Yesterday Secretary of State Clinton warranted to the world's media that the US was not playing a leading role in the aerial intervention in Libya. She assured all who would listen that American forces were playing only a supporting role in the complex operation of establishing a no-fly zone and, to follow the wording of Admiral Mike Mullen, get Gaddafi's forces to move back to garrison.
It seemed passingly strange that Ms Clinton would sound that particular note considering the widespread reports that it was her pressure which finally carried the day against the opposition of Robert Gates and Admiral Mullen. The most charitable characterization of her comment is that it carried Obama's water. There is no doubt but Mr Obama would have been far, far happier to sit this particular fracas out while letting more robust governments such as those of Nicholas Sarkozy and David Cameron do the heavy lifting.
As the Obama administration's handling of most of the political unrest in the Mideast and North Africa has shown clearly, the president and his "team" seek a world in which the US is not a leader but rather a dutiful follower of consensus achieved elsewhere by others. There may be many reasons lurking in the intellectual shadows surrounding this strange course of action, but two overt mechanisms are evident. The president fears being equated with George W. Bush and his "Freedom agenda." The president and at least some of his closest adherents eschew the crude realities of nationalism and national interest as well as the necessary concomitant, the US as a Great Power.
It was not statesmanship which forced the president and his people to cower behind a berm of contradictory messages regarding Libya ranging from the overly bellicose--Khadafi must go!--to the humbly pacifistic--this is a matter for the Libyan people. It was not statesmanship which compelled Mr Obama to stand in the darkness downstage as David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy marched upstage, grabbing the spotlight as they did so. It was not statesmanship, carefully calculated and deliberately decided policy which caused the POTUS to hide the US military lamp in the bushel of military nothingness which is the current British defense establishment or allow the French to jump in first, grabbing attention and credit as their zoomies occupied the safe sky over Benghazi.
Mr Obama's motives were far more mundane, not to say base than the requirements of global diplomacy. He was afraid. Fearful of looking like George W. Bush. Affighted of having to make the very tough decisions which must be made in the next few days and weeks. Frightened of losing his base and of alienating further the independents of the American electorate--a non-trivial consideration in that the Obama 2012 campaign is already well underway.
Then, of course, there is the hovering cloud of apprehension caused by uncertainty as to just what Arab and Muslim states and populations will say and do as the missiles and bombs fall on Libyan soil and heads. Mr Obama--and a good many others--is quite scared of the unpredictable consequences of Muslim sensibilities being outraged by the realities of warfare--even of imposing the no-fly zone demanded by the Arab League.
There are two reasons why the US and other civilized states should be involved in Libya. One is severely pragmatic--preventing Gaddafi from staying in power and presenting an ongoing threat to the civilized world, perhaps a much worse one than previously. The other is not at all practical; rather it is one of ideals, of principles, of values and norms. Gaddafi's conduct in recent days is repugnant to even the most loosely defined standards of acceptable governmental conduct.
The reality right now is that the air strikes and no fly zone may well leave Gaddafi in power. This possibility has been acknowledged by Admiral Mullen. This eventuality would render nugatory all the efforts made by the present coalition. Yes, it would be nice if someone close to Gaddafi would be so kind as to grease him. But that is what George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton both hoped would be the fate of Saddam Hussein. The providential assassination is not a firm base for policy.
The necessary inference is a ground operation may prove necessary. Such need not be an army which would remain in occupation, a military force providing security during an exercise in nation-building. British ForMin Hague has left the door more than ajar for an invasion. If the actual goal of the current operation is--as it should or must be--the removal of Gaddafi and the prevention of a bifurcation of Libya, it is hard to see how that may be accomplished without the introduction of ground forces.
The prospect of a replay of the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq can be nullified by careful limitation of the ground force mission to the defeat of Gaddafi's troops and the removal of Gaddafi. There would then be no responsibility for long term presence in a stability role while the do-gooders practice nation-building. While some sort of nation-building is no doubt required, this should be undertaken by the Arab League or the UN with "stability" forces being provided by the former under the auspices of the latter. This would allow Western combat forces to be withdrawn without the horrid endgame seen in Iraq and without the never ending counterinsurgency of Afghanistan.
It the US wants stability in Libya it must bend every effort to assure that Gaddafi is removed, Libya not partitioned, and any ground commitment be short and focused. We cannot do this by playing support to a coalition headed by France and the UK. We can only obtain the goals we want by exercising the leadership role the world--including Cameron and Sarkozy--want.
Everyone has had a brief glimpse of a world political order without the US front and center. No one found it to be as happy a place as they may have imagined or wished.
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2 comments:
Your thoughts? http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/03/21/the-libyan-no-fly-zone-responsibility-to-protect-and-international-law/
Thank you for the link. The Geek had read it earlier and was favorably impressed in the main. The best point in the Geek's estimation, was that which questioned the Security Council's role. The Geek is of the view that the UN has overly expanded its presumed authority--as has been noted in several previous posts. There is grave doubt as to actions directed at the internal affairs of a state, even the most reprehensible fall under the UN writ as outlined in the Charter.
Western (and Arab) states have good reasons to intervene, both pragmatic and principled. It is the best interests of all that Kadhafi be removed as his continuation would be a threat to peace. Of course, a state may decide that his barbaric treatment of his citizens is sufficient reason for intervention. In either event the UN should not be involved. Rather, should a state want international sanction, the correct venue would be a regional entity such as the Arab League or African Union.
Both may be jokes now, but only by treating them as serious organs of collective security and mutual benefit can either be expected to rise to the challenge.
Frankly the Geek would be much happier if the Arab League had both the will and the means to impose a peace on Libya while removing Gaddafi. Unfortunately this is not the case, so some other country(ies) must do the job. In this context it is again proper to raise, as the Geek did in an earlier post, the question of the role of the OIC. It is also proper to ask what are the limits to the Muslim imperative of never saying or doing anything critical of another Muslim individual, group or state.
Once again, thank you for the thoughtful provision of the link.
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