Sic 'Em, Dave, Sarko

David Cameron continues to take the hardline regarding the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libya.  Reportedly he has told his cabinet that there is no need for a UN Security Council resolution in order for the UK or any other country to place Libya under aerial interdict.  In this view Cameron has been joined by Nicholas Sarkozy.  The rather mercurial French president has gone so far as to recognize the rebel national committee as the legitimate government of Libya.

While the UK lacks the resources to do the no-fly job on its own, the British could do so in conjunction with the French.  Considering the recent agreement regarding joint military operations, the possibility of this happening moves up the list of likelihood.

If Cameron continues to feel muscular on the Libyan Question, President Obama will be more isolated in his calculated posture of apparent prudence and cautious statesmanship behind which lurks the fear of being seen as George W. Bush reincarnate.  The pressure ramped up ever so slightly yesterday when Secretary Gates clarified his earlier remarks on the difficulty of imposing a no-fly zone.  The secretary allowed in Manama that the US could do the job all on its lonesome should "President Obama so order."

With the Arab League having unanimously passed a resolution approving a no-fly zone and demanding that the Security Council act accordingly, the assorted member states have picked up a good measure of the political consequences which would ensue should the no-fly zone result in civilian casualties.  This move will reduce, albeit marginally, the negative narrative which will be written by anti-Western elements in the Arab and Muslim majority states generally in the wake of even a very pacifistic airspace denial effort.

The real questions do not involve the ability of the US or the Anglo-French duo or any other major power to impose and maintain a no-fly zone.  The most trenchant question is: Will a no-fly zone actually benefit the insurgents in a significant manner?  As important is this: What actions will follow the imposition of an unproductive no-fly zone.  And, of course, there is the most fundamental question of all: What is the goal of the exercise?

To take the last question first: The actual goal of any intervention either by air or ground must be that of utterly defeating the current regime.  The US and the rest of the West cannot afford a Gaddafi in power after his crushing of the insurgency.  It would not be a return to the status quo ante.  A victorious Gaddafi at best would be the Gaddafi of the worst of the bad old days.  You know, the Gaddafi of PanAm 103.  The Gaddafi who supported any and every movement or regime which opposed the West.  The Gaddafi who sought weapons of mass destruction with an ardor which surpassed that demonstrated by Saddam Hussein.

Preventing this version of Gaddafi, the basic Gaddafi 1.0 who strutted and terrified in the years before the US invaded Iraq, must be the highest priority of any and every responsible Western government, our own included.  All other goals pale into insignificance in comparison.

Now as to the first question: Would a no-fly zone really matter?  Would it preclude a Gaddafi victory?  The answer is simple, blunt, and unpleasant.  The answer is: No!  It is possible that Gaddafi would not even challenge the zone.  He has no need to do so.

The air attacks may scare the untrained, inexperienced people down range, but so far the effect of the attacks has been negligible.  The pilots--whether Libyan or hired hands from Syria or Sudan--have not shown the ability to hit targets.  As a consequence, the strikes have been acoustically and visually impressive but militarily useless.

The winning weapons for the Gaddafi forces have been of the indirect fire sort.  Unguided rockets, tube artillery, the backbones of standoff warfare have done the heavy lifting for the Colonel's killers.  Only after extensive preparatory fire has the armor moved forward to finish the job.

The untrained, poorly organized, massively inexperienced insurgent fighters lack all the basic wherewithal to withstand the physical and morale effects of standoff, indirect fire weaponry.  The same applies to facing down armor, even antiquated main battle tanks and similar vintage infantry fighting vehicles.

In a combat between a small but well equipped force such as the four or so battalions commanded by Gaddafi's kids and a mob, the small force will win.  To put it a slightly different way, the Gaddafi forces enjoy the bravery of being out of range.  Their possession of standoff weapons allows the Colonel's thugs to kill without the risk of being killed.  Any number of wounded insurgents quoted in Western MSM have moaned about the melancholy reality that the Gaddafi troops are never seen let alone shot at but stay safely out of AK-47 or RPG range and pound the holy hell out of the rebel positions.

Conclusion?  A no-fly zone will not tilt the battle in favor of the insurgents.  They are doomed as long as Gaddafi's forces can continue to move slowly along the one road, stopping to shell any insurgent held area into powder until they finally fetch up at the center of resistance, Benghazi.  At that moment it is all over for the insurgents.  Those who can run will fast step to the Egyptian border; those who can't will stay and be blown into small bloody fragments by the Colonel's artillery, rockets, and armor.

(At this point a no-fly zone would benefit the refugee stream heading for Egypt by assuring it would not be decimated by air attack.  That would be a humanitarian good deed, but is not a war winner.  It is not a way of achieving the goal of a Gaddafi free Earth.)

This leaves the second material question:  What happens after the no-fly zone proves nugatory?  Assuming that the leaders of Western governments, including the Clueless Guy in the Oval, concur that the ongoing presence of Gaddafi constitutes everybody's worst nightmare, there is only one option.  The last option standing is the introduction of ground combat units.

There is much fear over doing such.  Some anxiety is merited by factual, historical experience; some, even most, is not.  Drawing on the historical record it is safe to conclude that an operation limited to one discrete goal--the halting of the Gaddafi advance on a predetermined line, for example--markedly reduces the probability of "mission leap" along the lines of what happened in Afghanistan.

The difficulty in employing military intervention is not that of tactics.  Nor is it one at the operational level.  The only real problem is that which comes at the political level--defining in a properly limited way the goal to which the use of force is directed.  Provided that the goal consensually achieved by the major Western powers is that of enforcing a stop line, there is no requirement for "nation-building," no taking of overall responsibility for the future of Libya.

Admittedly, this limited a mission would leave the Gaddafi regime in charge of a truncated Libya.  On the upside, this truncated version of his previous domain coupled with the long term impact of sanctions would serve to erode Brother Leader's material capacity to continue in power.  It would also serve to curtail Gaddafi's potential for international mischief making most gratifyingly.

There is a very unfortunate but very real temptation for political leaders not to leave well enough alone.  They seem to be constitutionally disinclined to accept a half loaf when the full loaf seems to be so much more attractive.  Here the American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq are the most important object lessons.  Had the neocon ninnies of the Bush-Cheney years been at all able to restrain their unlimited ambitions, the effort in Afghanistan would have been restricted to a highly doable punitive expedition and the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq would have been limited to the removal of Saddam Hussein.

The US should have rejected any responsibility for doing anything beyond removing two odious regimes, assuring that al-Qaeda was destroyed and eliminating any residual capability in Iraq for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.  All the rest, all the follow-ons of "nation-building" or the constitution of new governments would have been passed on to the indigenous populations with the assistance of those members of the "international community" which cared to offer such.

The goal of any ground intervention must be restricted to the establishment of a stop line beyond which the Gaddafi units would not be allowed.  Taken in conjunction with the existence of an alternative, legitimate government and the assorted international sanctions, the result would be the ejection of Gaddafi from power.  This would be facilitated if the threat of prosecution for crimes against humanity were to be lowered even if not removed totally.  It must be recalled that the Taylor prosecution served as the single greatest spine stiffener provided to Gaddafi and family.

At the moment both Cameron and Sarkozy have shown both greater insight and courage than has Mr Obama.  Having written that, the Geek is constrained to add that neither man has been honest--at least in public.  Their military advice must have emphasized the irrelevance of the no-fly zone.  Their political and diplomatic advisors must have pointed out the array of negative consequences which would attend a Gaddafi victory.  These factors imply that each man must be aware that when night falls, only a ground intervention would prevent the Colonel from emerging triumphant and emboldened.

Since the British and French leaders have led on the Libyan Question, it is now incumbent upon them to tell it like it is.  They must prepare themselves, their publics, and the rest of the world for the necessity of a ground intervention in the very near future.  This also means they and their military and diplomatic high command must design a properly limited mission definition.  And, they have to drag Obama kicking and screaming in their wake.

So, Dave and Sarko, sic 'em!