Bring On The Clowns

The Libyan Affray has a magnetic appeal.  The confrontation between a dictator seemingly unmoored from the consensually agreed upon objective reality and a large, growing group of terminally fed up people has the elements of drama and tragedy which attracts interest and seemingly demands engagement by governments great and small.

One of the more intriguing, not to say potentially amusing, gambits of late has come from the Arab League.  The League, whose director, an Egyptian politician named Moussa, who is seeking the office of president in that country, has stated it is willing to enforce a no-fly zone in Libya.  The Arab League added it would do this in conjunction with the African Union.

The idea originated with Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi expat who was briefly "our man in Baghdad" before the Great Adventure in Regime Change.  He argued the League could do what the US and its allies did in Iraq after the Kuwait War.  The Arab League picked up on the idea as both the UN and NATO showed a profound lack of interest in ordering or enforcing a no-fly zone in Libya.

There is no doubt but some politicians including UK prime minister David Cameron have exhibited a zeal for imposing a no-fly zone which is not widely shared by the respective military forces and their chiefs.  Leading the opposition in public has been Robert Gates.

Dr Gates correctly points out that the imposition of a no-fly zone is both complex and resource intensive.  He is also correct when he warns that establishing a no-fly zone requires waging war, admittedly war of a severely limited sort.  The starting gun announcing the beginning of a no-fly zone is an attack upon the air defense system of the target country.  Missiles would be launched.  Bombs would be dropped.  Men would die down range.  That, bucko, is war no matter what name is put upon it.

He is being disingenuous when he emphasizes the size of Libya and implies that its geographic extent would render the imposition and maintenance of a no-fly zone more complex and resource demanding than the earlier efforts in Bosnia and Iraq.  The critical regions of Libya, the areas where fighting is occurring and where people live and air bases are located are found in a narrow band along the coast.  While there are bases deep in the desert wastes, these can be kept under surveillance by long endurance UAVs or satellites with manned platforms being deployed only as required.

There is one good reason why the US and Western European countries will not establish a no-fly zone.  In the current political climate there is a requirement for UN Security Council authorization.  No such authorization will occur.  Period.  China stated categorically that it would veto any resolution which included the establishment of a no-fly zone.  Russia did the same albeit in less blunt wording.  Both states have held a policy opposing any UN intervention in any matter which can be defined as "internal" for many, many years now and will not make an exception for Libya.

The Arab League and the African Union would not be restricted by the political considerations which make UN sanction so necessary for any Western nation to take action.  For reasons intrinsic to regional politics, either organization can go the no-fly zone route without UN permission.  As the Arab League has resolutely opposed any "foreign" intervention, the stage has been set politically for the League to go ahead with an intervention of its own, presumably including or starting with the imposition of a no-fly zone.

The question is can the members of the League pull it off with or without the aid of states from the African Union.  This is a fascinating matter.  As has been noted in many fora, the conduct of a no-fly zone is complex, resource intensive, and constitutes genuine war.

Neutralizing Libyan air defenses is not a trivial consideration.  The air defenses of Libya are predicated upon Soviet systems delivered and installed over a quarter century ago.  In the US strike back in 1986, the defense was able to shoot down an American aircraft.  Since then there have been upgrades and modifications.  There has also been a degree of system degradation.  Excluding the remaining Soviet and French fighters, the net capacities of the ground based missile and tube defenses would be rated minimal against US or other NATO assets.  The same cannot be said when considering attacks made by forces of either the League or the AU.

The probability of attacker losses is much higher when factoring the capabilities of equipment and personnel of League or Union forces.  This implies that the attacker must have additional assets for flack suppression and combat search and rescue.  It is worth noting that none of the League states have a dedicated combat SAR capability.  Also it is questionable if the League even with AU support has a large enough inventory of requisite aircraft to accept the virtual attrition imposed by the existence of a moderately competent air defense system.

It is worth mentioning that the US and other air forces which imposed the no-fly zones in Iraq and Kosovo had combat experience of recent vintage.  This experience was essential in translating the theory of training into the realities of the field.  In sharp contrast, no Arab League and no African Union member state's air force has combat experience in recent years.  Looking back, the experiences of some League members such as Syria and Egypt in operations against Israel are not such as to engender confidence.

Even giving the most generous assumptions, there is no reason to conclude that the combination of Arab League and African Union assets in fact could establish and maintain a no-fly zone.  Rather, it is probable that the initial losses would provoke escalation terminating in the introduction of ground combat forces.  Of course, such an introduction would require time, probably significant time given the difficulties of establishing a consensus and the complications introduced by the ongoing nature of internal political factionalization afflicting so many of the member states of both organizations.

Time passing would assure an increase in two aspects of the internal war in Libya.  The political will of the regime would be enhanced by the external threat.  The body count would grow as both sides sought a conclusion before outside forces arrived to complicate the situation.

The ground truth is simple.  The Arab League may be long on rhetoric but it is very short on the capability to back words with effective action.  The African Union is, fortunately, more economical with words.  This implies that there is little if any chance of a combined League-Union move on Libya.  This means that the League's threat is empty.

This means the League has to resort to the diplomatic option which originated with Hugo Chavez, who has been a long time associate of Brother Leader.  He has supported the Colonel without reservation since the start of the protests in Libya  He has strongly urged the Arab League to "mediate" the crisis.  And, the League's director has accepted the idea.  So has the incumbent regime.  The anti-government group has rejected the move.

There is nothing to "mediate."  The gap between the Gaddafi family enterprise and the insurrectionists is too vast and deep to bridge by any conceivable effort at mediation.  The years of repression and corruption and the alienation of the majority of the population from the current government admit of no compromise now that the battle has been joined.  Every rebel who is killed and every non-combatant who is caught in the crossfire serve to assure that nothing less than total victory will be acceptable to the insurgents.

What Sr Chavez, Director General Moussa, and Brother Leader do not understand is that the dead are dictating policy.  The corpses of those killed by the government forces along with those who died over the years at the hands of the Gaddifi security forces demand nothing less than a total restructuring of Libyan polity and society.  It is offensive insurgency of the most classic sort.

The Arab League, the African Union, the UN would be well advised to limit their involvement in Libya to the humanitarian aspects of the conflict.  The same applies to the EU and US.  Unless the Gaddafi forces resort to their stockpile of mustard agent which, while not in weaponized form, is not unusable, the West should restrain itself from any action beyond the humanitarian.  The Libyans started this affray for and from reasons which are organic to the country.  They will have to finish it.  Anything else will distort the process probably with consequences which will prove even more bloody and prolonged.

It is hard to write that.  The emotionally satisfying approach is that of a quick invasion by competent Western forces with the result that Brother Leader and company would be laid out by the heels rapidly and decisively. But, emotions don't count.  The reality is that the mess was made by Libyans.  It can only be cleaned and rectified by Libyans.  Only the Libyans can build a nation--if they want to.

This means that the professionals and clowns alike must restrain themselves.  They must do the hardest of hard jobs--standing by and limiting the human suffering to the greatest extent possible without seeking to impose a fast track solution on the situation.