Let Somebody Else Do It

Secretary of Defense Gates' message was simple, blunt, and to the point.  The US will do only those few things which other countries lack the capacity to do.  We will provide midair refueling, surveillance, and reconnaissance, some forms of communication, and intelligence.  We will not provide weapons or training to the anti-government forces in Libya.  In his view there are numerous other states which can do these tasks just as there are others who can patrol the no-fly zone or provide strike sorties intended to protect civilians from harm.

Leaving aside the more than slightly evident tensions between protecting civilians from all harm and the needs of the anti-Gaddafi forces for close air support and the accompanying sour sounds of hypocrisy, the position staked out by Dr Gates in testimony today showed a coldly realistic understanding of what the US can and cannot, should and should not do in the turgid turbulence of Libya.  The most realistic part of the Gates' view is its protective stance.  The limits placed on the American contribution to the "international community's" effort to immunize civilians from the effects of living in a war zone were clearly intended to protect against both mission creep of the sort which destroyed the American effort in Afghanistan as well as to shield Washington from the inevitable charges coming from the Kremlin, the Forbidden City, and elsewhere to the effect that the strictures of the relevant UN Security Council resolution were being transgressed.

There may be mission creep; there will be violation of the spirit and letter of Resolution 1973, but the US will not be a party to either.  This may not be the most courageous policy.  It most assuredly is not in the damn-the-torpedoes-full-speed-ahead! tradition of American war fighting or diplomacy.  It is, however, what is needed right now in the context of both Libya and the wider Mideast political tumult.  The view espoused by Gates in such clear and unmistakable fashion serves to give the US needed distance, needed time.  Both are necessary if the US is to formulate a genuine policy for facing the new political landscape of the region.

The Gates' formulation carries with it a very large downside.  This was recognized quite specifically by both the Defense Secretary and Admiral Mullen.  The downside is simply that when night falls Gaddafi may well still be in power.  The prospect of a stalemate, a de facto division between Cyrenaica and the rest of Libya, is real.  So is an outcome in which there is but one Libya under the direction of Gaddafi.

Either of these two outcomes would expose both Libyans and the world to the prospect of Gadaffi 1.0, the Brother Leader who never met a terrorist group he didn't want to fund, the international mischief maker whose wake was marked by downed airliners, blown up buildings, corpses, and failed states.  Whether for a few months or a handful of years, the restoration of the old model Gaddafi would be the worst of bad news for the people of the world.  The continuation in power of Brother Leader would be the worst conceivable development for Libyans, upon whose bodies the full fury of the man's sense of betrayal would lash.

Yet, in the real world, what alternative does the US have right now?  One can construct alternatives, but the least-worst outcome sort would have had to have been put into place weeks before the passage of the UN Resolution and the imposition of the no-fly/civilian protection zones.  Having come to the Libyan game too late and in an inherently overly limited way, the problem of constructing alternative policies to the one outlined by Robert Gates becomes far more problematical.

The problematical nature of the alternatives arise from the unique schizophrenia which afflicts the Arab mind.  It is a schizoid world view which was seen quite clearly in Iraq.  And, it has leaked around the edges of the political debates in recent weeks.

One prong of the schizophrenic view comes from the evident fact that the Libyan insurgents cannot fight in an effective, coordinated fashion.  It is not that the government forces loyal to Gaddafi are all that much better trained or equipped than the rebels for they are not.

(In this context it is worthwhile to spend some time checking out the immense amount of imagery available.  There is no essential difference between the equipment deployed by either the Gaddafi or rebel forces.  Nor is there much apparent difference in competence in military basics from digging in on the defense to the combination of fire and movement on the attack.)

The only essential difference between rebels and government is that the latter but not the former possesses a command structure.  Without a command structure, a coherent table of organization, none of the other features of military organization, communications, logistics, tactics, operational doctrine, are relevant.  The presence or absence of a command structure makes it possible for a numerically inferior force to beat its superior.  It allows a force comprised of men who are not a race of natural warriors (it there is such a critter) to defeat one comprised of heroes.  Command is all in war.

Well, if not exactly all, command, the capacity to control violence from a central location with a fair certainty that orders will be obeyed, is the sine qua non of effective war fighting.  The rebels have none.  The Gaddafi forces have some.  Therein lies the difference--and what a difference is clear from the imagery of the rabble running from a few distant incoming rockets or artillery shells.

There is nothing that can be done in a short span of time to address the critical lack of command in the rebel forces.  The lack is not simply one of training or inexperience.  Rather, the absence of command structure is organic to the society which produced the insurgents.

As a consequence the ability of outside "donors" be they NATO or Arab League to make up the deficiency is zero.  Supplying weapons will not address the absence of command.  Ditto training.  The only way command and its concomitants, control and communication, could be provided in a timely fashion would be for some outside combat force to take over the ground operations.  Sure, some Libyans could be attached to the "foreign" combat units, but they would be simply there for the optics.

In the alternative, the US and other outsiders can hope that the charade of the no-fly/civilian protection zones can be continued long enough for the insurgents to realize they must develop and put into effective practice their own command, control, and communication system--that they must gain a genuine command structure which is generally conceded to be legitimate in the eyes of the fighters it commands and controls.

The US and other countries may well introduce black and special operations forces both civilian and military, but this alone will not provide sufficient command capacity to offset the advantage enjoyed by the Gaddafi units in a timely enough fashion.  Rather, the employment of these genera of capacities will provide some aid to the insurgents by allowing better coordination of air strikes and ground movement.  This will enhance the staying power of the insurgents so as to provide time for these people to discover they need a command structure.

Of course, this brings yet another risk for the US and the other Western powers.  The individuals most likely to realize that they need a command structure are those with prior experience fighting against the US and its allies in Iraq.

(After all,  if these Fearless and Mighty Men of Islam are at all honest and possessed of a capacity for self-examination, they have come to understand that the single greatest reason the Bearded Warriors of the Prophet (PBUH) had their collective posteriors kicked by the infidels and apostates was the greater effectiveness of the infidel and apostate command, control, and communication systems.)

This means the advocates of violent political Islam will come to greater prominence in the effort to topple Gaddafi with results in the post-conflict environment not likely to promote Western norms, values, or interests. The Gates' approach coupled with the indigenous failings of the Libyan insurgents will prove harmful to our longer term interests in the country and the region.

However, we have no real alternative.  Remember the Arab schizophrenia?  The other prong of this world view arises from the antipathy Arab Muslims have for the notion of infidels killing Arab Muslims.  As the pretended(?) horror expressed by the Arab League at the idea that Arab Muslims were dying downrange as the US and others imposed the no-fly/civilian protection zone showed dramatically, there is a genuine loathing aroused in the Arab mind at the killing of good Arab Muslims (even soldiers) by the infidels.

If the Americans or the British or the French put troops on the ground and these troops actually kill Gaddafi's fighters, the hatred will be both real and explosive.  There would be a replay of the dynamics of Iraq and Afghanistan.  There is no way around that.  It is an emotional reality which cannot be denied.  It can only be exploited.  And, exploited it would be.  Not simply by AQIM but by every advocate of violent political Islam in the world.  The wave of fear, loathing, and hatred would be ridden by others as well, by Muslim "moderates" eager to keep their heads above the political tide, by non-Muslims who are rivals, even enemies of the US and its Western allies.

That is why we cannot simply go in and square matters away.  Matters would refuse to be squared away.  The emotional sensitivities of Arab Muslims and their capacity to deny realities other than those conditioned by a narrative of religion would assure what should have been a simple, direct, and straight forward ending of a very nasty regime and its death squads would transmogrify into one more protracted war of religion and identity.

The Libyan Question admits of no good answer.  The approach espoused by Secretary Gates is no more and no less than the least-worst way of dealing with the Question while honestly admitting that we have no capacity to answer it.