The Darkness Of The Future

Some years the future is clear.  For example, the global political stage was highly visible and future developments easy to predict during much of the 1990s.   It was evident that the weak responses of the Clinton administration to the aggressive acts and "declaration of war" by Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda would result in more, larger attacks.  It was not exactly difficult to predict that the "opening" of China to US trade would result in an ever growing torrent of money flowing to the Trolls of Beijing who would use the swag to power up their ambitions to have a global footprint.  Nor was it mentally taxing to conclude that the combination of hectoring and paternalism with which the US treated Russia would stoke the two primary characteristics of Russian policy--messianic zeal and galloping feelings of inferiority vis a vis the West coupled with a pervasive sense of insecurity.

In the background lurked the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the impact of which was growing across the Islamic world during the Nineties.  The growth of political Islam, particularly violent political Islam was evident not only with al-Qaeda but with the triumph of Taliban in Afghanistan, the presence of Iranian agents in the southern Philippines, the rise of political Islam in Pakistan, and the sectarian conflict in the rubble of Yugoslavia.  From that context prediction of the future trajectory was close to being a no-brainer.

It is not so easy today.  The rapid series of political disruptions in North Africa and the Mideast has introduced a set of complications which greatly complicates the prediction of future international trajectories.  If the current conflict in Libya continues and becomes a long duration (more than three months) internal war, the complications will be magnified.  

It is plain that Iran will continue to seek advantage in the Gulf region.  Its struggle with Saudi Arabia for regional hegemon status will both continue and grow.  Tehran will seek to exploit the Shiite disaffiliation in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.  Similarly, it will use its agents of influence in the less than monolithic Iraqi government to fill the vacuum which will necessarily develop further as the American presence recedes.  At the same time there is no doubt Ayatollah Khamenei will keep on consolidating power in his hands.  The carefully orchestrated removal of Ayatollah Akbar Rafsanjani from his post as head of the important Assembly of Experts is the most recent gambit in Khamenei's march to total and unquestioned authority.  It can be expected that the handpicked tool, Ahmedinejad, will follow up on this with a move against the Larjani family.

The imponderable (at least as to timing) in Iran is when will the lash back take place.  The Rafsanjani family like that of the Larjanis is both wealthy and powerful.  The more moderate clerics of Qom are much enamored of Rafsanjani and not overly impressed with the theological credentials of Khamenei.  Nor are they thrilled with the progress of Iran socially and economically the past few years.  The Green Movement has demonstrated a degree of committed perseverance totally unexpected in the wake of the first protests nearly two years ago.  So, the big question is: When will the balloon go up?

There are some features of the future which are clear.  Russia will continue to be an obstruction to effective collective action in Libya.  So too will China.  Both countries will also act to impede the implementation of a solution to the North Korean nuclear question.  And, should the continued centralization of authority in Iran reach the point of provoking widespread and violent internal unrest, both will be an obstacle to finding a viable solution for that challenge.

Another clear future of the tomorrows to come is the increasing potency of political Islam oriented groups and individuals in the new governments of Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries with governments under internal threat.  The presence of advocates of political Islam in governments of Egypt or Tunisia or Bahrain tends to scare the hell out of at least some Americans.  This degree of alarm is not necessarily justified as shown by the AKP in Turkey which is far more nationalist in its political philosophy than Islamist.  

The head of Tunisia's Renaissance Party has pointed to Erdogan and the AKP as a relevant role model.  So has Moussa, a leading candidate for the first post-Mubarak civilian president.  The historical experience tends to favor nationalism trumping Islam.  This does not mean there will be a total absence of Islam, a wall between mosque and state.  Rather it implies that while features of a country's internal and judicial policies will be tilted strongly in the direction of Islamic requirements and strictures, and public criticism or opposition to Muslim groups practicing violent political Islam will be muted in deference to the Islamic imperative on community solidarity, the governments will pursue national interest and not that of some mythical caliphate.

While there is some historically based reasoning to be calm in the face of governments dominated by political Islam, this does not imply that the future is secure or even that it can be seen so clearly that one has a high confidence in predictions at this point.  The assorted advocates of violent political Islam including those with the unlimited goal of a global caliphate will continue to exist.  They will also continue to be creative in their use of local grievances in the context of the "will of Allah" to recruit supporters and silence dissent from their goals.  But their potential growth will be limited if the US and other Western states pursue policies which give due regard to the very easily bruised nationalism which exists in all the countries experiencing unrest or its aftermath.

This suggests strongly that caution is the word to use when considering no-fly zones or any other intervention in Libya--or in some country yet to implode.  Interventions no matter how justified in terms of stopping massacres outrage national sentiments.  When the national sentiments are magnified by feelings of religious persecution, the result is very negative for the outsiders.  It is like domestic violence situations--ask any street cop what happens when the battling partners are faced by the well intentioned outsiders there to enforce the impartial law.  So it is with people  generally--unite against the outsider, particularly when that outsider represents another, maligned religious community.

The combination of prickly nationalism and religious imperatives also suggests that the US and other Western countries had best develop realistic and limited goals for their policies concerning new governments.  It is all well and good to play upbeat mood music about democracy, but that is not a policy, let alone a realistic and limited one.  The process of formulating appropriate policy goals starts with a coldly realistic assessment of just what national and strategic interests are in play in each country of the regions.

Here we encounter the real basis of why the future is dark.  The current administration has yet to demonstrate that it understands what national and strategic interests might be.  There is no general text covering national interest or its extension, strategic interest.  Rather there have been hazy almost bumper sticker mouthings such as "comprehensive Mideast peace" or "fostering democratic and transparent government without corruption" or "assuring women play their full role in the new system."  

Nice sound bites do not make policy, let alone realistic, achievable policy oriented toward the goal of achieving American national and strategic interests.  Nor are appeals to the "international community" and multilateral bodies a substitute for policy aimed at US interests.  

To say the Obama administration is adrift at the policy level is almost too kind.  Yet that is the ground truth at work today.  This means there is a real danger that Congress will interject itself into the making of foreign policy.  Congress may have its strengths, but the formulation and execution of foreign policy is not numbered among them.  Worse, absent definite policy a severe uptick in the level of violence in Libya or one of the other instable venues might excite the emotions of We the People to the point that political considerations compel action.  History records that such hasty, politically predicated excuses for reasoned policy are well described by a single word: failure.

The US has lurched from failure to failure under the forces of ideology and sheer naivety for most of the past eighteen years.  As a consequence, an avoidable one, the US has witnessed a progressive decline in its status and influence around the world.  If this sorry record continues through the current round of developments, the result will be a US which is irrelevant, a US which finally merits that Sixties vintage appellation, "a pitiful helpless giant."