There are times when the Tales of Cassandra ring accurate and true. This is one of them. It passes the test of Inherent Probability. It was even foreshadowed.
The article details the difficulties, not to say flat impossibilities being confronted by one small, which is to say, understrength Marine battalion in the rugged, dry, hot terrain of Helmand Province. The impossible situation has been created by the Afghan government, which has not provided any of the civic action, police, or military units promised. These missing Afghan assets are the key to long term success in the region and thus in Afghanistan generally.
The Marines are able to provide an austere sort of security but nothing more. Their job was to clear the area of Taliban and then to provide the backbone of a "hold" strategy which depended upon Afghan Army and police forces for its full effect. The Marine shield was presumed to provide a cover for civilians and civilian action in the areas of government, education, and health care.
Well, the Marines are there. Taliban has withdrawn. But, the critical Afghan personnel both military and civilian are major non-participants. The police unit sent to the area was undermanned, untrained, tainted with criminal activity, and counterproductive in effect. The thirty man detail dispatched by the Afghan Army believed it was in the area for a little R&R before going somewhere else to fight. The health care, governmental, and educational folks never came to the party.
As a result the civilians (stand by for enormous shock) are sitting on the fence, happy to see Taliban gone but fearful of what will happen when (not if) the Marines leave. Taliban is not known for its charitable treatment of those it deems "apostates" due to cooperation with the foreign forces. The Marines are working with due diligence to gain the trust and cooperation of the locals, but the chance of developing the mechanisms let alone the record of mutual trust is low absent the Afghan portion of the mission.
As if to counterpoint the crucial nature of this microcosm of what gives the surface impression of having been a successful offensive campaign into Helmand by the Marines and their British colleagues, Admiral Mullen today described the situation in Afghanistan as "serious and deteriorating." How right he is.
As the Geek pointed out in a post last month, among the reasons for a (high potential) US defeat in Afghanistan are the unwillingness and inability of the Karzai government to cooperate effectively with the US and other foreign forces coupled with Karzai's basic imperative to stay in power no matter what it takes--including cutting deals tacit or otherwise with Taliban and al-Qaeda. At least one if not both of these considerations were at work when the offensive into Helmand commenced last month. The Afghan National Army and other pledged forces were missing in a significant way at the starting line.
The longer term implications of this Afghan lack of will or ability to wage war against the Islamist jihadists are all resident in the minor slice of life presented in the Times piece. As the Geek has said and written until he is both blue of face and arthritic of finger is that the locals finally win or lose the counterinsurgent conflict. It is up to them to make the "better state of peace" which must ensue if the end of hostilities marks the beginnings of conflict resolution.
The actions and attitudes of much (but not all) of the Karzai government hints that the idea of hostilities termination and conflict resolution currently held in Kabul is not simply one of power sharing, which isn't bad in and of itself, but rather some sort of surrender which leaves Karzai at the top of the heap--at least for some sort of "decent interval." This sort of delusional "peace without victors" has a genuine appeal for the Karzai government--and many others in Afghanistan, including Taliban.
While this endgame may be suitable from the perspective of Kabul, it is most certainly not so from an American point of view. Anything, any settlement, any hostilities termination which has the slightest odor of an American defeat attached will simply encourage other Islamist jihadists. Admiral Mullen must be aware of this ramification as he stated on a different TV talk fest that the primary American focus was on disrupting al-Qaeda and Taliban, which remain the single greatest threat confronting the US today.
Islamist jihadism takes courage from the slightest hint of failing political will and diminishing military capacity on the part of any of its enemies, headed, of course, by the US. This is what is at stake in Afghanistan.
Building a democracy, or assuring human (particularly women's) rights, developing the economic base in Afghanistan are all nice. But, they are not essential to US national and strategic interest. Even undercutting the production of opium falls in the "nice but not necessary" category. There is only one compelling reason for Americans to fight and die in that chunk of unpleasant real estate--the military defeat of Taliban, al-Qaeda, and any other Islamist jihadists polluting the place.
The war we are fighting is not against terrorism qua terrorism. Nor is it a war for freedom, democracy, and prosperity in Afghanistan.
The war we are fighting, the "war of necessity" as President Obama correctly termed it, is against Taliban, al-Qaeda and Islamist jihadism generally. It is a matter of defeating the hydra there or facing more of its heads elsewhere and elsewhen.
That's the brutal truth of the matter. Get a firm grip on it.
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