Saturday, March 12, 2011

Cowardice And Appeasement Masquerade As Statesmanship

As expected when the Libyan insurgents failed to topple the Gaddafi regime by escalade, time has favored the Colonel's side.  His troops and militia are better equipped and trained than the rebels.  The latter are long on spirit but very short on capabilities.

The utter ineptitude of the amateurs which constitute the majority of the insurgent fighters is pathetically evident in pictures showing recoilless rifles mounted without any protection alongside the paved road which is the only sure line of communication east to west.  It is equally obvious in pictures showing fighters waving weapons but not digging individual fighting positions, shooting into the air while piles of ammunition spill out of boxes out in the open.  It is seen as well in the shooting of light antiaircraft cannon against aircraft hopelessly out of range.

The fighters interviewed by Western mainstream media all cheerfully acknowledge their lack of military training of even the most rudimentary sort.  (The Geek's personal favorite is, "I'm not trained but I've seen a lot of action movies.")  They also profess a willingness to die, a sentiment which seems to be well neigh onto universal among Muslim men.

The problem comes in the whole idea of war as summarized by General George S. Patton, Jr., a man who both knew a thing or two about war and loved the thrill of combat.  "You don't win by dying for your country.  You win by making the other sonofabitch die for his."  The mere willingness to die for the "cause" has the utility of mammary glands on a bull.

The combination of aircraft, armor, better training and leadership and a total willingness to kill any and all who might be opponents of the regime conspires to assure the Colonel has gained the upper hand in the ongoing insurgency.  With every passing day his forces will grow stronger and the rebels weaker--at least in manpower and materiel.  It is different in the critical consideration of political will.

Gaddafi's political will was assured by the institution of International Criminal Court proceedings against him, his family, and closest associates.  Way back when the deposed dictator of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was arrested in his exile refuge of Nigeria and sent to stand trial in the Netherlands, Gaddafi branded the action "unacceptable."  He saw the handwriting on the wall with the arrest and trial of his onetime surrogate.  He is not going to suffer the same fate.  Nor will he allow it to befall those closest to him.  The result is a high political will either to prevail or to die in Libya.

The political will of the insurgents is bound up with the certainty of brutal reprisals by Gaddafi should he win.  The rebels are not going to submit easily or meekly to forces which will kill them out of hand in the best of cases or deliver them to the mercies of Gaddafi's torture specialists in the most likely event.  The insurgents have very few choices: win, beat feet to the nearest border, or die miserably.

The correlation of forces is such that the war will continue and grow more bloody as the implacable Gaddafi pushes harder and deeper into the Land of the Insurgents.  If the West thinks it has seen a "humanitarian crisis," all that can be written in reply is, "You ain't seen nothing yet."

The insurgents are demanding a no-fly zone and would greatly prefer airstrikes against Gaddafis' bases of operation and field forces.  The opinion on the street in Benghazi is still opposed to the introduction of foreign ground forces, but that is subject to change as the government Masters of Massacre move closer.

The Arab League unanimously approved of a no-fly zone and called upon the UN Security Council to order the imposition of one.  Of course, asking the Security Council to do this is rather like masturbating with steel wool--both unproductive and unpleasant.  Russia and China have made it clear that each would exercise a veto over any such resolution in keeping with their view of the sanctity of internal affairs of a nation-state.

Any benefit from the Arab League move is most likely to be more indirect.  Both the European Union and NATO have specified that the Arab states must carry the substantial political burden of seeking a no-fly zone.  And, it must be noted that the EU with Germany at the lead has made it clear that it views any such action with great distaste.  The slapping down of the Cameron-Sarkozy endorsed no-fly zone plan was both quick and brutal.  NATO is not appreciably more excited about the prospect of executing any no-fly scheme.

Then there is the United States.  President Obama has denounced the Libyan regime in ringing tones but other than the exercise in fine sounding rhetoric has been tepid at best in supporting the insurgent movement.  He has deferred to the "international community" as part of his ongoing campaign to demonstrate that under his version of leadership the US is not going to be unilateral, particularly regarding Muslim majority states.  In this he is probably supported by most of We the People who have become sick, sore, and tired of long, expensive, bloody, and very unsatisfying wars in distant Muslim countries.  There are very few among us who want to see the Marines once more land on "the shores of Tripoli."

The big question is simply this: Will the views of We the People and our equivalents in Europe change as the Gaddifi forces butcher their way to and through Benghazi?  Will we remain indifferent and allow our governments to keep their detached attitude as the slaughter grows and the refugees crowd across the Egyptian border?

A slightly smaller question is will the Arab League keep their collective hands out of the Libyan cauldron if the body count escalates markedly?  At what point--if any--will their members say enough is enough and move to enforce the no-fly zone or provide ground forces in a peace imposition role?  It is difficult to see circumstances in which authoritarian regimes with large military forces at their disposal--think Syria or Saudi Arabia--send forces to protect rebels against a fellow authoritarian, even one as cordially despised as the Colonel.  It is equally hard to envision the Egyptian army moving into Libya given the politically unstable environment at home.

In short, it is difficult to see the Arab states dirtying their hands in Libya.  They have too much to fear at home to allow such a precipitant action.  There is too much danger of further unrest throughout the region for the local ground and air forces to engage in a bit of peace imposition.  The danger of inciting "radical extremists" within their Muslims looms too large in the minds of Arab leaders to take any risks.

Absent irresistible political pressure from the population it is equally unlikely that Western states will do other than provide humanitarian assistance regardless of tough talk from assorted capitals.  There is too much of the odor of appeasement present throughout the EU for that to happen.  Too much fear of upsetting the local "radical extremists" to allow the use of force.  To much fear of exciting the animosity of former colonial subjects to permit firm action.

This leaves the US.  As the broad guage negative reaction to the King subcommittee hearings on homegrown terrorism and Islamic radicalization have demonstrated, the stench of appeasement and fear can clog the nostrils of Americans as well.  At the same time the US has a president who exists by virtue of defining himself as being anti-George W. Bush.  He has already taken heavy hits from his own base for having extended Bush era policies after having promised to jettison them.  And, with a firm eye on next year's election, the last thing he is eager to do is commit the US to another war in a Muslim majority country.  It is no way for a Nobel Peace Prize winner to operate, is it?

There are good reasons that might be adduced in support of a decision to stay out of Libya.  The reasons taken in aggregate make the no-go choice appear to be an act of wise statesmanship.  Still, one has to wonder what will the decision of future historians be if and when the Colonel's killers prevail and stand triumphantly on mounds of corpses.  Will the estimate of these hypothetical historians of tomorrow be one of praise for wise statesmanship or condemnation for ethical failure of the highest sort?

The Geek has his conclusions.  Time will prove if he is correct.

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