One More Speech--One More Missed Opportunity

President Obama made his long anticipated "major" address regarding the Mideast and US policy in the region today over at Foggy Bottom.  It reads well and probably sounded even better.  Overall, the hot wash has to be a gigantic, "so what?"

The ever ready to cheer WaPo seems to be of that view in its instant report on reaction from the "Arab street."  If the account is accurate and representative of the larger understanding--and there is strong contextual reason to believe it is--Obama made the wrong speech, or the right speech many months too late.  Many of those quoted in the piece were disappointed that Obama did not get on his knees and grovel in apology for past American "sins."  Others were bitterly disappointed that the US still seemed to base policy on American national interest rather than the delusions, dreams, and dilemmas of (fill in one or another Arab nationality).  The majority though reflected a sentiment of American irrelevance to the events of the recent future, an irrelevance which will continue  into the future.

Of the various local takes on the Obama speech, the one which is both most trenchant and germane to US policy is the one of American irrelevance.  To a large extent the support or lack thereof for the demonstrators of Tunisia or Egypt was irrelevant to the participants--even if not to the outcome of the protests.  The Egyptians see themselves as having been solely responsible for the downfall of Mubarak.  There is no general willingness to see let alone accept the proposition that US pressure was the final cause of Mubarak's reluctant retirement to private life.  This is a classic case of not letting mere facts get in the way of creating and enjoying a pleasant exercise in national mythology.

The same dynamic albeit to a lesser degree was in play earlier in Tunisia.  When neither France nor the US was willing to do other than turn a back to the embattled dictatorship, the repressive fossil had no option but to board the next plane to Saudi Arabia.  Arguably, had the US taken a firmer, more public line with respect to the ouster of Gaddafi early in the protests, the matter would have been settled quickly and at far less cost in both lives and long term instability in the country.  Ditto on steroids as regards Yemen.

The blunt and painful truth is that the US was totally behind the curve in all the early manifestations of the "Arab Spring."  Whether this was the result of bad intelligence, bureaucratic inertia, lack of political vision and will, shootouts between the realpolikers and the idealists, or simple presidential indifference (or, most likely, some combination of the foregoing) is immaterial.  All that matters is the US was running far behind (to use one of Obama's favorite formulations,) "the arc of history."

As an old maxim of naval warfare dating back to the days of sail held, "a stern chase is a long chase."  The US is engaged in a stern chase right now with respect to Mideast policy.  The length (and success) of the chase is in no way helped by a rhetorical focus on democracy and the other desirable aspects of a modern, Western nation-state.  Nor is the chase made any less lengthy or more probably successful by a mere genuflection before the alter of economic development--the one billion dollar debt forgiveness and companion infrastructure development package promised to Cairo.

While Mr Obama made an appropriate bow to the young Tunisian man whose self-inflicted death by self-immolation served to ignite the demonstrations which escalated to the totality of the "Arab Spring," he failed to mention the man's motivation--poverty, lack of employment opportunity for himself, a college graduate, and harassment by the police over petty regulations.  The man did not die in pursuit of the vote.  He was not a sacrifice to the abstracts of democracy or transparent governance.  His life was not pledged to any cause beyond the base and degrading reality of impoverished, hopeless unemployment resulting from a badly performing economy.

The hopelessness of joblessness--particularly within the class of young people with post-secondary educations, a modicum of technological sophistication, an acquaintanceship with Western political, social, and cultural values--coupled with systems of polity and economy which were both inefficient and unresponsive caused the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt and beyond.  The change that was demanded was not so much political as economic.

The gloss of politics was an add-on.  It was added not only by the more sophisticated and Western oriented of the local protesters but also by the applauding Western observers.  Western media, Western academics, Western pundits, the Western molders of public opinion took the monolithic view that the demonstrators were eager democrats one and all.  The protesters were all seeking to gain a political and (implicitly at least) a social system based on those of the West.

While there were no doubt individuals in all the countries who held this goal, it is easily arguable that most simply wanted a better, more just, more efficient economy where jobs might be plentiful and remunerative, sufficient at least to provide for a standard of living such as to allow the raising of a family with a reasonable expectation that the children's future would be better than their parents' present.  That goal was sufficient as both motivation and goal for the vast majority of those who braved bullets and arrest.  Anything beyond would be nice, but not a requisite.

Many observers of the "Arab Spring" have confessed themselves to be reminded of the uprisings which scarred Europe in 1848.  Others call up the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union.  In both analogies, the pundits and politicians have concurred the motive was the quest for democracy.

The Geek is reminded not of those two major periods of political tumult.  Being a guy of small mind and limited imagination, the Geek is put in mind of Poland.  Specifically the events of the "Arab Spring" have reminded him of the Poland of the days of Solidarity.  It will be remembered that this precursor of the far more sweeping and dramatic changes of a decade later emerged not from the suppressed desire of Polish shipyard workers for a meaningful vote, but rather from pervasive economic discontent.  The combination of inflation and stagnant or falling wages was the consequence of very poor decision making on the part of the authoritarian government.

The result of the economic pressures was a push back of labor along the lines of a classic sit down strike.  The intent of the strikers was economic reform which would benefit them directly and substantially.  The reaction of the government transmogrified the sit down strike to a semi-violent demand for broad gauge political reform.  When the government belatedly brought some reform to bear along with repressive action, then and only then did the movement fade to the underground where it waited for the shift in political winds which finally came at decade's end.

Even now with promises of elections having been made by the "temporary" and "transitional" regimes, the root causes of economic discontent wait to be addressed.  Elections without any change in the economy will bring only further tumult and may eventually result in the election of more extremest governments in both Tunisia and Egypt.  In short, democracy and elections in and of themselves are not a guarantee of stability.  Far more likely to bring this result is the development of a more open, more equitable economic system.

At the risk of belaboring the all-too-obvious, the Geek is constrained to point out that rigging elections and creating the illusion of democracy is far easier to accomplish than is the remaking of economies into some semblance of efficiency--particularly when the states involved lack the essentials for this.  The creation and support of democracies which are economically dependent upon international handouts is no service to either the people of the effected country or the stability of state and region.

By ignoring the economic aspects of the unrest in order to pander to the feel-good emotions of supporting democracy and its relatives, Mr Obama missed making a real mark on the region.  He missed the chance to get on the "arc of history."  He missed the opportunity to regain some of America's lost influence in the Mideast.  He made the stern chase both longer and less likely to produce an outcome beneficial to the locals and suiting our national and strategic interests there.

Of course, the nature and impact of the Obama speech should have been drearily predictable.  The current Guy in the Oval has botched every foreign policy challenge--and opportunity--to come his way to date.  Why should this hazy mass of mood music at Foggy Bottom have been any different?