Turkey and Syria today, there is a much larger problem involving the anthropology of culture. It is a dynamic with which we Americans are--or should be--quite familiar. In our own history this particular dynamic was in large part responsible for such events as Prohibition. It is also responsible to some degree for the more recent "culture wars" which have been so much a feature of our politics.
The phenomenon is the divide which separates folks who live in urban environments and those who dwell in remote, often rugged, always sparsely populated, and usually relatively impoverished areas. In Afghanistan or Pakistan, it is the gulf separating the hill people from the urbanites. In Libya, it is the distinction between the ethnics of the western mountains and the coast dwellers. Elsewhere, it is the age old tension between subsistence and marginal farmers on the one hand and those who have migrated to the cities for the opportunities which are believed to exist there and only there.
Throughout the developing world, in all continents, in countries as far removed in geography, culture, and governmental styles as China and Mexico, Russia and Indonesia, the same dynamic is at work. Often, the work is destructive of social and, more importantly, political harmony.
There is a set of characteristics by which the hill people, the subsistence peasants, the "exiles" of remote and rugged regions define themselves in opposition to those of their fellow citizens who live in the cities. We Americans have seen the same definitions of self and opponent in our own recent past. There is nothing different with the far away folks in Afghanistan and the host of other countries where the destructive tension scars the social, cultural, and political landscape.
At the risk of some over simplification, the people who live far from the seductive attractions and entrancing visions of wealth existing in the cities see themselves as more moral, more honest, more honorable, more truly human than their opposites in the city. The rubes understand themselves to be the last vestige of honor, honesty, integrity, and religious morality. They also see themselves as being under constant, unremitting attack by the corrupt, immoral, irreligious forces of urban life.
The rubes see the cities as vast moral swamps. They understand the goal of urbanites to be that of attracting and perverting the sons--and more particularly, the daughters--of rural purity. The rubes fear the appeal of the cities, the seductions of wealth, bright lights, loud music, open sexuality.
For their part, the urban dwellers, whether a century or more ago in the US or today throughout the developing world, view the rubes with disdain. The hill people, the peasants, are all seen as rude, uneducated, unsophisticated, backward looking, fear ridden, clingers of the past, chained by religious superstition. The rubes are dismissed as the last of a deservedly dying breed.
The two groups stare at each other through prisms of distortion--or the crosshairs of a telescopic sight. Each distrusts the other. Each views the other as irredeemable. The city slickers are convinced that the rubes are hopelessly outdated, ignorant, superstitious, hung up on irrelevant concepts such as personal honor. For their part, the rubes are certain that all city slickers are pervasively corrupt, purveyors of moral degradation, apostles of apostasy, and generally as exploitative, manipulative people given to enriching themselves at the expense of their moral betters.
As a general rule, over time the rubes are willing to strike a bargain with the city slickers. The basis of the tacit agreement is simple: You city types just leave us alone and in return we will do the same for you.
Rarely do the rubes seek to replace the city slickers as the source of collective government. Rarely do the rubes seek to impose their social and cultural mores on the urban population by either politics or force of arms. To this extent the American experience of Prohibition or the more recent political activities of conservative, predominantly rural origin Christians constitute exceptions to the general experience.
In a similar way the emergence of violent political Islam is also an exception to the historical norm of "you leave us alone and we will leave you alone." The primary appeal of violent political Islam has been to threatened rubes. The threat may be as direct as an attempt by the urban based central government to extend its sway over the remote regions or it may be the more indirect but pernicious one of inducing the young of Rubeland to emigrate to the cities.
The hill dwelling tribesmen of Afghanistan or Pakistan's FATA are not necessarily more violent by inherent nature than others of their nationality. Rather, they see and have seen themselves as under threat from the dishonorable, corrupt, irreligious people of Kabul or Islamabad.
The situation was not different in the US a couple of centuries ago. The Scotch-Irish who moved to the rugged and remote frontier of the eastern mountains did so not because they were inherently of a greater man-against-nature mentality than Americans who lived in the flatlands of the coastal regions. Nor did they and their descendants remain in the far distant hollows because they were inherently antisocial. Neither did their more recent exemplars violently resist the incursions of mine owners, state governments, or federal "revenoors" due to some inbuilt streak of cussedness. No. They wanted to be left alone.
To the well intentioned outsiders of urban America, the hill dwellers of Appalachia may have appeared to be hopelessly backward, trapped in endless generations of poverty and deprivation, "clinging to their guns and Bibles" (to use the formulation of a noted and successful presidential candidate) due to personal fear of progress and change. And, to some small extent, the impressions--at least those of poverty and deprivation--might have been true. But, far more important was the self-belief of moral purity, the upholding of time honored traditions and values.
The folks of Appalachia were quite willing to accept some of the benefits offered by larger American society such as electricity, better medical care, economic opportunity, better housing, better nutrition. But they were not willing to take the benefits if these were offset by participating in systems both tangible and otherwise which were antithetical to basic beliefs and values. It took American social engineers generations to find the right approach, the proper mix, the best way to include the hill people without destroying with unacceptable rapidity the values and norms which had long sustained these people.
This is also the challenge in Afghanistan, the FATA, and other parts of Pakistan. It is the same in the other countries currently facing collapse and failure. Put simply, the trick is that of extending the good things of modern life to the rubes without pulling the rug of tradition, traditional values, norms, and mechanisms from under their feet. Change is acceptable as long as it is neither too fast nor too shattering in extent.
It is the rock of time upon which the grand ship of nation building must flounder. This is the case in Afghanistan. This is the case in Pakistan. Insisting on a rapid and complete penetration of the land and life of the rubes by the city slickers and their foreign supporters can only promote resistance--violent resistance. The insistence upon extending the "corrupt" and "irreligious" systems of the city into the mountain heartlands of the rubes can only result in a more ardent embrace of those ideas--in particular the religious--which make armed opposition legitimate.
The most basic war being waged in the vast arc of countries from Afghanistan to Tunisia is not between Islam and infidel. Nor is it between the adherents of violent political Islam and those of a more secular persuasion. It is not even a conflict between modernity and the warm certainty of the past. Rather it is the war between the traditionally oriented "exiles" of the hills and the city slickers.
In this war of culture, the city slicker (which includes the US government)is its own worst enemy. A prime characteristic of the city slicker is impatience. For the city slicker, particularly the American, the cliche, "Time is money," constitutes an imperative. But, to the rube, time is eternal. Time is something the rube possesses in great quantities.
The key to success in an insurgency is contained in a simple historical reality. The side which can afford time and accept casualties will win over the side which must save both time and lives.
What this confluence means is both easy to understand and bitter to accept. From Afghanistan to Tunisia and at all points in between, the city slickers of the West are doomed to lose. For the insurgent rubes, powered by the force of both the past and the ideology of religion, a line from an old Rolling Stones song applies, "Time is on my side."
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
Rubes Versus City Slickers
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