As usual the US, or, more properly, the Obama administration leads off. The issue this time is the ongoing imbroglio over the non-coup "military coup" in Honduras. Not only does the Deep Thinking Brain Trust In Charge Of Foreign Policy not yet get the fact that the removal of Manuel (Lefty) Zelaya was mandated by the Honduran Supreme Court and merely executed by the military but that the majority of the country's institutions support the continued ouster of the wannabe President For Life.
Another basic reality of human affairs which eludes the Deep Thinkers is that pressure consolidates long before it fractures political will. The addition of yet more pressure, in this case the restriction of visa services, will further the will and ability of the de facto government and its supporters to hang tough. The people in charge of such matters as this might be aggrieved that the Organisation of American States delegation was unable to achieve an acceptance of the compromise plan brokered by Oscar Arias, but they have neither asked why this is the case nor considered the impact of their attempt at applying more pressure.
Quite possibly had Sr Zelayas refrained from some of his more belligerent rhetoric and bellicose demands during his sojourn in the friendly and fraternal land of the Ortega regime, the de facto government would have gone along with the idea of letting Zelaya back in to fill the last few months of his term--provided he didn't seek some new electoral ploy. But, Zelaya and his supporters, headed by Hugo (Mouth of the South) Chavez couldn't be bothered by taking a time out from berating not only the "Great Military Coup and Death Of Democracy As We Knew It in Honduras but also the supposed sponsorship of the coup by the US. (Of course, they also sought with success the diplomatic support of the US while lambasting the Yankees.)
Now, bucko, all policy choices cause reactions. The reactions are, in the terms of mathematics, emergent systems. That means there is no linear relationship between the magnitude of the input--the decision--and the output--the reaction on the part of the target government, state, or people. History shows rather conclusively that policy choices which are meant to coerce, to force the target to bend to our policy, will cause a greater, much greater firmness on the part of the target to resist. The direction of the target's response--resistance--can be predicted correctly but, and it's a big but, the magnitude cannot. It is often disproportionate to the input stimulus.
So, pace, all you Brilliant Minds in Foggy Bottom and littering the White House landscape, your most recent essay in coercive diplomacy is not likely to pay off. It is, however, not unlikely that it will result in both short and longer term resistance and hostility from Honduras. And, guess what, guys and gals, it won't buy you any warm fuzzies with Hugo, Daniel, and Raul. Not even with Ewo and Rafael for that matter.
In second place--no--strike that--in a tie for first place in policy debacles du jour comes Russia. In a move which seems almost carefully crafted to assure that the Islamist jihadist plus nationalist insurgency in the North Caucasus continues, Vladimir Putin has gone on down to warmly embrace (at least metaphorically) the Kremlin appointed regional strongman, a man capable of creating a desert and calling it peace but failing to quell insurgency, named Ramzan Kadyrov.
Kadyrov is both corrupt and inefficiently repressive. The latter characteristic is the more important. Under his sway a simulacrum of peace emerged in Chechnya. The insurgency was not defeated despite Putin's claims to the opposite. It went underground. Became stronger. Took on far more of an Islamist jihadist tinge. And, came back. First in Ingushtia and then in Chechnya.
The insurgents are back, bigger, badder and better than ever. It will be far harder to defeat them now then it was during the desperately mis-handled First and Second Chechnya Wars. The Third Chechnya War started even before the bodies of the Second had been counted--but no one was willing or able to realize this unpleasant, brutal reality.
There is a way which has the potential to defeat the insurgents. The Geek even took the time to outline it. The historically derived way to win definitely did not have a role for people such as Ramzan Kadyrov, who, by the way, has already been repeatedly and severely castigated in elements of the Russian media for his repeated boorish acts which rival those of previous Soviet era failures.
The decision to continue more of the same old same old is another example of the tenacity and universality of decisions resulting in emergent systems. Again the direction of the response by the insurgents and uncommitted majority in the North Caucasus can be predicted--resistance--but the magnitude cannot be accurately estimated other than to say more, a lot more, blood will flow without positive, long-lasting result.
Vladimir Putin has demonstrated that he is sufficiently ideologically blinded and short-sighted to get a job in the current US administration or State Department should he find himself unemployed back at home. No greater insult is possible in the Geek's estimate.
In distant third place in the derby of asininity in foreign policy comes the Nonaligned Movement. Reportedly one hundred of the one hundred eighteen members of the NAM have signed on to The Protect Iran's Nuke Plants From Israel (and the US.) Over the years the NAM has been a source of much amusement given their collective propensity for loud sounds, posturing, and generally overly boisterous behavior at the UN and other global fora.
Does this unwieldy congeries of nations ranging from the important to the utterly inconsequential really, really believe that by running the Iranian proposal through the UN to protect Iran's nuke facilities from attack would be worth the paper it is written on? Even if the nuclear powers of the Security Council would be willing to restrict their nuclear counter-force targeting to be restricted by the UN in principle, in practice it would be ignored utterly.
The same is true for other countries including NAM leader India which would hit Pakistan's nuclear plants in a New York second if there was good (read "existential") reason. Why should Israel be any more constrained by the Iranian proposal should it be passed by the UN?
The subtext of the NAM support for Iran is that the member states harbor a number of unrealized (and perhaps, unrealizable) nuclear dreams of their own. And, many face regional rivals with which relations are less than peace, love, and flower-power.
The subtext of the support also bespeaks of animus toward the US and its presumed desire and need to constrict access to nuclear power in all its forms. The American policy toward the spread of both military and peaceful uses of the uranium atom has been mixed. Uncle Sam has shown a real ability to turn the Nelsonian eye on nuclear developments in some countries but not others.
This admitted and (perhaps) regrettable inconsistency has given rise to a degree of paranoia on the part of some members of NAM, but this is scarcely justification for siding with a dangerous, destabilizing, and relentlessly hegemonic power such as Iran. Perhaps these countries have swallowed the preposterous Iranian line that it simply wants electrical power. In that case, the words of Nicholas Sarkozy are relevant. "Frankly, who can believe them?"
Iran is not some poor little hounded victim of Israeli and American persecution. The member states of NAM have to get a grip on this. Otherwise they are condemning NAM to even more irrelevance in the international game. Numbers aren't everything--even at the UN, and the NAM has to understand that as well.
To be sure there are other examples of human idiocy in the foreign affairs arena today. But, three are enough. The Geek is getting old. His stomach churns too easily at sheer unadultrated stupidity these days.
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