Parsing what is happening in Pakistan is not unlike being a Kremlinologist in the days of the Cold War. Context is everything. In Pakistan the context consists of several equally important features right now. One is the state of play in the Pakistani government as it attempts to balance the power of pervasive nationalism against the appeal of Islamism. Another is the in-built fear and loathing directed against India. A third is the need to preserve the Army as both the only national institution and the bulwark against the presumed Indian threat with the need to at least stifle the Taliban insurgency. The final piece of essential context is the nature and internal dynamics of Taliban following the removal of Baitullah Mehsud.
The Pakistani government or at least its judicial system took a stance for the power of nationalism when it defied the ongoing US pressure over A.Q. Khan. The court ordered the removal of all restrictions on the life of Khan. While not as emotionally infuriating as the recent "compassionate" release of the convicted Lockerbee bomber, the lifting of all limits on Khan does not please the US. From the perspective of Islamabad this is good.
The Pakistani government is quite happy to receive money from the US and other countries which is furnished with the presumption it will go to stabilization efforts in the FATA. More than this is rejected by Islamabad. Again, this is both good and necessary from the perspective of the government which recognizes far more than do foreign chattering and academic classes that nationalism is the best, perhaps the only, palliative for a bad case of latent Islamist jihadism.
Frictions with India over the Mumbai bombing and the judicial aftermath have not decreased. Hiding behind the requirements of judicial process (nationalism again) the Pakistanis have been less than expeditious or determined in their investigation and prosecution of citizens alleged to have been involved in planning and executing the attack. Not even the issuance of a "red notice" by Interpol has impressed the Pakistani authorities. So little were the Pakistanis impressed by Interpol's action that they rejected the so-called Sixth Dossier, which will not improve the state of relations with India.
The Indian government was probably equally unimpressed with the troop shuffle conducted by the Pakistani Army on its border. By the time all the trucks had stopped rolling, three battalion equivalents had been withdrawn purportedly for the planned offensive in the FATA, but these had been replaced by four. Shell games to the contrary notwithstanding, the Indians remain Pakistan's "main enemy."
Without sufficient troops the chance of a genuine "offensive" into the Waziristans is improbable in the extreme. The Army is unwilling to take losses. Period. The government agrees. Period. There will be no ground offensive worthy of the name. Air strikes will continue. They are sufficiently "manly," low risk and, what the hey? might kill some Talib trigger-pullers.
Beyond that, the approach of Islamabad in the post-Baitullah Mehsud days will focus on dividing if not really conquering the component groups of Taliban. Some will be (literally) bought off. Others will be offered "truces" or even "peace treaties" exchanging modified Shariah and local autonomy for renunciation of violence. Others, Islamabad hopes, will be neutralized by the threat of American UAV attacks.
While it is plausible to impute cynical motives to the Pakistani government having adopted this strategy, there are also sound reasons. One is the role of Islamism in Pakistan, its Army, and, last but far, far from least, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI.) Islamism with or without the concomitant jihadism can be and has been a useful tool for ISI and is approved of in many parts of the nation, government, and military.
Another realistic justification for the non-campaign campaign against Taliban is found in the nature of the beast. Taliban is not a monolithic entity. It is a collection of local groups formed around a leader from the disaffiliated and Islamist leaning members of the society around him. Each group is independent. There is agreement amongst the groups on the goals and motivations, but none exists nor is necessary regarding means, methods, and tactics. The personality of Baitullah Mehsud allowed him to forge a degree of tactical alignment which others will have very great difficulty recreating.
This implies that each Taliban component must be dealt with in terms which are relevant to the cultural, social, economic, and personal relationship soil from which it has emerged and from which it receives daily nourishment. There is no "one size fits all" approach which has the slightest chance of succeeding. This includes a military offensive.
Force will be necessary but not sufficient to achieve even a "tame" Taliban. The ISI has more than sufficient contact with the assorted Taliban components to achieve the minimum operational goal of reducing the violence, if it chooses to use the opportunity. This remains to be seen.
The more-or-less in touch with reality number two in al-Qaeda may well be misreading the current situation with Taliban and the Pakistani Army. His latest production warns the "crusaders" and "apostates" of dire consequences should the offensive be pursued. On the upside, the Islamist jihadist blowhard agrees with most US observers that Pakistan is the primary battleground. But, where his side has no choice except fighting (if suicide bombings can be accurately labeled as fighting), the Pakistanis do not have to fight very much or very hard.
Given that the Talib fighters are members of a species of self-organising system and the personality of the leader is the locus around which self-organisation occurs, it is only necessary to "turn" the leader from following jihadism. The leader can be suborned into dropping jihadism from the group's agenda. He can be killed if he does not.
In the early mid-period of the US involvement in South Vietnam, the Quang Ngai Special Platoon Program was oriented toward this kind of action. Often, even quite often, the results were surprising in the number of people who changed sides and the low, even very low, body count.
A similar approach was undertaken with equal success by the Americans and locals in suppressing the post-WW II Huk Insurrection. In Malaya the British did the same during the long years of the Emergency. The lessons are there. Perhaps the Pakistanis have learned them. Time will tell.
In any event it is quite premature to characterize the Pakistanis as having tossed in the cliched sponge. The endgame may not be all that the US might wish, but there is a good likelihood that it will be sufficiently robust to provide a good measure of stability to the FATA and, thus, to the border with Afghanistan.
That's enough in this sort of war.
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