The twin pimples are alike in another way. Both are in the process of succumbing to Islamist jihadist insurgent groups. Sure, Somalia has had all the big news play. Couldn't be helped; the morass in Somalia has been incrementally developing despite (or because of) the good intentions of outside actors including the US. It has also been helped in the old media exposure by the fun and games undertaken by the Merry Pirates of Puntland.
By comparison Yemen has sat back in the shadows unnoticed by the media and most foreign policy wonks. Quietly, but surely the place has been travelling down the same road as Somalia, just at a slower rate.
The spotlight flicked on recently when the government launched an offensive against the Shia insurgents in the north. This Islamist jihadist bunch is headed by Abdul-Malek al-Houthi and is, unsurprisingly, called the "Houthis." It is a revivalist branch of the Zaydi version of Shia. What this means theologically eludes the Geek completely, but it has importance in assessing the overall appeal of the sect to Yemenis generally.
With the start of the offensive including air strikes and armored operations (which while macho as all get out are of very dubious utility in countering tribal guerrillas in rugged terrain), the usual suspects--humanitarian entities and the UN--have raised the expectable cry of humanitarian crisis. Considering that the Yemeni forces are undoubtedly firing shells and heaving bombs with great enthusiasm and little skill, the generation of refugees has been and will continue to be the single major feature of the offensive.
It deserves mentioning that while the Yemeni armed forces are blowing holes in the desert, the country (the Geek uses that term generically only) faces two other, shall we say, "challenges." One of them is al-Qaeda. The other is a regional insurgency in the south which is so far at least relatively untouched by the hot hand of Islamist jihadism.
War has been endemic to Yemen (or, the Yemens, plural since for most of the past several decades there were two, one North and the other South) since 1962. In that far off year when JFK was in the White House and most Americans alive today not yet born, the thousand year old Zaydi imamate was overthrown. Since that distant day war has reigned supreme with assorted truces, ceasefires, peace treaties and even a partition having come and gone with the rapidity of mirages before the eyes of a desert traveler dying of thirst.
Oh, the Brits hung on for a few years trying to keep Aden (or North Yemen) alive and well. But, in 1967 following the "Battle of the Crater," the Labor Government tossed in the sponge and left the field "East of Suez." The ever-ambitious Egyptian government of the day kept on fighting a proxy war supporting South Yemen (AKA The Peoples Republic of Yemen) in its effort to subdue the North. Eventually even Nasser gave up and sought greener pastures by giving the Israelis plausible cover for their Great Land Grab War of 1967.
And so it went, hot war followed by cold peace. The place(s) dissolved more and more over time into a loose assemblage of tribes, religious sects governed locally only by sheiks, or others with local mojo. The central government(s) governed little and loosely.
Even the reconstitution of Yemen as a single entity did nothing to alter the basic dynamics as recent events have proven conclusively. There was little if any functional legitimacy attached to the central regime and utterly no existential legitimacy. The government governed only through the balancing of opposing forces or, less successfully, through naked coercion.
The vacuum at the center encouraged--no--demanded the Zaydi resurrection. That is the name of the game with the insurgent group in the north. It is avowedly Zaydi and demands the reconstitution of the ancient regime, the Zaydi imamate. Turning back time to the years prior to 1962 may be Quixotic, but that does not lower the appeal of the dream, particularly to those living in the long ignored, long impoverished, long futile, and frustrated folks of the North.
The fact that the Zaydi are a branch of Shia Islam is important because it has opened the doors to support by Iran both direct and through the Iranian proxy, Hezbollah. While proof of the involvement beyond rhetorical levels is absent, there is strong reason to suspect it, given the military capacities demonstrated by the Houthis.
Be that as it may, Iran has termed the conflict an internal Yemeni matter and called for a political settlement. But, what else would be expected? Iran is already in sufficiently deep kim chee not to desire further submergence.
There is less doubt that Saudi Arabia has been deeply involved on the side of the central government. The Saudis have furnished money, and perhaps more to the Saana regime in the hopes of bolstering the government sufficiently that Yemen will not become even more of a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and similar Islamist jihadist groups. The Saudis have a dog in the fight given the long record of al-Qaeda personnel training and equipping in the hills of Yemen for strikes on Saudi Arabia.
In a real sense the US does not give a fig who wins in the place. Provided that whoever comes out on top--Houthis, Saana or Southern insurgents--they do not give a safe haven to Islamist jihadists. The US administration has been keeping a (deliberately?) low profile in the resurgent fighting, limiting its direct involvement to an appeal to both sides to observe the truce agreement of last year.
The American caution is well-advised. There is no probability that the current Yemeni offensive will be successful even in the most limited definition of the word. Linking ourselves to the Saana government would be counterproductive in the longer haul, should the Houthis win or should they strike a deal with the southern insurgents.
The second alternative is not probable given that both the government and the insurgents in the south are Salafists and this is anathema to the Zaydis of the north. The Salafist orientation of Saana, of course, gives Saudi Arabia cover for its pragmatically based assistance.
Despite its growing military capacity, and regardless of (probable) foreign support and the presence of (possible) foreign fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Houthis do not yet threaten Saana. This will come however as surely as dawn brings prayers across the bare mountains and desert of Yemen.
The worst case outcome from the perspective of Washington would be the emergence of an Islamist jihadist vise with one jaw in Somalia and the other in Yemen. Such a vise would be positioned perfectly to close on the critical southern approach to the Suez Canal.
The vise could also result from the success of an Iranian backed Zaydi government in Yemen. Stop and think for a moment about the implications of Iran having the potential to blockade both the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden.
Not a pleasant prospect, eh, bucko? The Revolutionary Guard in their famed inflatable boats could put quite a crimp in international trade and commerce without having to do much of anything. A further deterrent to the exercise of the "military option" in the matter of Iran's nuclear efforts?
Not in the near term, certainly. But, far from improbable in the mid- to long-term. Right now, the dynamics are running in favor of the Houthis. Without resolute assistance from some outside party or parties, selling insurance to the Saana government is a loser.
Oh well, as Allah wills.
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