Let Somebody Else Do It

Secretary of Defense Gates' message was simple, blunt, and to the point.  The US will do only those few things which other countries lack the capacity to do.  We will provide midair refueling, surveillance, and reconnaissance, some forms of communication, and intelligence.  We will not provide weapons or training to the anti-government forces in Libya.  In his view there are numerous other states which can do these tasks just as there are others who can patrol the no-fly zone or provide strike sorties intended to protect civilians from harm.

Leaving aside the more than slightly evident tensions between protecting civilians from all harm and the needs of the anti-Gaddafi forces for close air support and the accompanying sour sounds of hypocrisy, the position staked out by Dr Gates in testimony today showed a coldly realistic understanding of what the US can and cannot, should and should not do in the turgid turbulence of Libya.  The most realistic part of the Gates' view is its protective stance.  The limits placed on the American contribution to the "international community's" effort to immunize civilians from the effects of living in a war zone were clearly intended to protect against both mission creep of the sort which destroyed the American effort in Afghanistan as well as to shield Washington from the inevitable charges coming from the Kremlin, the Forbidden City, and elsewhere to the effect that the strictures of the relevant UN Security Council resolution were being transgressed.

There may be mission creep; there will be violation of the spirit and letter of Resolution 1973, but the US will not be a party to either.  This may not be the most courageous policy.  It most assuredly is not in the damn-the-torpedoes-full-speed-ahead! tradition of American war fighting or diplomacy.  It is, however, what is needed right now in the context of both Libya and the wider Mideast political tumult.  The view espoused by Gates in such clear and unmistakable fashion serves to give the US needed distance, needed time.  Both are necessary if the US is to formulate a genuine policy for facing the new political landscape of the region.

The Gates' formulation carries with it a very large downside.  This was recognized quite specifically by both the Defense Secretary and Admiral Mullen.  The downside is simply that when night falls Gaddafi may well still be in power.  The prospect of a stalemate, a de facto division between Cyrenaica and the rest of Libya, is real.  So is an outcome in which there is but one Libya under the direction of Gaddafi.

Either of these two outcomes would expose both Libyans and the world to the prospect of Gadaffi 1.0, the Brother Leader who never met a terrorist group he didn't want to fund, the international mischief maker whose wake was marked by downed airliners, blown up buildings, corpses, and failed states.  Whether for a few months or a handful of years, the restoration of the old model Gaddafi would be the worst of bad news for the people of the world.  The continuation in power of Brother Leader would be the worst conceivable development for Libyans, upon whose bodies the full fury of the man's sense of betrayal would lash.

Yet, in the real world, what alternative does the US have right now?  One can construct alternatives, but the least-worst outcome sort would have had to have been put into place weeks before the passage of the UN Resolution and the imposition of the no-fly/civilian protection zones.  Having come to the Libyan game too late and in an inherently overly limited way, the problem of constructing alternative policies to the one outlined by Robert Gates becomes far more problematical.

The problematical nature of the alternatives arise from the unique schizophrenia which afflicts the Arab mind.  It is a schizoid world view which was seen quite clearly in Iraq.  And, it has leaked around the edges of the political debates in recent weeks.

One prong of the schizophrenic view comes from the evident fact that the Libyan insurgents cannot fight in an effective, coordinated fashion.  It is not that the government forces loyal to Gaddafi are all that much better trained or equipped than the rebels for they are not.

(In this context it is worthwhile to spend some time checking out the immense amount of imagery available.  There is no essential difference between the equipment deployed by either the Gaddafi or rebel forces.  Nor is there much apparent difference in competence in military basics from digging in on the defense to the combination of fire and movement on the attack.)

The only essential difference between rebels and government is that the latter but not the former possesses a command structure.  Without a command structure, a coherent table of organization, none of the other features of military organization, communications, logistics, tactics, operational doctrine, are relevant.  The presence or absence of a command structure makes it possible for a numerically inferior force to beat its superior.  It allows a force comprised of men who are not a race of natural warriors (it there is such a critter) to defeat one comprised of heroes.  Command is all in war.

Well, if not exactly all, command, the capacity to control violence from a central location with a fair certainty that orders will be obeyed, is the sine qua non of effective war fighting.  The rebels have none.  The Gaddafi forces have some.  Therein lies the difference--and what a difference is clear from the imagery of the rabble running from a few distant incoming rockets or artillery shells.

There is nothing that can be done in a short span of time to address the critical lack of command in the rebel forces.  The lack is not simply one of training or inexperience.  Rather, the absence of command structure is organic to the society which produced the insurgents.

As a consequence the ability of outside "donors" be they NATO or Arab League to make up the deficiency is zero.  Supplying weapons will not address the absence of command.  Ditto training.  The only way command and its concomitants, control and communication, could be provided in a timely fashion would be for some outside combat force to take over the ground operations.  Sure, some Libyans could be attached to the "foreign" combat units, but they would be simply there for the optics.

In the alternative, the US and other outsiders can hope that the charade of the no-fly/civilian protection zones can be continued long enough for the insurgents to realize they must develop and put into effective practice their own command, control, and communication system--that they must gain a genuine command structure which is generally conceded to be legitimate in the eyes of the fighters it commands and controls.

The US and other countries may well introduce black and special operations forces both civilian and military, but this alone will not provide sufficient command capacity to offset the advantage enjoyed by the Gaddafi units in a timely enough fashion.  Rather, the employment of these genera of capacities will provide some aid to the insurgents by allowing better coordination of air strikes and ground movement.  This will enhance the staying power of the insurgents so as to provide time for these people to discover they need a command structure.

Of course, this brings yet another risk for the US and the other Western powers.  The individuals most likely to realize that they need a command structure are those with prior experience fighting against the US and its allies in Iraq.

(After all,  if these Fearless and Mighty Men of Islam are at all honest and possessed of a capacity for self-examination, they have come to understand that the single greatest reason the Bearded Warriors of the Prophet (PBUH) had their collective posteriors kicked by the infidels and apostates was the greater effectiveness of the infidel and apostate command, control, and communication systems.)

This means the advocates of violent political Islam will come to greater prominence in the effort to topple Gaddafi with results in the post-conflict environment not likely to promote Western norms, values, or interests. The Gates' approach coupled with the indigenous failings of the Libyan insurgents will prove harmful to our longer term interests in the country and the region.

However, we have no real alternative.  Remember the Arab schizophrenia?  The other prong of this world view arises from the antipathy Arab Muslims have for the notion of infidels killing Arab Muslims.  As the pretended(?) horror expressed by the Arab League at the idea that Arab Muslims were dying downrange as the US and others imposed the no-fly/civilian protection zone showed dramatically, there is a genuine loathing aroused in the Arab mind at the killing of good Arab Muslims (even soldiers) by the infidels.

If the Americans or the British or the French put troops on the ground and these troops actually kill Gaddafi's fighters, the hatred will be both real and explosive.  There would be a replay of the dynamics of Iraq and Afghanistan.  There is no way around that.  It is an emotional reality which cannot be denied.  It can only be exploited.  And, exploited it would be.  Not simply by AQIM but by every advocate of violent political Islam in the world.  The wave of fear, loathing, and hatred would be ridden by others as well, by Muslim "moderates" eager to keep their heads above the political tide, by non-Muslims who are rivals, even enemies of the US and its Western allies.

That is why we cannot simply go in and square matters away.  Matters would refuse to be squared away.  The emotional sensitivities of Arab Muslims and their capacity to deny realities other than those conditioned by a narrative of religion would assure what should have been a simple, direct, and straight forward ending of a very nasty regime and its death squads would transmogrify into one more protracted war of religion and identity.

The Libyan Question admits of no good answer.  The approach espoused by Secretary Gates is no more and no less than the least-worst way of dealing with the Question while honestly admitting that we have no capacity to answer it.

What Did Anyone Expect?

There seems to be a subtext of shock with the latest twist of events in Libya.  Yet, there is nothing unexpected in the images of fleeing rebels totally unnerved, not to say unmanned, by a few shells from tanks and artillery fired by men loyal to Gaddafi.  After all, the legions of media experts in military affairs had previously declared that only the "allied" air assault had allowed for the rebel  successes, so why is there any surprise when a hiccup in that air support resulted in a speedy collapse of the rebel offensive?

The buzz from inside the Beltway, in large measure propelled by the Nice Young Man From Chicago, has centered around the possibility of the US and other outsiders providing arms to the rebels.  This notion is absurd.  The rebel forces have ample weapons of the individual and light crew served sorts.  The dissidents even have some heavier equipment, armored personnel carriers and tanks abandoned by their Gaddafi loyalist crews but still serviceable.

What the anti-Gaddafi "fighters" need is not hardware.  What they need is organization, leadership, and, most of all, training.  The skill level of the rebels is pathetic at best.  The imagery proliferating from Libya shows the anti-government individuals have utterly no knowledge of even the most rudimentary aspects of combat.  The bozos of the desert do not even dig in.  They do not use cover and concealment.  They do not even bother to emplace their tank killing recoilless rifles.

They have no fire discipline.  No small unit tactics.  No coordination of effort.  No recognized command and control system.  In short, they have none of the requisites for effective war fighting.  They are, therefore, doomed to lose.

In a way it is possible to take comfort in the sheer incompetence of the vast majority of the Libyan "freedom fighters."  The all too obvious inadequacies of the rebels indicate the influence or at least the numbers of combat experienced advocates of violent political Islam, veterans of the anti-US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is sparse.  There can be little doubt that the men who have survived combat against the US and its Western allies in either venue have gained the basic survival skills so desperately lacking with the majority of the Libyan amateurs.

While the greatest percentage of the opposition forces may be as are the majority of all Libyans, people who wear their Islam lightly, the existence of austere, Salafist derived advocates of violent political Islam has been documented in blood for a century.  These were the men, men from Cyrenaica and from the city of Darnah who were the spine, muscle, and sinew of the bloody defensive insurgency against the Italians.  These men have been the sharp point of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.  These men sought out jihad against the Americans in Muslim lands far, far away from Libya.  And, it is these men who are, right now, the only effective combatants in the struggle against Brother Leader.

In the event the US (or any other Western country) provided arms or other military equipment, it would be the same men, the Warriors of the Prophet, who would benefit the most.  Any force multiplying equipment or services would propel the advocates of violent political Islam to the top of the local tree.  This would not be in the best interests of the US, other civilized states, or the majority of the Libyan people.  Should the jihadists be given the wherewithal to wage more effective war, the first and largest loser would not be Gaddafi and his forces but the Libyans who do not share the zeal of those committed to violent political Islam.

In this context it is useful to reflect on some melancholy realities of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The largest number of victims of violence were not foreign troops or indigenous troops loyal to the central government but combatants affiliated with groups not approved of by the advocates of violent political Islam.  The other large group of victims were the non-combatants, civilians who were either in the wrong place at the wrong time or who were vocally opposed to the all encompassing goals of the jihadists.

Samantha Powers, Susan Rice, and Hilary Clinton pushed for the no-fly/civilian protection resolution for fear of "genocide."  They focused on the most attractive target, the target with the very big mouth, Gaddafi.  By so doing they overlooked completely the existence of a group--the advocates of violent political Islam--just as given to wholesale killing, just as prone to murder those who disagree or oppose as Gaddafi.  To compound the blunder of the no-fly/civilian protection resolution with providing weapons or other useful military equipment or services would be to favor one murderer over another--not prevent murder period.

The totality of the Obama administration's behavior during the past few weeks demonstrates a bunch of situationally naive people who are adrift at the policy level.  The Obama "team" was saved from the worst consequences of its lack of competence by the timely departure of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak.  The angels who had smiled protectively on the fools of the administration stopped doing so with the advent of the Libyan Question.

The air campaign if taken to the limit can assure the rebels are not destroyed quickly and totally.  Beyond that the best efforts of airmen and missile launchers alike can do little.  It is not possible to bomb the rebels into a position of winning at any acceptable political cost.  It is not possible to bomb Gaddafi out of power in a speedy fashion.  Nor can the rebels win in a matter of weeks--even with massive outside assistance in equipment, training, and organization.

In the longer term, Gaddafi cannot hang on indefinitely.  In the longer term, the advocates of violent political Islam will come to dominate the rebel councils.  When the down-the-tubes trajectory of Gaddafi intersects with the upward trending fortunes of the rebels, the real winners will be the advocates of violent political Islam.  When that happens, the US, the West, and the Libyan people will have much to regret.

Internal War--Neocons And The Tea Party

Like the shambling corpses in the classic black and white version of Night of the Living Dead, the neocon ninnies have been resurrected by the fragrant miasma surrounding the "Jasmine" and "Lotus" revolutions.  Eliot Abrams and Joshua Muravchik having been baying in the van, eager for a faster, harder intervention in Libya and chomping after the chance to depose Bashir Assad.

Back east (from the Geek's perspective) in the soon-to-be-wilds of caucus Iowa, the redoubtable neocon hawk John Bolton, in the context of a conservative Republican cattle call, not only lambasted the Obama view of foreign policy, he advised the GOP to add foreign policy to its current two arrow quiver.  The nonpareil unilateralist and one time UN ambassador is obviously of the view that foreign affairs will be an ever larger component of the domestic political scene--and all the Republican front runners were monumentally deficient in this aspect of the presidential job description.

Bolton's understanding both of the increasing importance of American foreign relations and the lack of both experience and talent in this area represented within the Republican front bench may be accurate, but it is far from unchallenged within the ranks of the elephants.  The Tea Party movement, or at least its favorites which gained election this past November, does not constitute a cheering section for US engagement with the rest of the world.

Senator Rand Paul has staked out an isolationist position which makes the (in)famous isolationists of the Thirties seem almost like globalists in comparison.  Other Republicans--not just Senator Paul's dad, Ron--are all for slicing and dicing foreign aid in all its myriad forms.  There seems to be a near universal consensus among those on the right of the aisle to stop paying dues or other assessments to the UN.

At the same time the standard issue defense conservatives of the GOP seek to keep as much money as possible flowing to the Pentagon, regardless of all other considerations.  It does not seem to be "more bang for the buck" so much as "more bucks for more bangs."

As if all these different and contradictory currents were not confusing enough, Republicans in Congress are simultaneously for and against the Obama intervention in Libya.  They are for it in the sense of feeling good because Made in the USA bombs and missiles are macerating goodly numbers of Gaddafi thugs.  They are against it because (a) Obama treated Congress like a collection of mushrooms, (2) the US isn't running the show, (3) the administration dithered too much, too long, (4) because it looks as if the US is dancing to a French tune.

The picture of Republican foreign policy is more disjointed and disjarring than one of Jackson Pollock's exercises in random splattering.  By comparison the Obama understanding of how to conduct the nation's international business appears almost rational, well considered, and tightly braided.

As the line on Monty Python ran, "Stop this sketch!  This sketch is silly."

The Republicans had best get a grip on a very inconvenient truth: The Man With The Moustache is probably right--foreign affairs will be far more central to American presidential (and congressional) politics a year hence than it is today.  At the same time both the neocons and the isolationist tilted members of the GOP and Tea Party movement are as wrong as a soup sandwich.

This set of contentions does not mean nor imply that the Obama hyper-multilateralist, apologetic, deferential way of dealing with the world is right.  It is not.  It is as wrong as grilled watermelon.

There are a couple of ground truths involved which render Obama as well as the neocons and the neo-isolationists wrong.

The first of these is simply that the US is a Great Power.  It is not simply first among equals.  It stands alone in its mixture of hard and soft power capacities.  There is an implicit but quite evident corollary to this.  The rest of the world is not only comfortable with this but expects the concomitant American leadership when unpleasant bumps occur in the global night.  (OK, to err on the side of accuracy, there are some states which are quite unhappy with the status quo, examples include Iran, Venezuela, and the two rivals, China and Russia.)

The second and equally critical foundational truth is this: The only sure guide to a state's foreign policy and diplomatic relations is national interest.  True, principles, that is, national norms, values, ideals, and aspirations as well as the inducements and constraints of domestic politics are an important component of the process by which national interest is defined, but they are not the sole determinants of this interest.

This positive statement is accompanied by a negative.  The worst, the absolutely worst basis for determining either national interest or foreign policy is ideology.  Ideologically driven approaches lead to blunders as in Iraq.  This is why the neocon approach is doomed to counterproductive failure.  As history has demonstrated times beyond counting, institutions cannot be transplanted to new and strange environments by force of arms.

The inapposite nature of ideologically predicated foreign policy is also why the unquestioningly multilateralist stance of the Obama administration is wrong.  The same can be applied to the neo-isolationist understanding of the Pauls and their soulmates in and out of Congress.  No Great Power has ever resigned its status.  The other countries just won't allow it without imposing very large and quite unacceptable costs.  Unless, of course, one considers the cost in lives and treasure extracted by World War II to have been just fine.

Looking ahead, it is necessary to ask a question: Have the events of the so-called "Arab Spring" been an earthquake or simply a foreshock?  A year from now will the world be shaking to aftershocks or will the real earthquake, a temblor of ten on the global political Richter scale?

Consider what might plausibly occur over the next six to twelve months in the Mideast alone.

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood may gain political dominance through the much celebrated "democratic process" and, having done so, drop its secular cover and revert to its base: violent political Islam.  The MB has the advantage of tight organization, a well established hierarchy, a long developed agenda, and a large amount of perceived legitimacy.  Also, there is no reason to conclude that it has abandoned its core definer of commitment to political Islam including,where necessary, that of the violent sort.

If the Assad regime is overthrown, the most likely outcome will be a Sunni regime dominated by advocates of violent political Islam with any number of domestic and regional scores to settle and goals to accomplish.  Or, if hard pressed, the Assad government might choose to unite its restive population with the time honored technique of an external war.  Or, as a wrinkle to this, Hezbollah may be turned loose by its two sponsors, Syria and Iran, with predictable consequences for the region.

Libya may well turn out as a stalemate, a divided entity caught in a slow motion semi-internal war.  It is equally possible that the post-Gaddafi country will be one in which the Sufi inclined majority falls under the control of the Salifist derived advocates of violent political Islam who are quite thick on the ground of Eastern Libya, Cyrenaica.  This would give AQIM a secure and wealthy base of operations.  It would also mean for the majority of Libyans that they have simply exchanged a secular authoritarian regime for one of a Koran waving nature.

There is a better than excellent chance Yemen will collapse into a welter of feuding regions and tribes in which the single greatest "winner" will be AQAP.  In this regard it is well to recall that Secretary Gates this past weekend termed AQAP the largest threat confronting the West from all the assorted franchises of bin Laden's group.  Saudi Arabia would be put square in the crosshairs of AQAP should it emerge as the most potent faction in the riven remnants of Yemen.

Then, of course, there is Iran.  There is always Iran.  The mullahs will be a year closer to the goal of the "Mahdi Bomb."  The Iranian government will have had more months to cultivate and spread influence among the Shia of Iraq, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.  (Recall that the Eastern Province is majority Shia as well as the most prolific producer of oil in the kingdom.)

The Israeli-Palestinian Question will not be answered in the next few months.  The resumption of rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza points in a dangerous direction.  So does the restart of IED attacks mounted in all probability from the West Bank of the Palestinian Authority.  Once again the dead and the fearful will direct policy on both sides.  This implies the cycle of strike and counterstrike will escalate slowly but inexorably over the next year--unless a more dramatic war intervenes on the Northern Front of Israel.

This set of seismic shocks yet to come has been restricted to the Mideast.  The rest of the world has been ignored intentionally but this in no way should be taken to imply the rest of the globe--North Korea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, even Latin America will be monuments to peace, love, and flower power, sections of the globe where overage diplomats and military officers can be safely put out to pasture, free to rusticate without unpleasant demands placed upon them.

John Bolton was right.  And, it would be good for the Herd of Elephants to pay attention to him.  Foreign matters will come closer and closer to center stage.  This will be the case to an even greater degree if We the People become more optimistic about the economy over the next year and if, (unlikely as this may be) Congress addresses the deficit to more than a symbolic degree.

The US has suffered through eighteen years of ideologically driven, situationally naive presidents.  We have at least two more years of this enervating situation yet to go.  Is it too much to hope that the days of True Belief will come to an end--along with the decline of American influence and status in the world--in 2012?

Unfortunately it is.  That is unless either Obama bows out or the Republicans come up with a person capable of being a president who is not out of his depth when he must play his role on the world stage.

And, make no mistake about it, the next president will have to play a great role--for the earthquake is yet to come.

Ripples And Fallout

No event exists or can exist in a vacuum.  Certainly no event punctuated by the noise of bombs, missiles, and gunfire can be considered to have no implications, no ramifications, no ripples and fallout.  So it is with the Western Answer to the Libyan Question.

If there had ever been any chance of the Six Power Talks resuming, there is none now.  The US led campaign to abate the North Korean nuclear nuisance died with the first Tomahawk hitting some Libyan target.  The view adopted by the Hermits of Pyongyang is simple and direct.  When Gaddafi wimped out in 2003 and abandoned his nuclear and chemical weapons research and development efforts, he placed himself at the mercy of the West. How merciful the West is can be seen through the dust and flames of the incoming missiles.

This North Korean understanding echoes the earlier contention in Pyongyang that the instant the Soviet Union dropped out of the arms race, gasping and retching with exhaustion, it was lost.  The loss of the nuclear option assured that the Cold War would be ended to the advantage of the US.  The Hermits took a similar position regarding Saddam Hussein.  His decision to allow UN inspectors roam Iraq in search of prohibited nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, Pyongyang has animadverted, led inexorably to the American invasion and Saddam's fall.

The big QED is self-evident.  As long as North Korea has a nuclear capacity, even a very rudimentary one, it will be safe.  Lose that capacity and all is over.  The security of the North and its peculiar form of government can last only so long as it keeps stonewalling any and all attempts to end its nuclear program.  Or, to be accurate, all other programs oriented to obtaining and expanding the arsenal of weapons capable of mass destruction and associated delivery systems.

Anyone who believes that the logic tree in Tehran is different from that in Pyongyang is capable of buying the Golden Gate Bridge on EBay.  The mullahs have long pointed to Pakistan as the prime example of just how having a nuclear capability provided an impressive measure of both immunity and ability to extort.

So, the first major bit of fallout from Operation Odyssey Dawn is this: Nuclear weapons do make a country safe.  One must wonder if this easily foreseeable ramification was considered by The Nice Young Man From Chicago and the Three Weird Sisters who counseled him with such dramatic effect.

The partisans of consistency in American foreign policy have been wondering just when will the US and the rest of the "international community" do a Libya on Syria.  Senator Joe Leiberman has reportedly called for a no-fly zone over Syria if Bashir Assad employs the "same tactics" as did Gaddafi in Libya.  The senator invoked the Libyan "precedent" explicitly as he referenced the lethal means used already by Syrian security and military units.

Leiberman did not mention Hama.  He should have.  It would have made his case more convincing.  Bashir's father turned the Syrian army loose in that city back in 1982 after the Muslim Brotherhood raised the flag of rebellion.  At the least ten thousand people died under rocket, artillery, and air delivered fire.  The death toll might have been an order of magnitude greater.  In Syria, particularly among the aging "old guard" of the Syrian Baathist party, Hama constitutes precedent.  More than the omnipresent security services, the collective memory of Hama is the fear factor which has inhibited popular unrest until the past few days.

A couple of ground truths reinforce the trenchancy of the Hama precedent.  The first is the firm grip the old guard has on the military and security services of Syria as well as its demonstrated ability to inhibit the reformist tendencies of Bashir these past several years.  The second and more important governing reality is that Bashir and all the rest of the power elite in Syria are Alawites. The Alawites are a despised minority perceived by the majority Sunni population, particularly by hardliners such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as apostates deserving of death--death, not the power and preeminence they have enjoyed for more than sixty years now.  This means the current government and its adherents have nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, no safe haven should the levers of power slip from their grasp.

For Bashir and the rest, Syria is their Alamo.  They can neither expect nor give quarter.  Any internal dissent, any incipient rebellion, is existential from the perspective of the Alawite ruling structure.

With so much at stake, the Hama precedent must govern.  That is the essential starting point for any evaluation of US policy regarding the internal dynamics of Syria.  Bashir and the Baathists will do whatever is necessary to survive, to maintain power.  If that means piling corpses higher and higher, it will be done.

Hilary Clinton in a TV interview belabored the obvious with regard to Syria.  She averred that every country in the Mideast is different.  Duh?  Gosh, you don't say?

Syria certainly isn't Libya.  Syria is far from isolated.  While Gaddafi could count on the unstinting support of Hugo Chavez (so can Bashir, whom Hugo called a "brother" and a "humanitarian",) the Syrian leader can rely upon the support and assistance of Iran, Hezbollah, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and probably Saudi Arabia.  This means the current regime can gain access to money, diplomatic assistance, and even personnel from these countries.

Nor has Syria gone out of its way to alienate European and other states.  It has good to very good diplomatic and economic relations throughout most of the West.  It is not seen in other, lesser developed regions as a potential troublemaker, backer of coups, supporter of local terror groups, meddler in local politics.  This is quite unlike the situation in which Libya--or more properly, Gaddafi personally--placed itself.  This implies that even with a reenactment of Hama, the degree of official international condemnation would be lessened greatly.

Nor, in the event the balloon goes up in Syria is it at all probable that the mild mannered and soft-spoken Bashir would go on television ranting about how he would crush the rebels "without mercy" or go way over the line of sanity with wild accusations concerning drug use, or the involvement of al-Qaeda and the CIA.  The Syrian leader is constitutionally incapable of presenting himself as a Gaddafi style nutjob.  This coupled with the inevitable media (including Internet) blackout would make the task of overlooking any repetition of Hama relatively easy for any government so inclined.

Syria has a far more well equipped and trained military than did Libya.  It has a far more up to date air defense system.  In short, it would not be so easy a nut to hammer.  And, quite unlike Libya, any attack on Syria, even one approved of by the Arab League and UN Security Council (impossible as that hypothetical might be), would result in a response by Hezbollah and Hamas directed against Israel.  Any effort to impose a no-fly zone would touch off the next Arab-Israeli war.

Now, that, bucko, is a very unpleasant thought.  One which underscores just how far from Libya on the spectrum of doable targets one finds Syria.

Anyway the tofu is sliced, the result is the same: Libya is not a precedent as regards Syria.  If the current regime needs to kill a few score or a few thousand score of its citizens to maintain the political status quo, it will be done.  And, R2P to the contrary notwithstanding, the "international community" will do nothing beyond issue boiler plate denunciations and impose a few meaningless sanctions.  Well, if really motivated, there may be a move to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court, an action which would not simply be without meaning but would have the counterproductive effect of undercutting the notion of "accountability" for crimes against humanity.

There are other ripples sloshing around.  None are particularly positive as regards the international puissance of the West generally or the US in particular.  One of these is the highlighting of political divisions within the European states as well as between some of those and the US.  Another is a further underscoring of the adrift-at-the-policy-level approach to international affairs which characterizes the Obama administration.  Yet one more is the ease with which the Western public, and the American in particular, can delude itself about potential future developments in critical countries if the magic totem word, "democracy" is uttered often and loudly enough.

Bad as those might be, there is one ripple which is a tsunami in comparison.  The Libyan Question and the Wstern answer to it has demonstrated that the US and others have not learned a thing from the messes in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  What this means is simple.  We have not yet learned the crucial nature of answering the "what next?" question before taking the first action--a first action which will always, but always necessitate a second and a third and so on.

In the game of global chess, the US and the others have once more shown they are fine trumpet players--loud but irrelevant to the needs of reality.

The Irony Of R2P And The Ivory Coast

You all remember Rwanda, don't you?  It did make the news back about the time Whitewater was the lead story.  The butchery in Rwanda, the killing of Hutus by Tutsis and Tutsis by Hutus put enough bodies in local streams to cause impromptu dams and flooding.  The imagery was shockingly brutal enough--even in the pre-YouTube days of network censorship--to cause waves of revulsion throughout the US, Europe, and elsewhere.

There were mouthfuls of "deplore" and "unacceptable."  There were repeated calls for "restraint" and "moderation."  World leader after world leader denounced the ongoing slaughter.  But, no state did anything to impose a moratorium on mass murder.  The "international community" assembled on the banks of the Hudson was long on words and very, very short on deeds.

It was only a decade or so later that the "international community" and its great organization, the UN, did something other than talk.  Boosted by "concern" and even "alarm" over religiously motivated industrial strength killing in Bosnia, the member states of the UN finally did something in response to Rwanda.  The 192 members unanimously approved an "outcome document" which enshrined the Responsibility to Protect (R2P.)

The diplomats assembled in the General Assembly executed the will of their respective governments and declared that when a government failed to protect its citizens from genocide or war crimes or crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing, then the "international community" had the responsibility to extend protection to those in danger and need.  It was a feel-good move.  Some of the governments, particularly the legatees of the long Western movement by fits and starts to lessen the damage of war and enhance the rights of citizens against arbitrary government, might actually have intended that R2P would have real effect in the real world of real evil deeds.

Other states, no doubt, had no intent of ever honoring any obligation under the R2P formulation.  None would oppose it openly as such would be even more politically incorrect and liable to bring international disapproval than being against clean air and drinkable water.  International disapprobation brings with it a loss of influence and no state wishes that for itself.  So every country marched along with a light heart and a merry tune on its lips into a brave, bright future of greater safety for all.

Even the many governments which were authoritarian on a good day and brutally suppressive most of the time joined up.  Libya linked arms with Norway, Syria with Sweden, Iran with Denmark; Russia wrapped its arms around Canada while China did the same with the US.  It was such a sweet moment!  There was Zimbabwe; there was Sudan; there was the Ivory Coast.  All singing the R2P jive.

The R2P outcome document was long, almost infinitely long, on high minded and lofty sentiments.  It was short to the point of nonexistence on those pesky details such as what would trigger R2P or who would make the trigger decision or who would actually do the dirty work of protecting some group somewhere against some dire threat.  There were no mechanisms, no procedures, no substance which would serve to speedily and uniformly transform the fine sounding words of R2P to the dirty realities of imposing its requirements on a recalcitrant (or nonexistent) government.

All except the most starry-eyed and vapid minded of folks knew that the realities of international politics assured that R2P would have the impact of an ant's fart on a hurricane.  True, but with an important, indeed critical caveat, unless one or more major powers determined that national or strategic interest demanded the application of R2P in a particular venue--and worked with determination and purpose to gain sufficient support from states having coinciding national or strategic interests.

This is why the bombs have been falling in Libya and not Yemen or Bahrain.  Consistency is nice but not either necessary nor sufficient in the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

For reasons endemic to the domestic political cultures of both France and the UK, Libya loomed large.  Facilitating the task of gaining sufficient consensus internationally was Colonel Gaddafi's record of global mischief making and domestic suppression.

The US could have sat out this particular dance.  The Americans had no direct dog in the fight even if there existed a longer term threat of a resurgent Gaddafi reverting to his pre-2003 type should he prevail domestically.  But, the Obama administration had taken lumps almost beyond count for its lack of a firm stance during the "Jasmine" and "Lotus" revolutions.  And, it should never be forgotten there were three potent members of the senior level personnel who had either been badly traumatized by Rwanda (Powers and Rice) or were abundantly proud of the American led intervention in Bosnia (Clinton).

Now comes the irony.

Of all the countries around the world currently undergoing internal political convulsions, there is one in which the impact of governmental sins of both omission and, more importantly, commission merit the immediate invocation of R2P.  That country is not Bahrain, despite the contentions of those who abhor inconsistency.  Nor is it Yemen even though that country has seen a respectable body count.  It is not even Syria, authoritarian as that country might be.  It is not even Libya even though the fighting is in full swing under the kindly eyes of US and other country's pilots.

The country is the Ivory Coast.

By all the metrics and standards customarily employed to measure such things, the Ivory Coast is in the throes of internal war in which one of the contestants is the internationally condemned incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, and the other is the internationally recognized winner of the presidential election, Alassane Outtara.  Each claimant to the throne is backed by armed supporters, but Gbagbo has the army as well as less formal militias in his corner.

The weeks and months since the election have seen an escalation in violence which has taken a very obvious ramp up in the past few days.  There are, according to the UN, which has the typically ineffectual "peace keeping" force in country, currently as many as one million internally displaced persons, most of whom are fleeing the murder squads in Abidjan.

Fears of an increased body count have grown since Gbagbo now has one--that's right, one--attack helicopter at his disposal as well as some brand new multiple rocket launchers.  These fears have not resulted in any significant action by the UN or the "international community" or even the African Union.  There have been no economic sanctions imposed on Gbagbo or his intimates.  Nor have there been any travel bans.  None of the instant moves employed against Gaddafi in the earliest days of the popular uprising.

The UN Human Rights Counsel has taken time out from condemning Israel so that it might send a commission of inquiry to the Ivory Coast.  Apparently this bastion of concern over the wellbeing of all people everywhere cannot rely on media reports and must ascertain for itself as to whether or not there have been human rights abuses committed by Gbagbo and his forces.  In the same resolution, the Watchdog of Humanity called upon the state radio in Ivory Coast to "refrain" from inciting violence.

Wow!  That must have them shaking in their boots all around the presidential palace.  The boys had best be careful with their knee knocking, they might drop one of those dread rockets and hurt themselves.

The US has taken a firm, even hard, line on the Ivory Coast Question.  In a video message to the folks down there Ivory Coast way, President Obama has termed the election "fair and free" and has said that he recognizes Outtara as the real deal president.  He called for Gbagbo to hand over the keys to the presidential latrine.

Well, if that doesn't get Gbagbo's attention what good would sanctions or travel bans or no-fly zones do?  Right now it is impossible to say how many people have died since the 28 November 10 election.  But, given the impressive number who were killed in the crossfire during the last round of internal war as well as the more conservative reports out of Africa, the number must equal at the least the eight thousand or so killed in Libya prior to the establishment of the no-fly and no-go zones.

Considering that Susan Rice was reportedly shaken to her very core when she went to Rwanda shortly after the machetes stopped swinging and Samantha Powers has made her bones as an academic by studying genocide, it is of some interest that the US is seemingly indifferent to the looming massacres in the Ivory Coast.  Even if Ms Rice and Ms Powers are loath to see white American wings over a Black African country, they should be plumping for the symbolic sanctions and travel bans.  Admittedly, the Ivory Coast is a prime source of high quality chocolate and Americans are fond of eating this particular comestible, but even our collective sweet tooth should not be allowed to prevent action intended to halt killings.

By the appearance of indifference to African deaths at the hands of Africans, the US and Europe run the real risk of being accused once more of racism.  This happened, you might recall, during the Nineties with the contrast between Rwanda and Bosnia.  The French alone have taken some sort of lead at least in the UNHRC.  Perhaps Sarkozy is sensitive to sentiments arising in Africa.

The Geek has written this post not because he favors an intervention in the Ivory Coast.  He does not.  Rather the purpose of this exercise has been to demonstrate not simply the intellectual bankruptcy of the Obama administrations approach to foreign affairs but, more importantly, the failure, an inevitable and built in failure of the R2P and similar lofty minded moves by the "international community."

When night falls, like it or not, foreign policy is directed, even dictated, by a combination of domestic political imperatives and national interest, not abstract principle.  The only form of hypocrisy which matters is that of pretending otherwise.

Idiocy Epitomized: Libya And R2P--And Why It Is A Western Artifact

The ultimate justification for the current inchoate effort by France, the UK, and others including the less than eager US is The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which doctrine derives from a 2005 outcome document concerning the massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia which was adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly.  This action can be seen best as a collective catharsis of collective guilt by an "international community" awestruck by what it had "allowed" to occur.

The heart of R2P is the notion that should a state fail to protect its citizens from "genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity," the international community has the obligation to undertake the protective task.  The doctrine as adopted by the UN is an outgrowth of the earlier concept holding that the UN could call upon member states to intervene should internal political disruption produce a potentially destabilizing refugee stream.  Both artifacts of the General Assembly fall far outside the mandate of the UN as conceived.

(It is worth noting in this context, the framework of R2P, that the three people in the senior ranks of the Obama administration who pushed hardest for the Libyan intervention are connected in one way or another with both the doctrine and the two slaughter ridden venues from which it emerged.  Former Harvard professor and current National Security Council heavyweight Samantha Power is a specialist in genocide, our Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice has long been an advocate of robust intervention to prevent any repetition of Rwanda, and SecState Hilary Clinton has been proud of her presidential husband's brave move in mounting out the air and later ground intervention in Bosnia.)

The foundation of both R2P and its precursor can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and companion international agreements or conventions including those falling under the general term "Geneva Convention."  Despite the grandiose title of the Human Rights document and regardless of the expansive goals of the others, the Geneva Convention and all the rest, are not consensus documents representing any global set of norms and values.  They are creations of the West, of Europe and the US along with other, Western leaning societies and cultures such as those of South and Central America.

The adoption of the several conventions and declarations by all members of the UN in no way obviates the basic reality that the ideas, the norms and values to which official assent has been given, are Made in the West and are the unique outcome of Western history.  This ground truth can be inferred from the assorted reservations which have garlanded the official acceptances on file.  Many of these reservations, such as those entered by various Muslim majority states, demonstrate a rejection of Western norms, values, and ideas regarding both "universal" rights and limitations on acceptable means of waging war.

Don't get your knickers in a knot over the use of the word "Muslim" in the preceding paragraph.  The uniquely Western nature of the norms and values embodied in the referenced documents owes little to religion per se.  Back down, Christians or Jews, this is not a slam on the ideals contained in your sacred writings.  The core of all religions is universally in favor of peace, love, flower power, and urge the eschewing of war other than those of the "just" kind.  Of course there have been wars fought over the meaning of the word "just."

The Western origin of the norms, values, and ideals embodied in the referenced conventions emerge not from religion and sacred sentiments but rather from a more base emotion: disgust.  Over the centuries Europeans fought wars of a uniquely bloody nature.  They also fought wars with nauseating regularity.  And, Europeans, particularly the English and, later, the Americans, fought wars with a single minded absolutism which came to the highest fruition with the hectatomb of World War II.

From the Thirty Years War to the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon to World Wars I and II, the Western Way of War provided object lesson after object lesson in the need to somehow regulate and modulate war so as to ensure the lowest cost of lives, particularly the lives of non-combatants, and the least possible damage to non-military targets.  As a result there was a development of norms which were far more often honored in the breech than in the observance.

The attempts to regulate both war and governmental treatment of civilian populations which proved most likely to fail were those predicated upon religious strictures.  The Catholic Church made numerous moves to limit and control war.  All failed.  Far more efficacious were limitations on war were those based on national self-interest.  The long centuries of very limited (and quite inconclusive) war which spanned the period between the Thirty Years War and the conflicts of Napoleon were the result of self-interest pricked by the recognition that unlimited, absolute war was as destructive of the victor as the vanquished.

In a companion way the limits that governments increasingly imposed upon themselves in the suppression of internal unrest or mere interpersonal violence were the consequence of a growing recognition that social and political good order and stability required polite and restrained behavior.  The code of the gentleman which emerged in England and was copied faithfully in the US was the result of this recognition.  The growth in fits and starts of representative and increasingly democratic government was likewise the consequence of a blossoming realization that inclusion was far more beneficial than suppression.

After the suppression of the Paris Commune and the ending of the American War Between the States, the internal good order was more and more facilitated by a concern on the part of the government for the rights, dignities, and status of the civilian population.  During the same period the first stumbling efforts to codify the off and on practices of limiting inter-state conflict were made as well.

But it took the massive, unprecedented industrialized mass murder of the two World Wars to prod the West, or at least those states in the West left standing when the Second World War ended, to make a concerted effort to impose their collective internal and international values, norms, and ideals in a set of international conventions.  It is from this soil of blood and guts that the plant of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the expanded Geneva Convention grew.  The UDHR was adopted quickly with the formal inauguration of the UN.  The conventions, like the UN itself, were the product of Western experiences over centuries and the expression of norms, values, and ideals were forged in the fires of war.

This, then, is the background of the current idiocy in Libya.

The question which must be addressed is simply this: How relevant is this Made in the West artifact to the situation in Libya (and Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, or others yet to be born?)

In plain point of fact R2P is a doctrine to be applied on an ad hoc basis only.  This means that there is no end to the implied hypocrisy of any specific application.  Is it not hypocritical to bomb one's way to peace, stability, and civilian safety in Libya but not the Ivory Coast?  Or, Yemen?  Or, should the body count cross some mythical line yet to be determined.  Bahrain?  Syria?

Then there is the necessary corollary of hypocrisy--base opportunism.  The existence of R2P allows cover for opportunism, for the disguised pursuit of national interest.  It is this rather than any legitimate apprehension of feeling the military wrath of the "international community" which propels the solid opposition of Russia and China to any UN interference in the internal affairs of a state.  Other countries, such as India, which have had experience with internal unrest and a concomitant bloodstained suppression, may view R2P and its precursor with a jaundiced eye.

The experiences of intervention under one name or guise or another also predisposes African and Latin American states against R2P and its companions.  The pervasive fear of intervention which can be seen throughout Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Mideast is totally legitimate, every bit as legitimate and history based as the Western expression of "universal" norms and values.  The two are fundamentally antipodal and will remain that way into the future as far as one can see.

The uncertainties regarding the relevance of R2P as well as the potential narratives of "hypocrisy" and "opportunism" are in play with respect to the divisions which have become so evident in Europe.  The sharp distinctions between the Western created conventions and the culturally and historically determined "reservations" put in place by Arab and Muslim states have become every bit as high profile.  It is, for example, not naivete but a difference in perceptions of norms and values which provoked the expressions of shock and dismay from the Arab League over the reality that imposition of a no-fly zone required that bombs be dropped and missiles fired.

In short, the Libyan Affair has again demonstrated a long standing historical truism.  The best guide to foreign relations is self-determined national and strategic interest.  While principles can and have played a constructive role in determining both national interest and foreign policy, basing a war (for that is what it is, regardless of euphemism) on the "universal" principles embodied in R2P and its foundation conventions is not wise.  Nor is it likely to be productive in the longer term regardless of the specifics occurring in the shorter run.

In sum, President Obama was misguided in the extreme when he succumbed to the importuning and arguments of three special pleaders, Powers, Rice, and Clinton.  Grabbing the coattails of Sarkozy and his personal view of R2P was not a mistake: it was, as Talleyrand famously put it, "a blunder."

"The Europeans Wanted The No-Fly Zone---"

There is a historically based truism about war--even a very small war hiding behind an euphemistic moniker and a poetic code name.  The truism can be summed accurately in a single word: unity.  There must be a unity between political goal and military goal.  There must be a unity between the goal and what can be termed the "definition of victory."  There must be a unity--or at least a tight cohesion--between the definition of victory and the "theory of victory," which is the specific mix of military and non-military means intended to result in victory.  Finally, there must be a unity of command so as to assure that all forces employed are marching to the same band.

Unity in all the forms mentioned is critical to war waged by a single power.  It is even more critical when the war is undertaken by a coalition.

To date Operation Odyssey Dawn (as the Americans term the effort in Libya) or Operation Ellamy (as the Brits have dubbed it) fails in most of the ways listed above.  There is no unity of political goals as between the several coalition members.  There is no unity between political and military goal as regards the US.  There is no unified definition of victory.  Thus, there can be no definition of victory.  Nor can there be a unified theory of victory.  And, looking forward, the unity of command and common effort is nowhere to be seen.

Operation Odyssey Dawn has been through yesterday a predominately American effort.  Nearly two thirds of all sorties have been flown by US aircraft.  American planes flew 212 sorties while the British and French as well as other NATO states contributed 124.  This trend continued during the past twenty-four hours with the Americans flying 113 sorties and the other twelve coalition partners contributing 63.  This is an improvement on the 85 percent Made in America record of a couple of days earlier.  The overwhelming majority of the 162 Tomahawk missiles fired were American (the British have fired a dozen or so from a submarine which represents a goodly chunk of the 64 Tomahawks in the British inventory.)

In this respect the operation represents business as usual.  Way back when during the days of H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton the no-fly zone was primarily an American effort.  The US flew five sorties for every one undertaken by the UK.  (The French were not involved at all.)  The situation was much the same during the Bosnian affray.

All this "joint" effort has put a lot of hours on the airframes of American aircraft.  It would be interesting to know how many hours had accumulated where and when on the F-15E Strike Eagle which crashed in Libya as the result of an "equipment malfunction."  The use--perhaps bordering on overuse--may be one reason the US military seems anxious to pass the baton to someone else in Libya.

It is not the only nor even the primary reason the US is looking so eagerly for an early exit from its current leadership role.  Leaving aside the motives and their worthiness, the most important consideration is whether or not the American bowing out will help or hinder the gaining of unity in all the forms mentioned.

The primary requirement, the requirement from which all subordinate forms of unity descend, is that of political goal.  With respect to Libya this seems to be quite elusive.  The French seem to be wedded to an endstate which sees Gaddifi gone.  The British have acknowledged they have no exit plan, which implies the absence of a final political goal.  The American president has drawn a line between an expansive political goal and a very, very narrow military one.  The Germans are opposed to everything which may bring with it the possibility of someone shooting someone.  The Turks are likewise inclined.  The Arab League is adrift in a sea of confusion bordering on despair.

The upshot of this sorry state of affairs is there is little if any probability of a unified political goal emerging regardless of who or what finally takes over the political direction of the war.  With this reality in place at the most foundational level, it almost doesn't matter who runs the actual conduct of daily operations.  But, politics guides that as well.  The UK with phlegmatic realism understands that NATO has the command and control capacity to run a coalition war.  The French and others are against this for the frankly political reason that NATO is Western and as such will alienate the Arab states whose political cover is essential for the effort.

The internal political contradictions and tensions which afflict not only the AL but many of the member states as well prevents the League from adopting and keeping to a unified political goal or even collaborating with non-Arab states in formulating one for the Libyan Question.  This reality makes an imitation of the ISAF in Afghanistan a fiction.  (Not that the ISAF is a model of unity--consider the risk averse nature of many contributor countries such as Germany whose ROE's virtually prevent firing an angry round.)

When night falls there will be a cobbled together simulacrum of a central political directorate.  Command and control of daily, routine operations will devolve to someone, perhaps the French or a joint Anglo-French body, or, just maybe, NATO.  The political directorate will not make the hard choices of the what-do-we-do-next? sort of decisions which will be popping up in a very unpretty way shortly.  These matters will be kicked back to the national leaders.  The notion that the assorted leaders of the main players (which will continue to include the US as only the US has many critical capacities such as enough aircraft) will achieve a consensus on the questions of what-now? is hallucinatory at best.

The yawning gap between President Obama's declaratory policy--"Gaddafi must go"--and the no-American-boots-on-the-ground pledge underscores the impossibility of coming to effective terms with the what-now? genre of questions.  The vast differences in motivation among the assorted NATO states which have contributed aircraft of basing facilities further exacerbates the question.

The American stance toward the effort in Libya is epitomized in the quote giving this post its title.  Of course this view ignores the vast differences in motives and intents within the "Europeans."  Frankly, the effort is the brainchild of France and the UK.  This allows the inference that these two should be the political directorate, but such is totally unacceptable to all others.

So the necessary unities will not exist.  This redounds to Gaddafi's advantage.  The greatest irony in this is simply that should Brother Leader come out of the current fracas still in power, the states with the most to worry about are those of the Arab League.  Given Gaddafi's past love affairs with terror groups and the current political tumult in most Arab states, his capacity for mischief is unlimited.

A line from an old Jefferson Airplane song is relevant: "Go away or go all the way in."  This is the fundamental dilemma facing the mock coalition in the sky over Libya.  The states with the most dogs in the fight are those of the Arab League.  The collective and individual unwillingness of these states to address the ground truth in play in Libya right now constitutes a major failure of political will and acumen.  In time this failure may well lead to more failed states where Arabic is the language.

American Ethics And American War

The Geek wrote this post last August.  Somehow it never got published.  Admittedly there is a reference in the next paragraph which is dated but the overall subject is still timely considering the accusations which have been made regarding the infliction of civilian casualties during Operation Odyssey Dawn.  The agenda driven and the poorly informed as well as the opportunistic and gullible always either peddle or buy the line holding Americans are as kill crazy as a ferret in the chicken house.

Frankly the accusations by Amnesty International to the effect that the US has violated international law and the ethics of warfare by its actions in Yemen (see immediately preceding post) rankle the Geek no end. This short take is a personal note to the tender hearted, high minded, lofty thinking, and historically ignorant lawyerly types at Amnesty International as well as other, similarly inclined NGOs and their sympathizers at the UN.

Just over sixty-five years ago President Franklin Roosevelt was briefed on the planned invasion of Iwo Jima. He was told the island was heavily defended by a large, well dug in defensive force with orders to hold until the last man. The goal of the defenders was to inflict a maximum number of casualties on the American forces with the larger intent of weakening American political will so as to allow an end to the war on terms very favorable to the Japanese.

The president was also told that there were no people on the island other than members of the Imperial Japanese armed forces. No civilians. No dragooned Korean laborers. No "comfort women." It was a pure military target with only soldiers, sailors, and airmen present. Killing them was well within the laws of warfare.

Finally, the president was advised that American fatalities would be very high. Higher even than the hectatombs of Tarawa or Peleliu. The US military high command unanimously held that the best means of attack would be standing off and drenching the island with chemical munitions, particularly the most potent one we had in our arsenal, mustard agent. There was no danger of retaliation. The Japanese had no means and the Germans were effectively defeated at this point.

FDR was told bluntly that using chemical weapons would save thousands of American lives and would not cost one Japanese life more than would be the case with a conventional invasion.

Faced with this stark choice the president said, "No." He would not cross the ethical Rubicon of being the first to use chemical weapons in WW II. (This despite the well documented use of both chemical and biological munitions by the Japanese in China.)

The ethically (or morally) based decision of FDR condemned more than six thousand US Marines to death.

The invasion of Iwo Jima constituted a tribute to human courage and endurance which will reflect glory on the Marines and the country which produced them for generations to come as well as the most famed photograph of World War II for Americans. But, there is no doubt that the men who died as well as their families, friends, indeed, the nation as a whole, would have cheerfully exchanged glory for the lives of those who were killed in the black sands of Iwo Jima.

Mr Roosevelt preserved his moral purity. He, perhaps, protected the ethical integrity of the US. To the president and many others later, during peacetime, with the luxury of considering both ethics and their cost in human lives, the decision was the correct one. And, arguably it was; it did establish a limit during the closing days of a war in which all previous limits had been not only transcended but obliterated.

The Geek has seen no signs that later presidents became any less conscious of ethics as a limiting factor in war. Presidents have made grave mistakes in deciding where and against whom and with what means war must be waged. However, the mistakes have been far more often than not on the side of caution, conservatism, on the side of limiting both the scope of war and the lethality of the means employed.

Get a grip on this, Amnesty: The US is not given to using disproportionate means. It is not given to employing weapons with undue breadth of effect. It is not in the habit of using too much. It is far more common to use too little.

Even though those of Amnesty International love to hate America. Even though they are all members of the Blame America First club, the historical realty, the ground truth, is the US attempts (often without success to be sure) to fight with the least force possible, to kill as few as feasible, to take all due, and many undue precautions to exempt civilians and non-combatants from harm.

Hey, AI, you all may not like it, but that is the nature of history. Get over your chronic inability to see affairs as they actually have been and are.

Gaddafi Stays On Message While The US Doesn't Have One

It would be easy to admire Gaddafi's tenacity if, indeed, he had any other option.  With an International Criminal Court indictment hanging over his head and very few safe havens to contemplate, Gaddafi has little choice other than to fight on.  As a result it is a no-brainer to see why Brother Leader has stayed on message.

The brain sweat comes in with a question.  Why is it necessary for the US, the assorted European states, the members of the Arab League, and African Union to make it so much easier for the Colonel to keep on keeping on?  Why do all these players seem to have an agenda calculated to assure that not only will Gaddafi maintain power, he will be around to cause enormous amounts of trouble until and unless the indirect pressures of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation take effect?

The Arab League has walked back from its walk back concerning the imposition of the no-fly zone--"What!  You mean you have to fire missiles and drop bombs?"  Apparently working under the assumption that Muslims wouldn't lie about such a matter, the Arab League took Gaddafi's word for appalling civilian casualties but then were convinced just possibly the Gaddfi noise machine was exaggerating the body count.

But the Arab League trepidations found a quick echo in the foreign ministers of both the EU and NATO.  For the last couple of days, the loudest sound in Europe has been that made by knees knocking with fear.  Given that few of the countries represented in either group is noted for resolution in the face of the uncertainties which come with every use of military means, this is no surprise.  It is so unsurprising that it would be a very real shock if the Gaddafi family--some of whose members are very well acquainted with Western ways--had not counted upon this sort of division and worked assiduously to provoke it.

The opposition which has come from one of the Boys in the Kremlin and the Trolls of Beijing is also no shock.  Again it was so expectable that it bends the mind to believe that once again the Gaddafi family was not counting upon it.  The offers by the Gaddafi family to cancel the current oil and natural gas leases and offer them to other countries including China, Russia, and India show some base cunning at work.  The pursuit of divide and conquer particularly with assemblages which are already divided needs no deep thinking.  The payoff has been handsome with India, Brazil, and South Africa joining Russia and China in a chorus of very loud denunciation.

Public support within the US and UK for the current ill and perhaps mis-defined military mission runs around one in three.  It may be higher in France as its citizens seem to be willing to take pride in their country doing something which is compatible with both national interests and national values.  However, the low support in the US has shown itself in the opposition presented to "Obama's War" from the left, right, and center of both parties.

Much of the opposition is predicated upon the all too obvious dichotomy between the goals of the current air operations and the Obama declaratory policy which holds, "Gaddafi must go."  The lack of congruence between the stated goals and the declaratory policy is guaranteed to undercut public confidence and, thus, support for the effort.  President Obama has either been very economical with the truth or quite hallucinatory regarding the endgame in Libya.

Other very obvious disconnects between US actions and policy in Libya with its actions and policies elsewhere in the Arab states also undercuts both understanding and support.  We are in an active shooting war with the announced aim of protecting civilians from an arbitrary and brutal regime in Libya while being merely "concerned" when the same is taking place in Yemen albeit on a arguably lesser scale.  The Obama administration has not even worked itself up to the level of being concerned when it comes to the situation in Bahrain, which leads to the conclusion that oil is thicker than blood given the close cooperation between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

The lack of coherent goals couples with distaste for the war against Gaddafi and the fear of upsetting the always sensitive Muslims to provide the interesting lack of eagerness on the part of everyone to take over the lead in Libya.  The Obama administration is quite keen on passing the baton to someone else.  But there is a palpable lack of takers.  Even if NATO showed willingness to do the job, the Arab League has opposed the idea as have NATO members Turkey and France.  Given the need for all decisions to be made by consensus, Turkish and French opposition kills the concept.

Perhaps France is angling for the job.  Assuming the command and control resident with French forces is up to the job, there is no objection to this.  Even the subordination of American combat units to such a command has precedent.  In this context it might be recalled that the US handed over command during the Dominican Republic intervention in 1965 to Brazil.  American combat forces including ground units served as a part of an Organization of American States task group with the complete approval of the US Congress and media of the day.

Perhaps the muscular and ambitious Nicholas Sarkozy, who has done more than any other single person to push for the current intervention without a salient goal, is or will have second thoughts as the gravity of the "what next?" question sinks in.  There can not be a single observer well oriented in time and place who believes the no-fly zone even with the add-on of strikes against Gaddifi's forces will provide for a stable, secure outcome.  The current operation will not and can not remove Gaddafi and without this there is no possibility of an outcome even tangentially favorable to Western interests and values.

In the best case the current operation will end with Libya divided into two zones.  The eastern one will remain under Gaddafi.  The western one will eventually fall under the sway of advocates of violent political Islam.  All must remember that the west, Cyrenaica, was not only the fountainhead of insurgency against Italy but also the homeland of a very austere form of Islam derived from the old Salifist doctrine.  This is a connection which is as true today as it was a century ago.  We must not forget or overlook this ground truth.

The policies and actions of the West are riddled with internal contradictions.  They are laden with ambiguities. They are freighted with uncertainties to a degree surpassing previous "optional" wars such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.  It is no surprise that support for the effort is narrow and very shallow.

All that can be written with certainty is that the world will be a nastier and more fearful place should Gaddafi remain in power even over a truncated form of Libya.  It is equally certain that in war unlike other forms of human endeavor, a full loaf is infinitely preferable to a half loaf.  And, what is being done right now is a half loaf approach at best.

Woosh! There Goes Yemen Down The Potty

You know things must be bad when Somali refugees start leaving.  This is happening in Yemen, so there is little hope that the place will escape failed state status.  Of course you can't blame these hyper vigilant survivors of a war without fronts.  They learned up close and personal that he who hesitates is dead.

The Yemeni army is fractured.  Several units have "mutinied" with the result that former comrades-in-arms are now shooting each other.  The army is reflecting the other divisions which have occurred in Yemen subsequent to the quite ill-advised use of highly trained and skilled snipers to kill dozens assembled outside the University of San'a last Friday protesting the thirty-two year old dictatorship of Abdullah Saleh.  As Talleyrand once observed of a particularly stupid bit of political murder committed by his boss, Napoleon, "Sire that was worse than a crime.  It was a blunder."

How much of a blunder Saleh has been discovering the past forty-eight hours.  The chief tribe in this tribal assemblage, his tribe, has called for his ouster.  Several cabinet members--including fellow tribesmen--called it quits over the killings as did ambassador after ambassador.  Now the army has joined in with a senior officer, a commander of the northern district among others and a half-brother who has carried heavy internal security freight among others, leading the parade to opposition.

On the international scene, France continuing its leadership of the free and democratic countries, has become the first state to demand Saleh step down ASAP.  How long will it be before other countries in the West, for example the UK, join the chorus?

According to assorted "experts" the continued collapse of Yemen places the US in the space between a rock and a hard place.  After all, we are reminded, Yemen is a key ally in the fight against Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula.

Sure it is.

When evaluating the role of Saleh and Yemen in any contest with AQAP, it is critical to recall that Saleh took over South Yemen, the former Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, with the assistance of tribesmen who fought under the banner of violent political Islam.  Subsequently, these same folk have constituted the majority of the high command of the anti-terrorist units and a heavy percentage of the actual security force trigger pullers.  This ground truth along with Yemen's tribal nature may be the reason that Yemen has had a singular lack of success in suppressing AQAP.

It can be argued with some legitimacy that a failed Yemen right across the narrow straight from the long failed Somalia will exacerbate greatly the menace to navigation presented by the Merry Buccaneers Of Puntland.  A large grain of truth resides in that contention, but not a large enough one to make of it a pearl of wisdom.

The Yemeni coastguard rivals the Yemeni counter-terrorist forces for ineffectiveness.  This has not been remedied in the slightest by US aid.

Yemen is, has been and will be, whether or not Saleh stays in power, a source of jihadists and pirates alike.  The reason for that is the nature of the human terrain of Yemen.  The deep tribal nature of the place, the extreme poverty which besets the majority, the appeal of the most austere form of Islam, the cultural imperative of tribal solidarity against any outsider combine to assure Yemen is a fertile breeding place for jihad of all sorts.

Nor is the situation in Yemen going to be altered in any meaningful way by the introduction of democracy or any other form of exported "nation-building" including massive economic assistance.  It is critical, foundational, to remember that Yemen is not a nation in any recognizable sense of the word.  Rather it is a collection of rival tribes collected under a single flag which none recognize as being real.

Senior American decision makers headed by Defense Secretary Gates have warned that fragmentation of existing states will not contribute to stability.  While he made that warning with specific reference to the notion of a Libya partitioned into western and eastern components, his proposition is flatly wrong.  When a state, be it Libya, Yemen, or Somalia, is the artifact of well-intentioned Western diplomats, it is not an authentic affair.  Having never been a reality in the minds of most people living there, fragmentation along tribal or cultural lines is a viable option.

It can be argued on the basis of history, both European and non-Western, that nations and the states they create emerge slowly, painfully, and organically from internal imperatives and external pressures.  Only a nation and concomitant state so created can withstand stresses such as those seen in Libya or Yemen.

This suggests strongly that the collapse of Yemen into its component parts is not a bad idea even if the near-term consequences bear no resemblance to a stroll though paradise.  Only by falling apart will there be any hope of Yemen ever coming together in a stable way.

The best policy for France, the UK, or the US is to stay away.  Even if Saleh becomes a perfect imitation of Gaddafi, which is unlikely given the internal dynamics of Yemen, the West must restrain its impulses to impose peace, craft a settlement calculated to keep Yemen intact under some sort of imitation Western liberal government.

There is a lesson from Afghanistan which may be learned once more in Libya.  Outsiders cannot create a nation-state from a traditional, tribal society for which the entire notion of the nation and the state are literally unthinkable.  As was once said, "Don't try to teach a pig to sing.  It won't work.  It will annoy the pig."

Well, Now We're In--Why Should We Not Lead?

Yesterday Secretary of State Clinton warranted to the world's media that the US was not playing a leading role in the aerial intervention in Libya.  She assured all who would listen that American forces were playing only a supporting role in the complex operation of establishing a no-fly zone and, to follow the wording of Admiral Mike Mullen, get Gaddafi's forces to move back to garrison.

It seemed passingly strange that Ms Clinton would sound that particular note considering the widespread reports that it was her pressure which finally carried the day against the opposition of Robert Gates and Admiral Mullen. The most charitable characterization of her comment is that it carried Obama's water.  There is no doubt but Mr Obama would have been far, far happier to sit this particular fracas out while letting more robust governments such as those of Nicholas Sarkozy and David Cameron do the heavy lifting.

As the Obama administration's handling of most of the political unrest in the Mideast and North Africa has shown clearly, the president and his "team" seek a world in which the US is not a leader but rather a dutiful follower of consensus achieved elsewhere by others.  There may be many reasons lurking in the intellectual shadows surrounding this strange course of action, but two overt mechanisms are evident.  The president fears being equated with George W. Bush and his "Freedom agenda."  The president and at least some of his closest adherents eschew the crude realities of nationalism and national interest as well as the necessary concomitant, the US as a Great Power.

It was not statesmanship which forced the president and his people to cower behind a berm of contradictory messages regarding Libya ranging from the overly bellicose--Khadafi must go!--to the humbly pacifistic--this is a matter for the Libyan people.  It was not statesmanship which compelled Mr Obama to stand in the darkness downstage as David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy marched upstage, grabbing the spotlight as they did so.  It was not statesmanship, carefully calculated and deliberately decided policy which caused the POTUS to hide the US military lamp in the bushel of military nothingness which is the current British defense establishment or allow the French to jump in first, grabbing attention and credit as their zoomies occupied the safe sky over Benghazi.

Mr Obama's motives were far more mundane, not to say base than the requirements of global diplomacy.  He was afraid.  Fearful of looking like George W. Bush.  Affighted of having to make the very tough decisions which must be made in the next few days and weeks.  Frightened of losing his base and of alienating further the independents of the American electorate--a non-trivial consideration in that the Obama 2012 campaign is already well underway.

Then, of course, there is the hovering cloud of apprehension caused by uncertainty as to just what Arab and Muslim states and populations will say and do as the missiles and bombs fall on Libyan soil and heads.  Mr Obama--and a good many others--is quite scared of the unpredictable consequences of Muslim sensibilities being outraged by the realities of warfare--even of imposing the no-fly zone demanded by the Arab League.

There are two reasons why the US and other civilized states should be involved in Libya.  One is severely pragmatic--preventing Gaddafi from staying in power and presenting an ongoing threat to the civilized world, perhaps a much worse one than previously.  The other is not at all practical; rather it is one of ideals, of principles, of values and norms.  Gaddafi's conduct in recent days is repugnant to even the most loosely defined standards of acceptable governmental conduct.

The reality right now is that the air strikes and no fly zone may well leave Gaddafi in power.  This possibility has been acknowledged by Admiral Mullen.  This eventuality would render nugatory all the efforts made by the present coalition.  Yes, it would be nice if someone close to Gaddafi would be so kind as to grease him.  But that is what George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton both hoped would be the fate of Saddam Hussein.  The providential assassination is not a firm base for policy.

The necessary inference is a ground operation may prove necessary.  Such need not be an army which would remain in occupation, a military force providing security during an exercise in nation-building.  British ForMin Hague has left the door more than ajar for an invasion.  If the actual goal of the current operation is--as it should or must be--the removal of Gaddafi and the prevention of a bifurcation of Libya, it is hard to see how that may be accomplished without the introduction of ground forces.

The prospect of a replay of the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq can be nullified by careful limitation of the ground force mission to the defeat of Gaddafi's troops and the removal of Gaddafi.  There would then be no responsibility for long term presence in a stability role while the do-gooders practice nation-building.  While some sort of nation-building is no doubt required, this should be undertaken by the Arab League or the UN with "stability" forces being provided by the former under the auspices of the latter.  This would allow Western combat forces to be withdrawn without the horrid endgame seen in Iraq and without the never ending counterinsurgency of Afghanistan.

It the US wants stability in Libya it must bend every effort to assure that Gaddafi is removed, Libya not partitioned, and any ground commitment be short and focused.  We cannot do this by playing support to a coalition headed by France and the UK.  We can only obtain the goals we want by exercising the leadership role the world--including Cameron and Sarkozy--want.

Everyone has had a brief glimpse of a world political order without the US front and center.  No one found it to be as happy a place as they may have imagined or wished.

Syrian Immune System Challenged--Or Compromised?

Not that many days ago the Syrian jefe grande y supremo, Bashir al-Assad, decreed that Syria was "immune" to the political unrest spreading contagion like across North Africa and the Mideast.  Most observers around the world quickly agreed, nodding heads solemnly as they commented on how Bashir's anti-Israel and pro-Iran stance enjoyed widespread support among the common folk of the country.

That crowd sourced opinion may be correct.  It is also irrelevant.  Few people on the Syrian street place foreign policy on the head of the list of things liked or otherwise about the Syrian status quo.  There are far more pressing issues confronting most people in Damascus or the parched former farmlands of the country's northeast.

At first, events--most notably the failure of the expat called and organized first day of "rage"-- seemed to confirm both Bashir's self-assessment and the views of the experts.  Even later protests in Damascus were far more fizzle than the fanfare of revolution.

But the situation changed in a town far from Damascus, Daraa.  While protests occurred yesterday in five cities including Damascus, Daraa was the spot where the game possibly changed.  For reasons not yet clear, the security forces opened fire with lethal results for five civilians.  The powers that be reacted quickly and, from initial reports, properly.  Investigations and prosecutions were promised.  Even if the guilty proved to be security officials, prosecution was guaranteed, "regardless of rank."

The situation in Daraa was not defused by the governmental actions.  Today, at the funerals for two of the men killed, the security forces used tear gas to disperse demonstrators.  As is the case quite often with funerals, the one held today served as a platform for launching political protests.  More than a few of the ten thousand close personal friends of the deceased took to the streets with a vengeance.  In the customary point-counterpoint style of Mideast politics, the security forces pushed back with gas and mass arrests.

The new opposition group which has given itself the moniker of "The March 15 Revolution," has made the now obbligato move of establishing a Facebook page.  Not surprisingly, it has blamed the regime for the deaths.  Assorted human rights groups including the now ever present Human Rights Watch has backed the claims of the March 15 Revolution.  The outside world responded in a way completely compatible with the protocol which has been established in the wake of the "Jasmine Revolution" and its follow-ons.  The US and UN both jawboned away.  Ban Ki-Moon called the lethal suppression "unacceptable."  The White House condemned the use of force "strongly."

The government has sealed Daraa so confirmation of the events, body count, and number arrested is difficult or impossible.  The government undoubtedly sees the move as necessary not only to prevent outsiders viewing Syrian dirty laundry but also as a means of quarantining the fatal virus of political challenge and change.

The events in Daraa are noteworthy if for no other reason as having been the most deadly outbreak of political violence since the Kurds got uppity in 2004.  Back then security forces killed at least twenty-five in the northeastern city of Qwamishli and left another one hundred plus wounded.  Politics, particularly those of a dissenting sort, constitute a full contact sport in Syria.

Any protests of any sort do rattle the regime's cage.  It should be recalled that Syria has been under a "State of Emergency" since the Baath Party took control in 1963.  That is one whacking big emergency--fifty-seven years and counting.

Even the typically youthful (median age of population is 21.7 years according to the CIA World Factbook) Syrians remember the bloodletting in the city of Hama.  At that place Bashir's father, Hafiz, suppressed an uprising orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood at a cost in lives which makes Gaddfi's efforts of late look like a festival of peace, love, and flower power.  The city was virtually destroyed by heavy artillery, air attacks, and tanks.  As many as one hundred thousand were buried in the rubble.

Syria's current problems must be set against the inhibitory effects of the Hama legacy.  Syria has been hit hard by the global recession of recent years.  Unemployment and its equally sickening twin underemployment are rampant--particularly among the critical segment, educated youth.  The governmental deficit is very large and not likely to do other than grow in the next few years.  A harsh and prolonged drought has worsened the already critical water shortage such as to severely cripple agriculture and turn large numbers of previously decently well off farmers into proprietors of dust bowls.

The combination of rapidly declining water supplies, shrinking oil production, a rapidly growing population, and a public economy skewed toward military procurement has place enormous pressure on the government to meet public demands.  It has already terminally derailed Bashir's ambitious schemes for reform and modernization.  The honeymoon with Bashir which started when he succeeded dear old dad proved to be short as the new kid found out what reality was all about.

Paradoxically, the inept response of the Bush/Cheney administration to the murder of Prime Minister Hariri served to rekindle the honeymoon.  The diplomatic mistreatment of Syria unified the population behind the Bashir government.  The American inspired isolation as well as the ongoing US stance of ignoring the Golan Heights in favor of the West Bank and Gaza not only reinforced public support for Bashir but gave the regime the impetus needed to cozy ever closer to Tehran.  (The old cliche about shooting oneself in the foot comes to mind.)

Bashir is not Hafiz.  This means that while the Syrian security and internal intelligence services are highly competent and omni-present, the government will not rely solely on the jackboot of repression.  In an important symbol of this, Bashir has stated he will go personally to Daraa not only to assure the investigation is undertaken as promised, but, more importantly, to offer his condolences to the families of the dead.  It is certain the meetings will receive first story coverage on Syrian state TV.

Bashir and his wife are both media savvy and understand the West better than the majority of Mideastern political figures.  Bashir also understands the ways and means by which perceptions can be manipulated effectively within Syria.  It is probable he will turn the deaths in Daraa to the regime's advantage.

Overall, the majority of the population continues to rally on Bashir's side.  It is probable this applies even to the spearbearers of the current unrest--educated young people.  Solidifying and expanding this support requires some major efforts to address the most critical problems, lack of jobs and lack of water.  One way this might be done (if the budget deficit allows or Iran is sufficiently generous) is a new public works program aimed at capturing and transporting more water to the dessicated farmlands.

The US might be well advised to take another look at the Golan Heights.  The peace process between Palestinians and Israelis is more than simply moribund--it is stone cold stinking dead.  The only viable available option for reviving the corpse is that of the Golan Heights.  Israel can live very well without the Heights or even the ski resort and water in that area.  It has no legitimate reason to cling to the ground given the changes in military technology and the record of the past thirty years of border tranquility.

Movement on the Golan would help stabilize Bashir's government.  In this context it must be noted that he is not an odious dictator but rather a canny authoritarian who is operating a country which is a going concern, secular, possessed of a national identity, and capable of being an outpost of the civilized world against the advocates of violent political Islam.  Even Syria's stance regarding Lebanon is not unrealistic or overly ambitious.  Overall, Syria under Bashir is a Syria poised to incrementally enter the ranks of those states more democratic than not.

But, for any of this to happen, for Syria to turn its back on Iran, abandon any nuclear pretensions, drop Hezbollah and Hamas, inch toward real reform, requires a strong government, a stable government, a secure government.  For this, there can be no better outside aid than assistance in getting Syrian land back to Syrian control.

That is a project worthy of the Deep Thinkers most urgent and earnest attention.