What Did Anyone Expect?

There seems to be a subtext of shock with the latest twist of events in Libya.  Yet, there is nothing unexpected in the images of fleeing rebels totally unnerved, not to say unmanned, by a few shells from tanks and artillery fired by men loyal to Gaddafi.  After all, the legions of media experts in military affairs had previously declared that only the "allied" air assault had allowed for the rebel  successes, so why is there any surprise when a hiccup in that air support resulted in a speedy collapse of the rebel offensive?

The buzz from inside the Beltway, in large measure propelled by the Nice Young Man From Chicago, has centered around the possibility of the US and other outsiders providing arms to the rebels.  This notion is absurd.  The rebel forces have ample weapons of the individual and light crew served sorts.  The dissidents even have some heavier equipment, armored personnel carriers and tanks abandoned by their Gaddafi loyalist crews but still serviceable.

What the anti-Gaddafi "fighters" need is not hardware.  What they need is organization, leadership, and, most of all, training.  The skill level of the rebels is pathetic at best.  The imagery proliferating from Libya shows the anti-government individuals have utterly no knowledge of even the most rudimentary aspects of combat.  The bozos of the desert do not even dig in.  They do not use cover and concealment.  They do not even bother to emplace their tank killing recoilless rifles.

They have no fire discipline.  No small unit tactics.  No coordination of effort.  No recognized command and control system.  In short, they have none of the requisites for effective war fighting.  They are, therefore, doomed to lose.

In a way it is possible to take comfort in the sheer incompetence of the vast majority of the Libyan "freedom fighters."  The all too obvious inadequacies of the rebels indicate the influence or at least the numbers of combat experienced advocates of violent political Islam, veterans of the anti-US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is sparse.  There can be little doubt that the men who have survived combat against the US and its Western allies in either venue have gained the basic survival skills so desperately lacking with the majority of the Libyan amateurs.

While the greatest percentage of the opposition forces may be as are the majority of all Libyans, people who wear their Islam lightly, the existence of austere, Salafist derived advocates of violent political Islam has been documented in blood for a century.  These were the men, men from Cyrenaica and from the city of Darnah who were the spine, muscle, and sinew of the bloody defensive insurgency against the Italians.  These men have been the sharp point of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.  These men sought out jihad against the Americans in Muslim lands far, far away from Libya.  And, it is these men who are, right now, the only effective combatants in the struggle against Brother Leader.

In the event the US (or any other Western country) provided arms or other military equipment, it would be the same men, the Warriors of the Prophet, who would benefit the most.  Any force multiplying equipment or services would propel the advocates of violent political Islam to the top of the local tree.  This would not be in the best interests of the US, other civilized states, or the majority of the Libyan people.  Should the jihadists be given the wherewithal to wage more effective war, the first and largest loser would not be Gaddafi and his forces but the Libyans who do not share the zeal of those committed to violent political Islam.

In this context it is useful to reflect on some melancholy realities of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The largest number of victims of violence were not foreign troops or indigenous troops loyal to the central government but combatants affiliated with groups not approved of by the advocates of violent political Islam.  The other large group of victims were the non-combatants, civilians who were either in the wrong place at the wrong time or who were vocally opposed to the all encompassing goals of the jihadists.

Samantha Powers, Susan Rice, and Hilary Clinton pushed for the no-fly/civilian protection resolution for fear of "genocide."  They focused on the most attractive target, the target with the very big mouth, Gaddafi.  By so doing they overlooked completely the existence of a group--the advocates of violent political Islam--just as given to wholesale killing, just as prone to murder those who disagree or oppose as Gaddafi.  To compound the blunder of the no-fly/civilian protection resolution with providing weapons or other useful military equipment or services would be to favor one murderer over another--not prevent murder period.

The totality of the Obama administration's behavior during the past few weeks demonstrates a bunch of situationally naive people who are adrift at the policy level.  The Obama "team" was saved from the worst consequences of its lack of competence by the timely departure of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak.  The angels who had smiled protectively on the fools of the administration stopped doing so with the advent of the Libyan Question.

The air campaign if taken to the limit can assure the rebels are not destroyed quickly and totally.  Beyond that the best efforts of airmen and missile launchers alike can do little.  It is not possible to bomb the rebels into a position of winning at any acceptable political cost.  It is not possible to bomb Gaddafi out of power in a speedy fashion.  Nor can the rebels win in a matter of weeks--even with massive outside assistance in equipment, training, and organization.

In the longer term, Gaddafi cannot hang on indefinitely.  In the longer term, the advocates of violent political Islam will come to dominate the rebel councils.  When the down-the-tubes trajectory of Gaddafi intersects with the upward trending fortunes of the rebels, the real winners will be the advocates of violent political Islam.  When that happens, the US, the West, and the Libyan people will have much to regret.