A Matter Of Perspective

Afghanistan is reputed to be a dangerous place to live.  There is no doubt but it is.  Last year, according to a Congressional Research Service report, 2,421 civilians were killed, the majority by Taliban and other anti-government elements.

It was, however, far more dangerous to be a non-combatant living in the city of Cuidad Juarez.  In another, recent report by the CRS which drew on the work of a dedicated and talented research librarian at New Mexico State University (known in these parts as Moo-U), Molly Molloy, shows that 3,111 died in the war between cartels and government.  (Ms Molloy's number and that determined by the Geek are within five bodies of each other.)

Given the population difference between the country of Afghanistan and the city of Juarez, it is almost thirty times more deadly to reside in the latter than the former.  The CIA sets the population of Afghanistan at a bit over twenty-nine million while the most recent Mexican census gives a figure of 1.3 million residents for Juarez.  It deserves mention that the population of Juarez and the valley communities extending to the southeast have shrunk, some considerably, in the time since the census was compiled.

The numbers point at a grim reality: The so-called "drug war" in northern Mexico is far more deadly for those caught in the crossfire than is the combination of insurgency and brigandage underway in Afghanistan.  This is in spite of the undeniable fact that Taliban field commanders have taken to attacking soft, civilian targets regardless of the ROEs established by their seniors across the border in the FATA.

The pressure applied to Taliban and the others over the past several months has resulted in a de facto shift in operational level doctrine and tactics.  The goal of the peddlers of violent political Islam are no longer willing to take on the ISAF directly and have become increasingly loath to confront even the Afghan National Forces in the field.  The default is to seek to terrorize the civilian population by an escalating series of suicide bombings and an increased use of IEDs particularly of the roadside bomb variety.

The ever changing Taliban field commanders--ever changing due to the massive success of the decapitation program inaugurated by General Stanley McChrystal--is comprised of ever younger, ever more True Belief ridden men of limited experience.  The lack of experience coupled with the growing competence of the Afghan forces and the superb capabilities of the US, UK, Canadian, Australian troops means the bad guys have little option but to hit the soft targets and hope that fear will trump anger on the part of the uncommitted majority with the effect of undercutting any support for the Kabul regime and the foreign troops.

This means the war will become more lethal for the civilians.  Whether the payoff of this rush to bloodletting will benefit Taliban is debatable at best.  History shows little probability of Taliban's approach working to its advantage.

In Mexico there has been no shift in either operational level or tactical doctrine on the part of either the government or the cartels.  The only change year over year has been that of the cartels deploying ever more deadly weapons in an ever more indiscriminate way.  Los Zetas pointed the way years ago with the introduction of military small unit tactics and weaponry to the contest.  Subsequently, all the cartels have followed suit with the result that any and all have shown the capability to take and hold territory, blockade entire towns, and assault semi-fortified positions.

During the same span of time, the cartels have used self-consciously terroristic methods.  The beheaded corpses, the dismantled corpses, the heads rolled bowling ball style into bars, the grisly intermingling of multiple parts of multiple bodies are all intended to create terror.  So also is the program of singling out cops who refuse to submit to the sweet odor of bribery for barbaric execution.  Terror of this variety has been so successful that many of the smaller towns--and some not so small--have become de facto law free zones.

While the government of Cuidad Juarez exists and functions to a large extent, this is not the case in many of the smaller communities of the Juarez valley.  In many locations, including large swaths of Juarez itself, the cartel has become the government.  It is the thugs of the cartel who levy and collect tribute--taxes--and control the activities of businesses and politicos alike.  It is the cartel which decides how free the media might be, enforcing the strictures in the accustomed robust manner.

The same situation applies deeper in the interior of Mexico.  The government exists in name only.  Or, best case, it exists in the sense of providing law, order, personal, and communal security only sporadically as when the Mexican Marines or one of the very few army units which is both well officered and immune to corruption drops by for a few hours or days.

As in Afghanistan, the most fatal of conditions has become endemic in Mexico.  That condition is not so much fear as it is corruption.  Corruption has been legendary in Mexico for generations.  Even considering that fact of life, the lure of easy money has grown logarithmically since President Calderon declared open war with the cartels.  It has been established that the army has become almost as corruption riddled as the police.  The several internal security services which have frontline responsibilities for handling the cartels have taken the same course as have key components of the justice ministry.

None of this allows an optimistic view of Mexico over the next twelve months.  The highest probability is the body count will continue to grow.  The highest probability is the government presence will become more and more symbolic, more and more hollow, particularly in the northern states.  The highest probability is that Los Zetas and its emulators will spread their odious presence into Central American countries, an evil oil spot spreading ever to the south.

The states of the region are less able to counter the spread of the cartels than was Mexico when Calderon declared war.  This implies that the hollowing effect will be seen in Mexico's neighbors.  The signs of this dynamic are becoming unmistakable in Honduras, Guatemala, and, most recently, Belize.  Indications of the same occurring have been noted further south, even in Nicaragua.  (Perhaps Danny Ortega should spend more attention at home rather than joining with Chavez in supporting Gaddafi.)

Mexico is not a failed state.  Nor is it a failing state.  It is, however, in grave danger of becoming a hollow state, that is a state in which the remit of the government is limited severely by insurgent or quasi-insurgent movements.  It does not matter that the cartels are criminal enterprises.  All that matters is that the cartels have become sufficiently efficient purveyors of violence and terror to become the defacto government in portions of Mexico.  The "business plan" of the cartels is successful enough to be viable in the smaller, less wealthy states to its south.

Columbia came back from the brink of having been hollowed out completely by the combination of FARC and the cocaine cartels.  But the process took a decade and more as well as a level of US financial and other support far surpassing that which has been provided to Mexico.  Also, in the case of Columbia, the domestic elite finally grew aware of the peril confronting it and mustered its resources to support the government rather than simply getting on the next plane out of Dodge.  The Mexican elite has not yet shown an equal awareness let alone an equivalent commitment to the common weal.

This leads ineluctably to the conclusion that even with the uptick in attacks on soft targets in Afghanistan it will remain far more dangerous to live and work in Juarez.  It can be expected that more and more businesses and individuals will join the migration from Juarez to El Paso, from Juarez valley towns to their twins on the north side of the Rio Grande.  If the violence increases significantly, there is a very strong likelihood that the US-Mexico border will come to resemble that between Libya and Egypt today--a flood of desperate people seeking sanctuary from death and the fear of death.

Whether either the Mexican elite or We the People like the idea or not, the US does have a dog, a very big dog, in the fight.  Choice time is upon both parties to acknowledge this and deal with the result creatively or continue in a state of denial resembling that of the noted Colonel ("I am history!  I am the revolution) Gaddafi regarding the situation in Mexico.

For the Mexicans the problem is one of recognizing that factors other than the demand for illegal drugs in the US are primarily responsible for the degenerating conditions in Mexico--and then doing something about it.  For the Americans the problem is that of deciding if the prohibition of drugs is worth the costs.

Both Americans and Mexicans have little choice other than a rational consideration of what is at work in Mexico.  Insofar as the dynamic which is hollowing out Mexico is the consequence of the American fear and loathing of mind altering drugs there is an ethical imperative to examine closely the reasons for that fear and loathing and decide what is in our overall best interests: stomp down harder or admit the effort has not paid off such that benefits received are greater than the costs imposed.

Not that there is any hope of either Mexicans or Americans engaging in rational introspection, rational decision making, and rational action.  The subjects--nationalism and mood altering drugs--are simply too productive of overly strong emotion for that to happen.